Turkish Hizbullah on the Scene Again? . . .

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Five members of Turkish Hizbullah, two high-level members, were released this week when an amendment to Article 102 of the Turkish Code for Criminal Procedure went into effect. The amendment mandated the release of convicted criminals whose appeals had not been processed in a 10-year period, and is raising concern in some circles that the terrorist group, now re-united with old leaders, might take the opportunity to renew the violent terror campaign it waged in the southeast in the 1990s. From Hurriyet Daily News:

Some claim Hizbullah will "redefine itself" and enter a new era following the releases, but others say the possibility that the group returns to violence is now stronger than ever before, given that it has grown into a "mass movement of militants" through traffic on its websites and charity activities of some foundations that are accused of being front organizations for Hizbullah.

“The Turkish Hizbullah may even push to obtain seats in the forthcoming elections from independent candidates and may run in provinces such as Batman, Diyarbakır, Van and Mardin,” Faraç said.

While pro-Kurdish circles claim Hizbullah was a weapon against the Kurdish political movement, the wider public knew of the organization after mass graves that held dozens of hogtied bodies were discovered in the year 2000.

The public relived those days of horror when five Hizbullah members, two of which were allegedly leaders of the organization, were freed last week, as their cases, waiting to be discussed at the high court, did not come to a conclusion in 10 years' time.

Hizbullah came to prominence in the late 1980s in southeastern Turkey. Some experts say its aim is to destroy the secular order and spread “true Islam” throughout the country, by force if necessary. However, strong claims have surfaced that it was the state itself that established the organization to fight the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, through illegal means, such as summary executions.

Other experts dismiss such claims, but acknowledge that the Turkish state has long failed to appropriately investigate the group.

Indeed, many of those killed in the Southeast during the 1990s, usually with meat cleavers or a bullet in the neck, were known to be active pro-Kurdish politicians or journalists.

Many members of groups that preceded today's Peace and Democracy Party, or BDP, are believed to have been killed by Hizbullah, though hundreds of such murders still remain unsolved.

. . . .

The organization’s collapse began when Turkish security forces killed one of the group’s leaders, Hüseyin Velioğlu, during an operation in Istanbul in January 2000. Subsequent operations led to the discovery of dozens of mass graves containing the bodies of victims who had been kidnapped, tortured and buried alive.

Velioğlu’s death led the group to target Turkish security forces in 2001, a principal motivation behind government crackdowns on the organization in the following years.

The organization is also charged with the murders of 188 people, including Islamist feminist writer Konca Kuriş and Diyarbakır Police Chief Gaffar Okkan, who commanded huge respect in the city.

Turkish Hezbollah has incredibly murky past, and there is significant evidence that the group was used by deep state elements in the 1990s to counter the influence of the PKK. The PKK and Turkish Hezbollah were in a turf war for much of this period, and the result added to the mass human rights violations and internal displacement with which Turkey is still grappling. Another crime of the group that is not mentioned here is its role in driving many Syriac Orthodox Christians into Syria. Syriac Christians were popular targets of the groups' intense religiosity, many of whom sought refuge in Syria during the unrest and have not returned. For more background on Turkish Hezbollah, which is in no way related to Lebanese Hezbollah, see Gareth Jenkins's analysis from January 2008.


UPDATE I (1/10) -- During a press conference on the KCK trial, the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) announced it would welcome Turkish Hezbollah's participation, echoing a similar statement from Ocalan. At the same time, Ocalan warned that Hezbollah members will not be welcome in cities like Diyarbakir if they resort to their old ways. Meanwhile, PKK commander Murat Karayilan accused the Turkish state of attempting to revitalize the group in its fight against the PKK.

CHP Unveils Plan for the Southeast

CHP deputies are drawing up plans to establish a subcommittee to address economic underdevelopment in the southeast, principally the problem of unemployment. Along the same lines as AKP's recently stated commitment to GAP (see March 13 post), CHP's plans are also likely motivated by a desire to embarrass AKP by pointing out the association of some of its members to tariqah, Sufi Muslim brotherhoods that promote an Islamist agenda and have a long history of activity in the southeast. In today's Eurasia Daily Monitor, Gareth Jenkins offers an assessment of CHP's latest move and provides a short background history on the tariqah.

“Unemployment in the region has become the PKK’s primary instrument of propaganda,” commented CHP Deputy Ahmet Ersin. He claimed that other radical groups, including the Sufi religious brotherhoods known as tariqah and the Turkish Hizbullah, were also exploiting the often desperate socio-economic conditions in what has long been the most underdeveloped region of Turkey. “The local people are faced with pressure from unemployment, the tariqah, Hizbullah and the PKK. The state has to find a solution to unemployment, protect people’s lives and contribute to the development of the region,” he said (Vatan, April 11).

The CHP deputies’ call for the creation of a subcommittee, which they suggested should be named “Unemployment, Hizbullah, Tariqah and PKK Pressure in the Southeast,” is probably at least partly motivated by a desire to embarrass the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP); not only by underlining the failure of more than five years of AKP rule to solve the region’s problems but also by revealing the very close relations between some AKP deputies and the tariqah.

Nevertheless, although most domestic and international media attention has focused on the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish security forces, the call by the CHP deputies has also highlighted a struggle that may ultimately have more important repercussions for the future of southeast Turkey; namely, the battle for the hearts and minds of the local population, which is currently being waged by organizations, publications and charitable foundations associated with rival social networks.

In addition to being economically underdeveloped, southeast Turkey is also the most conservative region of the country. Traditionally, the main social networks in the region have been those based on clan or membership of one of the tariqah.

As well as confronting the Turkish state on the battlefield, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PKK has sought to consolidate its popular support by establishing or controlling political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the region. In the early 1990s this rivalry even led to a war between the PKK and the Ilim group, which the media usually refers to as Turkish Hizbullah and which was the most powerful violent Islamist organization in southeast Turkey.

The capture and imprisonment of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 resulted in the organization announcing a halt to its armed campaign. In January 2000 Hizbullah also abandoned violence after its founder, Huseyin Velioglu, was killed in a police raid. Both organizations continued, however, to propagandize and use NGOs and charitable foundations to broaden their bases of social support.

Unlike the PKK, which resumed its armed insurgency in June 2004, there is still no indication as to when or if Hizbullah will return to violence. In recent years, it has concentrated on building up a network of Islamic charities, Qur’an courses, bookstores, publications, websites, foundations and associations. The most prominent is İnsan Hakları ve Mustazaflarla Dayanışma Derneği (Association for Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed or Mustaza-Der). In April 2006 Hizbullah demonstrated its growing strength by organizing a rally in Diyarbakir, the largest city in southeast Turkey, which was attended by more than 80,000 people.

In recent years, other non-violent organizations have also stepped up their activities in southeast Turkey. In theory, the tariqah were outlawed in 1925 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the founder of the modern, secular Turkish Republic. In practice, the ban merely forced the tariqah underground. Since the 1950 the tariqah have gradually reemerged, although the continuing theoretical ban means that they tend to conduct their activities through NGOs and charitable foundations. Most of the members of the decision-making core of the AKP have, at some point in their careers, been associated with one or another of the tariqah. Although he no longer regularly attends meetings, for a long time Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was an active member of the Iskenderpasa Lodge of the Naqshbandiyah, the largest tariqah in Turkey. Particularly since the AKP took office in November 2002, the Naqshbandiyah has become increasingly active in southeast Turkey, not only organizing Qur’an courses and holding lodge meetings but also setting up soup kitchens and distributing food and fuel to poor families.