Kurdish Openings and Closings

Largely seen as a dove within the DTP, its leader Ahmet Turk was one of two parliamentarians to be banned from participating in politics for five years. PHOTO from Milliyet

The recent decision by Turkey's Constitutional Court to close the Democratic and Society Party (DTP), Turkey's primary Kurdish political party, will make the government's recent initiative to provide more rights and economic opportunities for the country's Kurdish minority all the more difficult. Not only this, but the decision will play directly into the hands of the terrorist Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), which will, of course, use the Court's finding as evidence that the Turkish state has little interest in having Kurds represented in Turkey's parliament or dealing with them on an equal basis. The DTP had 21 seats in Turkey's parliament, and performed quite well in municipal elections held on March 29. While not representing all of Turkey's Kurds, there is little question that the party is a powerful force and could have been a hugely potential ally for the AKP-led government's effort to "open" Turkish society to greater Kurdish political participation and rights protections.

The Court's decision was announced on Dec. 11, and effectively not only closed the DTP, but banned 37 of its members from participating in politics for five years. Most important of these 37 are parliamentatians Ahmet Turk, the party's leader, Aysel Tugluk, both largely considered moderates in their party. Interestingly, the Court's decision did not ban some DTP members who have adopted a harder line against the government's initiatives and have made less of an effort to make gestures toward peace and reconciliation. After the decision, the Court's head, Hasan Kiliç, said the DTP had become "a focal point of activities against the state's unity." As Amnesty International reports, Kiliç also said the DTP was at odds with the "independence of the state, its indivisible integrity within its territory and nation."

The indictment that initiated the case against the DTP was filed in November 2007 by the same prosecutor who filed against the AKP the following March. Legal scholars have criticized the evidence presented in both indictments as shaky and not meeting international standards. Turkey's Law on Political Parties easily allows parties to be closed, and thus closures have become commonplace in Turkey's political terrain.

However, since the adoption of Article 90 into the Turkish constitution in 2004, which stipulates that the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms trumps national law, legal scholars like Ergun Ozbudun have insisted that the Consitutional Court must follow European standards despite the fact that it has yet to amend its Law on Political Parties. Amendment of this law has has long been requested by the European Union (EU) and human rights groups, and the AKP pledged to make the legislation a priority after its own near closure experience last year. Amending the Law on Political Parties is essential to Turkey meeting the Copenhagen political criteria for EU acccession. Recently, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, the EU parliament's rapporteur charged with reporting Turkey's progress toward accession, pointed to Turkey's failure to change its party law during a discussion about the DTP closure case.

The Venice Criteria

Significantly, the Court's verdict followed its rapporteur's decision that the DTP had strong enough ties to the PKK to consider it deserving of closure under the Venice Commission's criteria for party closure. The Venice Commission, formally the European Commission for Democracy Through Law, is an advisory organ of the Council of Europe set up to legally advise European democracies of proper legal procedure. Under the Commission's Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogues Measures, it is legally appropriate to close "parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution." Whether the DTP had in fact done either is contested, the question of fact likely to eventually go before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). However, as a note, undermining the perceived unity of the Turkish state or calling for autonomy does not in itself meet the Venice Criteria and so the Constitutional Court's final judgement will make an interesting read. For DTP's part, its leaders have repeatedly denied having "organic ties" to the PKK, which the ECHR used in June to uphold the Spanish government's closure of Batasuna, a Basque party affiliated with ETA. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International agree that the Venice Criteria cannot be applied to the case of DTP. A broad swath of human rights groups in Turkey have also widely condemned the ruling, including the Human Rights Association (IHD). However, many of those who thought the DTP's closure might well be justified under the Venice Criteria were opposed to it since the politial impact will indeed be great. (For one example, see Ihsan Dagi's column from last year.)

Aftermath

After the closure case, protests broke out throughout the Kurdish southeast, as well as in Istanbul and Ankara. From Jurgen Gottschlich:

Thousands of angry demonstrators fought bloody street battles with the police and gendarmes. In Hakkari, Van and Diyarbakir Kurdish youths barricaded off whole districts and held prolonged skirmishes with the police.

On Saturday 12 December businesses in all Kurdish cities remained closed in protest against the ban. For some time there has been talk of a Kurdish intifada.

. . . .

The PKK has meanwhile declared that with the constitutional court's decision, dialogue can definitively be said to have failed. The PKK prisoners said that state, media, military, police and judiciary had shown their racist, colonialist faces.

The prisoners have announced a hunger strike and called on the population to show "resistance on the streets". With the attack on a military vehicle last week, for which the PKK claimed responsibility just a few hours before the constitutional court's judgement last Friday and in which seven soldiers were killed, the mood was already tense.

These protests succeeded a an earlier round sparked by reports on the prison conditions of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. The earlier round led to a 23-year-old university student shot in the back by police. The PKK is already using the closure case to mobilize more street protests, and it is likely PKK attacks will escalate as the group reorganizes and finds its bearings post-DTP. Indeed, political analyst Mehmet Ali Birand wrote before the closure case that many in the PKK were desperately hoping that DTP would be shut down since "the PKK is fed up with difference in opinion within the DTP and is looking for a new party and members that will strictly obey."

Pressed by Turkey's recent retrenchment with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and fears that the government's Kurdish initiative might actually turn out to be successful, the PKK is now likely to experience an increase in new recruits, and perhaps, greater sympathy with Kurdish leaders in the KRG who have previously denounced PKK violence and sworn to crack down on the terrorist organization.

The Closing of the Kurdish Opening?

With increased hostilities and the likelihood of more PKK attacks akin to the PKK shooting of 7 Turkish soldiers in Tokat earlier this month, the AKP is likely to find the political atmosphere for reform more difficult. While the AKP has stated its opposition to the closure case, calling it a regrettable development and having Interior Minister Besir Atalay meet with Turk, it has not taken a strong line nor does it plan to push for political parties reform any time in the near future -- both gestures that would strengthen its legitimacy with Kurds.

Prime Minister Erdogan has been particularly critical of the DTP since he announced his initiative in July. Erdogan's announcement followed Ocalan's declaration that he was drawing up a roadmap for peace to be released Aug. 15. Erdogan beat Ocalan to the process, and Ocalan's roadmap ended up not being released, falling instead into the hands of an Istanbul prosecutor. Erdogan's criticism of DTP was particularly virulent following DTP-planned celebrations surrounding the rather bizarrely planned surrender of 26 fighters entering Turkey from Northern Iraq as "peace messengers." The prime minister will no doubt find more difficulties following the removal of moderate figures like Turk. In June, speaking ahead of the announced initiative, Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertugrul Gunay declared Turk to be the most important person for peace in Turkey.

Kurdish Politics

As to the future of DTP, after announcing that the 19 remaining MPs would resign from parliament, the party has reversed its decision and plans to join the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), established shortly after the closure case was opened in November 2007. In order to form a parliamentary group, independent MP Ufak Uras will likely join the party to meet the threshold of 20 MPs required to do so. Ironically, more hardline Selahattin Demirtas and Emine Ayna are now among the contending figures to be elected as chairs of the new party.

DTP is the fourth Kurdish party to be closed in Turkey. For a basic accounting, see Ayse Karabat's reporting on party reorganization efforts after the March elections. For more understanding of developments and rivalries within the party, see past posts, especially Aug. 12, 2008 and July 22, 2008, as well as Ayse Karabat's reporting on an open conference DTP held this past July when both the government and Ocalan were talking about reforms, the peace process, and potential amnesty for PKK fighters. After it became clear that the AKP would not push amnesty for PKK fighters as part of the peace process, the DTP became particularly insistent on the point, as well as on Ocalan's release, and moderate voices in the party were drowned out.

In the past, figures like Turk had treaded a middle line, frequently denouncing violence as a legitimate strategy (as he did this past May following a mine blast that killed 6 Turkish soldiers) and praising government intiatives like the Ergenekon investigation and limited cultural rights reforms. In recent months, though, even Turk has become harder line. At Newroz festivities in March, he compared Ocalan to Nelson Mandela and stood by as more militant Leyla Zana -- who is not a member of DTP, but was among the 37 politicians banned by the court (she is actually serving a prison sentence at the moment) -- insisted disarmament be a final step in the peace process, some might argue thus tacitly legitimizing violence. He has also recently insisted that the Kurdish problem will not be solved until Ocalan is released. However, Turk's constituency must also be kept in mind, and him urging for Ocalan's release and saying it is necessary for peace in no way means he supports PKK violence.

Many politicians and intellectuals in Turkey have long argued that Turkey's peace process is contingent on negotiating with the PKK, following examples of negotiations with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland and, recently, the Spanish government's negotiations with ETA after the group declared a permanent ceasefire in 2006 (though ETA's ceasefire was broken nine months later and negotiations ended).

FYI -- For a nice briefing and short analysis of the AKP's recent initiative, see former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Mort Abramowitz and Kurdish expert Henri Barkey's recent article, "Turkey's Transformers," in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs.

DTP Calls for Investigation of JİTEM

Şırnak deputy Sevahir Bayındır is one of several DTP politicians to call for an investigation into JİTEM, a clandestine military intelligence unit alleged to have organized mass atrocities against Kurdish civilians.

The recent arrest of Ret. Brig. Gen. Levent Ersöz, who had escaped to Russia last July, has brought the operations of a clandestine military intelligence unit, long known as JİTEM, to the forefront of public attention. Ersöz is thought to have worked directly underneath Ret. Maj. Gen. Veli Küçük, and to have been the leader of the illegal and long-rumored JİTEM. JİTEM is responsible for mass atrocities committed against Kurds since the 1990s, including the forced disappearances of HADEP politicians Ebubekir Deniz and Serdar Danış in Silopi in 2001. Under Ersöz was Ret. Col. Abdülkerim Kırca, who recently committed suicide when former JİTEM subordinate Abdülkadir Aygan, who is exiled in Sweden, recounted his participation in the stealth organization to Taraf.

Until recently, Turkey had long been remiss to investigate crimes committed by JİTEM thugs and assassins, many of whom seemed to have worked as civil servants in the Gendarmerie. Turkey's failure to open an investigation into the disappearence of Deniz and Danış resulted in a finding against it by the European Court of Human Rights and an order to pay damages to the men's families. As a function of the Ergenekon investigation, which has now led to an investigation into a whole assortment of alleged deep-state activities, including JİTEM, it is possible than an investigation might just now be opened.

To mark the disappearances, thousands of Kurdish protestors in Silopi, a district town of the southeastern province of Şırnak, took to the streets to demand a thorough investigation. DTP district chair Halil İrmez and MP Hasip Kaplan requested searches be made of the state-owned wells of the Turkish Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ), a request which DTP MPs have taken to the Justice Ministry. There is suspicion that JİTEM buried the bodies of Deniz and Danış -- alongside other victims -- in BOTAŞ' acid wells. Earlier Ergenekon informant Tuncay Güney alleged this was a common method of summary execution used by JİTEM in the 1990s. According to TDZ, "Late in December, the Silopi Prosecutor’s Office authorized investigators to locate and open local oil wells. BOTAŞ’s management announced that it would provide any assistance necessary in opening up the wells. However, BOTAŞ has only a few oil wells in Silopi; most of the wells in the region belong to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), and these wells must also be examined." In response to the DTP MPs, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Şahin has expressed willingness to uncover the wells if more evidence comes to light.

The EDM's Emrullah Uslu elucidates the nexus between Ergenekon and the state/deep state's activities in the southeast:

. . . [T]he debate over Ergenekon has finally turned to the state’s policies toward the Kurds in the 1990s. Abdulkadir Aygan, a former member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and later a member of the clandestine gendarmerie intelligence unit known as JİTEM, confessed to the media that when retired Colonel Abdulkerim Kirca was the head of JITEM in Diyarbakir, the unit conducted dozens of executions (Star, January 19). Since then, Aygan has been living in Stockholm for fear of his life. The following day, Kirca committed suicide (Star, January 20). Chief of General Staff General Ilker Basbug, armed forces commanders, and a large number of military officers attended Kirca’s funeral in what was apparently a show of solidarity by the military for its members (Hurriyet, January 21). The Turkish Armed Forces issued a statement saying, “the media with its untrue stories judges people and drives them to tragedies. The authorities should act to stop this irresponsible media coverage” (www.tsk.mil.tr. January 21).

As was to be expected, the media continued giving attention to Aygan’s confession. Aygan claimed that JITEM had executed between 600 and 700 Kurds in the 1990s and that “JİTEM operations always ended in death.…those who were reported to JİTEM as having any relationship with the PKK were executed” (Taraf, January 27).

. . . .

With the possibility of establishing a relationship between Ergenekon and some of the unsolved murders and PKK operations in the Kurdish region, the Ergenekon prosecutors asked the court in Diyarbakir to send the files of the JITEM trial in which 11 accused JITEM members have been tried in the last 10 years without producing a conviction (Referans, January 28).

Moreover, the Ergenekon prosecutors have asked the court to send the files on Brigadier General Bahtiyar Aydin who was mysteriously assassinated in town of Lice in Diyarbakir Province in 1993 and the files of colonel Ridban Ozden, whose murder in Mardin Province in 1995 was blamed on the PKK, a theory that is rejected by many including Ozden’s wife (Sabah, January 28).

It still remains to be seen how Ergenekon prosecutors will connect the murders in the Kurdish region in the 1990s with the arrested Ergenekon suspects and the buried ammunition found after the last two waves of Ergenekon arrests in January.

The 10-year JİTEM trial of 11 suspects will be combined with the Ergenekon case. The case regards offenses committed in 1989.

Earlier this week, TDZ profiled Aygan, tracing his life from early involvement with the PKK through his career in JİTEM. In Sweden, Aygan enjoys political asylum.

DTP MPs calls are part of a larger effort within DTP premised on the hope that by taking advantage of the current opportunities for sunshine offered by the Ergenekon investigation, Turkey might actally succeed in routing out those in the state who perpetrated human rights violations, and who continue to take advantage of opportunities to cause ethnic strife within Turkey. For more on Ergenekon and Kurdish politics, see Aug. 12 post.

Last Thursday marked the eleventh wave of arrests in the Ergenekon investigation. Though not as dramatic as the tenth wave, more than 30 people were arrested, including Türk Metal Union leader Mustafa Özbek.

UPDATE 2/2 -- Bianet has published Taraf reporter Neşe Düzel's interview with Aygan from his home in Sweden. The interview ran in Taraf on Jan. 27.

Beyond Bananas: Hopes for the Kurdish Minority in 2009

PHOTO from the New York Times

President Gül received praise from those serious about resolving the Kurdish problem when he invited Hakarri DTP deputy Hamit Geylati to Çankaya Palace this November. With Geylati, Gül discussed the status of the Kurdish minority with the president, including cultural and political rights. What made the meeting so remarkable was its contrast to the politics of Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose staunchly nationalist remarks in Hakarri in late October helped ignite protests against the prime minister throughout the region. Sparked by reports from imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's attorney that the exiled head of the infamous separatist group is being mistreated, thousands of Kurds rallied against the prime minister's appearance, prompting stores to be shut down in protest and demonstrators to clash with police. The Prime Minister's failure to fully recognize and promote the cultural and political rights of Turkey's Kurdish minority has been a sore spot for Kurds for some time, and was quite palpable when I visited Diyarbakır last May.

The political differences between Gül and Erdoğan evince the incoherency of the government's policy toward the Kurds, especially at a time of considerable rapprochement, even cooperation, between AKP and the Turkish Armed Services. Like other contrasts between the policy positions the president and prime minister have taken, Gül is more willing to make fundamental reforms, escape from the vicious cycles of past politics, and move Turkey forward. Erdoğan, on the other hand, is playing a role more molded to the traditional statist/nationalist politician. Intellectuals like Mehmet Altan, Ece Temelkuran, Altan Tan, and Hasan Cemal, among scores of others, have expressed scorn at AKP policy as of late (see TDZ, Dec. 2; Yavuz Baydar, Dec. 1). Cemal, who writes for Milliyet, went so far as to compare Erdoğan's increasingly cozy relationship with the Turkish Armed Services (TSK) to Tansu Çiller, who served as prime minister as the state's war against the Kurds escalated in the early 1990s. Indeed, the prime minister's Kurdish policy is so bemoaned by Turkish liberals as to catch the attention of the not-so-long-ago enamored international press: both the New York Times and the Spiegel recently ran stories on the prime minister's disconcertingly nationalist proclivities.

AKP won re-election in 2007 with high hopes that the party would transform politics in the Kurdish southeast, thereby easing tensions between the Turkish state and the PKK terrorist group. The PKK assumed a dominant position in the 1980s following the reactionary-led military coup of 1980 that devastated its politics. Throughout the 1980s and the bitter war the organization fought with the Turkish state in the early 1990s, the PKK declared a right to self-determination for all Kurdish people to be secured by its winning full territorial and political independence from Turkey and forming its own state. Since then, the "Organization," as it is referred to by many Kurds, has expressed its willingness to negotiate a settlement with Turkey that provides the country's Kurdish minority with cultural and political rights to self-determination within the confines of the Turkish state. Since Öcalan's capture in 1999, the PKK is far from monolithic in its structure, ideology, and practical politics, and neither is the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi), often recognized as its political wing. One might think of the DTP's relation to the PKK as similar to that between the IRA and Sinn Feín in Northern Ireland or ETA and Harri Batasuna in the Basque country, although its association is probably even more obfuscate and control weaker. The PKK is largely a destructive force in Kurdish politics, preventing more moderate, compromising voices from rising to power, and conflict between hardliners in the Turkish state and those in the Kurdish minority has the effect of further empowering the hardliners while undermining compromise. This is true in terms of military relations between the PKK and the Turkish military just as it is between nationalist politicians in Ankara and the more radical politicians in the DTP. (For further discussion of this dynamic, see my post on the DTP party conference from last August, as well as my assessment of Kurdish politicians' reactions to the Ergenekon investigation.)

In Hakarri, Erdoğan declared that those who question the idea of "one nation, one flag, one state" should leave Turkey. This is exactly the kind of thinking that will empower hardliners in both the PKK and the DTP, and in an environment in which over 90 percent of Turks would rather live in Turkey than an independent Kurdistan, is likely to disenchant a significant number of Kurds before hopeful that their cultural and social rights might be accommodated within the Turkish state structure. Politicians as far back as the 1960s have recognized that the Kurdish problem affects all of Turkey, and that the only peaceful and just solution is an arrangement in which the Kurdish minority is assured cultural and political rights, and perhaps even given some measure of limited autonomy from Ankara. Just as there are similarities between Turkish and Kurdish citizens, there are also differences, and there is certainly room to negotiate smart, lasting solutions premised on multiple sites of sovereignty, identity, and participation, all secured by rights. Indeed, it is the denial of even the most basic political rights that pits Kurds against Turks (for example, see Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu on freedom of expression and the Kurdish issue), not to mention invasive practices of torture and police abuse that inflict severe psychological damage and ill will. And, while there are plenty of reformers -- Turks and Kurds alike -- who are determined to change the status quo, rhetoric like that from the prime minister in Hakarri is sure effrontery to the spirit of progress first engendered by the more conciliatory politics of AKP, especially when Gül exerted a leadership role within the party.

Disillusionment with AKP's commitment to cultural and political rights for Kurds was already greatly waning at this time last year following the PKK's renewed attacks in fall 2007. My description of the situation I wrote about last February for the most part holds true. Kurds continue to be prosecuted under restrictive speech codes as torture and detention of suspected PKK-members is on the increase. Further, AKP is less likely to offer its support to local efforts that promote Kurdish culture or education. Although the EU still has a very important role to play in implementing law that legalizes rights for Kurds to hold cultural gatherings and conduct Kurdish language education, AKP support for such undertakings remains half-hearted. Further, even though Turkey's recent efforts to make way for a 24-hour Kurdish broadcast channel are hugely laudable, 2008 brought with it more problems as well, including the recent conviction of Leyla Zana, an increase in "open air" torture and detention, and the continued prosecution of Kurds under draconian restrictions of freedom of expression. For the most recent examples, see the cases against journalist Veysi Sarısözen, who is alleged to have praised the PKK in his writings, and Kurdish politician Mahmut Alınak, who was recently sentenced to four months and five days in prison for organizing people to take part in civil disobedience. Harrassment of Kurdish politics is evidenced by the cases brought against Diyarbakir mayor Osman Baydemir and the city's DTP leader, Nejdet Atalay, for referring to members of the PKK as "guerillas" versus "terrorists." Violent protests during Newroz celebrations this March in Van and Hakarri further belie any claim that much progress has been made to stem state repression of Kurdish dissent and open the southeast up politically.

Instead of talking about political and cultural rights, Prime Minister Erdoğan is more keen to talk about economics. Turkish intellectual Ece Temelkuran has compared AKP policy in the southeast to giving out Islamist bananas, an attempt to perhaps bridge the development gap, but an approach that ultimately fails to address the demands of Kurds for the state to recognize their unique identity and standing in Turkish society. (For a similar argument, see Kerem Oktem, who assesses these Islamist bananas as tantamount to co-optation.) While some Turks far too often decry such a demand as separatism, other Turks and most Kurds see recognition as the foundation of basic human rights -- the right to address each other in their own language without state interference, to educate their children in the language of their grandmothers, to celebrate their culture in free assembly, and to enter politics as individuals with identities that might be both Kurdish and Turkish, and therefore, more difficult to negotiate than that of the average Turk. However, what Temelkuran identifies as "Islamist banana politics" and the politics that analyzes in his consideration of AKP policy, fall far short of meeting this demand. Nonetheless, AKP holds economic development and the creation of a state television channel as sufficient compromises, a secret battle plan to combat a war on terrorism that fails to extirpate the root of the problem. While AKP's realization of the need to develop the southeast is light years ahead of the thought asserted by other political parties, it still simply not enough, and as a result, likely to fail. Nonetheless, even when AKP's economic policies for the Kurdish southeast are highly dubious, they have often tacitly endorsed by some in the Western media (see the New York Times' treatment of GAP this March).



Kurdish Turks/Turkish Kurds?? protest in Ankara. PHOTO FROM REUTERS

Islamist banana politics gained further legitimacy this fall when the government and military began working more closely together. As indicated by the recent resignations of former AKP deputy chair Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat, an ethnic Kurd, banana politics are likely to become even more entrenched as the government further eschews cultural and political rights . As Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu elucidates, his replacement, Abdulkadir Aksu, also Kurdish, "has been widely viewed as a reflection of the AK Party's shift in policy from one that supports the greater engagement of Kurds in the political process to one that has further narrowed the room for maneuver for Kurds to express their political opinions." Further signalling this new era of cooperation and consensus on the Kurdish issue, the military top brass, typically quite reticent on political approaches to the Kurdish problem, has publicly agreed with the prime minister that the solution is economic. While this is undeniably in-part the case -- and, despite the TSK's discussion of non-military solutions being a positive step -- the danger is that too exclusive a focus on the economy is incapable of leading to a comprehensive political solution, thereby risking failed policy, and likely more violence as a function of resulting frustration. Not only are banana politics not fair to Kurds, but they are not pragmatic.

Insidious defenses of banana politics cite AKP's decisions as made in agreement with Kurdish public opinion (though the polls are dubitable, and show only the slightest of majorities placing economic over cultural/political concerns), in addition to an exaggerated disconnect between Kurdish intellectuals/political leaders and the overwhelming majority of Kurds, who are overwhelmingly very poor people. The myopia of the banana defenders is on full display in arguing the last point since any amelioration of the living conditions of Kurds will likely raise consciousness of cultural repression, not diminish it. For examples of banana defenses, see Abdulhamit Bilici and Mümtaz'er Türköne. In one defense, Türköne argues,

"For [DTP], the victory of the AK Party, especially in Diyarbakır, will be a
nightmare. If the AK Party wins in southeastern Anatolia, the Kurdish question
will enter a new phase. The PKK and the DTP will not remain the sole powers
designing pro-Kurdish politics. Pro-Kurdish politics will be ‘pluralized.’"

Plural societies value multiculturalism, and rarely does one see pluralism used as a verb; what Türköne means is more closely approximated by the term assimilation, and prosperous, multi-ethnic societies are just as, if not more, likely to resist assimilation and make self-determination claims (see Quebec, the Basque Country and Cataluña, Northern Ireland, Belgium, etc.).

Further undermining its credentials in the southeast, AKP has failed to take a strong stand against DTP's potential closure, leaving many Kurds, even those not necessarily fond of DTP, feeling betrayed. DTP is in the process of preparing itself for potential closure, including forming a backup party, though it is possible that the Constitutional Court will not reach a decision until after March's local elections (see Bianet, Dec. 18).

In an interview this Novemeber in the Spiegel, DTP co-chair Ahmet Türk, a moderate within the party who has denounced PKK violence, characterized the Turkish state's treatment of the Kurdish minority as cultural and social genocide. Although such claims are difficult to adjudicate, they do reveal just how oppressed many Kurds feel by a state that has historically been reluctant to even recognize the fact of a distinct Kurdish identity. It is important to remember that Turkey has gone leaps and bounds from where it was in the 1980s in its treatment of the Kurds (and, this is not to discount the work of leftist before the coup), but it has further to go still. (See Nicole Pope's column from yesterday wherein she recounts remembering a time when "Kurd" was not kosher in policy discussions).

And, while Erdoğan's remarks in Hakarri give cause for concern, President Gül's actions give reason to be hopeful. There are indeed other reasons for hope. In the course of ongoing preparations for local elections, political parties are undertaking intense efforts to win Kurdish votes in the southeast. AKP's recent release of TRT-6 -- and Erdoğan's interview introducing the channel, in which he wishes for its success in Kurdish -- is just one example of the progressive reform that might come about if such competition for Kurdish votes continues. AKP and CHP both have welcomed the recent opening of departments of Kurdish literature at Dicle and İstanbul University, a bill introduced in November by DTP deputy Siirt Osman Özçelik. For its part, CHP has also attempted to court Kurdish voters, though the party, as AKP-leaning Today's Zaman concludes, is less likely to win large percentages. Even so, that the party is making a serious effort despite knowing it is unlikely to have much success is even more indicative of the importance of the Kurds' burgeoning vote in the country.

Also, as the Christian Science Monitor's Yigal Schleifer reports, worthy of note is that the competition for votes is also affecting DTP's politics. In the course of campaigning, DTP has boosted efforts to appeal to religious Kurds and shed its Marxist secular image. DTP's transformation is just as groundbreaking as that of CHP or AKP, if not more so, as a vote-savvy, politically conscious DTP courting religious Kurds is less likely to be beholden to the PKK, and from a stronger position of power, more capable of participating in a political solution to end PKK violence. As Schleifer notes, Kurds are among the most religious of Turkish citizens, and as DTP moves to win Kurdish AKP-voters, AKP will feel even more pressure to win religious Kurds who also demand cultural and political rights. According to Taraf, DTP deputy Hasip Kaplan has already proposed a law allowing that the Kurdish letters Q, W, and X in government correspondence, and attention is focused on the continued prohibition of the use of Kurdish by public officials, including parliamentarians.

Kurdish Broadcasting and TRT-6: Time Will Tell

PHOTO BY Yigal Schleifer

From Yigal Schleifer at his blog, Istanbul Calling:

In what could be a very significant move, Turkey's state broadcaster (TRT) is set to launch a Kurdish-language channel in the beginning of 2009. Full details about the channel, called TRT 6, are still sketchy, but it promises to provide much more than the pitiful current level of public broadcasting in Kurdish, limited to a few hours a week and hardly watched.

Dedicating a channel to Kurdish programming is an important recognition of a language that's the mother tongue of millions of Turks. But TRT 6's real aim, it appears, is to undercut the appeal of Roj TV, a Kurdish satellite network broadcasting out of Europe, that is extremely popular among Turkey's Kurds. Ankara has accused Roj of being a mouthpiece for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and of spreading anti-Turkish propaganda. But the channel, which shows a mix of news, music videos and other programs, has been able to become as popular as it is because there has been no other alternative out there.

Taking on Roj might be a tough job, though. The network's appeal, besides that it broadcasts in Kurdish, is based on its independence and the fact that it shows things no Turkish channel would dare do, such as footage from the PKK's camps in Northern Iraq or performances by Kurdish musicians who are banned in Turkey because of their political views. The channel also acts as a kind of Kurdish grapevine. I was in the predominantly-Kurdish southeast of Turkey a few years ago working on a piece about Roj TV and met with a family whose son was a PKK guerilla who had recently been killed in a clash with Turkish forces. When I asked them how they found out about their son's death, both parents told me that it was through Roj. I heard similar stories from other people.

If TRT 6 puts on some innovative programming, or at least programs that aren't produced with a very heavy state hand, then it and Roj TV might be in for an interesting ratings battle. We'll be watching.

As expected, the response to TRT-6 is mixed among both Turkish and Kurdish officials. TDZ quotes former Diyarbakır Bar Association President Sezgin Tanrıkulu: "This is an important and serious step. This shows that the state has moved on from the stage of denying the existence of Kurds to acknowledging Kurds. We can discuss the content of the channel, but regardless of all of that, it is important that a public broadcaster is allocating one channel for this." Meanwhile, Kurdish hardliners like party co-chair Emine Ayna and prominent DTP deputy Selhattin Demirtaş dismiss the channel as mere AKP politicking. One common attitude is reflected by Batman mayor and DTP party member Nejdet Atalay: “For years, Kurdish was recorded in police records as an ‘unidentified language.’ They used to tell us that Kurds do not exist. Now they are going to tell us that there is no such thing as Kurds in Kurdish.” DTP rhetoric is driven in part by upcoming local elections for which AKP and DTP are vying for votes, but should not be dismissed as mere campaigning. A more cogent call for skepticism was made by former DTP deputy Mahmut Alınak. From Bianet:

Reminding that he was punished for playing Kurdish music during an election period by the Kars Criminal Court of First Instance with three more people, Alınak said, “The state made this move because it could no more go on with the century long ban. Since it could not silence technology the Kurdish TV channels that already exits, it will try to reduce their influence.“The state made this move because it could no more go on with the century long ban. Since it could not silence technology the Kurdish TV channels that already exits, it will try to reduce their influence."

In Ankara, political parties are similarly divided. Predictably, CHP leadership is discontented while AKP and government officials hail the channel as a major step forward in the state's relationship with its Kurdish minority -- roughly 20 percent of its population.

After the 1980 coup, Kurdish language was largely prohibited in public places. Although there still exist numerous restrictions on Kurdish cultural life, a 24-hour Kurdish broadcast channel is a welcome development, especially if the channel is well-implemented and proves itself more than an election ploy. However, the channel has no firm legal basis, and appears more than a bit of a contradiction when restrictions are still in place that prevent the use of Kurdish letters in public documents. Pressing the government for further reform, DTP deputy Hasip Kaplan has proposed a law to include letters x, w, q in the alphabet and the removal of all the obstacles before the Kurdish language. And, to remove any question about the legality of using Kurdish in public -- which, given TRT-6, is indeed bizarre -- Gültan Kışanak, DTP’s Diyarbakır deputy, prepared a bill that will enable the Kurdish language to be used in the public space (see Bianet, Jan. 2).

An optimistic outlook of TRT-6 is made in a TDZ op/ed by Mutlu Çiviroğlu:

TRT's Kurdish broadcasts actually started in 2004, after the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) approved legislative amendments that allowed TRT and private channels to broadcast in local languages and dialects. Following these amendments, on June 7, 2004, TRT 3 started broadcasting in both the Kurmanji and Zazaki Kurdish dialects, as well as in Arabic, Circassian and Bosnian, each for 30 minutes a day. Due to legal obligations, all broadcasts had to have Turkish subtitles and the content and timing of the programs did not attract many viewers.

However, with the recent initiative of the Kurdish TV station, TRT officials seem to have taken a different view. In an interview with the Zaman daily, TRT General Director İbrahim Şahin said they would primarily use Kurmanji, which is spoken by 90 percent of the people in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish regions, and that they would later include the Zazaki and Sorani dialects, as well. "Our intention is not to scare anybody. We sincerely want to meet the need for a TV channel for people who couldn't learn Turkish. This channel will be a family channel, like TRT 1, that will have series, entertainment programs and news programs. It will have everything that a family channel offers. As long as our national unity, integrity, anthem and flag are not disrespected, we will produce the same programs for the Kurdish channel that we do on other TRT channels. In the Constitution, Article 2954 clearly indicates our principles and mission and, on the condition of remaining within these boundaries, our colleagues will be able to freely say and produce whatever they want," Şahin explained.

In fact, Dec. 25, 2008, represented a remarkable day for the democratization of Turkey and the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks because the opening of the Kurdish TV station has a historical significance and meaning for Turkey. It's the common hope and desire of many people that this channel will be a democratic and objective project that will respect the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish people. It is also hoped that TRT 6 will act as a bridge for sharing the language, literature, culture and traditions of Kurds and strengthening mutual love and respect between Kurds and Turks. Instead of making premature judgments and labeling the channel as a mouthpiece of the government, perhaps it would be wiser to give it some time and contribute to it in different ways.

Just how those cultural and linguistic rights will be negotiated with Article 2954 and other Turkish law will, of course, be the real kicker. As Schleifer writes, we will be watching. For a great piece on Roj-TV, see Schleifer from 2006. For a coverage from the Economist, click here.

Zana Sentenced to 10-Year Prison Term

From TDZ:

A Turkish court on Thursday sentenced pro-Kurdish politician Leyla Zana to 10 years in prison for “committing crimes on behalf of a terror group,” court officials said. She is expected to appeal the decision at the Supreme Court of Appeals.

The Diyarbakır 5th Higher Criminal Court also revoked Zana’s right to vote and run for political office as well as other political rights. Zana was a potential candidate for a mayoral nomination from the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the upcoming local elections in March.

Zana and her lawyer, Fethi Gümüş, did not appear in court at yesterday’s session.

Zana was facing charges of “spreading propaganda for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK]” and for “committing a crime on behalf of the organization,” but she was convicted of “membership in a terrorist organization” under Article 314 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). The court said it believed Zana’s actions went beyond spreading propaganda or committing crimes on the PKK’s behalf. The court reiterated its earlier opinion that “the defendant, in her statements to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, has expressed that she does not see the PKK as a terrorist organization and that she sees the leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, as the ‘leader of the Kurdish people,’ thus, indirectly accepting the charges.”

Zana gained prominence in 1991 for taking part of her oath of office in Parliament in Kurdish, a language not recognized as an official language in Turkey. She was convicted in 1994 by the State Security Court (DGM) of links to the PKK, which is considered a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

In 2004, she was released after the appeals court overturned her conviction and that of three other Kurdish former lawmakers. PKK is u terrorist organization and responsible for the deaths of 40,000 people in Turkey.