The Powers That Be

PHOTO from Radikal
 
Thousands of protestors organized this Saturday to mark the one-year anniversary of the detention of journalists Nedim Sener and Ahmet Şık. Both men have been in prison since March of last year on what appear to be trumped up terrorism charges (see past post), and are by no means alone. They are joined by more than 100 other journalists who are imprisoned on a variety of charges ranging from membership in a terrorist organization to spreading propaganda on behalf one. The overwhelming majority of these cases are against Kurdish nationalist journalists or journalists whom prosecutors have attempted to link to Ergenekon, the shadowy deep-state network thought to be continually plotting to overthrow the government.

Rather than repeat what I have written in past posts on the issue (click here), I would simply like to draw attention to a recent statement released by Reporters Without Borders calling for Turkey to live true to its internationally articulated position that freedom of expression is paramount in a democratic society. These remarks came in response to the recent effort in France to make it illegal to deny the 1915 crimes committed against Armenians as genocide.

In response to both the French National Assembly and Senate's passing of the law, Turkish diplomats joined press freedom advocates and liberals throughout Europe and the world to denounce the law as an unjust and dangerous restriction on the freedom of expression. For the most part taking the moral high ground, French liberals and Turkish diplomats won a major victory last week when the French Constitutional Council ruled that the law violated French constitutional provisions protecting freedom of expression. From RSF:

“We are pleased that freedom of expression has not been sacrificed to a cause, no matter how just the cause may be,” Reporters Without Borders said. “The dangerous breach opened by this law has been closed for the time being but it has already damaged the credibility of the democratic values defended by France and those who defend human rights and the Armenian cause in Turkey.

“We urge France’s politicians to renounce any intention of drafting an amended version of this law. Any thought of using legislation to establish an official history of past events should be ruled out for good after this precedent.

“The Turkish authorities must now face their responsibilities. In the name of free speech, they have for weeks been condemning the French parliament’s meddling in history. Now they must prove that their comments were not just tailored to the circumstances by allowing Turkish citizens to mention the Armenian genocide without fear of being prosecuted.

“Consistency requires that, at the very least, they immediately decriminalize two offences, insulting the Turkish nation (article 301 of the criminal code) and insulting the memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Law 5816 of 25 July1951).

“This decision does not exempt Turkey from finally confronting its own history; quite the contrary. Now that Ankara no longer has the excuse of ‘foreign meddling,’ it must remove the straightjacket of official history from the Turkish republic, open a debate about the fate of Turkey’s minorities and end the growing criminalization of journalistic activities.”

Yet the aforementioned restrictions remain, in addition to a host of other offenses that--vaguely interpreted--can be wielded against journalists, including, inter alia, accusing journalists of influencing judicial processes, discouraging citizens from military service, and inciting hated among the citizenry.

While these laws still exist on the books, most concerning, of course, is the use of anti-terrorism laws against journalists, a practice that has picked up under the helm of Ergenekon and KCK prosecutors and within the past three years. Using anti-terrorism laws against journalists is common practice in authoritarian countries ranging from Ethiopia to Venezuela, but it is Turkey who now rivals Iran and China in having the highest number of jailed journalists in any country in the world.

For the past report by the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission Thomas Hammarberg (April 2011), click here. Since the reporting dates, both the KCK and Ergenekon investigations have continued, raising the number of jailed journalists even higher. In December, at least 29 journalists were detained in a wave of operations against the KCK. Prosecutors accused the journalists of relaying PKK messages to Kurdish nationalist protestors. Numerous other arrests, sometimes on a mass scale, took place throughout 2011.

For a detailed accounting, see Bianet's recently released 2011 Media Monitoring Report, released just last week. I am adding a link to it in the "Key Documents" column on the right-hand sidebar. Bianet reports there are over 104 journalists in prison, up from 30 at the end of 2010.

According to AKP officials, this number is inflated since these people merely happen to work as journalists. They are not in prison for their writing or for being journalists, but because they are members of terrorist organizations who happen to be journalists. Attempts to portray the issue in terms of press freedom are therefore insincere, and according to some, part of an international smear campaign devised by -- guess who? -- terrorist aligned with the ultra-nationalist deep state.


[For those based in Washington, the Center for International Media Assistance, an initiative of the National Endowment for Democracy, will be holding an event on press freedom in Turkey on Tuesday, March 13, at 2 p.m. The event is entitled, "The Big Chill: Press Freedom in Turkey," and you can RSVP here.]

For Hrant, For Justice, For Turkey

PHOTO from Birgün

Perhaps no issue is more revealing of the struggle for liberal democracy in Turkey than the assassination of Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and the trial of members of a likely state-linked organization that gunned him down on Jan. 19, 2007.

Almost five years to the date of what was a very calculated murder, the Istanbul court hearing the case of 19 defendants accused of participating in the conspiracy to slay Dink ruled on Jan. 17 that there was indeed no organization, no conspiracy. Instead, the court portrayed the assassination as a random act of violence carried out by two ultra-nationalist youths acting alone. The court did not even touch the issue of links between state officials and the organization that have been revealed in the five years following the assassination. For more on the verdict from Reporters Without Borders, click here.

Not a Random Act of Violence

Dink presaged his murder, telling friends before his murder "that his heart was a 'timid pigeon' waiting for bad things to happen (see June 26, 2008 post). Dink had begun receiving threats from ultra-nationalists in 2004 following an article he wrote for the Turkish Armenian paper Agos, over which he presided as editor. In the article, Dink claimed that Sabiha Gokcen, Ataturk's much beloved adopted daughter, was an Armenian orphan. The article earned him the scorn of then Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit, who denounced the article as a crime against national unity.

Before 2006, Dink had been subject to numerous court cases because of his questioning of an ethno-national conception of Turkish identity and his writing on the 1915 massacre of tens of thousands of Armenians. Throughout his work, Dink tried to bridge divides between Turks, Armenians, and Turkish Armenians, challenging both Turkish and Armenian identity, polarizing approaches to the genocide issue, and the general recalcitrance of the two sides. He did this as only a Turkish Armenian could, and his thinking challenged fellow Turkish citizens and ethnic Armenians alike. Most of all, Dink represented the expression of difference -- not just being different, but expressing it, and doing so always as an individual guided by free thought and its commensurate dignities. His writing, and that he attracted so many fans, Turkish and Armenians, is a testament to where Turkey has come since its founding and the longing for liberalism shared by so many of its citizens.

Yet not all were so content with Dink's ideas, his constant challenging of Turkish state and society. In 2004, Dink began receiving numerous death threats. The gravity of their danger to Dink's life prompted the deputy director of security in Istanbul to order police in Bakirkoy, where he lived, and Sisli, where he worked at Agos, to make provide for his protection.

In February 2006, intelligence of the murder conspiracy to which he would soon fall victim made their way from police in Trabzon to Istanbul. The memo from security officials in Trabzon stated, and quite simply, that Yasin Hayal, a known ultra-nationalist in the Black Sea province, was going to kill Dink. Less than one year later, Hayal, acting alongside 17-year-old gunman Ogun Samast, gunned down Dink outside Agos's offices.

Yet it seems the memo, ranked "low priority" by Trabzon police chief Ramazan Akyurek, was not paid much attention, if any, by Istanbul police, and little action was taken by either authority nor the gendarme in Trabzon, who were also watching the conspirators, to halt the assassination. Akyurek has since been promoted to head the Board of Inspectors in the General Directorate for Security. Dink knew his death was coming, and so did members of the Istanbul and Trabzon police, as well as the Trabzon gendarme. Meanwhile, Nedim Sener, one of the journalists who took the Dink investigation seriously and documented what the police knew before the murder, has been jailed on charges of being linked to the Ergenekon terrorist organization.

To offer further damning evidence of the neglect -- and quite possibly, involvement -- of elements within the Turkish security forces, one of Dink's assassins, young trigger-man Ogun Samast, posed with police officers in Samsun behind a Turkish flag just two days after the murder. While government officials have complimented themselves on apprehending Samast and other conspirators soon after the murder, adequate explanations for this photograph and the events before the murder have yet to come to the forefront, and according to many of Dink's supporters, have indeed been subject to a massive cover-up in which the state is complicit.

Where Does the Government Fit In?

Indeed, the more than four-year trial of Dink's conspirators has been hindered from the beginning due to an inability, and perhaps unwillingness, to procure evidence from state security offices, as well as government agencies such as the Telecommunications Board (TIB), which only last December turned over evidence documenting phone conversations and text message exchanges between the conspirators. TIB, citing a 2007 provision by the Justice Ministry related to the use of phone records in criminal investigations, had refused to turn over evidence for more than four years following the murder. Video footage of the street on which Dink was shot was erased from cameras soon after the incident, another fact that has led to accusations against the police ranging from neglect to complicity.

As Hurriyet columnist Sedat Ergin points out, efforts, or lack thereof, to hold state officials to account for their role in the murder have given way to serious misgivings on the part of the Turkish public. In 2008, and administrative court acquitted police of neglect while failing to really delve into the events in the days and months before the murder, and in 2009, another effort to investigate the role of security officials was blocked by the Interior Ministry, which at the time and just as today, was controlled by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The gendarme is the only state organ wherein an official has been found responsible for neglecting to prevent Dink's murder.

Though AKP government officials are always careful to point to the independence and integrity of judicial processes, the fact that the government now has firmer control of the judiciary has caused many critics, both of the government and the investigation into Dink's murder, to point their finger at the government. When the Dink investigation started in 2007, the government did not have the control over judicial organs, such as the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), that it currently wields. (Click here for a bit of insight as to how the AKP has gained more control through amending the constitution to give its elected representatives the ability to appoint members to this body and Turkey's high courts. See also this past post.) The HSYK is currently investigating the presiding judge in the case, Rustem Eryilmaz, as well as prosecutor Hikmet Usta, though on grounds that the two inappropriately spoke out publicly after the verdict rather than that they mishandled the case.

More cogent criticism centers on the government's relation to the police. As Milliyet columnist Metin Munir indicates (luckily, Hurriyet Daily News has translated this column into English, and so it can be read here), the real blame should be placed on the government's failure to prevent the police from hindering the investigation. According to Munir,

Nobody is blaming the government for not interfering with the judiciary; its guilt is in not intervening with the police, with the intelligence organization and in not demonstrating the necessary attention to bring out the truth. In Turkey, judges and prosecutors are not as strong and independent as, for example, in the United States, the United Kingdom or Italy.

While in the West the prosecutor commands the police, in Turkey the police command the prosecutor. This is the truth in practical terms, especially in politically sensitive cases.

The judges are also bound to prosecute whatever is in the indictments presented to them. The government does not command the courts and prosecutors. But it does command the security forces. For this reason, it has its share of responsibility in the verdict the court has ruled. It could have put pressure on the police to provide that a more comprehensive and a stronger file be handed over to the prosecutor. It did not.

The government is still boasting about catching the murderer in 32 hours. This is not a matter to be proud of; it a matter to be ashamed of. Who was going to kill Dink and when it was going to happen were known by security forces days before the murder. If the incident was stopped at that time and the murder was prevented, then yes, it could have been a matter of which to boast. But it is not hugely ingenious to identify the assassin and then catch the killer.

This is what the government has to explain: Why isn’t the entire organization, the one for which the killer acted as a hit man, foiled and punished even if it is five years that have passed since the murder? What is the reason for the systematic reluctance on this matter?

Mustafa Akyol, generally more sympathetic of the AKP, explains that this reluctance might be driven by the fact that many of the bureaucrats and police who neglected to properly investigate Dink's murder (and, my words, not his, but perhaps even cover up critical aspects of the killing) are now aligned with the AKP and have been appointed to key positions within the government. These include not only Akyurek, but also former Istanbul police chief Celalettin Cerrah, headed the Istanbul police at the time of Dink's murder. The government has never allowed Cerrah to be questioned in relation to the case, and in 2009, he was appointed a provincial governorship in Osmaniye. Similarly, the failure of the AKP to put pressure on TIB and the obstructive role of the Interior Ministry throughout the investigation give great cause for concern.

A Chance for Redemption?

Soon after the verdict, Dink family lawyer Fethiye Cetin declared that the effort to unveil the truth behind Dink's murder had only just begun, and it is quite possible this is the case. An indignant Cetin has already appealed to the Supreme Court, which will likely render a decision in one year's time. Hikmet Usta, the Istanbul prosecutor charged with the case, has also made an appeal, joining Cetin in denouncing the court's inability to find evidence that the crime was the premeditated work of a criminal organization as a complete oversight of the facts presented.

Everyone is a Turkish Citizen

PHOTO from Taraf

The CHP has declared its support to amend the constitution in favor of a non-ethnic understanding of Turkish citizenship. Under the country's current constitution (drafted under military tutelage) all citizens of Turkey are members of the Turkish nation (click here, in Turkish). Further, according to Article 66, every Turkish citizen is considered to be a Turk. This is the first time that any major Turkish political party in the entire history of the Turkish republic has offered such a non-ethnic understanding of citizenship.

The change is proposed as part of a wide series of concrete constitutional reforms the CHP has endeavored to put forward. The proposed reforms were drafted by CHP vice-president Suheyl Batum with a team of 35 academics. Though some have speculated that the CHP is too diverse a coalition to generate concrete proposals (Batum himself hales from the center-right), the constitutional proposals are more solid in substantive than the rhetoric coming out of the AKP.

The CHP has also expressed its support for education in mother tongue, which requires amending Article 42, which stipulates that no Turkish citizen can receive education in any mother tongue language other than Turkish. Article 42 specifically targets languages native to Anatolia, such as Kurdish, while allowing for education in English, French, and other foreign languages.

Kilicdaroglu addressing a campaign rally in Hakkari. PHOTO from Milliyet


Meanwhile, for the first time in nine years, the CHP held an election rally in Diyarbakir a day ahead of the rally AKP is expecting to hold tomorrow. Though turnout was somewhat disappointing for the party (only ~2,000 people showed up), it is clear the CHP is performing a series of firsts that could find itself winning voters in the southeast and currying favor with liberal reformers who have since become disenchanted by the AKP.

For an accounting and history, as well as some more context, of the proposals the CHP is putting forward on the Kurdish issue, see this post from a few weeks ago.

Prime Minister Erdogan will hold a rally in Diyarbakir today.

Torn Between Worlds

Hranuysh Hagopyan, Armenia’s diaspora minister, walks with acting Patriarch Aram Atesyan after an award ceremony in Istanbul on Sunday.  PHOTO by Hasan Altinisik / Hurriyet Daily News

A group of Turkish Armenians were recently honored in Istanbul in a ceremony involving Archbishop Aram Atesyan, and significantly, Armenia's minister responsible for dealing with the Armenian diaspora, Hranuysh Hagopyan. Many Turkish Armenian intellectuals, newspaper, and some of the honorees questioned whether the presence of the diaspora minister was desirable. From Hurriyet Daily News:

“I would prefer not to have a diaspora minister in Turkey,” author Mıgırdıç Margosyan told the Hürriyet Daily News before receiving his gold medal from Armenian minister Hranuysh Hagopyan.

“I’ve been living on the land that [we have] been living on for thousands of years. I am not in the diaspora. This is a terrible irony,” Margosyan said. The writer also directed his criticism toward the Turkish government, saying the lack of a Turkish state official at the ceremony was disappointing.

. . . .

After attending the Global Summit of Women in Istanbul, Hagopyan handed out medals to 15 Turkish Armenians, including Margosyan, composers Garo Mafyan and Cenk Taşkan and Alis Manukyan, the first Armenian female vocalist in Turkey’s State Opera and Ballet.

“We are living in the lands where we have to live. And we continue to pay our debt to these lands,” Mafyan, who is arguably the best-known popular music composer, told the Daily News. He added that he is ready to do everything he can to make sure dialogue continues between Turkey and Armenia.

“It is [still] very important to receive an award from Armenia for contributing to Turkish popular music,” he said.

Turks of Armenian descent or Turkish Armenians or Armenian Turks or however one would group them are a population of at least 60 million people. Most belong to the Armenian Orthodox Church, which has a Turkish Patriarchate in Istanbul apart from Yerevan. Some Turkish Armenians are Catholics, and there are yet others of Armenian descent that do not enjoy minority status under Turkish law and whose numbers are not counted in official government numbers. This "hidden" Armenian minority, consists of people, sometimes referred to as crypto-Armenians, who converted to Islam in the latter half of the nineteenth-century and early part of the twentieth-century when Armenians began to face sharp discrimination, and eventually, Ottoman state-engineered ethnic cleansing.

Under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Armenians, along with Greek Orthodox Christians and Jews, enjoy "minority status" based on religion. The status granted these minorities rights certain rights vis-a-vis the new republican Turkish state, and essentially granted two separate legal regimes: one for ordinary Turkish citizens, and another for the minorities granted status under the Treaty of Lausanne. (Syriac Christians, Alevis, Caferis, as well as ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, were denied such rights.)

However, some Armenians, Greeks, and Jews complain of being treated as second-class citizens. These minorities are still sometimes accused of collaborating with foreign enemies, and even in the context of receiving EU accession monies designed to protect and promote minority rights, face criticism from some nationalist circles for seeking to undermine the Turkish state.Armenians, in particular, have long faced suspicion of being linked to Armenian terrorist groups and secretly desiring the dissolution of the Turkish state, which many Turks are taught has two main enemies: the external enemies of imperial Europe, and the internal enemies, i.e. minorities who see the disintegration of the country. To make matters worse, Turkish Armenians often get caught in the middle of Turkey's politics with Armenia and other countries, such as when Prime Minister Erdogan responded to a genocide resolution in Sweden by threatening to expel Armenian immigrants in radio interview last March. (This is not to say that the poor Armenian immigrants were not more caught.)

At the same time, Armenians also face criticism from Armenians in Armenia, as well as from the sizable Armenian diaspora. As a result, Turkish Armenians are torn between Turkish citizenship, their relation to the diaspora, of which they are not a part since, unlike even the vast majority of Armenians living in Armenia, they did not immigrate. The vast majority of Turkey's Armenian population are the descendents of Armenians who migrated to cosmopolitan Istanbul following the hard times of the 1890s and onward under the Ottoman Empire (and before 1915), and so escaped the massacres at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the mass dislocation into Syria, the Soviet Union, and scores of other countries that followed.

Vahe Sarukhanyan, writing for Heqt Online, has an interesting piece up discussing Istanbul Armenians as the "Diaspora's Outsiders." An excerpt:

Sociologist [Arus] Yumul says that for the worldwide Armenian diaspora, the Istanbul-Armenian community is akin to a "lost lamb", an "outsider". She says that other Armenians have taken them to task for being non-active in Armenian affairs and for cow-towing to the government in Ankara. Yumul says she agrees with these assessments when it comes to the Ottoman period, but that after Turkish independence Armenians not only didn’t get involved in Armenian politics but also Turkish affairs. It was kind of a survival strategy she noted.

Yumul added that the community is slowly integrating into the larger Turkish society and that mixed marriages are paving the way.

"At one time Armenian parents resisted but this too has faded. The next generation will be more like a hybrid, free to chose whether they are Armenian, Turk..."

She was quick to add that this doesn’t mean that Armenians will disappear in Turkey.

However, the use of Armenian as a daily language of communication is also on the decline; the number of Armenians who can’t speak the mother tongue is growing. Parents send their kids to Armenian elementary schools but afterwards many go to private or foreign high schools so that they won’t have problems with the Turkish language in college.

The 1990s were a turning point for the community in many ways. Armenians, like the other minority communities, began to voice their concerns, speak about the discrimination they faced, and even raise the taboo subject of the 1915 Armenian Genocide

Twenty years ago, all this was unthinkable. What the next twenty will bring for the community remains a big question mark.

More evidence that Lausanne is outdated, and that its continued legal character is becoming more and more anachronistic as Turkey opens up . . .

On another note, Kadir Has University has announced plans to start teaching courses in Armenian. The classes are offered in the context of improving regional relations with Armenia.

For more on the Treaty of Lausanne's lasting impact in Turkish politics, see my post from 2008, "Article 301: An Anti-Imperialist Discourse." For the treaty's misused application in relation to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, see this past post. For more on Turkey's Armenian minority, click here.

Remembering Mec Yeġeṙn

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

April 24 marks the day of remembrance for the purported 1.5 million Armenians who perished in the year 1915 during what Armenians refer to as Mec Yeġeṙn. While Armenians have pushed for years to pass laws in other states acknowledging Mec Yeġeṙn as "genocide" such efforts have done little to yield recognition of the tragedy inside Turkey. However, despite these efforts, an increasing number of Turks are exploring the history of the events of 1915 when what was then the Ottoman Empire systematically eliminated the Armenian population then living in Anatolia after concerns that Armenians were cooperating with the Russians to bring about dissolution of the Empire.

Yesterday, for the second year in a row, Turks gathered in Taksim Square to pay homage to the Armenians who lost their lives almost 100 years ago and call for a "coming to terms history." The first demonstration of this kind was held last year when the world was paying more attention to whether United States President Barack Obama would refer to Mec Yeġeṙn as "genocide" in his annual speech commemorating the tragedy. He did not, but what did not get noticed, and in what my mind is more important, is that Taksim was home to Turks raising awareness of the issue. Whether they called Mec Yeġeṙn "genocide" is less important than that there is now a lively discussion in Turkey that was not at all present 5-10 years ago. Last year hundreds of Turkish intellectuals and common citizens signed an online apology for what they referred to as "the Great Catastrophe." From Hurriyet Daily News:

Apart from two events in Istanbul, sit-ins were held simultaneously in Ankara, İzmir, Diyarbakır, Bursa and Bodrum. Prayers for the tragedies were conducted in all Armenian churches in Istanbul after the Easters prayer. The church’s limited their commemorations to prayers and no statement were made.

The first of the events in Istanbul was held in Sultanahmet by the Human Rights Association, or İHD, in front of the Turk Islam Artifacts Museum at 2 p.m. The crowd gathered with red cloves and read a press statement. The cloves had the names of Armenian intellectuals who were taken from their homes in Istanbul on April 24, 1915, and died in exile. The black banners held by the crowd read, “The Museum – prison of 1915” and “The intellectuals were held before sent to the journey of death.” The names of 250 intellectuals were read and the crowd left the cloves and banners near a tree in front of the museum before disassembling.

Ayşe Günarsu, member of the İHD Istanbul branch and the Commission Against Racism and Discrimination, spoke to the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review. She said they were there to refresh a memory that society was made to forget. “This location where the museum stands used to be İbrahimpaşa Palace in those years; also called the Central Prison. The intellectuals were gathered here and then sent to exile from Haydarpaşa train station. Many of the intellectuals never returned.” Günaysu said the Turkish intellectuals are too late “to commemorate the genocide.” İHD held a protest at Haydarpaşa last year.

“This is a matter of conscience,” said İhsan Kaçar, another member of the commission. “Intellectuals are not sufficient for Turkey to face itself. The NGOs need to have a clear stance on this matter. Facing the Armenian taboo will mean Turkey has to face its own history.”

For coverage of the demonstration last year and the strong efforts to pass a genocide resolution in the U.S. House last year, click here. For more on Turkish efforts to address the Armenian question, which is still difficult in Turkey given the country's many laws limiting freedom of expression, click here.

Party Lists Released . . . Game On.

Turkey's political parties have released their party lists ahead of June 12 parliamentary elections. The AKP's list considerably diminishes the power of National Outlook ("Milli Gorus") politicians and aims to gain votes in coastal centers where the party has not fared strongly.

Meanwhile, the MHP is sticking to its strategy of going for votes in both Turkey's coastal areas and Central Anatolia. The MHP suffered a tremendous loss in last year's Sept. 12 election when many of its supporters broke with the party to vote for the AKP-sponsored referendum. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli made the referendum a chance to challenge the AKP on its Kurdish opening, but at the end of the day, MHP's brand of ultra-nationalism seemingly increased support for the MHP, which is now hovering right at the 10% threshold required for parties to enter parliament.

The AKP will go after the MHP with full force in an effort to have the party fall under the 10% threshold. Should this happen, the AKP would almost certainly be guaranteed the super majority of 367 deputies it needs to conduct business without much compromise. It is a make-or-break year for the MHP. Turkish political parties that fall under the 10% threshold have a difficult time coming back, and the MHP would likely come out of the bruising with an even more ultra-nationalist attitude.

Significant to the party lists is the lack of minority representation. No party nominated an Armenian candidate as initially conjectured. Two Jews and two Syriacs were nominated, though all but one of these candidates have either been placed low on the party lists or are representing small parties and so have little chance of entering. Erol Dora, a Syriac, is running for the BDP from Mardin and stands a decnt chance of being elected. If Dora is elected, he will be the first Syriac member of parliament in the history of the Turkish Republic.

Women also got the short end of the stick. The CHP nominated the most women (at 20 percent), and has made gender equality, which the party considers to be under attack, a major plank in its platform. The AKP nominated 14 percent, and the MHP 12 percent. 12 women are running as independents, mostly from the pro-Kurdish BDP, which has by far the highest representation of women in parliament. Among these women is Leyla Zana, a hardline BDP candidate who is very divisive in Turkish politics.

There was some initial speculation that the AKP might attempt to nominate a female candidate who wears the headscarf, though it seems Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc's February statement that now is not the time seemed to have held true in the end. Only one covered candidate was nominated, a school teacher from Antalya, and her name was placed toward the bottom of AKP's party list. For more on women's political representation (and the headscarf), click here.

A Minority Rights-Based Approach to Cyprus

International Minority Rights Group International has published "Minority Rights: Solutions to the Cyprus Conflict." Here is a summary:

Attempts to resolve the ongoing conflict in Cyprus over the past forty years have been marked by one common feature: the systematic failure to recognize the presence of most minority groups on the island, and to involve them in conflict resolution processes and in drawing up plans for the island’s future status. This reflects the wider marginalization of minorities in both northern and southern Cyprus, who are effectively silenced within a discourse of competing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. Drawing on interviews with representatives from minority groups from both parts of the island, as well as on the wealth of literature that has grown up around the ‘Cyprus problem’, this report argues that minorities in Cyprus have a vital role to play in any future settlement, as well as in ensuring ongoing peace, prosperity and security on the island.

I have not yet had the opportunity to review the report, but thought I would go ahead and post it.

Wildlife Is Not Immune from Ultranationalism

Vulpes Vulpes Kurdistanica

Turkey's environment ministry is changing the names of three species of animals bearing Turkish and Armenian names. From the BBC:

The environment ministry says the Latin names of the red fox, the wild sheep and the roe deer will be altered.

The red fox for instance, known as Vulpes Vulpes Kurdistanica, will now be known as Vulpes Vulpes.

Turkey has uneasy relations with neighbouring Armenia and opposes Kurdish separatists in Turkey.

The ministry said the old names were contrary to Turkish unity.

"Unfortunately there are many other species in Turkey which were named this way with ill intentions. This ill intent is so obvious that even species only found in our country were given names against Turkey's unity," a ministry statement quoted by Reuters news agency said.

Some Turkish officials say the names are being used to argue that Armenians or Kurds had lived in the areas where the animals were found.

Really? Yeah, really.

A Liberal Democracy?

Jenny White calls attention to a recent incident in Ankara wherein a group of people advocating for organ donation got in a confrontation with police. From Kamil Pasha:

The governor of Ankara province wanted the stands handing out brochures to be removed from Yüksel Boulevard, one of Ankara’s main thoroughfares. A mass of police in full riot gear arrived to carry out his order and got into a discussion with a young woman at a stand promoting organ donorship. Young people gathered and surrounded her protectively, chanting “No to Fascism.” Watch the film. In seconds the police had moved in violently, as they have done with other protests and public civic actions in recent years, often by students and other young people. You can see them dragging people off (the news account said some were dragged away by the hair), throwing them about like paper dolls, and in the film if you watch carefully, you will see a policeman punching one of the young women hard in the face twice.

What was it that Erdogan said about the praiseworthy youth in Egypt demonstrating for their rights, that Mubarak should heed his people’s wishes?

Over-the-top police violence against men and women has been the norm in Turkey since I first went there in the 1970s. The problem has been police immunity and a continuing culture of disrespect for youth, for women, and for civil rights; a widespread acceptance and even approval of violence as a sign of masculinity and love of nation; and a lack of understanding of the principles of liberal democracy — making a safe space for alternative views and lifestyles. Democracy too often means I got the most votes, so everyone else should fall in line with my ideas and my values. A 2006 survey by Çarkoğlu and Toprak shows that the majority of the population values democracy and civil liberties, but shows little sensitivity toward others’ rights. Democracy is understood as a system that represents the views of the majority, rather than protecting the rights of minorities.

Radikal has posted a video of the incident.

Respect for difference and moving toward a liberal versus majoritarian understanding of democracy is one of, if not the, primary deficits of Turkish politics and one I have written about extensively. Events like the attack on the art galleries in Tophane last September to the beating of an Alevi man who sold alcohol at his store to the 1993 burning of the Madimak Hotel in Sivas (which left 37 people dead, mainly Alevis), and countless, countless others all stem from this basic need to respect difference and the rights of others.

On the government level, such questions are raised by restrictions on alcohol, "immoral broadcasting," the harassment and closure of LGBT groups, etc. Most of these posts are marked with "creeping conservatism," but they might also be labeled as "concerns for liberal democracy." And, conversely, respect for those who choose to drink alcohol should also be met with respect for those who choose not to drink alcohol just as respect for those who wear the headscarf should be met with respect for those who do not wear it. Too often disrespect is the story . . . over and over and over (like a broken record).

For more on the police, who should be first in line to be inculcated to respect the rights of others, see this December 2008 report from Human Rights Watch. See also many of the entries marked "police."

Saving Archaic Greek in Turkey

Thanks to Jenny White and 3quarksdaily.com . . .



For more on Turkey's Pontic Greek population, click here. Interestingly, since the Pontic Greeks converted to Islam, they do not have minority status in Turkey since such standing was based on religion.

United States Issues Religious Freedom Report

The United States Department has issued its annual International Religious Freedom Report. For DRL's report on Turkey, click here.

Though many accusations might be leveled at the United States for not taking a consistent position on democracy and human rights issues, a difficult task for any country, the State Department's reports on human rights and religious freedom are refreshingly objective.

Issued by the State Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the reports are issued independent of the State Department's other policy making arms. For a bit on how, why, and the history behind these reports, click here.

Holy Cross Church Opens Without a Cross

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

The first mass in 95 years was held at the Surp Hac (Holy Cross) Armenian church on Van's Akdamar Island yesterday despite a controversy this week about the cross that church officials wanted to place atop. The church was first opened as a museum two years ago following a Turkish government funded restoration, after which a Turkish flag was placed at its top. Culture Minister Ertegrul Gunay announced in April that the church would be open for prayer once a year.

In expectation of the first mass, the Turkish Armenian Patriachate built a 100-kilogram church, which it had planned to place atop the church with the help of for experts from Armenia. However, municipal authorities objected to the cross, arguing that church officials did not have proper permission from the Van Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Given that the church has been open for two years and that the government had plenty of time to address the issue, the cross controversy evinces the difficulties that remain in both Turkey's reconciliation with its Armenian minority, as well as its relations with Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.

All the same, Aris Nalci, an editor at the Armenian newspaper Agos, told journalist Yigal Schleifer that the cross controversy should not overshadow the significance of the mass. From Schleifer, writing for Eurasianet:

“This is a very important step for this city and the people living in the city,” said Nalci, who came early to Van to help publish a special edition newspaper in Armenian called “Van Time,” the first Armenian-language newspaper to be printed in the city since 1915.

“Five years ago, you couldn’t imagine that a newspaper in Armenian would be published in Van. Previously people here would tell me not to say that I’m Armenian. Now people here are proud to say they have an Armenian friend,” he recounted.

“This is a big opportunity. It’s a big step for the Van people,” Nalci added.

After heralding the open as a major accomplishment in Turkey-Armenia relations, why the Turkish government did not take a stronger position on the cross remains to be seen. High-ranking government officials did not attend the ceremony, though the government has said that the mass will not be the only one to be held at Akdamar.

The Ancestry of Mimar Sinar

The ancestry of Mimar Sinan, the famous architect responsible for building numerous mosques throughout 16th-century Ottoman Turkey [including Sultanahmet ("The Blue Mosque") and Suleymaniye in Istanbul], has long been subject to debate. The architect is said to have been Greek and Armenian while some Turkish nationalists have long insisted in his pure Turkish patrilineage. It was no doubt this insistence that led zealous Turks to dig up his grave in the 1930s and remove his skull from the rest of his remains in order to finally prove his "Turkishness." From Hurriyet Daily News:

According to Professor Selçuk Mülayim from Marmara University, the corpse of Mimar Sinan, best known for the 16th-century Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul, was taken from its modest tomb next to that building Aug. 1, 1935, in order to measure the famed architect’s skull.

Documents show that the team, headed by Turkish Historical Society Director Hasan Cemil Çambel, society member Şevket Aziz Kansu and historian Afet İnan, conducted the excavation in an hour, Mülayim told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review recently.

“The purpose was to prove he was an ethnic Turk,” the professor said. “Kansu took measurements with compasses and other tools and from these measurements it was decided that he was an ethnic Turk.”

At the time of the team’s foray into the tomb, there was a rising appreciation of Mimar Sinan in Europe, where people were increasingly claiming that the great architect could not have been Turkish, Mülayim said. “The excavation was an answer to these claims.”

To this day, few members of the Turkish public know that the man hailed as the greatest of Ottoman architects was actually a Muslim convert of Armenian origin.

Following the excavation of Sinan’s tomb, the Turkish Historical Society team took its findings to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. “He refused to look at the results, saying, ‘Instead of measuring his skull, make a statue of the architect,’” Mülayim said.

The idea that Sinan’s skull is missing from his tomb is not a new one, but one that many experts have avoided repeating in public.

For more on the construction of Turkish identity, click here. Though Turkey has come a long way, defensive notions of "Turkishness" are still at the heart of much of the country's identity politics.

"Cage Plan" Hearings Get Under Way

PHOTO by Emrah Gürel/Hurriyet Daily News

With eyes focused on Turkey-Israel relations, Turkey's recent vote on Iranian sanctions, and increased PKK violence, the Ergenekon investigation continues onward, as do the trials it has brought in its wake. Among these are of the 33 suspects charged with participating the Cage Action Plan, the mysterious designs of which the Turkish daily Taraf revealed last November. The first hearing for the Cage suspects got underway in Istanbul yesterday.

According to Taraf and a susequent investigation, active and retired military staff plotted to commit mass acts of violence against Turkey's non-Muslim communities in a premeditated effort to cause enough chaos and discontent with the AKP government to force it out of power. These acts of violence allegedly included the assassination of Hrant Dink, as well as the murders of three Christian missionaries working at Zirve publishing house in Malatya and Catholic priest Andrea Santoro in Trabzon. The group is thought to have also been hatching further actions.

At yesterday's hearing, the 12th High Criminal Court in Istanbul granted the Turkish-Armenian Agos newspaper, of which Dink had been the editor, joint plaintiff status, allowing Dink lawyers to participate in the hearings. Fethiye Cetin, who has long advocated on behalf of the Dink family and the Hrant Dink Foundation to bring the shadowy operation surrounding Dink's murder to light, argued that the alleged conspirators had long waged a campaign of intimidation against the paper and was responsible for Dink's murder. Two separate trials involving Dink's murder ae currently ongoing, and have been plagued with problems and continued coverups.

The defendants denied the allegations, arguing the document laying out the plan is a hoax. They had requested to e tried in military court, stating that the civilian court in which the case is being tried had no jurisdiction. The court denied their request while granting that of Agos. For an account of the hearing, see this report from Bianet.

The Cage suspects face 7 to 15 years in prison for being memers of an armed terrorist organization.

For more on the Cage Action Plan, see Jan. 25 post.


UPDATE I (6/18) -- The second hearing took place yesterday at which alleged "Cage Plan" ring leader retired Vice Admiral Ahmet Feyyaz Ögütçü gave his defense, dismissing the charges against him as based on a series of fabrications and hoaxes that are part of a conspiracy designed to weaken the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). For an account of the hearing, see this report from Bianet. A third hearing is taking place today.

More Reason Why Neighborhood Pressure Matters

Bogazici University and the Open Society Institute have released a study assessing intolerant attitudes in Turkey toward ethnic and religious minorities and LGBT people. The survey, released in report form as "The Otherization and Discrimination in Turkey
(in Turkish)" ("'Biz'lik, 'Oteki'lik, ve Ayrimcilik: Kamuoyundaki Algilar ve Egilimler"), was conducted between Feb. 15 and April 25, in 18 provinces with the participation of 1,811 interviewees. Hurriyet Daily News summarizes the results:

The most striking result of the survey concerns the question on “who deserves a restriction on their rights?” The answers given by the respondents indicated that the discriminatory tendencies and the level of tolerance have changed little in the last five years.

An astonishing 53 percent of participants strongly believed that the right to freely express a different sexual orientation should be restricted. Similarly, 37 percent of the people sampled denounced the right of believing in no religion, with 59 percent standing against atheists flaunting their lack of religion. Moreover, 28 percent denounced the right of non-Muslims to be open about their religious identity.

The results showed that 72 percent of the sample supported the idea that “those who have a different sexual orientation, like homosexuality, should be open about their sexual identities.”

According to the 2005 results of the survey, 58 percent said non-heterosexuals should not be equally free. The percentage of those who say the rights of those who have a different native language other than Turkish should be restricted is 19 percent, the same figure as the 2005 survey.

Those who say that all ethnicities, religions and sects should be secured by the Constitution make up 74 percent.

Some 36 percent of the interviewees said their primary identity was “being a citizen of Turkey,” whereas a 29 percent thought “having a Turkish national identity” was most important.

Meanwhile, 66 percent said they have no other ethnic culture and they are rooted completely in Turkish culture, while 20 percent said their ethnic culture and language were secondary to Turkish language and culture. Some 8 percent said their language or culture came before Turkish culture while 2 percent said they had absolutely no connection to Turkish culture and language.

59% of respondents in the survey said they did not feel any sort of neighborhood pressure. And, the rest?

Such surveys should boost concern about the arguments of "strong democrats," those who continue to stress democracy with little reference to rights protections and difference. See my March 26 post on the need for Turkey, and the AKP as the government in power leading up constitutional efforts, to come to a sophisticated of rights-based democracy. Until the "democrats" start talking about protecting everyone's rights, promoting difference and diversity in Turkish society, and adopt an open, articulate discourse that encompasses all of Turkish society, many Turks are likely to fear rule by the majority -- and, if the respondents in this poll hasd their say, for good reason. Leadership requires taking risks and promoting new understandings, most especially in conservative societies where difference is seen as something Other. The AKP has taken some positive steps in this direction, but how genuine, far-reaching, and reflective of an overall attitude appreciative of diversity is still very much in doubt. When combined with a general societal ambivalence toward liberalism and a lack of tolerance, many Turks' fear of rule by majority should be taken seriusly. Turkey might not end up like Iran, but it could certainly end up a more closed, oppresive society should majoritarian democracy continue to take a stronger place without attention to rights. For more on neighborhood pressure, see also Feb. 10 post.

More Than Bananas

For another piece from the Middle East Report Online on Turkey's Kurds, see Will Day's 2008 consideration of the politics of Kurdish poverty in the southeast. Day takes a look at purely economic solutions to the problems, as well as support for the AKP in the region. From Day:

The politics of that “problem,” as indicated by the discrepant displacement and unemployment figures, largely define what can and cannot be said in the poverty debates. For the Turkish state, in fact, poverty in the southeast is a condition prior to politics, strictly separated from questions of history, identity and culture. “The problem of citizens [here] is a humanitarian problem,” as Hüseyin Avni Mutlu, governor of Diyarbakır, told the mainstream newspaper Referans in January. Ankara appoints governors to oversee the southeastern provinces. “Cultural identity is not the basic problem. The agenda of the people is economic; the agenda is sustenance. Any other claims are political.” So long as the desires of the people of the southeast are rendered as a universal, biological need—sustenance—the state will recognize them. The governor dismisses questions about the historical and political origins of poverty as “the worst form of exploitation, human exploitation.”

It is a viewpoint that clashes somewhat with those of poor Kurdish youth, even those, like Mehmet, who have seen some benefit from the state’s solicitude since their own stint shining shoes and selling tissues. Mehmet’s elder brother received an interest-free loan from the governorate, one of a number of state-sponsored programs to encourage entrepreneurship, and set up a small kebab stand. He divides the profits between supporting his ailing parents and saving up for his imminent marriage. Mehmet works for free, but when he needs pocket money, his brother obliges.

Mehmet wakes up every morning at 5:30, buys fresh liver and meat for the stand, and heads to high school (having dropped out years before to work, he is now five years senior to his first-year classmates). After school, he runs the stand until midnight. Three days a week, he attends a training program, provided free of charge by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, that will certify him to lay natural gas lines.

Mehmet’s understanding of Diyarbakır’s economy, nevertheless, is colored by a broader feeling of exclusion. “When we go west to find work, people hear our accent, or the police take one look at our ID cards [where one’s place of birth is listed] and they say, ‘He’s from the east, he’s a terrorist.’ When we stay here, there are no factories, no jobs, and we can’t get a decent education or score well on the national university exams because the state only sends the worst teachers here, and any talented teachers here escape to the west if they find the chance.”

That the present shape of poverty has a political history, and that the presence of poverty does not erase other claims—that one can be hungry and desire education in Kurdish, that one can hope for both a more equal distribution of wealth and a more equal distribution of dignity and life chances—captures, in condensed form, the kind of recognition advocated by the NGOs and municipal governments working in the southeast. These NGOs and municipalities are the new legal, public face of Kurdish politics, emerging from a series of political reforms in motion since the early 2000s. From their perspective, the separation of poverty from politics is equal to a denial of historical and social reality. “The problem,” stresses the mayor of Diyarbakır, Osman Baydemir, “is economic, social, cultural, political, legal and administrative. An integrative approach is essential to bringing improvement.” The politics of poverty extends even to word choice. The Turkish state favors the term yoksulluk (an abstract noun indicating an existing state or condition of “poor-ness”), while domestic NGOs and regional governments prefer yoksullaştırma (a verbal noun emphasizing action behind the state or condition described, and translatable as “causing to be poor,” or impoverishment).

For other local actors, recognizing more than basic human need in the southeast is not only essential to designing more effective poverty relief. Many NGOs and research groups working in the region hope that discussion of forced migration and its role in the production of the new urban poverty may also urge the state toward a deeper commitment to assisting in the rehabilitation of the regional economy. If the claims of the southeast can be associated with principles of the European Union and the UN—such as cultural rights and participatory local governance—they may acquire a stamp of legitimacy that pushes the state to reevaluate its reflexive equation of southeastern grievances with PKK demands.

Since 2008, the AKP and the military have considered granting some "cultural rights" to Kurds, though both parties are for more comfortable discussing the economic dimensions of the Kurdish question -- which are, no doubt, less controversial and more palatable to nationalist Turks. Some Turkish opinion leaders have harshly criticized purely economic-centered political solutions. From my look at the Kurdish question in January 2009, before the government announced its recent 'Kurdish opening' (documented here):

Instead of talking about political and cultural rights, Prime Minister Erdoğan is more keen to talk about economics. Turkish intellectual Ece Temelkuran has compared AKP policy in the southeast to giving out Islamist bananas, an attempt to perhaps bridge the development gap, but an approach that ultimately fails to address the demands of Kurds for the state to recognize their unique identity and standing in Turkish society. (For a similar argument, see Kerem Oktem, who assesses these Islamist bananas as tantamount to co-optation.) While some Turks far too often decry such a demand as separatism, other Turks and most Kurds see recognition as the foundation of basic human rights -- the right to address each other in their own language without state interference, to educate their children in the language of their grandmothers, to celebrate their culture in free assembly, and to enter politics as individuals with identities that might be both Kurdish and Turkish, and therefore, more difficult to negotiate than that of the average Turk. However, what Temelkuran identifies as "Islamist banana politics" and the politics that analyzes in his consideration of AKP policy, fall far short of meeting this demand. Nonetheless, AKP holds economic development and the creation of a state television channel as sufficient compromises, a secret battle plan to combat a war on terrorism that fails to extirpate the root of the problem. While AKP's realization of the need to develop the southeast is light years ahead of the thought asserted by other political parties, it still simply not enough, and as a result, likely to fail. Nonetheless, even when AKP's economic policies for the Kurdish southeast are highly dubious, they have often tacitly endorsed by some in the Western media (see the New York Times' treatment of GAP this March).

Islamist banana politics gained further legitimacy this fall when the government and military began working more closely together. As indicated by the recent resignations of former AKP deputy chair Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat, an ethnic Kurd, banana politics are likely to become even more entrenched as the government further eschews cultural and political rights . As Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu elucidates, his replacement, Abdulkadir Aksu, also Kurdish, "has been widely viewed as a reflection of the AK Party's shift in policy from one that supports the greater engagement of Kurds in the political process to one that has further narrowed the room for maneuver for Kurds to express their political opinions." Further signalling this new era of cooperation and consensus on the Kurdish issue, the military top brass, typically quite reticent on political approaches to the Kurdish problem, has publicly agreed with the prime minister that the solution is economic. While this is undeniably in-part the case -- and, despite the TSK's discussion of non-military solutions being a positive step -- the danger is that too exclusive a focus on the economy is incapable of leading to a comprehensive political solution, thereby risking failed policy, and likely more violence as a function of resulting frustration. Not only are banana politics not fair to Kurds, but they are not pragmatic.

Insidious defenses of banana politics cite AKP's decisions as made in agreement with Kurdish public opinion (though the polls are dubitable, and show only the slightest of majorities placing economic over cultural/political concerns), in addition to an exaggerated disconnect between Kurdish intellectuals/political leaders and the overwhelming majority of Kurds, who are overwhelmingly very poor people. The myopia of the banana defenders is on full display in arguing the last point since any amelioration of the living conditions of Kurds will likely raise consciousness of cultural repression, not diminish it. For examples of banana defenses, see Abdulhamit Bilici and Mümtaz'er Türköne. In one defense, Türköne argues,

"For [DTP], the victory of the AK Party, especially in Diyarbakır, will be a nightmare. If the AK Party wins in southeastern Anatolia, the Kurdish question will enter a new phase. The PKK and the DTP will not remain the sole powers designing pro-Kurdish politics. Pro-Kurdish politics will be ‘pluralized.’"

The AKP did not win in local elections, instead suffering heavy setbacks throughout the southeast. When the government announced plans to move forwrd with the 'Kurdish opening,' many observers thought the AKP and critical figures in the Turkish state had come around. However, with the initiative now stalled, it is clear that any such turn will not be wholesale, that reform on the cultural/minority rights front will come incrementally, and that these changes will, indubitably, be hard fought. While the future is not clear, two things are near certain: one, thinking like that expressed by Turkone in 2008 is and will not produce peace; and two, that the production of peace will not come in one sweep of reforms, but will necessarily be be process-oriented, multi-faceted, and require the engagement of all parties with stakes in the issues involved in the conflict. No one is going away anytime soon.

Another Missed Opportunity?: A Look Back at the 'Kurdish Opening'

Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir
DHA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

I am re-posting the timeline I originally posted on April 20 with updates. I will continue to update the timeline, but will not re-post it. The updated timeline can be easily accessed from the link under "Kurdish Timeline" on the right-hand sidebar.

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With many opinion leaders and observers of Turkish politics considering the 'Kurdish Opening' "closed," the government has fallen relatvely silent in recent months as it has moved to focus on constitutional reform. The Ergenekon investigation and revelations about a potential closure case against the AKP seem to have put the government's Kurdish initiative on the shelf for a while longer yet. Following harsh attacks by the opposition since the initiative's announcement, much strengthened by the botched Oct. 19 crossover of 34 Kurds from Iraq, eight of them former PKK militants, the government had already shown signs of watering down previous plans. Writing for the Middle East Information Research Project's Middle East Report Online after the Oct. 19 public relations disaster, Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden summed up the 'Kurdish opening' this way:

The AKP, assuming it intends to create momentum for peace anew, will find this task difficult. Even though the governing party enjoys considerable EU support, it will again encounter resistance from the parliamentary opposition, as well as the armed forces, who have accused the AKP of surrendering to “the terrorists.” What is more, a large part of the AKP’s constituency comes from the nationalist mainstream and is unsupportive of expansive overtures to the Kurds. The party leadership, beginning to look ahead to the 2011 elections, is already loath to rock the boat.

In 2009, the phrase of the moment was “road map” -- whether in the TESEV report [click here] or Öcalan’s shelved opus. Deniz Baykal invoked the phrase sardonically to distance his party from the Kurdish opening, bidding the AKP, “Bon voyage!” The problem, though, is that the Turkish government appears to have been without a road map. Its journey has accordingly seemed meandering, its leaders driving blind. A slightly different metaphor, however, of peace as a process, does seem to describe events as they have transpired. Erdoğan might still be prevaricating when he claims the “democratic opening” is a seven-year work in progress with short-, medium- and long-term objectives. But this concept does offer some hope, a glass with something in it, even if it is far from half-full. And Erdoğan is not wrong to emphasize how much progress has been made.

The politics of pushing throuh the initiative, especially an amnesty for former PKK militants, is no easy task, and especially at a time when the AKP is embattled in efforts to amend the constitution. Understandably, with the CHP now red-hot over judicial reform, the AKP does not want to offend nationalist voters and gain the wrath of the MHP, a party with which the AKP heavily competes for votes in conservative Anatolia.

Yet, the AKP has plenty of room to save itself and re-ignite the process. If the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Part (BDP) can be properly engaged and the process yield results in terms of decreasing terrorist attacks and reinvigorating enthusiasm lost in October, the popular enthusiasm for the government's initiative recorded in polls last summer might also be rejuvenated. The road is not easy. The Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA)'s Hatem Ete, back in August, wrote that the AKP's task at hand involves the government involving all parties in the initiative, from the ultra-nationalist MHP to the BDP, and that as daunting a feat as this is, that should the AKP be able to get state institutions involved, most importantly the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the initiative might just yield results. While Ete rejects any form of mediated talks with the PKK, he does acknowledge an important role for Kurdish nationalist politicans to play. With the looming threat of increased violence and yet indications from imprisoned PKK former leader Abdullah Ocalan that he is willing to allow for more distance between the PKK and the BDP, engagement is indeed possible at this time and will prove essential to successful reform efforts in the future. Ongoing operations against suspected members of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan - KCK), a group functioning as go-between for the PKK and the BDP, have badly damaged relations and, as Huseyin Yayman explains, only served to consolidate support for the PKK by leding creedence to their rhetoric of "elimination." Bridges burnt between the AKP and the BDP in recent months can be rebuilt, but only with diligent, sustained effort and willignness on the part of the AKP to engage in dialogue to begin with -- something the party did not seem keen to do even at the earliest stages of the initiative.

The AKP's initiative is not the first significant gesture a Turkish government has made in regard to the Kurdish problem, but it could be the first to succeed. In 1991, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel boldly declared, "Turkey has recongized the Kurdish problem," and before then, President Turgut Ozal had been holding secret negotiations with the PKK throgh indirect contacts. In 1993, despite the ocnflcit's later escalation, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller spoke of the Kurdish conflcit as parallel to Spain's conflict with the Basques, suggesting that a limited autonomy solution might be possible. (In November 2008, the same was suggested by then Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission co-chairman Joost Lagendijk.) And, in 1999, after the Helsinki Summit, Mesut Yilmaz instructed, "The road to the European Union passes through Diyarbakir." The ending of the unilateral PKK ceasefire in 2004 and rising Turkish nationalism has since complicated the journey, but it is not too late to forge onward.

However, as Lagendijk informed at the end of his tenure, the path taken must first be chosen by Turkey. Erosion of support for the EU accession process and skepticism about the wave of trips the EU paid to the southeast in the first years of the accession have soured the efficacy of the EU in the process while the United States' role is beleaguered by its role in Iraq and widespread accusations of its having imperial designs. (Notably, in recent months, Ocalan has sent signals that he is now more willing to deal positively with the EU.) And, there is drive in Turkey t do, however dissipated it might be in this moment. In a recent op/ed response to an argument that the BDP has not changed while the government has, Radikal columnist Oral Calislar writes that Kurdish nationalism is a fact that must be dealt with, and that, in fact, both Kurdish nationalists and the government have changed. This, indeed, is a product of the peace process, and it leaves much hope to be had. Several Turks realize that the formation of the Kurdish Regional Govoernment (KRG) changes the name of the game, and that the continued polarization and relative deprivation of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey could have profound effects in the future if the issue is not solved in the soon to near future (for examples in English, see these op/eds by Omer Taspinar and Cengiz Aktar; for a taste of recent nationalist rhetoric, see AFP's interview with BDP deputy chairwoman Meral Danis Bestas).

Recognizing the Kurdish problem to be his problem, Prime Minister Erdogan made a bold first step when he addressed an audience in Diyarbakir in 2005, and recognizing"Kurdish nationalism" will be another big step yet. But, this is what a peace process is all about. The government was never going to solve the Kurdish problem in one fell swoop, but the initiative was, and should it be re-energized, a step in the right direction.

Below is a timeline I have assembled documenting developments in the 'Kurdish opening' from February 2009 to last week's attack on Ahmet Turk. I would more than appreciate any additions of important events/details I have left out. For events before February 2008, see my post, "Beyond Bananas: Hopes for the Kurdish Minority in 2009," Jan. 8, 2009, in addition to this article by the European Stability Initative's Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere that appeared in Turkish Policy Quarterly.


A TIMELINE

February 2009

2/15 -- Protestors marking the tenth anniversary of Abdullah Ocalan's capture clash with police throughout the southeast.

2/22 -- Prime Minister Erdogan visits Diyarbakir to launch TRT-6 under threats from the PKK. Despite the government's efforts to seell the station in the southeast, the new channel is largely seen as an election ploy. The DTP does not support the channel, largely seeing it as a superficial attempt by the AKP to undermine its clout before elections.

2/24 -- DTP leader Ahmet Turk, observing UNESCO World Language Week, illegally speaks Kurdish in parliament to the outrage of nationalist politicians. Turkish national television immediately cuts off feed.

2/27 -- Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug expresses support for limited cultural rights.

March 2009

The PKK declares a unilateral ceasefire.

3/9 -- Iraq President Jalal Talabani calls on the PKK to lay down its arms following a bilateral meeting in Anakra with President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan. Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). President Massoud Barzani supported Talabani's call much to the betrayal of some Kuridish nationalists in Turkey.

3/10 -- President Gul, talking to reporters in Tehran, sends the first signal of what would become known as the 'Kurdish Opening,' declaring, "There are already good things happening. We are resolving our own internal problems."

3/23 -- Prime Minister Erdogan visits the KRG to urge cross-border cooperation in stopping PKK attacks incursions into Turkey. It was the first time a Turkish leader had visited the region in more than 30 years.

Newroz celebrations result in few incidents of violence and the expected calls for the state to negotiate with the imprisoned Ocalan and the PKK. Ocalan calls on followers to resist KRG-led resolution efforts, harshly criticizing KRG President Massoud Barzani and telling followrs to stay away from a planned summit Barzani was reported to be planning in Arbil. The Arbil summit never came to fruition. Leyla Zana denounces the calls of KRG politicians for the PKK to lay down arms, echoing Ocalan's call to stay away from the planned summit in Arbil. United States involvement is also denounced.

3/25 -- Diyarbakır AKP deputy İhsan Arslan said that those “who want to solve the Kurdish problem cannot disregard the DTP, the PKK or Abdullah Öcalan.”

3/29 -- In municipal elections, the DTP wins landslide victories across the southeast, losing many districts in which the AKP had done well in 2004. Academic and member of Turkey's PEace Assembly told Bianet before the election that "it's a referendum on if the PKK-DTP line should be regarded as the main address for a dialogue to solve the Kurdish issue or not. . . . The state and the government are trying to avoid that and hope to render conservative Kurds as their counterpart. I believe that DTP, which claims to be the main actor, will gain strength in the elections."

April 2009

4/20 -- Over 120 suspected members of Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan - KCK), a group functioning as go-between for the PKK and the DTP, are detained, including senior members of the DTP. The arrests are widely seen by Kurdish nationalists as a response to the DTP's March electoral victories. The detentions and arrests that follow will be the first in a series of operations against the KCK. These are still underway.

4/27 -- An extensive police operation in Istanbul against a leftist organization linked to the PKK results in a five-hour shootout in which three police officers are killed. The militant on the other end of the gunfight, Orhan Yilmazkaya, turns out to be 0ne of the top three leaders of the Revolutionary Headquarters.

4/29 -- 10 soldiers are killed in Diyarbakir and Hakkari provinces in violation of the PKK's unilateral ceasefire.

May 2009

5/13 -- Ocalan announces plans to release a roadmap for peace, later issuing a statement through his attorneys that the roadmap would be relased on Aug. 15. Though the roadmap was never released, stories about its would-be content continue to be published in Turkish newspapers through the summer, including in a much talked about government-sanctioned interview with Ocalan conducted by Hurriyet journalist Ertegrul Ozkok. Details included a wiseman commission to mediate an amnesty between the Turkish state and the PKK. Ocalan informs that any mediation should be done without participation from the United States or European Union. Ocalan's roadmap, as it was part and parcel revealed, also resembled the vague four-point plan the DTP would later float around. PKK Commander Murat Karayilan, in an April interview with Milliyet's Hasan Cemal, laid out similar plans (see also Jenny White's post, including a link to the interview in Turkish).

5/18 -- President Gul says Turkey has a "historic opportunity" to solve the Kurdish question.

5/22 -- In a speech in Duzce, Prime Minister Erdogan argues that Turkey should begin fairly dealing with its minorites. From the speech: "Over many years, suspicions toward foreigners existed in this country. This mindset has seemingly not changed. They have chased members of various ethnic groups out of this country. Have we won? We should think about this. Actually, this was a result of a fascist mentality."

5/26 -- A mine explodes in Diyarbakir province killing six Turkish soldiers in violation of a unilateral PKK ceasefire in effect since March.

5/31 -- The PKK extends its ceasefire to July 15 in anticipation of Ocalan's roadmap.

June 2009

6/13 -- A Turkish soldier and a PKK militant are killed in a firefight exchanged at the Turkish border.

July 2009

7/15 -- The PKK extends its unilateral ceasefire to Sept. 1.

7/22 -- Prime Minister Erdogan announces that the government is preparing its own comprehensive plan for peace. Soon after, AKP deputies appear for the first time in six years on Roj-TV and state that “all political actors [including Ocalan] should be considered if they positively contribute to the peace process." Interior Minister Besir Atalay gives a televised press conferece. From the conference: "We have the intention to take determined, patient and courageous steps." MHP leader Devlet Bahceli and other ultranationalist leaders vociferously denounce the plan while some PKK opinion leaders welcome it, hoping that it might lead to dialogue between the government and the PKK.

7/29 -- Leaders from Turkey, Iraq, and the United States meet in Ankara to discuss how to deal with the PKK in the context of a tripartite mechanism setup between the countries to arrange for cooperation between them on the issue.

August 2009

8/1 -- CHP Deputy Chairman Yılmaz Ates joins a show on pro-PKK Roj-TV, stating that “we need to have self-criticism about what happened that we [Turks and Kurds] have become foes.” Divisions seem to emerge within the CHP as to how to approach the government's intiative.

8/3 -- The Turkish National Police Academy hosts Interior Minister Besir Atalay and a group of opinion leaders to discuss the Kurdish question. The workshop, titled “The Solution to the Kurdish Question: Toward the Turkish Model,” was attended by 15 participants, all warm to the government's plans.

8/12 -- Prime Minister Erdogan delivers an emotive speech to his party's parliamentary group. Referring to the "Kurdish Opening" as a "democratic project." Erdogan asks, “If Turkey had not spent its energy, budget, peace and its young people on [fighting] terrorism, if Turkey had not spent its last 25 years in conflict, where would we be today?”

"The DTP's Deputy-Chairman Selehattin Demirtas, list[s] four demands as the basis for any peace settlement including: forming a new constitution that fully supports democracy; amending article 66 of the constitution, which defines a Turkish citizen as anyone 'bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk, in order to emphasize the non-ethnic qualification for citizenship; removing the ban on using the Kurdish language in education and media and empowering the local municipalities'" (Emrullah Uslu, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Aug. 14, 2009).

8/20 -- Ocalan delivers his 160-page handwritten roadmap to his attorneys whereupon it is confiscated by prison officials at Imrali.

8/25 -- The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) General Staff express support for the government's plan to grant limited cultural rights and improve economic development in the southeast. However, the TSK drew red lines on negotiating with the PKK, undermining the unitary structure of the Turkish state, or making Kurdish an official language.

The end of August proved to be a turning point. First, harsh criticism of the AKP poured forth from the parliamentary opposition, replete with dire warnings of the impending downfall of the republic. This invective was followed by a message from the chief of general staff, İlker Başbuğ, posted on the army’s website, which reiterated the military’s commitment to the “unitary” Turkish state and the struggle against terrorism. The top general rebuffed the DTP call upon the government to negotiate with Öcalan, saying, “There should be a good look at who is responsible for the bloodshed. You cannot put martyrs who sacrificed their souls for their country and terrorists in the same corner.” In response to the push for political and cultural autonomy for Kurds, Başbuğ continued, “The state of Turkey, the country and the nation, is an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009).

September 2009

9/2 -- Prime Minister Erdoğan, attending an iftar meal (to break the daily Ramadan fast) with police at a Special Operations Department branch, declare[s], “I say this very clearly and openly: Neither the state nor the government of the Republic of Turkey will sit down with terrorists or treat a terrorist organization as a party to negotiations. This can never, ever be a subject for discussion” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009).

9/5 -- Prominent AKP MPs turn[] a discussion of the Kurdish opening into a recitation of old slogans, denouncing the PKK as “baby killers” and exalting Turkey as “one nation with one flag.” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009.)

9/10 -- The Higher Education Council (YOK) gives Artkulu University in Mardin the permission to teach Kurdish language education courses. The language was offered alongside Farsi, Arabic and Syriac at a new "Living Languages in Turkey" institute. YOK Chair Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, announced that language courses would train academics to teach minority languages. A similar initiative at Dicle University in Diyarbakir for teaching courses only in Kurdish under the heaidng of a "Kurdish" faculty was rejected.

9/14 -- The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) apply to the parliament to prolong its mandate to conduct military operations in northern Iraq.

9/23 -- Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug once again expresses cautious, but heavily guarded support for the government's intiiative. For coverage from Bianet, click here.

9/23 -- The PKK issues a press statement criticizing the "Kuridsh opening" for not recognizing Ocalan as a negotiating figure and not suspending anti-PKK military and police operations. DTP members argue the government's initiative presents old policies in a new package.

October 2009

10/8 -- After refusing to meet with Interior Minister Besir Atalay, CHP leader Deniz Baykal sends a letter to Prime Minister Erdogan agreeing to meet with the prime minister. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said the government might be forced to hold a referendum on some elements in the "Kurdish Opening," of which the details had still not been disclosed.

10/19 -- At the request of Ocalan, 26 refugees from the Makhmour UN refugee camp in northern Iraq and eight former PKK members cross into Turkey at the Habur Gate as a "peace group." Though the eight former PKK members were detained at the border, they were released within 24 hours. The next day, prosecutors brought charges against five of the former guerillas, but the important thing is that they were not detained, the government citing that they had not committed crimes during their times with the organization.

Interor Minister Besir Atalay, who helped coordinate the crossover, said returning group was considered the beginning of the laying down of arms by the PKK, but later the process ceased after scenes of celebration interpreted to be pro-PKK flooded Turkish television screens. Opposition political parties harshly criticized the AKP, raising public ire over the incident and accusing the government of cooperating with terrorists. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli denounced AKP's actions as treason, and a number of anti-PKK rallies took places throughout the country. Prime Minister Erdogan held the DTP responsible for the celebrations, deeming them to be provocative. Significantly, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), for its part, criticized the celebratory nature of the return, but said nothing of the return in itself being wrong (Interview with Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere, The Balkans Project, Nov. 16, 1009)

The DTP most definitely used the rallies to their advantage, but after the first day, Ahmet Turk ordered participants not to wear PKK regalia and tried to minimize the gatherings being perceived as pro-PKK. Another group from Europe was expected to turn themselves in, but their arrival was cancelled after the Turkish embassy in Brussels withheld their entry visas. [See Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009.]

10/28 -- Fifteen NGOs in Diyarbakir issue a press statement criticizing the DTP for not playing a more constructive role in the "Kurdish opening."

November 2009

11/12 -- Interior Minister Besir Atalay announces a six-point action plan. An amnesty is not included in the plan.

11/13 -- The AKP introduces part of its "Kurdish Opening" in parliament. The legislation includes the easing of restrictions on private Kurdish-language television stations and Kurdish language faculties in universities, as well allowing towns and villages to use their original Kurdish names once again.

11/21 -- The AKP meets to discuss opposition to the "Kurdish opening" and designates certain party members to discuss the initiative. There is talk about removing Atalay as the main voice of the initiative. From Today's Zaman:

The party leadership decided on individuals who will have the authority to make statements for the party and the government in the initiative process. These individuals are Prime Minister Erdoğan, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek, Chief EU negotiator Egemen Bağış, deputy chairmen of the AK Party Hüseyin Çelik, Salih Kapusuz and Ömer Çelik; and deputy chairmen of the AK Party’s parliamentary group Bekir Bozdağ and Suat Kılıç. According to the new strategy, nobody except these individuals has the authority to make statements on the initiative.

AK Party deputies were again given the red lines that are never to be crossed when implementing reforms to actualize the democratic initiatives. Every move has to comply with the first three articles of the Constitution. According to this, Turkey’s unitary structure, flag and official language will not be changed.

11/22 -- A DTP-organized convoy touring Izmir is attacked by Turkish nationalist youth. Protests broke out in Hakarri after the attack.

11/25 -- Ocalan complains to his attorneys after he is moved to new prison facilities and his isolation ended. However, Ocalan sends messages through his attoneys that the new prison facilities are worse than before. The government had invited the the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) to tour the new facilities and meet with Ocalan and other inmates. A protest in Diyarbakir draws five thousand people, all answering the DTP’s call to protest Ocalan’s prison conditions.

11/26 -- In Bamaric, in Canakkale province, a clash between Kurdish and Turkish youth incites widespread violence against Bamaric's Kurdish minority. Three Kurdish teenagers are jailed, and a lynch mob of thousands gathers outside where they are being held.

11/29 -- A group of PKK supporters in Diyarbakir launches Molotov cocktails at the offices of Sura-Der, a pro-Hizbullah association. In response, a thousand Hizbullah supporters assemble to protest the PKK.

11/29 -- The KCK issues a statement saying the “attacks” against Ocalan show that the intention of the Turkish government is to eliminate the PKK leader. “This is a war project against Ocalan and our organization and the Kurdish people. If Ocalan is not released from the ‘death cell’ where he was put, our organization is not responsible for further developments.”

11/30 -- The "peace group" that returned in October issue a statement on Ocalan's prison conditions in a press release made by the Diyarbakir Branch of the Human Rights Association (IHD). The statement is now being used in a case against them being pursued by prosecutors in Diyarbakir. For more on the case, see Bianet.

December 2009

12/6-7 -- Weekend protests of Ocalan's prisons conditions draw thousands, and include more violent clashes with police. A 23-year-old university student is killed by a bullet in the back.

12/7 -- A PKK attack in Tokat kills seven Turkish soldiers. Three soldiers are wonded in a separate attack on a military vehicle.

12/7 -- The DTP's Emine Ayna gives a controversial interview (in Turkish) to Radikal in which she says the PKK gave the DTP the political space to do politics. She further goes onto say that no one should expect the DTP to deny or back away from this fact, adding that Kurds can always "go to the mountains," a metaphor for joining the PKK. Unsurprisingly, there is now a lawsuit being pursued in relation to the interview. Ayna has used the interview for her own political gain and remains in parliament while DTP doves Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk are banned from politics.

12/8 -- The Constitutional Court begins to hear arguments in the DTP closure case.

12/11 -- The Constitutional court announces its decision to close the DTP and ban 38 DTP politicians from politics for a period of five years, including chairmen Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk. Dramatic protests and clashes with police follow. See Dec. 20 post.

12/15 -- Shop owner Turan Bilen, whose store was attacked and car set on fire during protests of DTP's closure in Bulanik (Mus province) , opens fire on demonstrators, killing two and injuring seven.

12/23-24 -- To purportedly end allegedly KCK-organized street violence, police raid various addresses and arrest approximately 100 alleged KCK members, including human rights activists, politicians, students and ten mayors. For a list of some of those detained, including Diyarbakir Human Rights Association Chairman Muharrem Erbey, click here. For more on Erbey and a bit of insight into the operations, see this brief from Human Rights Watch. A petition followed the arrests. The so-called 'KCK operations' started in April following the DTP's sweeping election victories, prompting charges that the state/government are using the operations to target the party.

The National Security Council (MGK) announces full support of the government's Kurdish initiative and announces plans to publish a roadmap of its own in 2010. The roadmap has not yet been published. Rumors persist that Interior Minister Besir Atalay will be removed from his charge of coordinating the initiative.

12/28 -- An additional 24 alleged KCK affiliates are detained in Batman and Van.

12/30 -- Ahmet Turk's granddaughter, Ruken Turk, is sentenced to 10 years in prison for attending a pro-PKK demonstration.

12/31 -- DTP's closure and the 5-year political bans of DTP parliamentarians Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk go into effect upon publication in the Official Gazette. Turk and Tugluk's parliamentary immunity is terminated. Without Turk and Tugluk, and following a call from Ocalan, the remaining representatives of the DTP have decided to stay in parliament, joining the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which was strategically formed shortly after the closure case was opened against DTP in November 2007 as a fallback should the DTP be closed. Independent deputy Ufak Uras had agreed to also join the party, giving the party the 20 required members it needs to form a parliamentary group and be represented in parliament.

January 2010

1/10 -- Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu makes a tour of Mardin in support of the Kurdish opening.

1/10-11 -- Police detain two of the PKK returnees who crossed into Turkey as part of the Oct. 19 "peace group."

1/15 -- Atalay holds a press conference in attempt to reignite enthusiasm for the Kurdish opening.

1/15 -- Radio Ses in Mersin begins broadcasting in Kurmanci, Zaza, and Arabic. According to Bianet, "Radio Ses ('Voice') airs four programs in the Kurdish Kırmançi dialect, one in the Zaza language spoken by the Zaza people in eastern Anatolia and one broadcast in Arabic per week.

1/19 -- Former DTP member Hasip Kaplan announces that he has applied to the Europpean Court of Human Rights (ECHR) , arguing the Constitutional Court's decision to close the DTP violates the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


1/22 -- Gendarmerie forces detain approximately 60 alleged KCK members, including Igdir mayor Mehmet Nuri Gunes. Protests in Igdir are to follow.

1/24 -- Approximately 60 people are detained in another KCK sweep. 400 people are involved in clashes with police during a demonstration in Dogubeyazit.

1/24 -- The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistan -- TAK) issues a new declaration, in which TAK threatens to hit economic targets and civilians who play critical roles in maintaining the existing political system. TAK further warns tourists not to come to Turkey, and criticizes the PKK for being too passive in its struggle against the state.

1/25 -- Conflict erupts in Igdır between pro-Kurdish demonstrators and police following a DTP demonstration. Shops mostly belonging to ethnic Azeris are stoned during the course of events, provoking violent reactions from Turkish ultranationalists.

1/26 -- A delegation from the CPT visits Ocalan's facilities at Imrali and interview him and other prisonmates. Click here for coverage from Bianet.

February 2010

2/1 -- The BDP elects leaders Selahattin Demirtas and Gultan Kisanak as its co-chairs at its first party congress.

2/2 -- The day following the BDP's first party congress, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in Ankara opens an investigation of the party. The investigation is launched on alleged crimes of “turning people against the military,” “contradicting the Political Parties Act” and “praising crime and criminals,” according to the Anatolia News Agency.

2/3 -- PKK Commander Murat Karayilan releases his own roadmap for a future peace agreement between the state and the PKK.

2/3 -- U.S. general Ray Odierno, top commander in Iraq, meets with Turkish government officials as part of tripartite mechanism setup between the United States, Turkey, and Iraq. Discussed are details of how to evacuate the Makhmour U.N. refugee camp, where 10,000 Turkish Kurd refugees have been residing since 1993. Makhmour is a major source of recruitment for the PKK and its closure will be an important part of any peace settlement. (Click here for coverage from Hurriyet Daily News. For U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarks on the meeting, click here.)

2/3 -- Police detain 16 former DTP members.

2/3-4 -- The EU-Turkey Civil Commission (EUTCC) hosts its sixth international conference on the Kurdish question.

2/6 -- Following Ocalan’s advice, BDP leader Selehattin Demirtas declares, “The PKK and the BDP are two separate organizations. If the PKK want to say something they have the right to say so. We will not be their voice.” In an interview a few days later, Demirtas thanks Ocalan for allowing the BDP to develop its own political program as an independent party from the PKK. According to Emrullah Uslu,

With the BDP, Öcalan seems be at a point where he wishes to cooperate with the EU, so he has ordered the BDP to distance itself from the PKK. In parallel with Öcalan’s demand, BDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş outlined his party’s relations with the PKK, saying, We will not be the voice of the PKK.” During
another interview, Demirtaş thanked Öcalan for letting his party develop its own policies separate from the PKK. Based on this information, one can assume that the pro-Öcalan Kurds are pursuing a double-sided strategy. The BDP, of course, under the direction of Öcalan, is pursuing policies more independent of the PKK.

The PKK, on the other hand, plans to pursue its own policies through a more violent terror campaign. In an interview, Cemil Bayık revealed the PKK’s 2010 strategy to remove the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the Kurdish region. According to Bayık, the Turkish state thinks the AKP is the last resort for it to establish relations with Kurdish communities. If the PKK removes the AKP from the region, Bayık thinks, the Turkish state will have no choice but to sit down with the PKK and negotiate peace.

Unlike its traditional strategy, the PKK this time will use proxies to terrorize society. The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), an offshoot PKK organization that terrorized the country, especially tourist destinations and metropolises, in 2006 and 2007, will be the proxy organization for the PKK in 2010. The reason why I underline the TAK’s role is because this mysterious organization has recently issued a declaration threatening to resume its intense terror campaign in 2010.

2/6 -- Today's Zaman reports on Interior Ministry plans to restructure the village guard system in line with a report prepared by the parliament's human rights commission issued following the Bilge massacre. However, to date, no concrete measure has been taken. The Council of Europe has long called for the system's abolishment.

2/8 -- Unidentified individuals in an automobile open fire on BDP headquarters in Ankara. Interior Minister Besir Atalay calls BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, describing the act as a "provocation" and conveying the AKP's concern over the incident.

2/9 -- Rojda, Turkey's most popular Kurdish female singer, is arrested on charges of "spreading propaganda for an illegal organization." More than one month later, Rojda is convicted and sentenced to one year and eight months in prison after she had been invited to attend a meeting of artists Prime Minister Erdogan had assembled to discuss the Kurdish opening.

2/9 -- More than 90 civil society organizations, including business associations, chambers, professional unions, human rights activists and women's organizations, launch the “two minutes of darkness” protest, which will run through the month.

2/11 -- The first hearing in Ankara occurs in a case involving two off-duty police officers who shot to death a Kurdish man following a confrontation in a bar triggered by the man singing songs in Kurdish.

2/13 -- Police detain another 69 people in an effort purported to assuage expected demonstrations marking the eleventh anniversary of Ocalan's capture. More detentions and arrests occur the next day. According to Bianet, more than 100 people are arrested over the weekend, mostly members of the BDP.

2/15 -- Demonstrations marking the eleventh anniverary of Ocalan's capture draw clashes with police. From Bianet: "According to Fırat News Agency, 25 people got injured in the demonstrations, 21 people were taken into detention, 17 of them children. Overall, 110 demonstrators were arrested including 35 children."

2/19 -- A trial of 61 alleged members of the KCK gets underway in Diyarbakir.

2/20 -- Prime Minister Erdogan hosts popular artists to discuss the Kurdish opening in an effort to garner popular support.

2/22 -- In one of the many cases brought against her, Aysel Tugluk is acquitted of charges of "spreading propaganda for a terror organization." Tugluk was tried together with two of Ocalan's lawyers, Irfan Dundar and Fırat Aydinkaya, who received sentences of 10 months each.

2/23 -- At an event organized by the Civil Society Development Center (STGM), Kurdish civil society leaders expressed frustration at not having their voices adequately heard by the governmnet. Today's Zaman quotes Levent Korkut: “It will be difficult for the democratization process to move on if dialogue and cooperation between civil society and the state is not ensured."

2/24 -- Mehmet Ali Aydin, head of Diyarbakir's BDP branch, is formally arrested after showing up for a morning court proceeding.

2/26 -- Van BDP deputy Fatma Kurtulan submits a motion to parliament to open an investigation into the death of former president Turgut Ozal.

2/26 -- Italy arrests 11 suspected PKK members. Dutch authorities apprehend the PKK's lead operator in the Netherlands. And, on the same day, a German court lifts the gag on Roj-TV, which had been in pace since 2008.

March 2010

3/2 -- France arrests nine Turkish citizens suspected of recruiting for the PKK.

3/4 -- Belgium detains 30 people for suspected links to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, after conducting raids on 25 locations, including a studio of Roj-TV. Nine were arrested, including Kongra-Gel (PKK) Chairman Remzi Kartal and executive Zübeyir Aydar.

3/7 -- CHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu hints that the CHP would support a general amnesty, only to back away from his comments the following week under presumed pressure from his party. The remarks triggered a strong reaction in the Turkish press.

3/7 -- Commemorating International Women's Day, in a speech delivered in Urfa Prime Minister Erdogan called on all women to contribute to the government’s efforts to end the terror problem.

3/12 -- Siirt BDP deputy Osman Ozcelik submits a motion to parliament calling for an investigation into a recent wave of suicides among former members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The motion read: “The opinion that the TSK is covering up certain incidents is gaining ground among the public. The fact that most of the military personnel who are reported to have killed themselves are of Kurdish origin, and statements from families of alleged suicide victims that they do not find the TSK statements on the alleged suicides convincing give way to suspicions that there is ethnic discrimination in the military and even cases where executions are covered up as suicides.”

3/15 -- Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan regional administration in northern Iraq, met with Aydın Selcen, Turkey’s first consul general in Arbil, the de facto capital of the semi-autonomous region.

3/15 -- Turkish Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug defends the village guard system as essential to Turkey's "fight against terrorism."

3/15 -- BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas meets with Interior Minister Besir Atalay to discuss the safety of Newroz observances.

3/17 -- 14 people are detained in Siirt in another KCK-sweep, including Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) provincial head Sıdık Taş, the Human Rights Association’s (İHD) Siirt branch head, Vetha Aydın, provincial council member Belkıza Epözdemir, Tüm Bel-Sen branch head Ferit Epözdemir, and several administrators from various unions and associations.

3/18 -- Newroz celebrations begin in Hakkari under tight security. Celebrations continued throughout the week with few disturbances, accompanied by the usual Kurdish nationalist fanfare. Celebrations in Istanbul were confined to Kazlicesme in Zeytinburnu. For more in-depth coverage of festivities, including excerpts from message a from Ocalan delivered by BDP members, click here.

3/19 -- Siirt Mayor Sidik Tas is formally arrested.

3/20 -- Prime Minister Erdogan hosts another meeting with Turkish artists.

3/21 -- The PKK leadership's People's Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) Executive Council Presidency announced a "new phase" in the organization's struggle. Karayılan said in an interview with Ayla Jean Yackley from Reuters News Agency that a political solution has grown increasingly difficult to be reached, pointing to the DTP's closure. "We can end the ceasefire and resume the armed struggle," Karayılan warned.

3/22 -- The Public Prosecutor's Office in Diyarbakır launches cases against Turk and Tugluk for various speeches made by the politicians. Another case against both politicians is being pursued in Ankara.

3/25 -- Demirtas tells Today's Zaman that the BDP will support the government's constitutional package if all restrictions on campaigning in Turkish are lifted (not just the oral use of the language, but also written and broadcast materials), Treasury money is fairly disbursed between parties, and the election threshold is lowered. The following week, BDP co-Chairwoman Gultan Kisanak echoed Demirtas in her party's group meeting, iterating that the BDP's support of the package is conditional on the government's "extensive acceptance" of its recommendations. For more on the BDP's position, including analysis from former Chairman of the Diyarbakir Bar association Sezgin Tanrikulu, see this article from Today's Zaman's Ayse Karabat. Ocalan has said that Kurds should not support the constitutional reform package until the Anti-Terrorism Law (TMK) is lifted.

April 2010

4/6 -- Prosecutors in Diyarbakir begin to pursue a case against members of the October "peace group." From Today's Zaman: "At the time of the Kandil-Makhmour returnees, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was critical of the jubilatory nature of the group’s reception and had said: “Is the attitude seen at Habur correct? Is it a unifying attitude? Is it an attitude that makes people uneasy? Is there freedom and peace in the attitude?”' See also this report from Bianet.

4/8 -- Former MP of the closed Democracy Party (DP) Leyla Zana is sentenced to three years' imprisonment under charges of "propaganda for a terror organization" on the grounds of calling PKK leader Öcalan the "Leader of the Kurdish People". See also coverage from Today's Zaman.

4/12 -- A man attacks Ahmet Turk outside the Bilen trial in Samsun. Turk is hospitalized, and questions emerge about the security with which the former DTP leader was provided. Protests and highly questionable clashes with police breakout throughout the country (see also reportage from Bianet). Shops are closed in Hakkari, Yüksekova, Şemdinli, Van, Başkale and some areas of Mersin in protest of the attack. Emerging from the hospital, Turk urges calm. From Today's Zaman: Later, Interior Minister Besir Atalay, "speaking to a TV program, said Turk is known for being courteous and moderate and urged people to remain calm in the wake of his attack and look to his example as a model of a reasoned and measured response to injustice. He added that they will not tolerate attempts at provocation, and he cautioned security forces to take better measures to prevent such attacks in the future." For reactions from the Turkish press, click here.

4/13 -- Demirtas gives a sharply critical speech at his party's group at a podium blazoned with a banner reading "1,483 BDP members still detained." At the meeting, Demirtas declares, "we have seen nothing else but cruelty from AKP during the past eight years. Not one single area of freedom created by AKP was for the benefit of the people". Bianet gives a summary of the "KCK operations," which commenced in April 2009 following DTP victories in the southeast.

4/15 -- Hurriyet columnist Yılmaz Ozdil writes, "The person who punched Ahmet Türk on his nose was an interpreter of the feelings of many people in this country." Lawyers from the Diyarbakir Bar Association file a lawsuit against Ozdil for "inciting hatred and hostility amongst the public and humiliation of the public."

4/19 -- A gymnastics teacher attacks Energy Minister Taner Yildiz in Kayseri, yelling, " “This is the fist of the Turkish people. Here is [a Kurdish] initiative.” Yildiz was attending the funeral of a soldier killed in a PKK attack.

May 2010

5/7 -- Two more Turkish soldiers were killed in two separate incidents of PKK-placed landmine explosions in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces.

5/8 -- BDP Istanbul Provincial Chairman Mustafa Avci describeds the KCK operations as "political genocide," characterizing them as retaliation won for the electoral victories the DTP won in March 2009's local elections.

5/9 -- For Mother's Day, the southeastern NGO Peace Mothers staged a sit-in in Ankara. More than 100 protestors called for an end to the Turkish military's operations against the PKK.

5/11 -- Riots between students at Dokuz Eylul University in Mugla result in a police officer shooting a Kurdish student. The riots are later said to have had an ethnic dimension.

5/13 -- Former DTP leader Aysel Tugluk is acquitted in two of the multiple cases that have been brought against her since her parliamentary immunity was removed following DTP's closure.

5/16 -- Milliyet runs a statement by Ocalan, issued through his lawyers, that he will no play an active role in settling the conflict if officials do not meet with him by May 31. He warns of attacks and broad rebellions in Turkish cities.

5/16 -- To protest continued operations against the PKK, a group of BDP deputies and a large crowd form a human shield in an effort to block military operations in Lice (Diyarbakir).

5/17 -- The BDP announces that it will begin taking the cases of those arrested in the KCK operations to the European Court of Human Rights.

5/20 - 5/24 -- An additional 120 people alleged to members of the KCK are detained.

5/20 -- The Turkish military carries out air strikes against PKK positions inside northern Iraq. The military later reports it killed 19 PKK fighters.

5/21 -- Six people are arrested for insighting the attack on Ahmet Turk in Samsun. Proescutors are demanding four years for Turk's attacker.

Manouchehr Zonoozi, a former director of Roj-TV in Denmark, recently gave an interview to a Danish newspaper in which he spoke of the close links between Roj-TV and the PKK.

5/26 -- The Turkish military reports to have killed four PKK fighters in clashes in Tunceli. Early the next morning, one Turkish soldier and four others are wounded in continued clashes.

5/27 -- A PKK attack in Siirt on a military vehicle kills one Turkish gendarme.

5/31 -- A PKK attack on a naval base in Iskenderun (Hatay) leaves six Turkish soldiers dead. It was the first attack on a Turkish naval base in the history of the Turkish Republic, and a sign that the PKK is intent on expanding the conflict. Some government officials, opposition leaders, and public opinion leaders begin speculating that the attack is linked to Israel's raid on the Mavi Marmara.

June 2010

6/1 -- An additional six people are arrested in Van in the course of the KCK operations. Seven more people are arrested there on Friday (6/4).

Three Turkish soldiers are injured in an attack in Cukurca (Hakkari).

Six PKK members surrender at the Habur Gate in Silopi province, and another in Adiyaman province.

6/2 -- A security summit is held in response to increased violence in the southeast. The professionalization of the military is discussed, as well as increasing the response to unrest in the southeast. Interior Minister Besir Atalay expressed the government's commitment to the political and economic solutions laid out in the announcement of the Kurdish opening last summer, but again, failed to give any specifics.

6/3 -- KRG President Massoud Barzani meets with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The two discuss trade between the KRG and Turkey, as well as the deteriorating security situation in the southeast. Barzani reiterates his opposition to the PKK's decision to end the ceasefire, and meets with DP leaders following his meeting with Davutoglu.

Violence continues in Cukurca with an attack on an armed police vehicle that injures three Turkish police officers. The local police department and police housing facilities fell under attack the night before. Another two police officers are injured in another attack on Friday.

6/7 -- An indictment is finally issued for the over 1,500 people who have been detained in the ongoing KCK operations. The indictment includes 15 BDP-elected Kurdish mayors.

6/8 -- A bombing in Istanbul's Kucucekmece district injures 15 military officers and two civilian bystanders. Five suspects are arrested after the bombing.

6/9 -- Ten people are arrested in KCK operations in Hakkari, including Hakkari BDP provincial head Sıddık Akış, BDP deputy co-chairperson Berivan Akboğa, former provincial head of the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP) Huvzullah Kansu, Dicle News Agency reporter Hamdiye Çiftçi and party members Baki Özboğanlu and İzzet Belge. Protests in Hakkari's city center following the arrests draw clashes with police.

6/11 -- A bomb placed beside a road linking Tunceli and Elzig injures 13 Turkish soldiers, some of whom were conscripts who had just been discharged after completing their mandatory military service. Police report to have foiled an attempted bombing in Izmir.

6/15 -- At the AKP's parliametary group meeting, Prime Minister Erdogan denounces the BDP, accusing the party of supporting the PKK: "Saying peace won’t bring peace. Those who are in direct or indirect contact with the PKK are accomplices to murder." Erdogan's remarks draw a strong response from BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, who accuses the prime minister for essentially calling for the closing of the BDP.

A PKK-planted landmine in Sirnak kills one Turkish soldier and injures another three.

6/16 -- A PKK attack on a military border post in Sirnak kills one Turkish soldier. The Turkish military responds by sending three commando divisions and a specialized battalion to chase the attackers into northern Iraq.

6/17 -- Ten members of the group of eight PKK memers and 26 residents of the Makhmour refugee camp who crossed at Habur in October are arrested at the first trial against them.

6/18 --


July 2010

August 2010