PHOTO from Birgun
Fast approaching the anniversary of the Feb. 28 process, or the 1997 "postmodern coup" that brought about the fall of the Islamist Refah government and a slate of reforms to defend secularism against what was perceived by some as the encroaching threat posed by political Islam, the government has announced plans to restructure Turkish education.
Reforms include provisions that would allow school children to receive education at religious (imam-hatip) high schools after completing four years of primary education or pursue distance learning (essentially "home school") courses. At the moment, students are required to complete eight years of education before being allowed to complete the final four years at imam-hatip, which combine traditional and religious education. Under the new law, education would be structured into three four-year segments: four years primary (ilk), four years middle (orta), and four years high school (lise), and hence the 4+4+4. The government is arguing the new law is an improvement since all 12 years will be mandatory even if it is to be completed at home.
The problems with the law should be apparent, and late this week earned the denunciation of the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists' Association (TUSIAD) and prominent opinion leader and entrepreneur Guler Sabanci. In rural areas, particularly in the east and southeast where children, particularly girls, already do not go to school, the law would greatly diminish educational standards. Parents in these areas are often not well-educated themselves (this is an understatement), and would not be capable of providing a quality education. Further, child labor is a tremendous problem (see past post) and girls are frequently kept at home (for more on this, see past post; see also the above advertisement from a 2010 campaign launched by Milliyet urging fathers to send their daughters to school).
The proposed law also allows for provision that would reduce the age of apprenticeship to 11, though it is still unclear to me as to how an apprenticeship works. (Is it pursued concurrent with other curriculum? Does it allow one to withdraw from school entirely? Would this possibly trigger more child labor?) The apprenticeship is also chief among TUSIAD's concerns (for more, click here).
On Wednesday, the parliament sub-commission for education took up the bill after a debate by a wider debate by a larger commission. Though the AKP has been sensitive to criticisms coming from groups such as TUSIAD and has expressed some willingness to compromise, it is unclear just how many of the proposed provisions could be made law. The sub-commission is scheduled to take the draft up once more on Feb. 28 after some tweaking from party officials. For an account in English, click here.
Cumhuriyet columnist Utku Cakirozer frames the recent move within the context of the Feb. 28 process. Cakirozer refers to measures put into play soon after the coup that required all students to attend eight years of primary education (from five to eight) before dropping out or enrolling in imam-hatip. The generals also restricted Koran courses. Students were not allowed to enroll in Koran courses until after their fifth year of school, and courses were subject to inspection by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet. Penalties, including prison sentences for parents who did not send their children to schools or sent their children to Koran courses before they were old enough. In addition, operators of illegal Koran courses were also subject to penalties.
Gradually, the AKP government has whittled away at what some might read as particularly intrusive restrictions, particularly on religious education. In 2003, prison sentences were replaced with fines; in 2004, parliament reduced the sentence for running an illegal Koran course from three years to one and ended and authorities ceased closing down illegal courses; in 2005, the Diyanet ceased inspecting Koran courses; and after last June's elections, the minimum age for Koran courses was eliminated. According to Cakirozer, the goal is now to do away with the eight-year rule for uninterrupted education.
As it inevitably does, the headscarf also falls into the debate. As Cakirozer points out, young girls wearing the headscarf (as young as fifth grade) will now be allowed to do so at imam-hatip, effectively ending the ban. I care more about the fact that these children will simply not receive the same quality of education as I do about an effective end to the ban after that age (the ban was one of the reasons driving the government to do this to begin with), but it is important to note that is also important for many critics of the new law (for another example, see this coverage from Hurriyet).
Other columnists and opinion leaders see the law as a broad-based effort to increase the influence of Islamist education, particularly imam-hatip and Koran courses. For an example, see Egitim-Is head Veli Demir's comments in Melih Asik's column in Milliyet.
UPDATE I (2/27) -- Nicole Pope's column in Today's Zaman offers a solid English-language analysis summing up the threat the proposed law poses to Turkish education.
Showing posts with label Social Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Social Policy. Show all posts
Sunday, February 26, 2012
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Erdonomics?
PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News
A recent report by TurkStat, the Turkish government's statistical arm, reveals a growing division between rich and poor despite the high growth percentages and foreign direct investment numbers the government has been posting. While the rich have indeed been getting richer, the poor have gotten poorer. From Hurriyet Daily News:
The numbers come at the helm of an election year in which the CHP is challenging the government on its failure to grow the economy for everyone. Moving back to a social democratic agenda, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has promised to work to bridge the wealth divide and provide better social services. The AKP, on the other hand, has put the emphasis on traditional welfare systems and pursued a neoliberal economic policy that has kept Turkey from pursuing another IMF loan while at the same time largely failing to adequately address income inequality, poverty, and the country's significant informal sector.
Part of the problem here is that Turkey lacks a proper tax infrastructure that would progressively address income inequalities and help solve for the growing inequality brought by high interest rates and an elite-oriented growth policy. From my post last February:
A recent report by TurkStat, the Turkish government's statistical arm, reveals a growing division between rich and poor despite the high growth percentages and foreign direct investment numbers the government has been posting. While the rich have indeed been getting richer, the poor have gotten poorer. From Hurriyet Daily News:
The people in Turkey’s highest income group are 8.5 times richer than those in the poorest, up from 8.1 times in the previous survey, according to the “2009 Income Distribution and Living Conditions” report recently released by the Turkish Statistical Institute, or TurkStat.For the report, click here.
The overall poverty rate in the country likewise increased from 16.7 percent in 2008 to 17.1 percent in 2009, the report said. This means a total of 12.97 million people living in poverty, up from 11.58 million a year earlier. According to TurkStat, the monthly income set as the official poverty line for a four-person household in Turkey was increased from 767 Turkish Liras in 2008 to 825 liras in 2009.
. . . .
According to TurkStat’s figures, the richest 20 percent of people in Turkey earned 47.6 percent of the country’s total income in 2009, while the poorest 20 percent had a share of only 5.6 percent.
“Of course, as the statistics demonstrate, the gap of more than eightfold is a sign of inequality. But compared to Western Europe, this ratio is better and I don’t see a worse deterioration,” Professor Seyfettin Gürsel, the director of Bahçeşehir University’s Economic and Societal Research Center, or BETAM, told the Daily News. He said increasing income taxes in an equitable way would enable the social transfer of wealth needed to help solve the problem of income inequality.
TurkStat’s survey showed that poverty rates increased in both urban and rural areas, to 15.4 percent and 16.1 percent, respectively. The 7.09 million urban poor in 2008 went up to 7.51 million, while the total in rural areas went up from 3.2 million to 3.49 million.
. . . .
Wages constitute the largest income source for the Turkish population, 42.9 percent, compared to entrepreneurial income, at 20.4 percent, the survey said. The breakdown of statistics by region and province showed that Istanbul residents continued to have the highest levels of disposable income in 2009, with an average of 12,795 liras annually in 2009, followed by the Western Anatolia region with 11,501 liras. Southeast Anatolia had the smallest amount of disposable income, an average of 4,655 liras. The number of poor people in Southeast Anatolia increased from 895,000 in 2008 to 999,000 in 2009, or 13.7 percent of the regional population.
The numbers come at the helm of an election year in which the CHP is challenging the government on its failure to grow the economy for everyone. Moving back to a social democratic agenda, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has promised to work to bridge the wealth divide and provide better social services. The AKP, on the other hand, has put the emphasis on traditional welfare systems and pursued a neoliberal economic policy that has kept Turkey from pursuing another IMF loan while at the same time largely failing to adequately address income inequality, poverty, and the country's significant informal sector.
Part of the problem here is that Turkey lacks a proper tax infrastructure that would progressively address income inequalities and help solve for the growing inequality brought by high interest rates and an elite-oriented growth policy. From my post last February:
According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the revenue Turkey collects from personal income taxes and profits stands at less than six percent of the total GDP, and has been declining steadily since 2000. (See "Public Finances" at the bottom of Turkey's OECD statistical profile.) This is the lowest among all OECD countries. As the Anatolia News Agency pointed out in its report Monday, a decline in personal income tax collections likely shifts the burden to workers and more vulnerable members of society. Though the Agency cites no sources, I would very much like to see more analysis of the problem.Kudos to the AKP for bringing the Turkish economy out of a sad time, but it is time to balance neoliberalism with economic and social rights and democracy that delivers. Perhaps the CHP can shake things up a bit. A counter-cyclical fiscal policy would also help -- some lessons from Chile? Finally acting like a social democratic party while paying significantly less heed to the nationalist/laicist rhetoric . . . actually focusing on democracy that delivers . . . what a concept!
Also worth taking note of are the remarkable revenues taken in on cigarette sales, which no doubt hit the families of smokers quite hard. (And, in Turkey, smoking is not only an "upper-class" addiction.)
According to the United Nation Development Program's Gini index calculations, Turkey stands between Peru and Ecuador in terms of economic inequality. All European Union member countries rank far ahead of Turkey according to Gini's equality measures, in addition to Croatia and Macedonia, the two other countries that have accession partnerships with the EU.
Friday, May 14, 2010
The Gentrification of Tarlabasi
From Hurriyet Daily News:
Evictions and resettlement from municipal urban transformation projects are spreading from historical areas in Fatih to Beyoğlu’s infamous Tarlabaşı, where some renters and property owners are worried about what an expert is calling another gentrification process.According to the Beyoglu municipality, those residents who do not accept an agreement with the investors leading the project will have their homes expropriated. See Jenny White's blog, Kamil Pasha, "for a litany of destruction and decay in mostly minority neighborhoods and professions."
The “Tarlabaşı Renewal Project” started in the central Istanbul neighborhood on April 4, 2007, when its tender was given to Çalık Holding’s GAP Construction Company. Property owners said the tender was offered without their permission or consultation about the future of the buildings. Owners have formed the “Association for Solidarity with Tarlabaşı Property Owners and Renters.”
Ahmet Gün, head of the association, said he submitted a file to the European Court of Human Rights against the renewal project, saying it was a violation of the right to own property.
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Standing in the Way of Economic Growth?
Tekel workers clash with police in Ankara on Thursday, April 1. AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily NewsTekel workers won an important victory at the Council of State at the end of last month when the Administrative Division of the Council of State's General Commission ruled that the government's relegation of their employment status to 4-C temporary worker status exceeded its powers and violated the rights of the former tobacco-industry workers. The Council applied to the Constitutional Court to annul the legal validity of the status.
A few days later, Tekel workers again took to the streets to stage a one-day demonstration in Ankara on April 1. However, police would not allow them to re-occupy their previous position in front of the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions, or Türk-İş, headquarters in Ankara’s Kızılay district and clashes followed as demonstrators were pushed into other sectors of the city. Prime Minister Erdogan had strong words for the protestors: "Who are they? They are overshadowing the current positive developments in the country. The growth rate in the last quarter is 6 percent. We should focus on this. We can’t allow illegal actions."
For more on the Tekel stand off, see March 7 and Feb. 9 posts.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Tekel, Neoliberalism, and the AKP
AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily NewsPictures of class warfare continue to flash across Turkish television screens as workers for the formerly state-owned tobacco monopoly Tekel carry on their protest against the state's closure of 12 factories and plans for their re-assignment as temporary workers (4C employment status). Under the government's plans, laid off Tekel workers would be redeployed into lower-paying temporary personnel positions in other private firms for a period of ten months. Under the plans, Tekel workers would receive no severance and be faced with unemployment following the ten months. Further, they would lose their rights to strike and collectively bargain since they would no longer be working as public workers under the Labor Law.
Protests have been marked by violent street clashes with police, a seige of AKP party headquarters, and now, a hunger strike that has left at least nine protestors hospitalized. After AKP efforts to resolve the conflict by meeting with labor union representatives failed, the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Turk-Is), the main umbrella labor union here, executed a general strike in which thousands of workers across Turkey did not report to work in order to show solidarity for Tekel workers. The Labor Confederation (Hak-Is), the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DISK), the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (KESK), and the Turkish Public Workers’ Labor Union (Kamu-Sen) all participated in the strike. In a February 1 meeting with union leaders, the government had offered the workers an additional month of work, as well as severance pay and 22 days paid leave.
Turk-Is, along with the other five unions, are now calling for another meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan and Parliamnet Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin. The unions are planning to meet Friday to decide their next move.
While labor unions conflicts are not unusual in Turkey, the intensity of the Tekel workers determination have garnered the sympathies of some Turks at a time when the AKP is already facing pressure on its most recent Kurdish initiative. It is possible that the strikes could have a significant impact on drawing attention to and heightening dissent of the AKP's neoliberal economic policies. Left-leaning intellectuals have been particularly keen to highlight what they see as inconsistencies between AKP's reputed welfare orientation and its neoliberal tendencies. (For an example, see Milliyet columnist Riza Turmen's recent column.)
Turkey has historically had a very large state sector, of which Tekel is a legacy. The question of what to do with laid off workers cast out of their jobs after sometimes decades of employment is particularly difficult, and indubitably irksome to the AKP, which has shown itself eager to privatize public sector firms, boost foreign direct investment, and solidify Turkey's re-orientation as a liberal market economy based on free trade principles and a diminished public sector. While the AKP has promoted welfare policies, its emphasis has been on strengthening Turkey's largely traditional welfare regime, moving responsibilities for caring for the least vulnerable members of Turkish society out of the state's hands and into those of voluntary and philanthropic organizations, with which the Islamic-oriented party has plenty of connections.
UPDATE I (2/21) -- An estimated 20,000 people assembled in Ankara on Sat., Feb. 22, to march in support of Tekel workers. AFP reports that Prime Minister Erdogan has "given the workers until the end of the month to either accept the new status or face unemployment, threatening to send police to demolish their make-shift tent city in the heart of Ankara."
UPDATE II (2/24) -- Tekel workers are planning another demonstration for tomorrow and a sit-in for Saturday following resignation of their principal union leader following a meeting on Monday between Turk Is, DISK, KESK, and Kamu-Sen, folloing which the four unions said they would end resistance if Tekel workers decide to do so. The four unions are characterizing the demonstrations as successful, though they have said they will support Tekel workers in their final decision. This organizational rift occurs as the end-of-the-month deadline approaches.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
The Tax Discourse (Or, Lack Thereof)
I sometimes think of Turkey as the Texas of Europe, and Turkey's regressive tax policies give me all the more reason to draw the comparison. Liam Hardy at American Anatolian Viewpoint takes a look at Turkish tax structures, writing that taxes here are not as widely debated as in the United States. I wonder why this is so, particularly when Turkey's reliance on regressive taxation disadvantages workers. Is this one more result of the lack of a viable Turkish left? Are there studies providing more concrete information about how Turkey's tax system affects social inequalities? Who is empowered by Turkey's tax system, and who all is hurt?
According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the revenue Turkey collects from personal income taxes and profits stands at less than six percent of the total GDP, and has been declining steadily since 2000. (See "Public Finances" at the bottom of Turkey's OECD statistical profile.) This is the lowest among all OECD countries. As the Anatolia News Agency pointed out in its report Monday, a decline in personal income tax collections likely shifts the burden to workers and more vulnerable members of society. Though the Agency cites no sources, I would very much like to see more analysis of the problem.
Also worth taking note of are the remarkable revenues taken in on cigarette sales, which no doubt hit the families of smokers quite hard. (And, in Turkey, smoking is not only an "upper-class" addiction.)
According to the United Nation Development Program's Gini index calculations, Turkey stands between Peru and Ecuador in terms of economic inequality. All European Union member countries rank far ahead of Turkey according to Gini's equality measures, in addition to Croatia and Macedonia, the two other countries that have accession partnerships with the EU.
According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the revenue Turkey collects from personal income taxes and profits stands at less than six percent of the total GDP, and has been declining steadily since 2000. (See "Public Finances" at the bottom of Turkey's OECD statistical profile.) This is the lowest among all OECD countries. As the Anatolia News Agency pointed out in its report Monday, a decline in personal income tax collections likely shifts the burden to workers and more vulnerable members of society. Though the Agency cites no sources, I would very much like to see more analysis of the problem.
Also worth taking note of are the remarkable revenues taken in on cigarette sales, which no doubt hit the families of smokers quite hard. (And, in Turkey, smoking is not only an "upper-class" addiction.)
According to the United Nation Development Program's Gini index calculations, Turkey stands between Peru and Ecuador in terms of economic inequality. All European Union member countries rank far ahead of Turkey according to Gini's equality measures, in addition to Croatia and Macedonia, the two other countries that have accession partnerships with the EU.
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