How Much Longer Can "New" Last?

PHOTO from Radikal

Since its disappointing election result in June, the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) has been internally divided and hopelessly outmaneuvered on multiple fronts.

The delicate state in which the party and its widely perceived feckless leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, finds itself is particularly sad given that the CHP has dramatically transformed itself in the wake of the sex scandal that brought down its former stalwart leader, Deniz Baykal. In contrast to Baykal, who seemed opposed to anything in the slightest progressive, including the EU accession process, minority rights, and a more nuanced understanding of secularism (away from the antiquated and oppressive concept of laïcité), the "new CHP," as the party has since branded itself, is decidedly pro-EU, pro-minority rights, and open to renegotiating the old Kemalist framework of secularism. The party espouses a commitment to liberalism reminiscent of the old AKP, and in few places can one find a hint of the staunch nationalist chauvinism that once dominated its politics.

Yet the "new CHP" might not last much longer. Though the party had expected to win over 30 percent of the vote in June elections, it received just over 25 percent, and since then, some opinion polls show popular support diminishing. More troubling is that the old nationalist stalwarts, headed by Baykal and former party general-secretary Onder Sav, are waiting in the wings to re-assume control should the liberals fail. And fail they might. A petition originating last week has collected the necessary number of signatures to force the CHP to hold an extraordinary congress in March, at which time those Baykal and Sav are likely to attempt a challenge of Kilicdaroglu's leadership.

The call for an extraordinary congress comes at a time when Kilicdaroglu is fighting to appease those more sympathetic to the old guard of his party. These efforts include Kilicdaroglu's visits to Silivri Prison, where numerous alleged members of the Ergenekon organization are being detained on charges of terrorism. These include CHP parliamentarians Mustafa Balbay and Mehmet Haberal, who the CHP ran for parliament and placed high on their party list despite their association with Ergenekon and known nationalist views and much to the advantage of the AKP, which pointed to their election as evidence that the CHP had not changed at all.

Upon his Nov. 9 visit, Kilicdaroglu called Silivri Prison a concentration camp for those who disagreed with the government, and it is these remarks that prompted a zealous prosecutor to charge him with insulting state officials and attempting to influence the judiciary, both of which are illegal and broadly interpreted under the current Penal Code. The prosecutor also filed a request that Kilicdaroglu's parliamentary immunity be lifted. In a fiery denunciation of the charges against him, Kilicaroglu responded in turn that he wished hismmunity would be removed and filed a formal application to the effect so that he could stand trial to face the charges against him -- a move followed by 132 parliamentarians from his party. Kilicdaroglu further said that he could be the next to end up in Silivri Prison, and perhaps even at the gallows.

Yet it is highly unlikely that Prime Minister Erdogan will allow for the removal of Kilicdaroglu's immunity (for more on this, see Murat Yetkin's column, in Turkish), and in fact, Erdogan has spoken against it, accusing Kilicadaroglu of cheap theatrics. Careful not to attract more international criticism or be responsible for what could happen if Kilicdaroglu were brought to trial, Erdogan is instead hoping Kilicdaroglu will fall victim to the divisiveness within his own party. Plus, Erdogan does not have much to fear at the moment from the CHP, which due to circumstances largely beyond its control, has turned into more of a sideshow than a real contestant for power.

That said, Kilicdaroglu, like other progressive elements in the CHP, are in a difficult spot. If they are too progressive, they will lose support from staunch Kemalists sympathetic to the old guard views within their party; yet if they take up the cause of two rather unpopular figures (Balbay and Haberal) and move too much toward the old rhetoric, they are likely to lose the liberals who voted for them in the last election. Kilicdaroglu's most recent attempts to portray himself as a victim under threat of being sent to Silivri are an attempt to take a hardline and demonstrate solidarity with Balbay and Haberal while at the same time seize an opportunity to criticize the specially authorized courts the government has setup to try suspected Ergenekon suspects. Yet, in a large sector of the Turkish public's eyes, this gesturing is more likely to place Kilicdaroglu and the CHP in the camp of Balbay and Haberal rather than as true liberals who stand up for everyone's rights.

The CHP, for its part, is not sure where it stands. Before elections, the party called for an amendment to one of the three currently inviolable first three articles of the constitution that would remove ethnically chauvinist tracings from the current definition of Turkish citizenship  (a key demand of nationalist Kurdish nationalists) only to return to the position that the first three articles should not be amended. Similarly, when the party boycotted parliament, it demanded the release of its own parliamentarians, saying little about the release of the six BDP-supported candidates also imprisoned and unable to take their seats.

Though these inconsistencies are no doubt a symptom of the democracy pains faced by the CHP as its new leadership struggles to revitalize the party and overturn Baykal's legacy (Baykal dominated the party for over 18 years), party officials should recognize that the increase it did make in its votes -- while shy from the 30 percent hoped for -- is the result of a more progressive, inclusive party that, at least in its campaign rhetoric, espoused hope for a "Turkey for everyone." The party did pick up votes from many liberals and progressives, a large number of whom have become disenchanted with the AKP and its increasing authoritarian tendencies. That said, this new support extended to the CHP is still incipient and not wide-reaching, and few voters, even if they voted for the party, trust it will deliver on the social democratic policies promised. Support for Kilicdaroglu, who simply does not compare to Erdogan at a rhetorical level, is probably lower.

So far, Erdogan has taken advantage of the CHP's dilemma. Kilicdaroglu, an Alevi with family ties to Dersim, where in 1937-8 over 10,000 Alevi (and Zaza) Kurds were killed in air strikes by Turkish forces, has long-proven to be more liberal on the Kurdish issue than the old guard within his party. The strikes occurred under the leadership of the CHP (though a much older, and obviously much different party), and in the last years of Ataturk's life. In November, in a brilliant political move, Erdogan apologized for the killings, a move sure to spark division within the CHP. Former CHP deputy chairman Onur Oymen's remarks toward Alevis had divided the party at the end of 2009 (before Kilicdaroglu came to power), and the prime minister knew it would divide the party once more, putting pressure on Kilicdaroglu at a time when he was simply trying to stay alive in his party and avoid an extraordinary party congress, which looks like it is now happening.

With Kilicdaroglu now evermore associated with Balbay and Haberal, especially given that both men were behind the CHP's boycott of parliament after the elections, Erdogan will now take credit for not removing the opposition leader's immunity -- for taking the high road. Kilicdaroglu will instead be let to fall on his own sword or that of Baykal, with whom Erdogan visited this past December, in order to, reportedly, discuss allowing Haberal to visit his dying mother.

Whether the "new CHP" will survive attempts by the stalwarts in its wings to bring back the old "Party of No" is yet to be seen, but is of critical importance at a time when anything liberal and progressive should be preserved. There has not been a viable opposition party in Turkey since the AKP came to power, which indubitably allowed the ruling party to consolidate its power over the past ten years. Though "the new CHP" is perhaps not yet viable, it is the closest thing Turkey has seen to a legitimate social democratic party since Bulent Ecevit's troubled Democratic Left Party in the 1990s. Baykal might no longer be holding the reins of the CHP, but it is not quite clear whether Kilicdaroglu is either, nor whether he will be able to hold onto power much longer.

Sarigul Throws In Support for the CHP

DHA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

On Tuesday, Sisli mayor and leader of the Turkey Movement for Change (THD) Mustafa Sarigul announced a cancellation of his plans to form a new poitical party in Turkey. Instead, Sarigul said the change taking place within the CHP was hopeful and seemed to hint that Kilicdaroglu's election obviated the need for a new leftist political party. Sarigul was expelled from the CHP in 2006 following a fiercely contested bid for the party's leadership.

For more on Sarigul and the TDH, see Feb. 9 post.

Enter Kilicdaroglu: Toward a New CHP?

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Returned again from Diyarbakir, I spent yesterday in Kocaeli listening off-and-on again to the CHP's party congress on the radio. A civil servant who served for years as a public accountant, newly-elected CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu made his name by becomng one of the CHP's most aggressive top party members when it came to attacking corruption scandals within the AKP. In his speech yesterday, Kilicdaroglu talked on corruption, as well as issues of poverty and unemployment. Though the party platform has changed little, Kilicdaroglu has replaced three-fourths of the CHP's Party Assembly's 80 members, removing many members close to now fallen Baykal and causing many to speculate that the CHP is in for big changes. This may well be wishful thinking, and only time will tell, but the exuberance in the leftist press is likely to keep Kilicdaroglu and talk of a "new CHP" in the news for the next week.

Other Turkey goings-on are falling a far distant second in the news cycle, all eyes instead focused on a constant stream of punditry as to just what the new leader means for Turkish politics and the CHP in coming 2011 parliamentary elections. Might the AKP be forced into a coalition with the CHP? And, might Turkey finally have a reasonably powerful social democratic presence in party politics, becoming more than the "party of no" that frustrated even the most entrenched AKP opponents during the Baykal years? The enthusiasm definitely evinces people's frustration with the CHP over the years and a yearning by many people for a strong alternative. Whether the CHP will live up to expectations is another question altogether, but at the moment, the sheer fact that so many seem hopeful that a renewed CHP might bring about change spells out just how much people have wanted change and just how deep the frustration with Baykal and the CHP's "party of no" politics has been in recent years.

For some past analysis on the CHP and Baykal's former iron-clad hold over the party, see my analysis following the CHP's 2008 party congress, as well as this broader take on the state of the Turkish left. The CHP's politics in recent years have indeed been so centered in being in the opposition, in addition to emphasizing Turkish nationalism over democratic socialism, that the party has often found itself facng condemnation from the Socialist International (for example, see July 25 post).

Kilicdaroglu's civil servant profile and calm manner (the latter, combined with a slight physical resemblence, has earned him comparisons to Ghandi) have been heralded by some as a positive development, perhaps leading to a more reasoned, less exhibitionist politics. Yet this same profile has also caused others to dismiss the new leader as potentially weak and inexperienced. Significantly, Kilicdaroglu hales from Tunceli, and a practicing Alevi, a religious minority group that has a long history of close ties to the CHP and had become increasingly critical of what some Alevis say is a Sunni Islamist bias in the AKP, the CHP's support for Kilicdaroglu might also have something to do with recent attempts within the party to broaden its support base and set it more apart from the ultra-nationalist MHP, which has gained votes in recent years largely at the expense of the CHP. Whereas the CHP under Baykal often seemed to resist AKP-led reform for the sheer sake of resistance, the MHP staked out a more pragmatic position, staunchly opposing reforms for minority rights and in the area of freedom of expression while forging alliances with the AKP on issues involving secularism, such as the AKP-MHP headscarf legislation in early 2008. In this way, the MHP has managed to win religious nationalists while the CHP has remained stagnate, its supporters increasingly frustrated with the party's intransigence and inner-party authoritarianism. Here is an excerpt from a piece I wrote back in February 2008:

Highly-criticized in liberal circles, comprised of those who seek an expansion of personal liberties, but yet are critical of AKP's pro-market, libertarian-type ideology, Baykal's CHP is frequently seen as a barrier to the entrance of a viable leftist politics. While AKP exists as the only pro-Europe party, the party's center-right, liberal democratic credentials remain unchallenged. AKP, perhaps best considered a center-right party akin to Germany's Christian Democrats, is thus the only party capable of courting pro-Europe liberals. Thus, the leftist constituency in Turkish politics is left without adequate representation, their social democratic values left unvoiced in AKP's center-right politics or lost completely thanks to CHP's unrelenting nationalism and demagoguery, a seemingly right-wing, conservative politics more in line with the proto-fascist MHP than with the social democratic parties of Europe.

So, what is CHP's relation to the left? In name, the oldest party in Turkey and the party of Atatürk, CHP underwent many transformations in its long and turbulent history. Following the rise of leftist politics in the 1960s, CHP became the manifestation of Turkey's mainstream left. Under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit in the late 1960s and 1970s, CHP espoused a social democratic politics built on a Kemalist foundation. In many ways, its politics mirrored that found in the emerging social democracies of Europe, and it even joined the Socialist International. While it is true that the party always held true to a rigid protection of the state's secular identity, it also promoted civil liberties, and under Ecevit's leadership, decried military interference in politics. However, following the 1980 coup and a complete re-working of the political left, CHP re-emerged weak alongside an array of other parties, all of which fell short of representing the leftism that had changed the face of Turkish politics in the two decades prior to the military's violent intervention.

. . . .

In so many ways, the demise of the Turkish left can be attributed to its' members own dogmatic prescriptions for the role of religion in society. The left's strict interpretations of secularism and conflation of the Islamist threat have proved a serious distraction for the advocacy of the social and economic reforms that typify leftist existence in other countries. As the sole inheritor of the left's legacy, CHP is a frightfully sad representation of its past history. Caught up in what it imagines as a virtual state of war against Turkey's internal and external enemies, the CHP and its secular elite are more likely to espouse Hobbes than Rousseau or Mill. Rather than protecting free speech, it must be stifled to preserve the integrity of a state facing threats from Islamists and Kurds. Rather than allowing for democracy, elected parties must be periodically closed because they might threaten the nationalist or secularist order. Rather than joining truly social democratic nations in Europe, EU accession must be held circumspect because it involves a surrendering of centralized state control, a re-negotiation of secularism, and countenance liberalism, for individuals vested with too much liberty might act contrary to state ideology and the carefully devised plans of the ruling elite.

Many liberals have left CHP, casting relucant votes for the center-right and vaguely Islamist AKP rather than continue to support the stumbling block Baykal and the CHP have thrown up in the way of Turkey's larger political development. How many of the many "floating voters" that cast ballots for AKP in 2002, and again in 2004 and 2007, were disgruntled leftists, fed up with Baykal and CHP authoritarianism? Other liberals have continued to support CHP, but not without due anguish. Still, yet another group, perhaps not liberal, per se, but frustrated with Baykal and the CHP status quo while equally afraid of AKP's economic liberalization schemes and "creeping conservatism," continue to support CHP rather than wed themselves to a more liberal vision of Turkish politics, a liberal ideology that if properly formulated, might coalesce the reasons for their resentment toward AKP with an incipient support for individual liberties and democratic pluralism.

Since I wrote this, disenfranchisement with the AKP among liberals and leftists has only continued to grow, oftentimes alongside fears of what many read here as the party's attempts to consolidate its hold on power -- the reason why many who would under other circumstances not be opposed to the judicial reform promised by the constitutional amendment package strongly opposed the AKP's efforts this spring, an opposition al the mroe heightened by the AKP's conducting of the Ergneekon investigation and seemignly self-interested attempts at self-preservation (for example, its exclusion of reform of the 10 percent threshold and failure to adopt the Venice Criteria for party closure in the reform package). Under these circumstances, a truly re-generated CHP has an even better chance of attracting voters than it did two years ago.

However, there are reasons for guarded skepticism as well. Kilicdaroglu would not likely have been elected had he too many radical changes in mind, and CHP Secretary-General Onder Sav will continue to play a powerful ahnd. Additionally, in drafting the list for the Party Assembly, it is clear plenty of compromises had to be made. Kilicdaroglu lauded Baykal as a great leader yesterday, and said little on the most controversial issues, like secularism and minority rights. Instead, he focused his criticism on the AKP, accusing it of using religion and ethnicity in politics to raise political tensions while offering little in terms of concrete solutions for Turkey's most pressing problems. On the Kurdish question, despite his Tunceli background (a province that is heavily Kurdish), Kilicaroglu, even more than the AKP, stressed the economic dimension of the problem with little discussion of cultural or expanded poltical rights for Kurds other than lowering the 10 percent threshold, a move that would indeed benefit the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party. (On the other side of the equation, Kilicdaroglu twice broke with his party on minority issues: one, in issuing strong criticism of then-CHP deputy party leader Onur Oymen's incendiary remarks that Turkey's attack on Alevis in Dersim in 1938 was justified, and again, in hinting that the CHP might support for an amnesty for PKK fighters.) There is also concern that a mild-manned Kilicdaroglu, who has less experience as a politician than others within top CHP ranks, is up for the job of governing a party with so many strong personalities, many of whom will likely vying for power in Baykal's absence. There are also, most cynically, and on the far right, some opinion leaders who have characterized the Baykal scandal and Kilicdaroglu's subsequent election as a project of Ergenekon. (For mixed reactions in the Turkish press, click here.)

What the future holds is almost anyone's guess, but right now many are just simply enjoying the prospect of change. For more talk of Kilicdaroglu's election, see Milliyet columnist Hasan Cemal, who uses a comparison between former CHP leaders Bulent Ecevit and Baykal to delineate two different and divergent roads which the CHP under Kilicdaroglu might take. See also liberal Attilla Yayla's skeptical analysis, as well as Levent Koker's discussion within the context of the ongoing constitutional amendment process.

Bye Bye, Baykal

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

A sex scandal has caused long-time CHP leader Deniz Baykal to resign from power. Baykal has headed the CHP since 1992 (with a brief break in 1999, after which he returned to power 15 months later), and clung to power so tightly and in such good health that it is a common joke to think of him as sort of android who will never die or weaken. However, a tape capturing a most embarrasingly human moment in which Baykal is seen having sexual relations with a fellow CHP parliamentarian seems to have brought the seemingly impenetrable leader down -- at least for the moment. The sex tape was released on Friday, and Baykal has blamed the government, saying it is no surprise that the tape has emerged in the heat of the constitutional amendment process. The CHP's party congress is scheduled for May 22-23, and Baykal, who had expected to run, has said he will not. Baykal has long been blamed as the principal reason for intra-party authoritarianism within the CHP, and his resignation opens up the possibility to change the party, the social democratic credentials have long been in doubt (see past posts).


UPDATE I (5/11) -- From Hurriyet Daily News:

CHP deputy Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is being tipped as a potential new leader in a different mold from the rest. Also known as “Ghandi Kemal,” Kılıçdaroğlu's star shined brightly during his candidacy for Istanbul mayor, where he raised the CHP's votes by five points over the previous election.

Reports said Kılıçdaroğlu's stance on the matter would become clearer in the next few days.

Other names mentioned include Samsun Deputy Haluk Koç, who has previously ran against Baykal, as well as former Social Democratic Populist Party, or SHP, leader Murat Karayalçın, who was the architect of the previous SHP and CHP unity.

Textile businessman Umut Oran, who ran against Baykal at the convention two years ago, and academic Süheyl Batum are other possible candidates.

Mustafa Sarigul: A Progressive for Turkey?

PHOTO from Hürriyet Daily News

Emphasizing the need for change with an enthusiasm for grassroots organizing and a new kind of politics akin to that of Barack Obama during the America presidential campaign, Mustafa Sarigul, the three-term mayor of Istanbul's Sisli district, is positioning himself to pose a serious challenge to both the AKP and the CHP in the November 2011 parliamentary elections. Sarigul resigned from the CHP last year following a dramatic fallout with the party resulting from his consistent challenging of CHP leader Deniz Baykal. TDH will become a formal political party once it clears formal legal hurdles, at which point the mayor says he will resign to focus on the 2011 elections.

At an event held for foreign press this afternoon, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States Faruk Logoglu, who has joined the TDH outlined the movement's plans and how its agenda differs from the political parties in power at present. Logoglu spoke alongside his youthful female colleague, 32-year-old Zeynep Dereli, who advises the TDH on foreign policy issues. Elaborating on TDH's plans to establish a broad-based social democratic party, Logoglu talked of the need for an alternative in Turkish politics at a time he said is defined by economic uncertainty and disenchantment with the government. Key to TDH's agenda is the European Union accession process, which Logoglu and Dereli characterized as stagnate under the AKP. Dereli went so far as to question the commitment of the AKP to join the EU, and both spoke of the need to re-focus Turkish foreign policy on transatlantic relations. Other big ticket items were the need to bridge the development gap in the southeast, as well as the wealth divide throughout the country; reform of the judiciary, including an overhaul of the High Council of Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK) and the need to expedite judicial proceedings; repeals of restrictions on freedom of expression facilitated by Article 301 and 318 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK); revision of the constitution and other laws in place that allow for military intervention in civilian affairs; and a rejuvenated initiative that would include engagement with Kurdish actors outside the state.

Logoglu said TDH polling has the party winning at least 13 percent of the vote, with more of its votes coming from the AKP's network of support than that of the CHP. Confident TDH would easily clear the 10 percent threshold needed by a political party to enter the Parliament, Logoglu confidently asserted the TDH's main advantages came in its early organizing efforts and ability to attract women and youth. These two groups are repeatedly emphasized as key demographic targets for the future party, which Logoglu claimed were also quite active in its leadership. The TDH has a gender quota of 30 percent in place at all electoral levels. According to the TDH, the movement has so far mobilized over 600,000 volunteers and established offices in 79 Turkish cities. Plans for offices in Brussels and Washington are in the works.

Also emphasized was the TDH's plans for a democratic inner-party structure, which the CHP has long lacked and to which Sarigul, among others, have fallen victim. CHP leader Deniz Baykal has held the CHP chairmanship for the vast majority of its post-coup history, and with an iron-clad grip that has long fueled charges of inner-party authoritarianism. Contrarily, the TDH said its new party chairmanship will be elected by a vote of all registered party members and will have a term limit of two years. Members of parliament will also be determined through a more democratic process rather than by headquarters, and the positions of party leader and prime minister will be held by two separate persons (like in Germany's SDP).

I have written frequently about the lack of a viable Turkish left in Turkey, especially during the past years when the CHP's increasingly nationalist stances have been so extreme as to place its membership in the Socialist International (SI) in serious jeopardy. For a comprehensive post on the CHP I posted before last year's municpal elections, see Jan. 11, 2009 post; for my first, and longest post on the demise of the Turkish left, see my Feb. 13, 2008 post.


TDH on the Issues

The Kurdish Conflict: Logoglu emphasized the need for Kurdish actors to be involved in the Kurdish process and expressed criticism of the state-centered conflict resolution efforts. Specifically, he highlighted the dearth of AKP consultation with civil society groups, as well as the delay to bring reform proposals to parliament and the domination of the Ministry of the Interior in terms of process. Twice Logoglu laid out alternative process by which the state would devise a plan, submit it summarily to parliament, seek civil society consultation, take it back to parliament, pass it, and then implement it. Logoglu did not address engaging combatants in any sort of negotiation effort, which, of course, would be the most difficult thing to sell in Turkey. According to Logoglu, the time it has taken for reforms in the AKP's Kurdish opening to go to parliament has solidified opposition and seriously imperiled current reform efforts, especially as the Kurdish DTP, which favors negotiations with the PKK, was largely shutout of the process.

The Transatlantic Relationship: Both Logoglu and Dereli emphasized that the EU accession process, in addition to Turkey's larger transatlantic position, was not merely a foreign policy choice, but a wider strategic objective with profound implications for Turkish domestic policy. Dereli sharply derided Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's foreign policy, saying the "zero problems with neighbors policy" was unoriginal in that this is, of course, what all countries want, while implying that Turkey must make strategic choices that do not jeopardize its transatlantic position or alienate its neighbors such as Israel or Azerbaijan. Specifically, she mentioned Iran, iterating her fears that Turkey would refrain from voting for sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council and thus further jeopardizing its standing with Europe and America. According to Dereli, Turkey should vote with its transatlantic partners. Logoglu also criticized Davutoglu, lauding some elements of the current Turkish foreign policy while pointing out that even in areas of great progress, such as Turkey's rapprochement with Syria, fundamental issues remain unsettled.

Cyprus: While wholeheartedly supportive of the EU accession process, Logoglu was candid about the problems with Cyprus and the necessity to pursue conflict resolution efforts. Dereli was optimistic despite acknowledging the unlikelihood of Talat winning in April elections, saying that perhaps the hardline Eroglu will be more able to negotiate a deal that is satisfactory to hardline parties in borth Northern Cyprus and Turkey. For his part, Eroglu acknowledged the inconsistensy in Turkish pledges to open up its ports to Cyprus, but was also sharply critical of the EU decision to admit Cyprus and not follow through on its old promise that Greece's 1981 admission would not adversely affect prospects for Turkish membership.

The Economy: Both Logoglu and Dereli pointed to the development gap between Turkey's West and East, declaring that the AKP has done little to address fundamental inequalities. Dereli evinced her argument by citing that a mere 10 percent of government subsidies for new investment were spent in the southeast while 35 percent were spent in the Marmara region. Logoglu declared the need for even greater foreign direct investment, which has been a tremendous accomplishment of the AKP, as well as the need to continue to develop a free market economy that is globally competitive.

Secularism: Logoglu spoke of a secularism that is "respectful" of all beliefs, and the need to find solutions (accomodations?) on deeply divisive issues like the headscarf.

UPDATE I (2/18) -- Sarigul is voicing his opposition to the Council of State's recent decision on reducing the difference in coefficients between students graduating from imam-hatip and vocational schools and those graduating from other high schools.

Tekel, Neoliberalism, and the AKP

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Pictures of class warfare continue to flash across Turkish television screens as workers for the formerly state-owned tobacco monopoly Tekel carry on their protest against the state's closure of 12 factories and plans for their re-assignment as temporary workers (4C employment status). Under the government's plans, laid off Tekel workers would be redeployed into lower-paying temporary personnel positions in other private firms for a period of ten months. Under the plans, Tekel workers would receive no severance and be faced with unemployment following the ten months. Further, they would lose their rights to strike and collectively bargain since they would no longer be working as public workers under the Labor Law.

Protests have been marked by violent street clashes with police, a seige of AKP party headquarters, and now, a hunger strike that has left at least nine protestors hospitalized. After AKP efforts to resolve the conflict by meeting with labor union representatives failed, the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Turk-Is), the main umbrella labor union here, executed a general strike in which thousands of workers across Turkey did not report to work in order to show solidarity for Tekel workers. The Labor Confederation (Hak-Is), the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DISK), the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (KESK), and the Turkish Public Workers’ Labor Union (Kamu-Sen) all participated in the strike. In a February 1 meeting with union leaders, the government had offered the workers an additional month of work, as well as severance pay and 22 days paid leave.

Turk-Is, along with the other five unions, are now calling for another meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan and Parliamnet Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin. The unions are planning to meet Friday to decide their next move.

While labor unions conflicts are not unusual in Turkey, the intensity of the Tekel workers determination have garnered the sympathies of some Turks at a time when the AKP is already facing pressure on its most recent Kurdish initiative. It is possible that the strikes could have a significant impact on drawing attention to and heightening dissent of the AKP's neoliberal economic policies. Left-leaning intellectuals have been particularly keen to highlight what they see as inconsistencies between AKP's reputed welfare orientation and its neoliberal tendencies. (For an example, see Milliyet columnist Riza Turmen's recent column.)

Turkey has historically had a very large state sector, of which Tekel is a legacy. The question of what to do with laid off workers cast out of their jobs after sometimes decades of employment is particularly difficult, and indubitably irksome to the AKP, which has shown itself eager to privatize public sector firms, boost foreign direct investment, and solidify Turkey's re-orientation as a liberal market economy based on free trade principles and a diminished public sector. While the AKP has promoted welfare policies, its emphasis has been on strengthening Turkey's largely traditional welfare regime, moving responsibilities for caring for the least vulnerable members of Turkish society out of the state's hands and into those of voluntary and philanthropic organizations, with which the Islamic-oriented party has plenty of connections.


UPDATE I (2/21) -- An estimated 20,000 people assembled in Ankara on Sat., Feb. 22, to march in support of Tekel workers. AFP reports that Prime Minister Erdogan has "given the workers until the end of the month to either accept the new status or face unemployment, threatening to send police to demolish their make-shift tent city in the heart of Ankara."

UPDATE II (2/24) -- Tekel workers are planning another demonstration for tomorrow and a sit-in for Saturday following resignation of their principal union leader following a meeting on Monday between Turk Is, DISK, KESK, and Kamu-Sen, folloing which the four unions said they would end resistance if Tekel workers decide to do so. The four unions are characterizing the demonstrations as successful, though they have said they will support Tekel workers in their final decision. This organizational rift occurs as the end-of-the-month deadline approaches.

Socialist International Condemns CHP Opposition to Military Courts Reform

The Socialist International (SI) has condemned the CHP's opposition to recent legislation requiring civilian courts to try military officials who pose threats to national security, constitutional violations, organizing armed groups and attempts to topple the government in peace time. The CHP had supported the legislation during its passage, but after claimed it had been duped by the AKP. The SI has released a statement quoted from in Today's Zaman:

The Council of the Socialist International … condemns in the strongest terms the coup d'état against the government of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales in Honduras,” inspiring people on the streets in Turkey to carry banners with the message “The CHP can now join the government in Honduras,” accusing the party of aligning itself with coup supporters. The SI defines itself as an “association of political parties and organizations which seek to establish democratic socialism.” Therefore, political parties affiliated with the SI should by definition be social democrats and should never inspire this kind of public criticism.

Click here for full article.

This criticism from TDZ is not new, and is echoed not only by TDZ, but by leftist Turkish intellectuals and critics who actually have a stake in the SI and have long criticized CHP's inconsistent policy positions alongside its SI membership. (See, for just one example, Baskın Oran's call in 2008 that the CHP be expelled from the SI.) The SI, for its part, has also long been critical of the CHP. This July, CHP leader Deniz Baykal did not go to the SI's summit in Greece. Former vice-chairman of SI, Baykal lost his seat to Iraq's Jalal Talabani.

The SI, unlike some conservative entities in Europe, has long been supportive of Turkey's accession to the European Union. However, in a rather bizarre twist for outsiders of Turkish politics, the CHP has often opposed efforts to pass important political reforms required for Turkey to come into harmony with the EU's Copenhagen criteria for membership. The CHP opposed cosmetic reforms to Article 301, amendments to Turkey's law on foundations, and reforms pertaining to expanding the cultural rights of Turkey's Kurdish minority. It might be said that the CHP would be more supportive of these reforms if they were not the party in opposition, but the CHP's political positions and nationalist rhetoric is all that most people hear. The generation of this opposition rhetoric seems to be more the priority of Baykal's CHP than any effort to work with the AKP on developing substantive policy to move Turkey all the closer to satisfying the EU's political criteria for membership. For another socialist European leader's take on the CHP, German Foreign Minister Frank Walter-Steinmeier's recent comments. TDZ columnists Klaus Jurgens and Orhan Kemal Cengiz, neither leftists, echo familiar criticisms of the CHP regarding the inconsistensy of its policy positions with the SI platform.

I have posted rather frequently on the state of the Turkish left on this blog, and would refer to my previous posts for more information on the political context in which CHP's conservative political positions are taken. Not since Bülent Ecevit's DSP has there been a powerful Turkish party on the left that has addressed traditional social democratic concerns like the expansion of neoliberalism rather than focus on the preservation of Turkey's traditional nationalist/laicist regime. See also Ron Marguille's article from 2007 on the state of Turkish socialism in response to the AKP's neoliberal moderate Islamism.

Honing in on CHP

At Turkey's founding as an independent state, Atatürk embraced the European ideals of the age in a way that no Ottoman sultan had ever imagined and at his death in 1938, Anatolia looked and felt drastically different than it had at Turkey's founding in 1923. Indeed, Atatürk not only embraced European values, but emulated them. Modelling the new Turkic republic on the European states of the day, the "Immortal Leader" adopted European legal codes and replaced Ottoman institutions to resemble those of Europe. Central to this nation-building project was Atatürk's wholesale adoption of the same European-style nationalisms that were reshaping Europe. As David Fromkin sadly narrates in A Peace to End All Peace, Turkey was not alone in this endeavor, but was undoubtedly the most successful. Unlike other nation-states carved out of the former Ottoman Empire, the Turkish nation-state was not designed by Europeans, but by Atatürk. Building atop the nationalist ideology of the Young Turks who preceded him, Atatürk carved Turkey out along the same nationalist lines that had come to shape those communities in the Americas and Europe to which Benedict Anderson has referred as "imagined." As one of the first nationalist movements organized against imperialist power, Atatürk brought together the peoples of Anatolia as Turks, romanized the Turkish language, worked to establish nationalist narratives of a shared tribal past, and sought diligently to "Turkify" the Ottoman institutions that had previously governed the Anatolian heartland. An ardent admirer of the French Revolution, Atatürk assembled Turkish nationalism along French lines, an educated, noble project built in the name of modernity, progress, and Enlightenment rationalism. Indeed, many of Turkey's liberals have come to denigrate the Turkish nationalist project as "Jacobin," inferring that just as French revolutionists reached particularly troubling and misguided excesses, so do some similarly self-avowed Turkish nationalists.

The nation-state pervaded what was both a project for state and society and came to define Kemalism, a loose-based ideology prescribing the political order that is still very much descriptive of contemporary relations between the Turkish state and society. Kemalism was defined in 1931 by CHP, the country's only political party in operation at the time. If one was (is?) a Kemalist, one swore adherence to what CHP considered to be the six principles of the state's existence: secularism (bearing close resemblance to French laicism), nationalism (very much influenced by European conceptions of flag and country), republicanism (in the sense that the Jacobins rejected French monarchy only to install institutions that would hardly be considered democratic by contemporary definitions), populism (very much resonant in European discourse following the First World War as it placed the interests of the nation over those of class politics, feared in Europe as Bolshevik), revolutionism (Orwellian insomuch as this meant specific support of the Kemalist status quo), and statism (recognizing the dominance of the state in the economic realm along similar lines and thought of in relation to European étatisme). The endurance of Kemalism is evidenced by CHP's continued symbolic use of the six arrows (alti ok)in its party emblem. These principles were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937 and continue to be the foundation of Turkish governance. (Previously posted on Sept. 16.)

Although CHP ventured leftward during the 1960s and 1970s, placing a great amount of its emphasis on social and economic issues in opposition to the center-right, the party remained for the most part true to its laicist approach to Islam, its statist reproach for federalism, and its nationality-based understanding of Turkish citizenship. While its commitment to laicism prevented it from making inroads with religious Turks, its statism/nationalism compromised the party's ability to deal effectively with ethnic minorities. Here, I think it is useful to note that the CHP, especially during the 1970s, was championed by the country's Alevi religious minority, whose support for secularism and democratic socialism fit well with the CHP agenda. Revealing here is that Alevi identity is largely religious, and not ethnically based, and that Alevis saw their rights against a Sunni religious majority as guaranteed by CHP's commitment to secularism. (I have written some about this right-left conflict in my historical tracing of MHP and the extreme Turkish "right.") Whereas nationalist groups on the right have traditionally been both ethnically and religiously chauvinist, CHP's nationalism is more narrowly tailored, keeping religion well removed from state affairs while protecting what many in the party see as the integrity of the Turkish nation. After the 1980 coup, and largely as a function of leftist politics being marginalized in the public sphere, CHP focused less on social democracy, and more on issues pertaining to secularism, state security, and Turkish nationality. Even as Turkey opened up in the 1990s, this remained a large part of the party's focus, and in recent years, under the leadership of Deniz Baykal, so much so and to the exclusion of any legitimate leftist agenda that the party was threatened with expulsion from the Socialist International. Turkish citizens have also decried the party's abandonment of any meaningfully leftist politics -- for example, see Genç Siviller. (I have explored these issues before in previous posts, see especially my Feb. 12 post of last year.)

CHP leader Deniz Baykal places a CHP pin on a woman's chador this past November. Baykal proclaimed that no Turkish citizen should be discriminated against based on their attire, a reversal of his party's staunch political and legal opposition to constitutional amendments made just last January to allow covered women to enter university under certain conditions.

Although CHP affirmed these dogmas in its party convention this past April and amidst the AKP closure case, it seems the party has turned an about face ahead of upcoming local elections. For example, in a most controversial and stunningly surprising move, the party has endorsed opening CHP membership to female candidates and party members who wear chadors. In Baykal's words: "It is not right to discriminate against people because of what they wear. It is not right to make deductions about them based on their attire." The move is particularly bizarre given that the chador is in many ways more controversial than the headscarf, although the debate about Islamic garb and politics is quite complicated. (See Mustafa Şentop's discussion of the chador initiative.) However, polls revealed the political acumen behind such a move, which is surely designed to capture religious conservatives and perhaps even some liberals who have long been disenchanted with Baykal's CHP. Some liberals praised the move as progressive, and the opening was hailed by Joost Lagendijk, co-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, as a welcome step forward.

Perhaps most surprising is that CHP's turnabout also includes criticism of the early republican period, previous criticism of which has landed journalists, politicians, and intellectuals like Atilla Yayla in jail. On December 3, Baykal declared, "“People with traditional clothes were not allowed to enter Atatürk Avenue [in Ankara] then. They were ordered to change their clothes and wear modern ones to be able to enter the avenue. We are a political party. Will we classify people in accordance with their attire? Is this possible? This is Turkey. People may wear whatever they want and go wherever they want.” Such comments were spiritedly reported in the liberal press:

"Little time left before second republicanism," the Taraf daily announced on its front page yesterday, implying that the secularist politician may set Kemalism aside and turn to a new understanding of republicanism.

Star's [Mehmet] Altan shared the same belief, saying that Baykal's new move stands as a litmus test for his commitment to becoming a new type of republican or, in other words, a next-generation liberal.

"When the CHP received a harsh defeat at the hands of the AK Party in the July 22, 2007 elections, party officials pointed to Baykal as the reason for the failure and accused him of turning his back on second republicanism. Second republicanism means to make the republic more democratic and save it from Kemalism. The CHP leader is going through self-criticism and heading toward second republicanism," he noted.

However, there are also many skeptics, such as TDZ columnist Fatma Disli and Marmara University Professor Levent Köker. Just what CHP tends to do in terms of securing actual policy in line with its newly expressed sentiments is unclear, but it is unlikely that Baykal will be able to counter much of this skepticism given CHP's past history without taking serious steps to renounce the party's past policy decisions, including its vehement opposition to the headscarf amendments last spring. As Saban Kardas at EDM reports, the move has also caused fighting within CHP: [

T]he “chador initiative” has provoked enmity within the CHP. Baykal’s call for a critical reflection on the party’s past angered more radical voices. Necla Arat, a parliamentary deputy from Istanbul and one of the fervent advocates of the headscarf ban, disparaged Baykal. She said that “criticizing practices during the era of Ataturk and Ismet Inonu [the second president of Turkey] because of ‘one-party-rule’ is unfortunate. My friends and I have started wondering whether the party is betraying its heritage [reddi miras].” Scores of other CHP deputies reportedly share Arat’s opinion (Hurriyet, December 4).

A rather surprising attack on Baykal came from the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Devlet Bahceli, who said that this issue was, in fact, a non-issue and did not correspond to the real problems of the people. He said, “As part of the Greater Middle East Project, there is an attempt to shape Turkish politics through moderate Islam… The Right pillar of moderate Islam is the AKP…Is there an attempt to erect a Left pillar of moderate Islam through this opening?” (Anadolu Ajansi, December 9).

Baykal issued a written response to Bahceli, in which he drew a distinction between a legitimate right to certain religious freedoms and moderate Islam as a political project. Baykal attacked Bahceli by saying, “only those who either abuse religion or come from a tradition of setting political traps [referring to the MHP’s controversial role in urging the AKP to pass the constitutional amendments on headscarves] will dislike this [the CHP’s defense of religious freedom]” (ANKA, December 10).

Baykal indeed took a bold step by opening one-party rule to debate and indicating that the CHP would defend religious freedom, but there are grounds for being skeptical about the prospects of the “chador initiative.” As political scientist Bekir Berat Ozipek says, having ruled the country single-handedly during the one-party-era (1923-1950), the CHP has not been able to adapt itself to competitive electoral politics since Turkey moved to multi-party rule in the 1950s (Today’s Zaman, December 8). Indeed, the CHP’s critical distance from the masses and their lifestyles and its modernization project of transforming Turkish society have shaped the identity of the party’s core grassroots. Therefore, even if Baykal’s intentions were sincere, many analysts like Ozipek are skeptical about the CHP’s ability to transform itself from a statist party to a liberal party embracing human rights and religious freedom.

Whether sincere or not, if Baykal's recent gamble fails in March elections, it will certainly damage his leadership of the party, leaving him vulnerable to be challenged by Haluk Koç. Key races to watch out for are the Ankara and Kocaeli mayoral races, in which CHP has nominated candidates Murat Karayalçın and Sefa Sirmen.

In other news with CHP, the party's continued vow to oppose any attempt by AKP to renew efforts to overhaul Turkey's military constitution has met with opposition from DSP (the Democratic Left Party). While DSP has not allowed women wearing the chador to enter their party, it has announced that it will not support CHP's opposition to constitutional reform, which might well allow for the substantive policy changes to which both DSP and CHP have before been opposed. It was only with the votes of DSP that CHP was allowed to challenge the headscarf amendments at the Constitutional Court. Although DSP's party has been significantly weakened over the years, the party to which Bülent Ecevit jumped has publicly declared its contention with CHP.

In relation to the Kurdish question, CHP has also revamped its policy. According to TDZ,

The Diyarbakır branch of the CHP submitted a report to the CHP headquarters and is supported by all of the 21 provincial party branches from predominantly Kurdish areas. In the report, the Diyarbakır branch suggested that the party's program first name the question the "Kurdish question" and not hesitate to use the term "Kurd." The report's other suggestions include: "The Kurdish identity should be recognized. Instead of being Turkish, being a citizen of the Turkish Republic should be emphasized. Kurdish language courses should be elective courses in primary and secondary education. Universities should open Kurdish language and literature departments. Formulas should be developed for the integration of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK] members."

. . . .

The CHP in its report on the Kurdish question in 1989 suggested cultural rights -- including education in one's mother tongue -- but was unable to implement its own recommendations.

The recent report issued by the Diyarbakır branch of the CHP also refers to the 1989 report and underlines that this report should be revised.

Kurdish citizens have a tendency to perceive the CHP as a "Turkish nationalist" party. The CHP's votes since the mid 1990s started to decline in Kurdish-populated areas. In the 2002 general elections, they were next to nothing. Baykal, during his visit to Diyarbakır this summer, faced protesters.

Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the former chairman of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, said the CHP's new initiative concerning the Kurdish question is not the talk of the town at all. He noted that the CHP has long had no influence in the region and has therefore not been able to revise its own 1989 report.

"The CHP does not represent anything in the region. This report or any initiative can only be meaningful if the party is able to establish a relationship with Kurds based on trust. For now, the CHP says one thing in Diyarbakır and the exact opposite elsewhere," Tanrıkulu underlined.

As with the chador initiative, it is completely unclear as to exactly what CHP is up to, and for good reason. Reconsidering notions of "Turkishness" seems laughable given CHP's opposition to Article 301, and its obdurate defenses of laws restricting freedom of expression. However, as I mentioned on Wednesday, it is of note that CHP is even campaigning for votes in the southeast given the unlikelihood of the party acheiving even the smallest modicum of success.

Bizarrely, Baykal recently predicted the AKP to receive over 50 percent of the vote. However, a recent MetroPoll has AKP behind, and the election seems all the more unpredictable because parties are reaching out beyond their traditional bases of support. In the end, will CHP be successful in its effort to expand its reach? If it should fail, will it again reverse itself and become even more nationalist? What will become of Baykal, whose authoritarian leadership over the party has long been questioned? If the party were to make inroads, could it sustain itself, or would its lack of a clear agenda result in fragmentation? What would any of these results mean for the future of Turkey's center-left?

Hikmet's Citizenship Restored

From the AP:

Turkey restored the citizenship of its most famous poet Monday in a symbolic step meant to show it was addressing criticism of its human rights record in hopes of joining the European Union.

Turkey stripped Nazim Hikmet of his nationality in 1951 at the height of the Cold War because of his communist views, branded him a traitor and imprisoned him for more than a decade. He died in exile in Moscow in 1963, but his work lived on — and the government's decision to restore his rights is meant to show Turkey is ready to embrace a limited amount of criticism.

"It is a step toward accepting differences in opinions, languages and ethnicity, which is necessary to become a member in the EU," said Dogu Ergil, a political analyst at Ankara University.

The BBC quotes Deputy PM Cemil Çiçek: "The crimes which forced the government to strip him of his citizenship at that time are no longer considered a crime." According to Bianet, in announcing the reinstitution of Hikmet's citizenship at a press conference yesterday, Çiçek declared, "We have annulled a 1951 decree to strip Nazim Hikmet of his Turkish citizenry. UNESCO had declared 2002 the 'Nazim Hikmet Year'. A most reputed name in the literary circles across the globe Nazim Hikmet deserves the annulment of this outdated and meaningless decree."

Hikmet is revered by many in the Turkish left. Outside my apartment in Kocaeli, there was a graffiti caricature of the poet, one of more than a few I saw etched on Turkish streets. Hikmet denounced imperialism, rallied to the causes of labor and worker's rights, and espoused that communism was his country's best hope for democracy and freedom. Useful to those unfamiliar with Hikmet, see a brief biography in today's Hürriyet.



And, to further ruminate on Hikmet, I feel compelled to post this YouTube video sent to me by a friend some time ago. The video is of a Turkish symphony commemorating Hikmet . . . if Copland interpreted Hikmet, I am assuming you would end up with something quite like this.

Intellectuals, Party Politics, and Hopes for the Future

Mümtaz'er Türköne examines intellectuals' relationship to politics, specifically the CHP. While holding intellectuals to task for adopting the same elitism as CHP members, Türköne acknowledges many to have supported AKP because of the party's pro-democracy and pro-EU agenda. Türköne is responding to a column by Oral Çalışlar in the leftist Radikal in which Çalışlar laments the emerging pro-establishment --meaning more nationalist/statist -- position of AKP, a development which has come to concern many progressive intellectual reformers as of late.

As CHP moves further to the right in its efforts to reach out to religious Turks, many of whom live outside the country's urban centers or are recent immigrants to the cities, AKP seems to be more accepting of CHP's pro-military/nationalist positions (and, before this, overly-concerned with its socially conservative base). Where does this leave pro-democracy intellectuals, who Türköne identifies with the left, and who have before supported AKP as a result of its liberal democratic credentials? At the moment, Turkey has no center-left party (see Erik Zürcher's recent critique of Turkish politics). While AKP can be aptly, though perhaps not adequately, explained as a center-right party (the party is economically and socially conservative), CHP is traditionally regarded as the establishment bastion of the Turkish left. However, CHP is more staunchly nationalist than it is pro-labor, more concerned with preserving Kemalist understandings of secularism --and, frequently, even ethnic solidarity -- than it is with promoting economic and social rights. Neither party is willing to aggressively address the issue of rights for ethnic and religious minorities, gender inequities, or draconian restrictions on the freedom of expression. Türköne intimates that intellectuals would be best represented by a third party, but in the end concludes that in the absence of a party, AKP is still the best hope. From Türköne:

Because of the elitist tradition on which it has relied, the CHP has failed to appeal to all of society and has not overcome its image as a bureaucratic party destined to always act as an opposition party. This was a problem of not only the CHP, but also intellectuals, who, like the CHP, are the products of the elitist tradition. However, intellectuals have a greater dilemma than the CHP. This is because intellectuals are accepted as intellectuals to the extent that they appeal to society. Unlike the CHP, they have to do things beyond this elitist tradition in order to advocate freedom, democracy and the rule of law. This accounts for why intellectuals cannot join the CHP, but at the same time, have problematic relations with conservative and traditional circles.

As the CHP reviews its elitist past, intellectuals are discussing their problems with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Having supported the AK Party against the militarist and bureaucratic political guardianship, intellectuals are now questioning this support.

In Turkey, being an intellectual makes you automatically leftist. As the term "left" or "leftist" are preferred concepts in Turkey, these intellectuals tend to define themselves as "democrats." Although this designation is used for a different reason, it means "liberal" as it does in the US Democratic Party. The designation of "democrat" is used out of habit or for convenience for these intellectuals, most of whom are former Marxists. Oral Çalışlar, a Radikal columnist, says the number of these intellectuals is "40 or 50 at most," but this is not a small number either. As an intellectual acts as a translator for the feelings and tendencies of the masses who cannot express them, this figure is rather high. To dispel any doubt, we may also provide some names. This is a long list including Ahmet Altan, who ruthlessly shoulders the entire burden alone, the Altan brothers, Eser Karakaş, Şahin Alpay and Cengiz Çandar.

. . . .

First, we need to question the frequently voiced theses that "The AK Party is not democratic" and "Everyone seeks democracy for only their own community." How can one suggest that a political party -- not only the AK Party, but also the CHP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) -- do not support democracy, which is their raison d'être? How can intellectuals, who are supposed to defend freedom against all sorts of power, yield to democracy, i.e., the rule of the people? Isn't there a problem with the description "a democratic intellectual who says the AK Party is not democratic"?

Our political system, which we call a representative democracy, is run through political parties. When you take political parties out of the system, there remains nothing that we can call democracy. Democracy is what makes parties exist. Parties are what make democracy exist. The description "a party that is not democratic," which Çalışlar is comfortable using, is not quite accurate. If he refers to "intra-party democracy," it is an altogether different topic. The political system that is up and running inside political parties is a product not of the Political Parties Law, but of the political culture of the nation.

For full article, click here.


An AKP stalwart, Türköne's conclusion is far from surprising, but interesting is his resignation at the structure of political parties. Türköne discounts the important role played by emerging Turkish civil society groups operating at the grassroots, and seems to suggest political parties to be the only driving force in democratic politics, in Turkey or otherwise. Attacking Çalışlar's position on political parties, Türköne argues that their predominance in Turkish politics has more to do with political culture than it does with the Political Parties Law. While this may indeed be the case, an issue addressed in my post two days ago about youth participation in politics, it does not mean that Turkish political leaders should not promote a more participatory polity.

Political culture is not static, and in Turkey, seems to be on the verge of recovery. Türköne's argument that intellectuals are best served by AKP may indeed be the case when it comes to the ballot box, but it is their engagement with the party outside of the dictatorial normal politics of inner-party decision making in which lie the best prospects for Turkish democracy. The development of a vibrant and diverse civil society is precisely what is needed in Turkey because the political party system is so impoverished, and one of the reasons for this poverty is the exact same party-centric view Türköne perpetuates. As Turkish citizens from a variety of religious and ethnic backgrounds, social classes, and political groups come to participate more in politics, Turkish political parties will in turn become more diverse, and consequently, more sophisticated in their understanding and approach to politics -- regardless of whether these citizens cover their heads, speak Kurdish, or practice heterodox forms of Islam. Increased participation in and organization of Turkish civil society should translate to increased demands for better representation, and demands for better representation are the only hope that a more democratic party politics might one day come to pass.

CHP to Embrace Minority Rights . . . Hmm?

From Hürriyet:

The main opposition Republican People’s Party finalizes the draft of a new party program. Race, religion, language, difference in origin and sect will be considered the richness of our cultural mosaic, a condition of our pluralism and a necessity for our democracy, reads the draft

The main opposition Republican People’s Party, or CHP, the target of harsh criticism in recent years due to its lack of transformation, has taken up the challenge to change in a new party program.

The draft program, updated after 14 years and to be put into effect mid-December, foresees a more active role for the CHP in solving the country’s controversial issues, including the Kurdish problem and minority rights. The draft, “From 21st century to bright future through a compass for change,” offers integration instead of assimilation to solve the Kurdish issue.

“The Kurdish problem is a problem of democracy and development. Ethical and cultural differences are our richness. Different ethnicities, cultures, sects and religious beliefs of those living within national borders cannot prevent synergy and the creation of a nation,” the draft says, adding that the removal of differences can never be a policy of the state.

“We offer integration, not assimilation. A mother tongue is a means of dialogue, official language is a means of political unity,” it says.

. . . .

According to the draft, the CHP will also launch a daring initiative on the status of “cemevis,” Alevi prayer houses.

The main opposition defends the existence of the Department of Religious Affairs, saying it should be open for each sect wanting to join and promises to grant equal status to cemevis as given to mosques, so that they too can benefit from state facilities.

We will see where this goes, but if the new party program does indeed lead to significant reversals of CHP policy on Kurdish and other minority issues, it will definitely place pressure on AKP and its reluctance to embrace cultural and minority rights. Such a party platform would also diminish the power of ultra-nationalist MHP, which has been able to form alliances with CHP in taking hardline positions on issues involving ethnic and religious minorities.

Familiar Criticisms, but Always Food for Thought

Ever provocative words from Ezgi Başaran at Hürriyet by way of TDN:

Turkey needs an urban, secular and liberal political movement that can successfully utilize the inherent potential of society to complete the modernization process while addressing the Kurdish and secularist-anti-secularist clash, according to Dutch historian and Turkey expert Erik Jan Zürcher.

Speaking to Hürriyet daily, Zürcher said while the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, exemplified the republican modernization process with the rural elite electing their own leaders to replace the republican elite, the party was not equipped to utilize the nation's resources to provide a boost to advancement.

He said the victory of the AKP in 2002 over the increasingly powerless republican elite had given hope to the people but its paternal structure and hierarchy, not its conservative roots, precluded it from transforming the country into a modern state.

The pace of progress in society was not matched by politics, said the historian, who is widely read in Turkey, adding that ultra-secularist and ultra-nationalist movements were not the solution either.

“The Republican People's Party, or CHP, is not working for democracy. The AKP is not equipped to modernize the country. I don't know where you can turn. There is a huge gap in politics. There is a need for a liberal, urban, secularist political movement that does not try to gain legitimacy from either the military or religion,” said Zürcher.

. . . .

He said the AKP's policies seem a lot like the Justice Party, or AP, in the 1950s. The AP was the first political party to win power from the CHP after the single-party era ended in 1946. Its first election success was in 1950, with an even bigger victory in 1954. “However, [Prime Minister] Adnan Menderes was spoiled and once the economy went down, he started to implement tyrannical policies and abused religion,” he said. The military toppled the AP in 1960 and Menderes was hung along with two of his ministers.

He said it was hard for Turkey to become a country that respects the rights of women, homosexuals and minorities with an AKP government, arguing that the party had neither the mentality nor the necessary human resources for the task. “Liberalism is mandatory for modernization. A free market economy is not the only tenet of liberalism,” he said.

I've written here quite extensively about the need for a viable leftist party, as well as about the demise of the Turkish left as a serious political force.

A Third Pole and the Possibility of a Socialist Republic

An interesting analysis that eschews the traditional dichotomy drawn between Islamists and secularists, discusses the negotiation that seems to be occurring between the two as anathema to the emergence of Turkish democracy, and raises the question of a forgotten third pole. I have qualms with much in this analysis, but there is also much here that is valid and the sheer provocative nature of piece makes it heuristically valuable. From Ertegrul Kurkcu of Quebec's Socialist Project thanks to BIA-Net:

Turkey's recent politics appears to revolve around two court cases. In the one case, the ruling AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – Justice and Development Party) stands behind the bar in order to defend themselves in the Constitutional Court closure case against charges by the Head Prosecutor of the Turkish Republic of “having become a focus of fundamentalist Islamist threat against the secular republic.”

In the other, the defendants are headed up by former army commanders, who during duty may have mobilized the power they exercised within the state security and intelligence services for crushing the ruling Islamist-rooted AKP government. The complex web, built up under the leadership of a retired four star general, comprises of a vast array of figures from Turkey's broad political spectrum including covert killers, fanatic ultra-nationalist agitators, former-Maoist political figures, solemn academics, retired paramilitaries, and others.

Struggle for Power

The involvement of courts, judges and prosecutors in the ongoing strife may surprise an onlooker who is unfamiliar with the particularities of Turkey's political background. What unfolds before our eyes is not simply a legal process as such, yet a war for power ‘pursued by other means.’ Seen through the eyes of European or U.S. media, Turkey appears to being torn apart between secularists and Islamists.

But this ideological approach misses the real nature of the ongoing strife in the country: the warring parties' programs are related to the restructuring of Turkey's socio-economic relation in a globalized world economy, rather than particular worldviews toward secularism or Islam, though the latter has indeed had a considerable impact on the course of the conflict.

In the one camp stands a contradictory alliance of Turkey's big capitalist class – who strive to ascend a higher level for competition in the global market through membership in the European Union (EU) – and the ‘Anatolian Tigers’. The Anatolian group is made up of middle scale businesses generally owned by the conservative local bourgeoisie of central Turkey of an Islamic background.

They have been competing in the global market since the 1980s when Turkey adopted export oriented development strategies to replace the statist and import substitution approach of the previous two decades. The ruling AKP has had an eye to further influence in the Middle East as a NATO member with a 'strategic alliance' with Washington, contrary to neo-conservative paranoia of Turkey adopting the ‘Taliban model.’ In the last six years in government, it has been able to coalesce with the interests of the big capital from its Islamist power base, although there have also been at times fierce frictions between the allies.

In the other camp is a complex political and social network of Turkey's bureaucratic and military elites in alliance with certain sections of the bourgeoisie whose domestic interests are endangered by the influx of international finance-capital in the Turkish markets. They derive their power from their manipulative capacity over Turkey's powerful state apparatuses – from the military to judiciary, from the academy to administrative bureaucracy – rather than from their role in social production.

The recent crackdown on the secret special organization 'Ergenekon', however, has apparently inflicted a heavy blow on the most criminal elements of this network. This group, with their extensive network across Turkey among staunch secularist-republicans, and with their control over the military-industrial complex, still represents an attractive – even if irrational from the standpoint of the globalization – perspective particularly among white collar occupations, who comprise the urban base of Turkey's political landscape. They have argued for a future for Turkish capitalism in Eurasia – the giant political-geographical space between Russia and China.

The influential generals who have inspired this new direction had already in 2002 stated that “instead of bidding for membership in the unreliable EU, Turkey should turn towards cooperation with Russia and Iran.” The following years would prove that these were more than mere words.

Between November 2002 (the first year of the pro-Islamist AKP in power) and July 2007 (the general elections which gained the AKP even broader victory for power in the parliament), a huge counter-current against Turkey's EU membership bid and against Turkey's military alliance with the U.S. swept across the country. The movement, in spite of its 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric, said very little against Turkey's NATO membership.

It mainly targeted democratic reforms for freedom of speech and organization, broader rights for Turkey's Kurds and non-Muslim minorities (believing that these made Turkey more vulnerable to Western influences and open to Islamic fundamentalism) and agitated against a peaceful solution in Cyprus for the fear of what might result from the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the divided island.

On the eve of the July 22, 2007 general elections, when they seemed to have the full backing of Turkey's armed forces, the national and international media image of the 'Eurasian' camp (labeled as 'secularists') was so bright and powerful that political analysts could not have predicted their present collapse. Indeed, the media they control or influence – including TV channels, dailies, magazines – and the main opposition CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – The Republican People's Party) have converged around the opinion that the defeat is caused by AKP-backed persecution of the “patriots” through “slanders” and “false accusations.”

A more coolheaded analysis, however, shows that their initial rise and dramatic collapse as was directly related to a major shift in the balance of power, particularly with the political stand of the armed forces high command. The unexpected consensus reached between the present Chief of Staff General Yasar Buyukanit and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan on May 5, 2007, marked the beginning of the withdrawal of the support of the armed forces for the ‘Eurasianists.’

In spite of baseless arguments by the liberal supporters of the AKP, the Turkish armed forces' interventions in daily political life have not stemmed from an anti-EU reflex inherent in the army mentality. It has stemmed from their 'perception of threat' that Turkey's territorial integrity is at risk as long as Iraq's prospective dismemberment remains on the agenda in the aftermath of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

EU Membership: A National Security Policy Principle

Indeed, the National Security Policy Document – a 'top secret' strategy document jointly drafted by the government and the armed forces which was leaked to the press in 1997 – posed, among others, several strategic aims: Turkey's westward orientation should not be modified by any means; Turkey's bid for full EU membership in the EU should be kept (although the negative attitudes of some EU countries should not be underestimated); and efforts directed at integrating Turkey into the world market, including via privatization of state assets, should be increased. This has framed Turkish state policy before and after the AKP government came to power.

In spite of Turkey's favorable strategic approach towards economic integration with global capitalism, Ankara-Washington relations worsened over this period, as the U.S. occupation reinforced the drive toward Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Due to the fragility of Iraq's territorial control of its borders, the Turkish military perceived a growing threat from the prospective of Kurdish independence in Northern Iraq. For the Turkish military and ruling classes, this was a negative example for Turkey's own 12 million Kurds. The U.S. presence in Iraq, Ankara's military elite believed, also gave the insurgent guerrilla PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan –Kurdistan Workers' Party) a relatively greater sphere of action on the other side of Turkey-Iraq border.

Having missed the 'chance' to enter into Iraqi territory as part of 'Allied Forces' after a 'no' vote in the Turkish Parliament in 2002, the Turkish military continued its de facto military presence in Northern Iraq to prevent the area from becoming a safe-haven for the insurgent Kurdish guerrillas. Yet, the breaking point was reached when Turkish 'special forces' were embarrassingly arrested by the local U.S. occupation forces in their bases in Suleimania. Turkey was forced to accept a U.S. ban on its covert actions against the Kurds of Iraq and the insurgent Kurdish guerrilla PKK.

The Turkish army responded to the ban from its 'greatest ally' with a mobilization of its political influence against the interests of United States of America in Turkey. From 2002 to 2007, an anti-American and anti-Kurd 'nationalist' psychology and political effort swept across the country. Turkey's NATO trained generals praised “the popular support for the indivisible unity of Turkish Republic.”

The campaign peaked in 2007 when Turkish Armed Forces regained their right to launch cross-border air and land force operations inside Iraqi territory against PKK guerrillas with intelligence support from the U.S. occupation forces. With their security position regained and Washington's recognition of the PKK as an 'enemy', the Turkish Armed Forces consented to a new approach in handling Turkey's ‘Kurdish question.’ In order to balance the PKK influence in Turkey's mostly Kurdish populated provinces, the Turkish army (even as a stronghold of secularism) adopted the ruling AKP's perspective of forging an 'Islamic Brotherhood', with the aim of ideologically integrating the Kurds into the Turkish state. The strategy would be completed by Turkey's recognition of the Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration, whose support Ankara desperately needed to block PKK infiltration into Turkish territory.

The start of the massive Turkish air forces operation over PKK-controlled areas of Northern Iraq in the spring of 2007 marked the end of the 'nationalist campaign' against U.S. interests under the auspices of Turkish Armed Forces. There was no more need for 'anti-U.S.' agitation. The 'subversive organizations' mobilized to campaign against Kurds had to be removed from the scene. The sabotages, arsons, lynching attempts and assassinations directed at Kurds and pro-Western liberals were to be persecuted. The nationalist NGOs and manipulations within political parties, trade unions and the media were not as useful and they should be ended. The eccentric organizations formed during the five years campaign were denied former support and/or tolerance by the Turkish armed forces and by its 'special security apparatuses.'

The road to the 'Ergenekon' operation was wide open. It was revealed during the prosecution that an aborted military coup was in the making from 2002-04. It failed to develop for the fear of international isolation as well as the lack of full support of the army high command. The Turkish Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Buyukanit, in his last public statement bluntly said: “Those who are guilty will pay for it. The Armed Forces is not a criminal organization!” The crackdown on the Ergenekon organization halted at the gates of Turkey's Chief of Staff's military campus, with the police having to suffice with the handcuffing of retired generals.

To the surprise of the once all-powerful 'secularist' camp, the Armed Forces also refrained from publicly backing the charges of anti-secularism against the AKP. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition CHP, sharply reacted against the Chief of Staff's silence as the AKP moved to lift the ban on wearing the veil in the universities: “We have been left only with the judiciary to rely on.”

The Head Prosecutor of the Republic charged the AKP with “attempting at establishing an Islamic state,” and this indictment was indeed a call for action in legal terms for the armed forces to play its historic role. It was not an ordinary legal document as such. It is highly unlikely that this indictment will retain its initial weight as the political forces are realigned amidst military operations in the southeast, police operations in the capital Ankara that are handcuffing the once almighty generals, and the deadly blasts in an Istanbul suburb which have claimed the lives of innocent civilians.

There Exists a Third Pole!

Although the two parties to the ongoing conflict would like to ally these social forces to their respective individual camps, there is a third party in the social struggle. This is the party of the labour, the oppressed, the poor, the Kurds, the Alevites, the women, the youth, and others.

Those who have marched towards the banned Taksim Square and paid the price of police brutality in May 1st; those who have poured out to the streets to protest against the neoliberal Social Security Law that deprives the workers of the last gains of the social welfare state; those who challenge the ecologically hazardous mining industries and nuclear power plants; and those who for decades have fought for the brotherhood of Turkey's peoples and for a peaceful solution to the 'Kurdish question' comprise the bulk of this camp.

Taking sides with one of the parties to the present conflict who strive for articulating Turkey with one or the other pole of capitalist globalization will not promote – and will actively be against – their social, political, economic and cultural interests. This third force is fighting to build its own capacities to address the people, and oppose playing one of the tunes in either of the bourgeois choruses.

The present situation throws up discussion of mainly two options. On the one hand, the restoration of a 'military guardianship' regime, which may or may not get along with the AKP government, is posited. Turkey, however, is not faced with an imminent military takeover as there exists no real social-economic pretext for such an extraordinary regime, in terms of the present balance of class forces.

On the other hand, the AKP is often posed as deepening Islamic solution to the impasse. But while the AKP pursues a social-cultural policy of pushing Islamist values in daily life as an instrument of its ideological-cultural hegemony, it is highly skeptical that they are aiming at an Islamic state, simply for the concrete reason that this would inflict more harm on their power base than their secularist opponents. An Islamist Turkey would inevitably be ousted from the negotiations table for EU membership (a major guarantee for the free circulation of Turkish capital and goods within the Euro zone, Turkey's major foreign trade partner).

That is why a 'third pole' is necessary to widen political options in Turkey. It is also necessary to bring to justice the Turkish political and military authorities responsible over the last decade for encouraging the secret Ergenekon organization. The military and political elites did so either through tolerance for extra-legal forces or by abusing their power to assist such forces for the sake of the survival of the military 'guardianship' regime. They did so at the expense of the lives of hundreds of people and the uncountable waste of human and material resources.

Such Herculean tasks can only be undertaken by a force that is not the accomplice of any bourgeois government, and that has no tolerance for oppression either by the political Islamists or by the ultra-nationalists. This task can only be assumed by those political forces that fight for a Social Republic. Such a pole in Turkey is emerging.(EK/EÜ)