Never the Same? -- A Reading of Turkey After the Mavi Marmara

Protests in Istanbul continued on Saturday, drawing crowds in the thousands. AP Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Upon the return of Turkish Ambassador Oguz Celikkol to Ankara, President Gul declared that Turkey's relations with Israel "will never be the same."

Departing for Ireland the day Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara in international waters, I left Istanbul's Taksim Square with the images of enraged protestors fully in my mind. From Ireland, reports of continued mass protests drawing crowds of up to 10,000 and feiry statements of Turkish government officials flooded Irish radio and the BBC.

Ireland, too, was not without protest: the Irish-flagged Rachel Corrie, part of the same flotilla, had lagged behind the other vessels and the Irish government was insisting that it be allowed to reach Gaza without incident. Protests occurred in Dublin and Belfast, as they did in other places across the world. Though Ireland was much less at the center of the raid than Turkey, it was clear that the Israeli raid would affect not only Turkey-Israel relations, but how Israel was perceived throughout the world.

I won't take the time here to regurgitate the news surrounding the raid and the deaths of nine Turkish citizens, one of them also a dual citizen of my own country, other than to focus on the Turkish response and Turkey's demand that a UN-backed investigatory commission be authorized to investigate the incident (which Israel rejects) -- an insistence all the more justified in Turkish minds following the release of autopsy reports revealing that the nine victims had been peppered with bullets and some shot at a very close range.

Soon after the raid, the Turkish government condemned the Israeli action as tantamount to murder, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu describing the actions in front of the UN Security Council as "piracy" and "banditry." The response elicted from Prime Minister Erdogan, who flew back from a trip to Chile, was just as strong. Erdogan issued aggresive statements throughout the week, comparing the incident to Sept. 11, iterating the commandment not to kill in multiple languages before the glare of video cameras, and characterizing Hamas as an organization comprised of "resistance fighters."

Meanwhile, Israel moved quickly to portray the Turkish citizens killed as Islamic exremists and terrorists bent on waging global jihad against Israel, linking the still murky Turkish humanitarian aid organization at the center of the incident with global terrorist organizations, including al-Qa'ida (for more on the humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), see Yigal Schleifer's article in the Christian Science Monitor).

The difference in narratives striking, tempers waged throughout the week as the bodies of those killed were returned to Turkey amidst more protests and calls for Turkey to cut off all relations with Israel. The Turkish government recalled its ambassador, cancelled joint military exercises scheduled with Israel, and suspended work on energy projects. The Turkish parliament issued a strong resolution calling on the government to reconsider military and eocnomic ties with Israel.

Calls for an even stonger reaction resided throughout the Turkish public and were not limited to supporters of the AKP or stronger Islamist parties (see this poll), or even to particularly religious people for that matter. Criticism from Turkish opposition parties often urged the government to take stronger action, and newly-elected CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, while urging calm, has criticized the government for being "two-faced": "They’re saying ‘one minute’ in front of cameras, and ‘yes please’ behind closed doors."

Over the weekend, Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu engaged in mutual finger-pointing, both accusing the other of being under the undue influence of Israel. Referring to recent statements made by Fetullah Gulen and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc that revealed a rift in the party over how to deal with Gaza, Kilicdaroglu declared that the "Tel Aviv advocate" is within the AKP. Tucked away in Pennsylvania, Gulen gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal in which he criticized the IHH's failure to reach an agreement with Israel. In the interview, Gulen seemed to warn the Turkish government to be careful in its posturing vis-á-vis Israel for fear of damaging relations with the United States. Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mehmet Ali Birand picked up on this message in his column today:

Gülen explicitly warns Turkey.

He opposes entering such a process with the National View. For, the IHH is according to him a radical Islamic movement and he believes turning this humane help attempt into an Islamic help movement would harm Turkey very much.

Gülen with his approach does not oppose the AKP. He just criticizes IHH’s attitude. He warns that such steps might go as far as cutting off relations between Turkey, the United States and Israel. He draws attention to how dangerous the situation is. It seems as if he says, “These guys are about to cause trouble for the country, stop them.”

According to Birand, AKP Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc might well have heeded Gulen's call when he said on Friday, "The hoca points in the right direction."

In an interview with KanalTurk on Sunday, Arinc expressed that more tension with Israel should be avoided, seeming to call on the IHH and other organizations to the right to back off. Whether Gulen and Arinc's statements are made for fear of weakening ties with the United States and Israel and/or are motivated by concern that Islamist parties to the right of the AKP might get a boost out of the incident in the same way they did after Israel's incursion into Gaza at the end of 2008 is unclear (see Jan. 14, 2009 post), but the question should be on the radar of those observing the AKP's Israel policy in coming weeks.

If Turkey-Israel relations are to be normalized, and even more importantly, if the United States is to preserve good relations with Israel, efforts should be made to come to a consensus on the investigatory commission proposed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Ankara has put the commission forward as essential to its normalization of relations with Tel Aviv, and while Tel Aviv, for its part, continues to resist, it is no doubt looking to gain the approval of the Obama Administration as it moves to craft its own internal investigation. For the United States, the Turkey-Israel alliance forged in 1996 is one of the few bright spots in the Middle East, and given the amount of political ill will toward nine Turkish citizens being killed by Israeli commandos in international waters, it would make sense to do everything in its power to somehow bring Turkey and Israel into some sort of compromise.

Turkey took a powerful first step despite all the feiry -- and, at times, more than unseemly -- rhetoric coming from government officials this week insomuch as it welcomed a rather vague statement coming from the UN Security Council last week without making too much fuss (the statement, falling short of a resolution, condemned "those actions" resulting in death, without assigning responsibility).

Given the gravity of animus toward Israel inside Turkey at the moment, as well as calls from other governments around the world for an independent investigation (including the UN Human Rights Council, the resolution of which the United States voted against), it would make sense for the all parties to do everything in its power to assure a comprehensive and open investigation of both the Israeli military's actions and the activities of the IHH.

For more on Turkey-Israel relations, see past posts.


UPDATE I (6/7) -- Two interesting analyses worth drawing attention to are Hugh Pope's piece in Friday's The Guardian and Steven A. Cook's assessment of Turkey-U.S. relations in Foreign Policy. Pope urges that Turkey's rift with Israel not be looked at as a turn away from the West, but rather as the response to a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. For Pope, when one objectively looks at Turkish policy in the Middle East in recent years, the country can be seen as "explicitly imitating lessons from the EU that proved how such convergence can end cycles of conflict." Cook, examining crucial foreign policy differences between Turkey and the United States, portrays the two countries as "frenemies," concluding the two countries competing strategic powers in the Middle East. See also a very insightful, albeit tragic, analysis by Alon ben Meir thanks to Jenny White at Kamil Pasha.

UPDATE II (6/8) -- Hosting the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Istanbul, Turkey took the opportunity of the conference to condemn Israel in an attachment to the conference's final declaration. 21 of the 22 countries in attendance, all save Israel and including Russia, joined the statement, calling for an international investigatory commission to be setup and condeming Israel's use of force in international waters. Though not linking the statement to the flotilla incident, Russian President Vladmir Putin said the Blue Steam II natural gas project, linking Russian gas supplies to Israel and Turkey, might not extend to Israel due to lack of demand.

UPDATE III (6/9) -- For a decent summary of the military, economic, and energy ties between Turkey and Israel and potential ramifications of the flotilla affair, see Saban Kardas' analysis in the Eurasia Daily Monitor. Though trade with Israel constitutes only one percent of Turkey's total foreign trade, much of it food imports, Ha'aretz reports that some Israeli supermarkets are already boycotting Turkish goods.

The Struggle Over Hasankeyf

PHOTO from Today's Zaman

From Today's Zaman's Yonca Poyroz Dogan:

Hasankeyf, which is under threat of being submerged because of the construction of Ilısu Dam on the Tigris River, is the only place in the world that meets nine out of 10 criteria to be included on the UNESCO World Heritage List, according to respected scientists who recently gathered in the town, one of the oldest and continually inhabited places on earth.

“We have gathered reputable scientists to prove that Hasankeyf should be included on the UNESCO World Heritage List,” said Güven Eken, who heads the Nature Society (Doğa Derneği). In order to be included on the World Heritage List, sites must be of outstanding universal value and meet at least one out of 10 selection criteria. The Great Wall of China fulfills five criteria, while Egypt’s Memphis and its Necropolis -- the field of pyramids from Giza to Dahshur -- fulfill three and India’s Taj Mahal meets only one criterion.

The Nature Society’s efforts together with Atlas magazine led to the gathering of about 60,000 signatures from people in Turkey including celebrities such as superstar singers Tarkan and Sezen Aksu and writers Yaşar Kemak and Orhan Pamuk. Their signatures in support of protecting Hasankeyf will be sent to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who will have to decide whether the Culture and Tourism Ministry will make an application to UNESCO.

Representatives of the Nature Society, scientists and Tarkan met with Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay last April and introduced a report that explains in detail how Hasankeyf can be a candidate for the UNESCO World Heritage List.

Criticizing the government’s decisions to construct dams on sites that are protected by law, Eken said as those “illegal” projects start to be built, locals and the civil society would challenge them in court.

One promising decision was taken last week by the Council of State, which overturned previously given authority to the State Waterworks Authority (DSİ) in response to a court case filed by several civil society organizations.

“The Environment Ministry is guilty,” Eken said. “Even if the dam is completed, it will not be able to hold water according to the Council of State’s ruling.”

The decision also pleased the representatives of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive. Recep Kavuş from the initiative said the Council of State’s ruling states that the DSİ cannot have authority over cultural values. The site was declared a natural conservation area in 1981.

March. On March 22 this year, 200 people planted approximately 60 trees close to the Tigris River under the slogan: “By planting trees in Hasankeyf and the Tigris Valley we sow hope and life.”

The initiative has also been struggling because there are many financial supporters for Ilısu Dam. Although they have had several campaigns demanding responses from the three Turkish banks that support the construction of the dam, they have not received a response, Kavuş said.

Prime Minister Erdoğan said in February that the construction of the dam and a hydroelectric power plant on the site would continue. He also said the consortium that has undertaken the project had found necessary financing after a group of European credit agencies last July withdrew their financial support for the project, asserting that it did not meet environmental standards for preservation of cultural heritage, and relocation criteria for moving the villagers.

Three Turkish banks, Akbank, Garanti and Halkbank, will provide $430 to $500 million toward the estimated $1.7 billion cost of the dam.

Turkish officials say the 1,200 megawatt dam will help reduce the country’s reliance on energy imports and eventually bring in money from tourism and fishing. Ilısu Dam is part of Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) -- an economic development program for the country’s poor southeastern corner. The $32 billion project will build more than 20 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants to boost irrigated agriculture in the arid region.

Construction started in August 2006, and the dam will swallow up more than 80 villages and hamlets by the time of its planned completion in 2013.

One other challenge to the construction of the dam has been going on since 2006 at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

The above story also describes in detail the ways in which Hasankeyf meets the UNESCO criteria to be considered a World Heritage site. In February, Prime Minister Erdogan again voiced support for plans to build the dam and a hydroelectric plant on the spot. With European backing for the project now out of the question, the government has turned to the Chinese to finance the project. See also this vivid description of Hasankeyf by Today's Zaman's Kursat Bayhan, which the prime minister has never visited.

For more on Ilisu, see posts of Dec. 20 and July 26.

Putting Turkey Back of European Tracks

In an interview with EurActiv.com, EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis said the most significant accomplishment in the course of EU-Turkey relations was "putting the Turkey train on EU tracks." Bagis was referring to the start of accession negotiations, which despite some positive developments in the past year, are still progressing at a precariously slow pace. While landing the accession partnership with the EU was no doubt a monumental acheivement, navigating the international and domestic waters of Turkey's accession politics is also no easy task, especially at a time when skepticism abounds in Turkey and Europe. With most of the 23 remaining chapters of the EU acquis left to be opened, the Turkey-EU relationship is still in stormy waters, and with it, Turkey's reform efforts.

Yet, one encouraging sign cannot be discounted: France and Germany, two of the EU's most infuential member states, have ceased talking about extending a "privileged partnership" to Turkey in lieu of full membership. While accession negotiations are still defined as "open-ended," with no guarantee or right to eventual membership, it seems for the moment at least that both countries, as International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Hugh Pope puts it, are "now aware of the long-term damage this has done to their own commercial interests, the EU’s stature on its southeastern flank and Turkey’s own reform program."

Signs of Moving Forward

For the past few years, including before European Parliament elections last summer, conservative politicians in France and Germany both used populist anti-Turkey rhetoric to attract voters (on this point, see former EU Enlargement Commissioner Maxime Verheugen's denunciation). Returning from France in October, President Gul declared the "privileged partnership" talk to be over, a statement repeated by Bagis in January. EU plans to offer Turkey something less than full EU membership, whether it be the half-cooked "privileged partnership" proposal or membership in French President Nicolas Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union, have long drawn scorn from Turkish politicians and worked against the reform process by putting Turks on the defensive and de-mobilizing optimism/support for eventual membership.

Other positive developments on the European side of the equation include the success of the Lisbon Treaty, which, while granted will take the EU awhile yet to get used to, puts to rest questions about the EU project that had to be sorted out before further enlargement. Though Lisbon did not do much to amend enlargement procedures (individual member states can still veto the entry of candidate countries), it does allow the EU to focus more fully on its future borders. Croatia is well on its way to acceding, and the accession of Iceland following its financial demise should be accomplished without too many hitches. Macedonia, despite problems with Greece, is making headway as well, and plans lie in wait for Serbia, which applied for membership in December, as well as for Albania and Montenegro. While a country with a population of 70 million plus is indubitably a much bigger swallow, Turkey's move eastward should provide momentum in the coming years as the former Ottoman-controlled Balkans unite with more "Western" counterparts. Another possible candidate is newly independent, predominantly Muslim Kosovo, which along with Albania, will get Europeans thinking about cultural/religious identity issues -- what it means to be "European" -- in ways hopefully more sophisticated than these grand level questions have been approached in the past.

While there are still plenty of Turkey-skeptic politicians in the wings, the shift on "privileged partnership," including German Chancellor Angela Merkel's long-standing promise to judge Turkey on its mertis at the time it accedes, should only put Turkish citizens and politicians more at ease. Another skeptic who has pulled back is recently elected EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy, whose past opposition to Turkish membership drew harsh criticism from Ankara. Van Rompuy has promised to act responsibly, honoring past commitments while not using his position to politicize Turkish accession. Additionally, Turkey has a friend in EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele, who has wholeheartedly expressed his desire to see Turkey become a member, playing up the geostrategic significance to Europe of eventual Turkish membership. Fuele will no doubt have a problem selling enlargement at a time when Europe is in recession and still coping with the recent additions of Bulgaria and Romania, but his determination to move forward on Turkey in the post-Lisbon EU should be read as an encouraging sign.

In Turkey, though disenchantment with the EU still rings loudly, the beginning of 2009 saw the government finally move forward with its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). The draft of the NPAA was released in August 2008, following an aggravating six-month wait after the February 2008 adoption of the EU's Accession Partnership Document (APD). As ICG's 2008 report observes,"in some ways it was already two years late, since no previous National Program was issued after the previous Accession Partnership in January 2006." That Turkey is now even has an up to date NPAA is welcome news, though there are shortcomings.

In addition to the NPAA, the government finally appointed an EU Chief Negotiator in January 2009, a move long requested by Europe, as well as bolstered the staff working on EU-related issues. To further reignite its EU bid, the government also appointed Brussels-experienced diplomat Volkan Bozkir as the Secretary-General for EU Affairs. And, further kicking off 2009 was a January trip to Brussels by Prime Minister Erdogan, who had not visited the European capital since the association agreement was signed. CHP opposition leader Deniz Baykal, whose party has frequently placed itself in opposition to any AKP-led reform regardless of its impact on Turkey's accession, also visited Brussels in February (see Feb. 11, 2009 post).

Other positive signs included the signing of an inter-governmental agreement on the Nabucco pipeline, as well as on the domestic front, a strategy for judicial reform and another to fight corruption. The government's Kurdish initiative and rapprochement with Armenia have also helped the EU process along (despite the shaky ground on which both now stand). With Spain at the helm of the EU Council Presidency, and possibly two more chapters to be opened, the next few months also look promising as long as Turkey moves forward, which it might be all the more inclined to do now that it is facing another possible closure case thanks in part to past foot-dragging on judicial and political parties reform.

Ambivalence on the Turkish Side

However, despite progress made in 2009, Turkish public support and optimism about eventual membership are at a continued lull. The standoff on Cyprus, which led the EU Council to block eight policy chapters in 2006 and France to block four more (five in total, but one overlaps; Cyprus is informally blocking others), as well as the talk of "privileged partnership" and anti-Turkey talk in Europe, have taken its toll. The most recent EU Parliament resolution on the 2009 Progress Report will not help either, nor will nationalist politicians' spouts of anti-EU talk or the constant grumbling in Turkey about meeting "EU demands."

The most recent Transatlantic Trends Survey, a project of the German Marshall Fund, put support for membership at 48 percent, down from 73 percent in 2004. According to the same survey, 65 percent of Turks polled thought European membership impossible, and perhaps most disturbingly, only 34 percent identified themselves as sharing common values with the West. The EU Commision's Eurobarometer puts the percentage of Turks in favor of membership at similary low levels -- 45 percent; another poll by Angus Reid has the percentage in favor only slightly higher. These numbers are concretely reflected in the Turkish public's lack of interest in the 2009 Progress Report. The report's November release garnered little attention among Turkish opinion leaders, who in past years often discussed the report on Turkish television and in newspapers. However, even with the pressure on before the EU Summit this December and the possibility of more difficulties arising from the Cyprus problem, including the suspension of negotiations, few seemed to care.

While Europe might be said to be experiencing "enlargement fatigue," Turkey is suffering from a bad case of "Europe fatigue," or at least serious second thoughts facilitated by a sense of "not being wanted." What Turks perceive to be moaning in Europe and constant scolding by European officials -- too often played up in the Turkish media -- has created a response among several Turks with whom I have talked that Turkey can and should "go it alone." Some of this is sheer pride, and it is no doubt helped along by fears, largely coaxed along by rumors, that Turkey will have to do this or that to meet "EU demands." Thinking of the accession process in terms of "demands" made by a foreign power rather than "criteria" that must be voluntarily met in order to gain membership into an intergovernmental organization badly damages the accession process in a country whose politics are prone to paranoia (for more on this, see April 11, 2008 post on Turkey's "Sevres syndrome"). Rather, the "demands"-oriented thinking injures Turkish confidence and gives rise to a sense of hurt and defensiveness, which frequently manifests itself in countering EU criticisms with arguments about Turkey's worth, oft replete with strong undertones of nationalism and even xenophobia.

The most commonly expressed criticism of the EU from Turks, be it from more secularist or non-separationist in how they approach the state's relationship with Islam, is that Europe does not want a Muslim country in its borders. This feeling is no doubt stoked by the recent EU decision to extend the Schengen zone, and thus visa-free travel, to Macedonians, Montegrins, and most controversially, Serbians, which are predominantly Christian, but not to Kosovars, Bosnians, Albanians, or Turks. The EU decision prompted a sharp response from Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and plenty of criticism in the Turkish press -- in short, it was talked about much more than the Progress Report.

Ambivalence on the European Side

Though European ambivalence and skepticism should improve as Germany and France pull away from the "privileged partnership" discourse, support for Turkish membership in Europe is still very low (the same Transatlantic Trends Survey put the percentage of Europeans who thought Turkish membership would work in the EU's favor at 19 percent). Former EU Enlargement Commisioner Olli Rehn, who is supportive of Turkish membership, explained the opposition in an interview with EurActiv in November 2008:

One view that is quit strong in France and Germany is there should be no further widening without deepening. I have held many discussions in France both in the National Assembly and with the civil society, likewise in Germany, and the view there is that we do not rule out a Turkish accession but first the EU should be deepened.

I feel a certain sympathy for the view that widening and deepening should go hand in hand and I understand the logic but I don’t think those two approaches are contradictory. In fact, widening and deepening are rather parallel and mutually-reinforcing processes. Both of them have made the EU what it is today - much stronger and more effective than let’s say 20 years ago.

A second main concern is cultural and religious resistance, which is more difficult and for which I do not feel so much sympathy because the EU is not a Christian Club. Rather it is a community of common values, democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms. If a country meets those conditions, it should be able to join the EU – if it is a European country and it has a European vocation.

Thirdly, there are concerns related to employment and the labour market, which are often linked to immigration. For instance in France, the Turkish EU accession is seen through the lens of certain problems related to the integration of the Muslim minority - if you can call 5 or 6 million people a minority, out of whom only a small portion are actually Turks.

The French fears have resulted in French leaders continued stress on concerns about Turkey being a transit country for illegal immigrants. Indeed, these same phobias have elicted discussion of possible derogations on labor and immigration issues that would be attached to eventual Turkish membership. Focusing on France, Turkey also won few friends when it was less than supportive about France's re-entry into NATO earlier last year, and won an enemy in previously supportive French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner when it moved to oppose the eventual election of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO's Secretary-General. Yet, it is not all bad news. Sarkozy's now infamous 2007 declaration that Turkey was not part of Europe, but of "Asia Minor," might have boosted his support among entrenched Turkey skeptics in France at the time, but there are now indications that the French president's rather asinine geography lesson energized the French left and helped consolidate support for Turkish membership, in fact because of Sarkozy's opposition. According to Pope,

although President Sarkozy may not have changed his own mind, his politicisation of Turkey’s EU membership during his election victory in 2007 has unexpectedly mobilised Turkey’s supporters in France. Left-wing newspapers now debate the merits of the country, whereas a decade ago they mainly picked apart Turkey’s then poor human rights record.

French businesses, anxious about what politician Pierre Lellouche early on thought was the loss of five billion euros worth of business, helped finance an ongoing nine months of 400 Turkish cultural events in 70 French cities. These plays, debates and shows -- including lighting up the Eiffel Tower in the red-and-white of the Turkish flag -- have probably done more to showcase Turkey than decades of diplomatic toil.

The German opposition is a bit different. Merkel, unlike Sarkozy, had promised previously to not directly prevent Turkey from gaining membership, and so refrained from blocking chapters as France did in 2007 (though the latter used Cyprus as the pretext). Yet, Merkel has made her opposition known all the same, and if the Christian Democrats do happen to still be in power at the time a final decision on Turkey is made, there will likely be difficulties. Germany continues to stress that accession negotiations with Turkey are open-ended, and that there is no right to or guarantee of membership, emphasizing that Turkey has stict obligations to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and reconcile its laws with the EU acquis (for example, see German EMP Elmar Brok's remarks in 2008 in response). While Germany's über-conservative Christian Social Union party remains publicly committed to "privileged partnership" (see, for example, CSU's criticsm of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's recent trip to Turkey), the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition agreement in effect since German elections in September makes no reference to it. Beneficial to Turkey's relations with Germany is strong trade between the two countries, as well as Germany's contibution of 17 percent to Turkey's foreign direct investment. There are also 1.2 million perople in Germany who enjoy dual German-Turkish citizenship.

Turkish and European proponents have plenty of work ahead of them if accession is to progress in the difficult times ahead, and it is clear that leadership and dialogue is what is needed most of all. European supporters of accession point to the fact that no enlargement has succeeded by looking only to popular opinion, putting emphasis on the time, work, and leadership that make enlargements successful. Swedish President Carl Bildt, who held the EU Council Presidency last term, expressed this opinion in the European Parliament's debates on enlargement last November.

We are all aware that there are those in our respective public opinions that would prefer to just shut the door to all of them [candidates seeking EU membership], hoping that the issue would go away, and opt for a far more closed idea of Europe. I belong to those who are convinced that this would be a mistake of historic proportions -- the consequences of which would haunt our Europe for a very long time to come.

Bildt echoed similar sentiments in an interview with Nigar Goksel, saying “the EU project and its important components, ranging from the euro to enlargement, have been the result of political leadership, not the result of a groundswell of love toward each other among different European nations. In fact, very little would have happened in the last 50 years without political leadership.” Here, arguments about the geostrategic importance of Turkey in terms of energy and influence in the Middle East, as well as Turkey-EU relations in terms of NATO, are all influential, and the more European leaders make them, the better.

Linking Turkey's Two Vocations -- Europe and Democracy

Final decisions about the "absorption capacity" of Europe for Turkish membership are a long way coming, but Turkey must do its part, too. While no accession has successfully taken place without European leadership, no accession has taken place without a groundswell of popular support in the acceding country for membership. Spain's accession to the European Union in many ways parallels Turkey in terms of the strong opposition Spain faced from countries fearing it relative economic deprivation and huge agricultural capacity; yet, the Spanish public was strongly supportive of EU membership and democratization following the Franco dictatorship, and success came with persistence. While there is indubitably more opposition to Turkish membership than Spain faced in the early 1980s, Turkey must overcome some of its political dysfunctions if it is to succeed. Nigar Goksel points to what the government might do to push forward in this endeavor.

While the EU process loses momentum, the agenda in Turkey has been consumed with clashing concepts of citizenship, competing patronage networks, colliding dogmatic visions, and culture wars. Loopholes in the constitutional system have allowed these battles to cause systemic deadlocks. The dysfunction in institutional checks and balances has led to a broad feeling of insecurity about the rule of law. By responding to this scene with patronizing and vengeful approaches, the government and its supporters only exacerbate the deficit of confidence and steepen the challenges for the government itself.

For the progressive taboo-breaking initiatives on the agenda to succeed, a concerted effort to reduce the perceived insecurity is called for. As long as the culture of reliance or vulnerability to the good graces of a political power persists, the fierce polarization that prioritizes personal and group interests over Turkey’s long-term interests will continue. The institutional and structural changes that the EU track will impose can curb this culture. However, rhetoric also matters. For the government to convince a critical mass about its commitment to its declared goals, rhetoric about freedoms and pluralism needs to be consistent across the ruling party’s ranks and across the range of issues on the agenda.

Rather than convince Turks of the benefits of EU membership for Turkey or sell its democratic values or culture to Europe, Turkey's government remains squarely focused on the technical aspects of accession, namely the EU chapters, and is frequently confrontational toward EU opponents. Neither is helpful. Essentially, the government has two jobs, both difficult: 1) sell Europe in Turkey, which is largely a rhetorical and public information effort, and 2) sell Turkey in Europe, which is a matter not only of satifying the EU acquis, but continuing to consolidate its democracy and pass reforms respecting human rights.

Selling Europe in Turkey

In regard to the first, building public support for accession would not only bolster the accession process, but also reforms the government would like to see passed -- and, now, with judicial reform all the more exigent, desperately need to be passed. Support for reforms as a function of EU membership is the lynchpin is critical to their realization. According to TESEV's Dilek Kurban, "For the people, Europe means a prosperous future. It is the only thing to inspire hope, to motivate people for change. This process is the only thing that holds the country together, Turks and Kurds, Muslims and others. If you lose it, what you’ll see is a disintegrating country." Even if one does not agree with the potential fallout Kurban identifies, most Turkish leaders would have a hard time denying the role the EU has in mobilizing reform, the motor the EU prospect provides when challenging the status quo and the powers that be. The entire reform process between 1999 and 2005, in addition to the meager reforms thereafter, were all largely driven by the EU, and the fact is hard to escape. EU reform is linked to accession, and when accession comes unglued, so does reform. This is one reason so many observers who know how determined the AKP is to pass reform on civil-military affairs and the judiciary have grown skeptical that the AKP is still in the pro-Europe camp.

Euroskeptics are not the only forces to blame for Turkey's low public morale for accession. Turkey's leaders must also own up, and do something about it as well -- otherwise, the alliance of the skeptics, and those who do not want to see Turkey in Europe, will win.

Selling Turkey in Europe

The government's constant confrontation with Turcoskeptics in Europe has done little to build support for accession in Europe, nor has it weakened the skeptics. Though frustration is understandable, countering Turcoskepticism is best left to European leaders supportive of Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan's calling out of a smirking Greek Cypriot politician at a lunch in Brussels did nothing to win Turkey friends or damage the credibility of the likely less than credible Greek Cypriot. For another example of less than helpful behavior, see Erdogan's remarks during a dinner he hosted for the diplomatic corps in Sept. 2008, during which the Prime Minister declared, "Forget about drawing water form this well. [The EU has] got the bucket so stuck in the bottom of the well, it'll be a miracle to get it out at all." Rather than attack Euroskeptics, or in the latter case, Europe as a whole, if the government is serious about accession, it must focus on the reform process and selling the democratic values it shares with the EU. To this extent, rather than paying attention only to opening acquis chapters, the government should draw on the synergy of the accession and reform processes, enthusiasically embrace Copenhagen, and move forward with broad-based democratic reform, including a new civilian constitution. Even if chapters are not opened, there is nothing to prevent the government from working on reforms in anticipation, nor in using the EU anchor for leverage in so doing.

In an interview to Today's Zaman, Spanish Ambassador to Turkey Joan Clos referenced his own country's accession.

In the Spanish accession process, when we talked about interests and strategy, we never succeeded in the argument. We never moved the hearts of the Europeans when we said we were close to the Strait of Gibraltar, were very important for Europe or when we said our agriculture was very important and we had the largest area of farmland.

. . . .

But when we talked with our European fellows and said, ‘Look, we want to be in the EU because we want to stabilize our democracy forever,’ this was something understood by every European citizen on the street. To give weight only to strategic and business reasons for European accession is purely an argument of interests. To put emphasis on values is a much deeper emotional question. There are countries which have geo-strategic value and position apart from Turkey, but the kind of democracy that you have reached with the republic and that you are trying to improve through governmental and everybody’s efforts makes the difference for Turkey in relation to your neighborhood. This should be the main driving force. Democratic Europe cannot lose a growing democracy in this part of the world. If you ask a German, Frenchman or Spaniard, ‘Do you want to help Turkey to be a European-like democracy with our values or not?’ the answer would be yes. This is more important than oil or agriculture.

Yet, Turkish politicans rarely, if ever, makes such arguments, choosing rather to focus on geopolitics, energy, and Turkey's economic weight and satisfaction of the economic/financial Maastricht criteria. (In a EurActiv interview with Bagis, the EU Chief Negotiator is keen to talk about Maastricht, but defensive on Copenhagen. The latter has to be broached by the interviewer, while the former is volunteered.) While it is obviously easier to talk about geopolitical significance and past achievements than shortcomings and future reforms, it is the latter that is badly needed. Several Turks, including Turkish politicians, often say "reform is for Turkey," which is all fine and well, but does little to unite Turkey's democratic vocation with its European vocation. When the two are united, both seem to benefit; when they are not, neither seems to go very far.

The Final Decision

Assuming Turkey can avoid a full-out confrontation with the European Council over Cyprus, which still hangs around its neck and provides ample ammunition and room for maneuvering to its detractors in Europe, a final decision on Turkish membership is still a long ways off. While this might be frustrating to some extent, it should also take the pressure off and encourage Turkish politicans to focus on reforms rather than criticisms of Europe. Sarkozy, nor Merkel, are likely to not be in power by the time a decision can actually be made, and though Austria and France have both expressed intentions to put Turkish membership to referendum, to talk about the European politics on Turkish accession now is more than premature given the rapidly changing dynamics of the region, and just as importantly, the more democratic, human rights-oriented Turkey could be if its politicians keep their eyes on the ball.

Turkish Ambassador to Germany Ahmet Acet urges European politicians to focus on the Turkey of the next 10 years, but the same applies to the government and the opposition. And, while the new government line recognizes that the final decision is a long ways off, it should also stress, as Clos instructs, the Turkey's passion for democracy and Europe, best evinced by the reforms to be hopefully realized in those next ten years. Turkey's entrance into the European Union would not only assist in the consolidation of Turkish democracy, but would also assuage the fears of AKP-opposition forces and skeptics who claim the AKP does not actually want European membership and is rather using the accession process to further its own "secret" political agenda. Since the vast majority of Turks want democratic reform, which the government also claims to want, tieing reform to the accession process is not only politically useful in this historically Westward-looking country, long-defined by a love-hate relationship with the West, but symbolically potent.

With few chapters left to open, Turkey must maintain a reasonable amount of momentum, and Copenhagen and Maastricht are both answers. To this extent, President Gul's comments that Turkey might choose to go the way of Norway are not particularly helpful, as they do little to unite Turkey's two vocations, which the AKP, as well as the opposition parties, all outwardly espouse. Rather, Europe, largely hesitant about Turkey's political turbulence and ambivalent relationship toward democracy and the West, needs to be convinced Turkey wants Europe and democracy. The government, and the opposition, can do better. Time will tell.

Things Fall Apart

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian and Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu in Zurich in October. PHOTO from Hürriyet

As the chances for ratification of two protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia crumble, the future of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia looks quite dim. The protocols were signed it Zurich in October, where both countries agreed to normalize diplomatic and bilateral relations, including opening the border and setting up numerous subcommissions, the most important of which would look at the "historical dimensions" betweent the two countries. However, Turkey has since made Turkish ratification contingent upon resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict despite making it clear in Zurich that ratification of the protocols would not be contingent on settling the rather intractable conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Erdogan has also stated that Armenia should remove its troops from the 13 percent of the territory it occupies inside Azerbaijan before borders are opened.

Nagorno-Karabakh

Turkey's position changed as its relations with Azerbaijan grew increasingly endangered after Zurich. Azerbaijan fears Turkey will sell it out on Nagorno-Karabakh, and opposes any Turkish rapprochement with Armenia before the conflict between it and Armenia is resolved. Armenians in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan revolted in 1993 with the assistance of Armenia, shortly after which Armenia essentially occupied. Following Armenia's invasion, Ankara broke off diplomatic relations with Yerevan and sealed the border. In addition to Armenia's campaign for genocide recognition, Nagorno-Karabakh has long been at the heart of tensions between it and Turkey.

Tensions with Azerbaijan had been high since the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement commenced in fall 2008, reaching a boiling point soon Zurich when President Gul appeared alongside Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan at a football game in Bursa. For public relations purposes, Turkish fans were prevented from entering the stadium with Azeri flags to protest the recent accords. Images of Turkish soldiers confiscating the flags in a none too delicate manner were aired on Azeri television, and a diplomatic splat soon blew up between Turkey and Azerbaijan, long considered "two states, but one nation." Soon after, Azerbaijan removad Turkish flags at a monument honoring Turkish soldiers who had died in Azerbaijan's 1918 independence war. In addition to fears surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan resents the price it receives for the natural gas sold to Turkey. The two countries remain in protracted negotiations over the issue.

The Turks are not without fears of their own. They fear increased ties between Russia and Azerbaijan, which include a recently signed major energy agreement providing or the sale of Azeri gas to Russia. Turkey needs Azeri gas in order to complete its plans for the Nabucco pipeline, and the more gas sold to Russia means the less gas for Turkey. Even worse would be a pipelines connecting Azeri gas to Russian supply routes, which Azerbaijan has used well to help terrify Turkey into submission. Russia has not proved instrumental to the peace process to the extent that it has done little to quell these fears, signing the energy accord in the heat of Turkey-Azerbaijan tensions.

All of this has led Turkey to look for the fastest exit route. Having introduced the Protcols to Parliament, Erdogan has declared his part done. Though Turkey stated at Zurich it could not guarantee ratification, the new conditions make it virtually impossible. Also important to note, Erdogan's ruling AKP controls a majority that could easily pave the way for ratification should the government be so

Fighting Over History

At the same time, Turkey and Armenia have very different visions of what a historical commission would look like: the Turks see it as an opportunity to open up discussion on the killing and insert more context into a debate of historical events that for many Armenians is shortly and simply understood as a state-planned campaign to exterminate them; meanwhile, the Armenians envision the commission as discussing relations post-1915. Concerns that discussion in such a commission would compromise the Armenian government's campaign for international recognition of the 1915 killings as genocide -- and, just as importantly, that of the Armenian diaspora -- have led to massive nationalist opposition in Armenia -- in which President Sargsyan's ruling party is less well-positioned than his Turkish counterpart. The nationalist opposition to the protocols has been tremendous, and drawn protests from the diaspora cross the world, most significantly in the United States.

Also disputed is the Turkish-Armenian border, premised on the 1921 Treaty of Kars. Armenian nationalists do not accept and bitterly resent the treaty, which was signed under pressure from the Russian government; the Armenian government, for its part, has never explicitly recognized the border.

Decision Time in Armenia

Turkey's exit strategy came on Jan. 13 when Armenia's Constitutional Court heard a challenge to the constitutionality of the protocols. While the Court affirmed them as legal, it seemed to place two important conditions on their implementation. The first of these involved the historical commission, which the Court ruled must not contradict Armenia's Declaration of Independence, which states that Armenia remain committed to its international genocide recognition campaign. The second involves a part of the Court's opinion that declares relations between the two countries must remain solely bilateral and not involve a third party. This would rule out Turkey's post-agreement demand that Nagorno-Karabakh be made part of the process.

Turkish nationalist opposition turned the court decision into political fodder. Soon after the Constitutional Court decision, the Turkish Ministry issued a statement declaring the conditions it establishes unacceptable. Perhaps more damaging is the Foreign Ministry's declaration of its sincerity as opposed to that of Armenia, Erdogan declaring that Turkey did not put the Protocols before its Constitutional Court. However, Erdogan clearly ignored that the Armenian government in power was not responsible for the constitutional challenge. Turkey, on the other hand, had said the protocols would not be conditional on Nagorno-Karabakh.

As of now, the future of the protocols appear dead in the water. Turkish experts have talked about trying to get Russia to pressure the Armenians, but as the International Crisis Group's Sabine Frazier lays out, the ball seems in Turkey's court. Should Armenia play its cards right, it could still pass the Protocols regardless of the conditions placed on them by its Constitutional Court. Since no specifics on the historical commission were ever determined and Nagorno-Karabakh intentionally not addressed, it will be hard for Turkey to cry foul, instead looking like the recalcitrant one at the end of the day. Such an appearance would make Turkey the diplomatic loser of a peace process some international observers could well say Turkish leaders were never serious about to begin with. Given that Turkey's problems with Azerbaijan are significant, and not unforeseeable, the real question seems to be why the Turkish government even initiated the process.

For a wonderful analysis of the issues at the heart of the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, including the benefits for both countries, see the Balkans Project's excellent October interview with Nigar Goksel. Goksel also had an excellent interview with the Armenian Reporter in June where she elucidates conflict resoluton efforts at the societal level. For a more comprehensive history of the conflcit as it stood before the August and October agreements, see also the International Crisis Group's April 2009 briefing of Turkey-Armenia relations. And, not to overwhelm with links, but for a commentary by a Turk who is supportive of the process, but critical of Erdogan's charges of Armenian insincerity, see Milliyet columnist Semih Idiz's recent column.


UPDATE I (1/27) -- Responding to the Armenian Constitutional Court's decision, U.S Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon averred that the Court's decision does not place conditions on the Protocols as asserted by Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In a clarification of Gordon's remarks, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley echoed Gordon's remarks, confirming they were on the record and that the United States views the Court's decision as an advancement of Armenia's ratification of the Protocols, which will now be submitted to the Armenian Parliament for a vote.

Turkey Ratifies Kyoto

From TDZ:

Parliament approved on Thursday its membership of the Kyoto protocol, the U.N.-led pact to combat global warming.

Turkey had announced in June its intention to sign the accord, which was first agreed by world governments in 1997. The government had postponed signing it for more than a decade because of its concerns about the cost on its economy.

Parliament’s ratification comes after intense pressure from both the European Union and international environmental organizations. Three voted against as 243 lawmakers voted in favor of the protocol.

Environment Minister Veysel Eroğlu in a brief speech he made after Thursday’s vote to ratify the protocol said, "I thank you all. Everyone should embrace this protocol," He said the government was taking necessary precautions for a better environment in the country.

Environmentalists say Turkey has been late in participating in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Turkey can no longer become a "party" to the protocol, so it has now "acceded" to it. Signing the Kyoto Protocol does not put an additional burden on Turkey until 2012, analysts said. Turkey was not a party to the convention adopted in 1992 when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, and it is not currently included in the agreement's Annex-B, which includes 39 countries that are obliged to reduce their greenhouse emissions to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.

The Kyoto Protocol was open for signatures in 1998, and entered into force in 2005 with the accession of Russia. More than 170 countries have signed the protocol. Governments around the world are trying to shape the next term by holding international meetings and work will be concluded in 2009, analysts said.

According to Environment and Forestry Minister Veysel Eroğlu, the cost of readying Turkey for compliance after 2012 is 58 billion euros, 15 billion of which is expected to be carried by the private sector. The Turkey Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) has endorsed ratification on grounds that it will enhance Turkey's role in energy negotiations to come and bring Turkey closer to entering the EU. For additional news analysis from TDZ, click here.

Gas Crisis to Boost Turkey's Hand with Europe

Europe's recent gas crisis lends additional support to the argument that the EU needs a strong relationship with Turkey in order to shore up its energy security. Turkey should not only strengthen its hands going into negotiations with Europe over the Nabucco pipeline, which is set to supply Europe with gas from Central Asia via pipelines laid over Turkey. For more an Nabucco, see this article from the Guardian on Wednesday.

All incoming gas from Russia into Turkey (almost 65& of its total supply) has been cut as a result of Gazprom's dispute with the Ukraine, although the Turkish government has retained the position that there will be enough gas to meet demand. There has been discussion that Turkey might broker a deal with Iran to increase the amount of gas currently being supplied by the Iranians, but the government is reluctant to consider this option.

For analysis by Saban Kardas at EDM, click here. For an excellent synopsis of Turkey's energy policy, focused primarily on its dealings with Europe in energy security matters, see Katinka Barysch's "Turkey's Role in European Energy Security," published in December 2007 by the Center for European Reform.

In related news, Turkey denied Greece's request to be supplied additional gas.

Environment and Human Rights Concerns Defeat Ilısu Dam

PHOTO BY Carolyn Drake/The Walrus

From the Guardian:

Insurers delivered a victory for environmentalists and dealt a body blow to Turkey's economic regeneration plans yesterday by pulling the plug on a bitterly contested dam project that critics claimed would wreck habitats, displace people and drown ancient archaeological treasures.

A consortium of German, Austrian and Swiss insurance firms ordered a halt to the £1.1bn Ilisu dam in Turkey's impoverished south-east after concluding that it failed to meet standards set by their governments and the World Bank.

The decision means suppliers underwritten by the insurers will have to stop work on the dam, located by the banks of the Tigris near Turkey's borders with Iraq and Syria, for 180 days and casts doubts on its long-term viability.

Environmentalists, heritage organisations and human rights groups campaigned against the project claiming it would have meant the loss of around 80 towns, villages and hamlets and the destruction of large areas of farmland. They argued that the mainly Kurdish local population had not been properly consulted and that between 50,000 and 80,000 people would be forced from their homes without compensation.

Heritage campaigners also claimed that the project would flood ruins from ancient Mesopotamia in the town of Hasankeyf and other sites, which are believed to contain evidence of 100,000 years of human occupation.

For full article, click here. The proposed dam has long been controversial, and has had both human rights and environmental groups mobilized for some time. There were concerns earlier this year that the German government might block the dam's construction. Hasankeyf was featured in an issue of the Atlantic this past November. See also Yigal Schleifer's earlier reportage of Ilısu, and the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) of which it is part. The AKP had sold the project on the grounds that it was vital to the economic development of the Kurdish southeast, though it is likely a majority of Kurds opposed it.

Also happy will be Turkey's southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq, which had both expressed anger at Turkey's decision to dam the valuable water of the Tigris.

Erdoğan Offers to Mediate Between U.S. and Iran

Erdoğan publicized the offer in an interview Sunday with the NYT's Sabrina Tavernise. From the New York Times:

Turkey wants to be the mediator between the new Obama administration and Iran, using its growing role in the Middle East to bridge the divide between East and West, said Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Mr. Erdogan said in an interview on Sunday that Barack Obama’s election opened new opportunities for a shift in relations between the United States and Iran, Turkey’s neighbor. Mr. Obama said during his campaign that he would consider holding talks with Iran, something the Bush administration has long opposed.

Mr. Erdogan described the note of congratulations sent to Mr. Obama last week by the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as “a step that has to be made use of.”

“We are ready to be the mediator,” Mr. Erdogan said, before going to the United States to attend a meeting about the global economic crisis. “I do believe we could be very useful.”

The United Nations has placed sanctions on Iran for a nuclear program that the United States and other nations say is working to develop a nuclear bomb. Iran says the program is peaceful.

Turkey supports the position of its Western allies but argues that the sanctions are weakening Iranian reformists.

“We watch the relations between Iran and U.S. with great concern,” Mr. Erdogan said. “We expect such issues to be resolved at the table. Wars are never solutions in this age.”

Turkey fears an economically and politically isolated Iran, which supplies it with its principal alternative to Russian energy. It also wants to avoid another military conflict on its borders.

For full article, click here.

Turkey has its own nuclear ambitions and is undergoing efforts similar to those in Iran. Further, Turkey is in the middle of important energy developments occuring between the EU and Iran, in which the latter might well supply the former with large amounts of natural gas via pipelines laid across Turkish soil. Any positive role Turkey can play in allaying the tension between Iran and the Untied States is certainly to the benefit of Turkey as well. Ahmadinejad visited Turkey in August.

2 Chapters to Be Opened at December Summit, Ready for Energy

More pleasant news from a comfortably placid, even encouraging French presidency. From TDZ:

The European Union is expected to open two new negotiation chapters with Turkey during an intergovernmental conference scheduled to be held on Dec. 18 and EU term president France would like to open more, were it not for problems beyond its control, French Secretary of State for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet has said.

France actually wanted to open more negotiation chapters during its presidency, which will finish at the end of December, Jouyet told a group of journalists on Wednesday at a reception held at the Turkish ambassador's residence in Paris to mark the Turkish Republic's 85th anniversary. However, it may not be possible to open a third or fourth chapter due to factors unrelated to the French term presidency, Jouyet added without elaborating. Sources told Today's Zaman that technical preparations had been completed for the opening of talks on the chapter on energy, but that this cannot be done due to objections from Greek Cyprus, which is at odds with Turkey over its planned oil exploration in the Mediterranean. The Anatolia news agency, meanwhile, quoted anonymous diplomatic sources as saying that chapters on the free movement of capital and on the information society and media would be opened. The same sources said Turkey was also technically ready for the opening of the chapter on energy but noted that this is not yet possible due to certain objections from within the EU.

A View from Europe

From Karel De Gucht, Belguim Minister of Foreign Affairs:

The Russian-Georgian conflict has been a shocking experience for the EU, albeit a shock that was perceived in a different way throughout the 27 member states.

For some, it carried echoes of a Cold War mentality they have known all too well. For others, it seemed like a prelude to a very hot war, the likes of which we haven't seen for generations. For all of us, it was a profoundly humbling experience – one that would make us think and that should make us act more convincingly than we have been doing for some time.

A strong and united European foreign policy is now needed more than ever. A common European energy policy is not just a complement but a precondition for that to come about.

Because it is our dependence on Russian energy more than anything that has prevented us from more decisive and unified action. Some of the EU member states import up to 100 percent of their oil and gas from Russia, and Russia has been more than ready to exploit that simple fact of life. It knows very well that it has the finger on the button that makes lights go out all over Europe.

It is only by linking our energy markets and finding new ways and sources of providing for them that we can take remedial action against this geopolitical weakness.

And that's where Turkey comes in.

Those of us who have actually spent time looking at the map will know that all of the existing oil and gas pipelines southeast of Europe run through Turkey, coming in through Georgia, from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, of course, from Russia. Likewise, all projects aimed at importing energy supplies from those countries but bypassing Russia will definitely have to run through it.

There is no doubt about it, the European energy policy we so desperately need, both for economic and for political reasons, will involve a lot of money, it will involve a lot of resolve and it will involve closer and unbreakable ties with Turkey. Then what are we waiting for?

. . . .

These are troubling times. With so many states reaching economic and political power, people are afraid Europe might fall off the map. And because so many of these international forces value the hard power of oil, guns and money over the soft power of enlightened ideals, democracy and institution building, they are rightfully perceived as a threat to our way of life, to the values and ideas we stand for, to the worldview that has made us what we are.

We are right to be apprehensive. But we would be wrong to let fear paralyze us, and we should not let it force us into making the wrong decisions, into making no decisions at all or into closing ourselves off from what is happening in the rest of the world.

Quite the contrary: We'll fight for our place in tomorrow's world. And I believe we will win this fight, simply because our liberal values and ideals of democracy, in the end, are stronger than any power. They have proved to be exactly that in the past, and they will be in the future.

In all this, despite what scaremongers throughout Europe try to tell us, Turkey is our ally. As an integral part of the European family, sharing the same values, it is our bridge towards the emerging powers in Asia and – let's not forget – the Middle East. Even more than that, Turkey is a bridge to the Muslim world, it is the prime example that modernization, secularization and democracy are not anathema to Islam.

It is, in short, an essential ally in the two most important struggles the world is engaged in for years to come. So let us rise above our fears and be as great and generous as the great game demands us to be.

Hasankeyf in the Atlantic

From The Atlantic:

Life moves slowly in Hasankeyf, a town on the banks of the Tigris in the heavily Kurdish region of far southeastern Turkey. Geography and political unrest have kept the modern world largely at bay. During my recent visit, Ali, a local artisan, demonstrated his trade for me—weaving rugs on a loom built by his grandfather, working in a room hewn from the limestone cliffs by a more distant ancestor.

Then the 21st century intruded, in the form of a lumbering Ankara Express bus. A group of Chinese tourists filed out, then stood in silence, absorbing the centuries of history before them. Archaeologists believe Hasankeyf may be one of the oldest continuously inhabited settlements in the world, dating back some 10,000 years. The cliffs lining the river are speckled with gaping black holes—homes carved out of the soft rock by cave dwellers thousands of years ago. What remains of a citadel built by the Byzantines in the fourth century A.D., and later expanded and reinforced by the Artukids and Ayyubids, rises above the city. Other ruins show the influence of Assyrians, Romans, Seljuks, Mongols, Ottomans—successive waves of conquerors who fought for dominance of the lucrative trading routes in northern Mesopotamia.

Hasankeyf may soon be hit by another conquering wave—this time, a watery one that could drown its history. Fifty miles downstream, near the village of Ilisu, a consortium of German, Swiss, Austrian, and Turkish contractors is preparing to build a massive hydroelectric dam that would catch water from the Tigris just before the river spills into Syria and Iraq. If all goes as planned, most of Hasankeyf will be submerged by a reservoir. Ali pointed out the projected waterline—about halfway up the spire of a 15th-century minaret.

For more on Hasankeyf and the Southeast Anatolia Project, see Sept. 3 post.