A Minority Rights-Based Approach to Cyprus

International Minority Rights Group International has published "Minority Rights: Solutions to the Cyprus Conflict." Here is a summary:

Attempts to resolve the ongoing conflict in Cyprus over the past forty years have been marked by one common feature: the systematic failure to recognize the presence of most minority groups on the island, and to involve them in conflict resolution processes and in drawing up plans for the island’s future status. This reflects the wider marginalization of minorities in both northern and southern Cyprus, who are effectively silenced within a discourse of competing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. Drawing on interviews with representatives from minority groups from both parts of the island, as well as on the wealth of literature that has grown up around the ‘Cyprus problem’, this report argues that minorities in Cyprus have a vital role to play in any future settlement, as well as in ensuring ongoing peace, prosperity and security on the island.

I have not yet had the opportunity to review the report, but thought I would go ahead and post it.

Rasmussen: A Friend to Turkey After All?

NATO Chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen is calling for the European Union to allow Turkey administrative arrangements with the European Defense Agency (EDA), a move that would greatly strengthen cooperation between NATO and the EU. Since Cyprus, a non-NATO member, was admitted to the EU in 2004, tensions between the EU and Turkey within NATO have run high as Cyprus has sought to block Turkish membership in European security institutions, among them the EDA. Turkey has long aspired for an EU-Turkey Security Agreement, as well as administrative arrangements in the EDA, both of which Cyprus has said it will oppose until a settlement on Cyprus is reached. From Hurriyet Daily News:

"Why doesn't the EU grant such an arrangement to Turkey?" said Rasmussen, in a pointed demand for Ankara, which provides NATO with one its biggest armed forces, to join the European Defense Agency, or EDA, a mainly research and development arm.

His call, delivered to top policymakers attending a transatlantic security conference in Brussels, was directed squarely at listening EU parliament head Jerzy Buzek.

The former Danish premier, who sparked outrage in the Muslim world over his defence of controversial cartoons lampooning Islam, has actively courted Ankara since before it dropped opposition to his appointment last year at the last minute.

Rasmussen said that Brussels should also conclude a security partnership with Ankara, and involve non-EU countries in decisions affecting its mission to Bosnia.

"Turkey is the second-largest contributor to the EU operation in Bosnia ... but the EU does not provide non-EU contributors with the opportunity to contribute" to policy and decision-making, he said, adding that it was "essential" it does

In 2003, Ankara consented to the Berlin-Plus agreements, which effectively created a framework for the EU to have access to NATO assets in exchange for non-EU members to involve themselves in the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), now headed up by EU Foreign and Security Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton. Yet, Cyprus' admission to the EU in 2004 and the EU's subsequent inclusion of Cyprus in ESDP planning complicated matters. An especially sore point for Ankara is its lack of say in ESDP planning in ESDP-related missions to which it contributes more resources than some EU member states.

Turning a Vicious Cycle Into a Virtuous One

EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule at a press conference with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.
AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

In his first trip to Turkey, EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule re-stated the European Union's position on Cyprus, urging Turkey to implement the Additional Protocol of the EU Customs Union and so end the blockade of Turkish ports to Cyprus. Not surprisingly, Ankara re-stated its position that it will not do so until the EU ended its isolation of Northern Cyprus and that it will not recognize Cyprus until an agreement between the north and the south is reached. Fule re-affirmed his commitment to Turkish membership, and in an op/ed published in Today's Zaman before his visit, argued the importance of the EU honoring commitments to Turkey and maintaing its credibility.

I am aware of voices both in the EU and in Turkey who question this course of action. But I have no doubt that honoring our commitments is the right thing to do, so that our engagement remains credible. Credibility needs building with concrete actions on both sides. We will continue our cooperation program and support the ambitious reforms undertaken in Turkey. We need to continue working together on the negotiations, opening new chapters as well as making progress in the chapters that have already been opened. We need to overcome the deadlock over Cyprus. With the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus, there is a unique opportunity to find a comprehensive settlement to reunify the island. I will use all the instruments at my disposal to support a solution to this problem.

I am convinced that we can turn this around, from a vicious circle into a virtuous one, provided there is political will of all actors involved. I know it takes courage and determination to do so, but I believe neither is in short supply in Turkey.

There are plenty of reasons to hope that this can in fact happen despite the recent polarization in Turkish politics thanks to the Ergenekon investigation and the government's plans to push for judicial and other constitutional reforms over recalcitrant opposition. The government has recently passed a new EU action plan, and as I wrote last month (see Feb. 21 post), there is plenty of momentum going into ths year Cyprus aside. Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos has said Spain hopes to open new policy chapters on education, competitiveness, food safety, and should Cyprus prove agreeable, energy. Yet, as UN-sponsored Cyprus talks continue with no end in sight, Cyprus will remain the elephant in the room until some breakthrough is reached. (For more on Cyprus and the accession process, see Feb. 17 post.) See also EurActiv's analysis of Fule's visit.

In other EU-related news, an informal EU parliamentary group was launched last week. Friends of Turkey brings together 47 MEPs.

Among the group’s members are the spouse of Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, Anna Corazza-Bildt; Sandra Kalniete (Latvia); Jaroslaw Leszek Walesa (Poland); Birgit Schnieber-Jastram (Germany); Georg Bach from Luxemburg’s Christian Democrats; İsmail Ertuğ, Knut Fleckenstein, Jutta Steinruck and Peter Simon (Germany); Emine Bozkurt (the Netherlands); Richard Howitt and Claude Moraes (UK); Tanja Fajon (Slovenia); Ioan Enciu and Victor Bostinaru (Romania); Boguslaw Liberadzki (Poland); Said El-Khadraoui (Belgium); Baris Zala (Slovakia); Evgeni Kirilov (Bulgaria); Raimon Obiols (Spain); and Kader Arif from the French Socialists.

Metin Kazak (Bulgaria); Jelko Kacin and Ivo Vajgl (Slovenia); Graham Watson, Andrew Duff, Sarah Ludford and Michael Cashman (UK); Marietje Schaake and Sophie in’t Veld (the Netherlands); Michael Theurer and Alexandra Thain (Germany); Liisa Jaakonsaari and Anneli Jaatteenmaki from the Finnish Liberals; EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee co-chairperson Hélène Flautre, Catherine Greze and Karima Delli (France); Fransizka Keller and Jan Philipp Albrecht (Germany); Raul Romeva i Rueda (Spain); Indrek Tarand (Estonia); Heidi Hautala (Finland); Judith Sargentini from the Dutch Greens and Sajjad Karim from the Dutch European Conservatives and Reformists are also among the members of the group.

ECHR Rules on Greek Cypriot Property Claims

In a victory for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on Friday recognized the jurisdiction of the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) set up by the TRNC in 2005 as a means to address property claims by Greek Cypriots. According to the ECHR's decision, claimants must first apply for redress to the IPC before applying to the ECHR. During the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus, several thousands of Greek Cypriots left their properties in the north, the issue remaining a significant part of conflict resolutions efforts between the north and south. The IPC was largely formed as a response to the growing number of property cases put before the ECHR, and according to Today's Zaman, since November 2009 has had 433 cases brought to it. Thousands more are awaiting a decision at the ECHR, though the decision means those cases must now be brought to the IPC. The ECHR was clear that recognizing the IPC did not equate to recognition of the TRNC. The decision also does not mean that the ECHR will not in the future make judgements ordering Turkey to pay compensation to Greek Cypriots once redress is sought at the IPC. From the ECHR press release:

The Court maintained its view that pending resolution of the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus, it was crucial that individuals nonetheless continued to receive protection of their rights on a daily basis. Even if the applicants did not live as such under the control of the “TRNC”, if there was an effective remedy available for their complaints there, the rule of exhaustion applied. This did not put in doubt the fact that the government of the Republic of Cyprus remained the sole legitimate government of Cyprus. The Court reiterated that an appropriate domestic body, with access to the relevant information, was clearly the more appropriate forum for deciding on complex matters of property ownership and valuation and assessing financial compensation, notwithstanding the time and efforts required from the applicants to exhaust domestic remedies.

. . . .

Even though the international community regarded Turkey as being in illegal occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, this did not mean that, when dealing with individual complaints under the Convention concerning interference with property, its discretion as to the manner in which it executed a judgment should not be respected. In the light of the many changes some 35 years after the properties were left, it would risk being arbitrary and injudicious for the Court to impose an obligation to effect restitution in all cases – which would result in the forcible eviction and rehousing of many men, women and children – even with the aim of vindicating the rights of victims of violations of the Convention.

. . . .

The Court also stressed that this decision was not to be interpreted as an obligation to make use of the IPC; the claimants could choose to await a political solution. However, if applicants wished to lodge an application before the European Court of Human Rights, its admissibility would be decided in line with the present principles.

Putting Turkey Back of European Tracks

In an interview with EurActiv.com, EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis said the most significant accomplishment in the course of EU-Turkey relations was "putting the Turkey train on EU tracks." Bagis was referring to the start of accession negotiations, which despite some positive developments in the past year, are still progressing at a precariously slow pace. While landing the accession partnership with the EU was no doubt a monumental acheivement, navigating the international and domestic waters of Turkey's accession politics is also no easy task, especially at a time when skepticism abounds in Turkey and Europe. With most of the 23 remaining chapters of the EU acquis left to be opened, the Turkey-EU relationship is still in stormy waters, and with it, Turkey's reform efforts.

Yet, one encouraging sign cannot be discounted: France and Germany, two of the EU's most infuential member states, have ceased talking about extending a "privileged partnership" to Turkey in lieu of full membership. While accession negotiations are still defined as "open-ended," with no guarantee or right to eventual membership, it seems for the moment at least that both countries, as International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Hugh Pope puts it, are "now aware of the long-term damage this has done to their own commercial interests, the EU’s stature on its southeastern flank and Turkey’s own reform program."

Signs of Moving Forward

For the past few years, including before European Parliament elections last summer, conservative politicians in France and Germany both used populist anti-Turkey rhetoric to attract voters (on this point, see former EU Enlargement Commissioner Maxime Verheugen's denunciation). Returning from France in October, President Gul declared the "privileged partnership" talk to be over, a statement repeated by Bagis in January. EU plans to offer Turkey something less than full EU membership, whether it be the half-cooked "privileged partnership" proposal or membership in French President Nicolas Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union, have long drawn scorn from Turkish politicians and worked against the reform process by putting Turks on the defensive and de-mobilizing optimism/support for eventual membership.

Other positive developments on the European side of the equation include the success of the Lisbon Treaty, which, while granted will take the EU awhile yet to get used to, puts to rest questions about the EU project that had to be sorted out before further enlargement. Though Lisbon did not do much to amend enlargement procedures (individual member states can still veto the entry of candidate countries), it does allow the EU to focus more fully on its future borders. Croatia is well on its way to acceding, and the accession of Iceland following its financial demise should be accomplished without too many hitches. Macedonia, despite problems with Greece, is making headway as well, and plans lie in wait for Serbia, which applied for membership in December, as well as for Albania and Montenegro. While a country with a population of 70 million plus is indubitably a much bigger swallow, Turkey's move eastward should provide momentum in the coming years as the former Ottoman-controlled Balkans unite with more "Western" counterparts. Another possible candidate is newly independent, predominantly Muslim Kosovo, which along with Albania, will get Europeans thinking about cultural/religious identity issues -- what it means to be "European" -- in ways hopefully more sophisticated than these grand level questions have been approached in the past.

While there are still plenty of Turkey-skeptic politicians in the wings, the shift on "privileged partnership," including German Chancellor Angela Merkel's long-standing promise to judge Turkey on its mertis at the time it accedes, should only put Turkish citizens and politicians more at ease. Another skeptic who has pulled back is recently elected EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy, whose past opposition to Turkish membership drew harsh criticism from Ankara. Van Rompuy has promised to act responsibly, honoring past commitments while not using his position to politicize Turkish accession. Additionally, Turkey has a friend in EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele, who has wholeheartedly expressed his desire to see Turkey become a member, playing up the geostrategic significance to Europe of eventual Turkish membership. Fuele will no doubt have a problem selling enlargement at a time when Europe is in recession and still coping with the recent additions of Bulgaria and Romania, but his determination to move forward on Turkey in the post-Lisbon EU should be read as an encouraging sign.

In Turkey, though disenchantment with the EU still rings loudly, the beginning of 2009 saw the government finally move forward with its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). The draft of the NPAA was released in August 2008, following an aggravating six-month wait after the February 2008 adoption of the EU's Accession Partnership Document (APD). As ICG's 2008 report observes,"in some ways it was already two years late, since no previous National Program was issued after the previous Accession Partnership in January 2006." That Turkey is now even has an up to date NPAA is welcome news, though there are shortcomings.

In addition to the NPAA, the government finally appointed an EU Chief Negotiator in January 2009, a move long requested by Europe, as well as bolstered the staff working on EU-related issues. To further reignite its EU bid, the government also appointed Brussels-experienced diplomat Volkan Bozkir as the Secretary-General for EU Affairs. And, further kicking off 2009 was a January trip to Brussels by Prime Minister Erdogan, who had not visited the European capital since the association agreement was signed. CHP opposition leader Deniz Baykal, whose party has frequently placed itself in opposition to any AKP-led reform regardless of its impact on Turkey's accession, also visited Brussels in February (see Feb. 11, 2009 post).

Other positive signs included the signing of an inter-governmental agreement on the Nabucco pipeline, as well as on the domestic front, a strategy for judicial reform and another to fight corruption. The government's Kurdish initiative and rapprochement with Armenia have also helped the EU process along (despite the shaky ground on which both now stand). With Spain at the helm of the EU Council Presidency, and possibly two more chapters to be opened, the next few months also look promising as long as Turkey moves forward, which it might be all the more inclined to do now that it is facing another possible closure case thanks in part to past foot-dragging on judicial and political parties reform.

Ambivalence on the Turkish Side

However, despite progress made in 2009, Turkish public support and optimism about eventual membership are at a continued lull. The standoff on Cyprus, which led the EU Council to block eight policy chapters in 2006 and France to block four more (five in total, but one overlaps; Cyprus is informally blocking others), as well as the talk of "privileged partnership" and anti-Turkey talk in Europe, have taken its toll. The most recent EU Parliament resolution on the 2009 Progress Report will not help either, nor will nationalist politicians' spouts of anti-EU talk or the constant grumbling in Turkey about meeting "EU demands."

The most recent Transatlantic Trends Survey, a project of the German Marshall Fund, put support for membership at 48 percent, down from 73 percent in 2004. According to the same survey, 65 percent of Turks polled thought European membership impossible, and perhaps most disturbingly, only 34 percent identified themselves as sharing common values with the West. The EU Commision's Eurobarometer puts the percentage of Turks in favor of membership at similary low levels -- 45 percent; another poll by Angus Reid has the percentage in favor only slightly higher. These numbers are concretely reflected in the Turkish public's lack of interest in the 2009 Progress Report. The report's November release garnered little attention among Turkish opinion leaders, who in past years often discussed the report on Turkish television and in newspapers. However, even with the pressure on before the EU Summit this December and the possibility of more difficulties arising from the Cyprus problem, including the suspension of negotiations, few seemed to care.

While Europe might be said to be experiencing "enlargement fatigue," Turkey is suffering from a bad case of "Europe fatigue," or at least serious second thoughts facilitated by a sense of "not being wanted." What Turks perceive to be moaning in Europe and constant scolding by European officials -- too often played up in the Turkish media -- has created a response among several Turks with whom I have talked that Turkey can and should "go it alone." Some of this is sheer pride, and it is no doubt helped along by fears, largely coaxed along by rumors, that Turkey will have to do this or that to meet "EU demands." Thinking of the accession process in terms of "demands" made by a foreign power rather than "criteria" that must be voluntarily met in order to gain membership into an intergovernmental organization badly damages the accession process in a country whose politics are prone to paranoia (for more on this, see April 11, 2008 post on Turkey's "Sevres syndrome"). Rather, the "demands"-oriented thinking injures Turkish confidence and gives rise to a sense of hurt and defensiveness, which frequently manifests itself in countering EU criticisms with arguments about Turkey's worth, oft replete with strong undertones of nationalism and even xenophobia.

The most commonly expressed criticism of the EU from Turks, be it from more secularist or non-separationist in how they approach the state's relationship with Islam, is that Europe does not want a Muslim country in its borders. This feeling is no doubt stoked by the recent EU decision to extend the Schengen zone, and thus visa-free travel, to Macedonians, Montegrins, and most controversially, Serbians, which are predominantly Christian, but not to Kosovars, Bosnians, Albanians, or Turks. The EU decision prompted a sharp response from Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and plenty of criticism in the Turkish press -- in short, it was talked about much more than the Progress Report.

Ambivalence on the European Side

Though European ambivalence and skepticism should improve as Germany and France pull away from the "privileged partnership" discourse, support for Turkish membership in Europe is still very low (the same Transatlantic Trends Survey put the percentage of Europeans who thought Turkish membership would work in the EU's favor at 19 percent). Former EU Enlargement Commisioner Olli Rehn, who is supportive of Turkish membership, explained the opposition in an interview with EurActiv in November 2008:

One view that is quit strong in France and Germany is there should be no further widening without deepening. I have held many discussions in France both in the National Assembly and with the civil society, likewise in Germany, and the view there is that we do not rule out a Turkish accession but first the EU should be deepened.

I feel a certain sympathy for the view that widening and deepening should go hand in hand and I understand the logic but I don’t think those two approaches are contradictory. In fact, widening and deepening are rather parallel and mutually-reinforcing processes. Both of them have made the EU what it is today - much stronger and more effective than let’s say 20 years ago.

A second main concern is cultural and religious resistance, which is more difficult and for which I do not feel so much sympathy because the EU is not a Christian Club. Rather it is a community of common values, democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms. If a country meets those conditions, it should be able to join the EU – if it is a European country and it has a European vocation.

Thirdly, there are concerns related to employment and the labour market, which are often linked to immigration. For instance in France, the Turkish EU accession is seen through the lens of certain problems related to the integration of the Muslim minority - if you can call 5 or 6 million people a minority, out of whom only a small portion are actually Turks.

The French fears have resulted in French leaders continued stress on concerns about Turkey being a transit country for illegal immigrants. Indeed, these same phobias have elicted discussion of possible derogations on labor and immigration issues that would be attached to eventual Turkish membership. Focusing on France, Turkey also won few friends when it was less than supportive about France's re-entry into NATO earlier last year, and won an enemy in previously supportive French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner when it moved to oppose the eventual election of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO's Secretary-General. Yet, it is not all bad news. Sarkozy's now infamous 2007 declaration that Turkey was not part of Europe, but of "Asia Minor," might have boosted his support among entrenched Turkey skeptics in France at the time, but there are now indications that the French president's rather asinine geography lesson energized the French left and helped consolidate support for Turkish membership, in fact because of Sarkozy's opposition. According to Pope,

although President Sarkozy may not have changed his own mind, his politicisation of Turkey’s EU membership during his election victory in 2007 has unexpectedly mobilised Turkey’s supporters in France. Left-wing newspapers now debate the merits of the country, whereas a decade ago they mainly picked apart Turkey’s then poor human rights record.

French businesses, anxious about what politician Pierre Lellouche early on thought was the loss of five billion euros worth of business, helped finance an ongoing nine months of 400 Turkish cultural events in 70 French cities. These plays, debates and shows -- including lighting up the Eiffel Tower in the red-and-white of the Turkish flag -- have probably done more to showcase Turkey than decades of diplomatic toil.

The German opposition is a bit different. Merkel, unlike Sarkozy, had promised previously to not directly prevent Turkey from gaining membership, and so refrained from blocking chapters as France did in 2007 (though the latter used Cyprus as the pretext). Yet, Merkel has made her opposition known all the same, and if the Christian Democrats do happen to still be in power at the time a final decision on Turkey is made, there will likely be difficulties. Germany continues to stress that accession negotiations with Turkey are open-ended, and that there is no right to or guarantee of membership, emphasizing that Turkey has stict obligations to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and reconcile its laws with the EU acquis (for example, see German EMP Elmar Brok's remarks in 2008 in response). While Germany's über-conservative Christian Social Union party remains publicly committed to "privileged partnership" (see, for example, CSU's criticsm of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's recent trip to Turkey), the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition agreement in effect since German elections in September makes no reference to it. Beneficial to Turkey's relations with Germany is strong trade between the two countries, as well as Germany's contibution of 17 percent to Turkey's foreign direct investment. There are also 1.2 million perople in Germany who enjoy dual German-Turkish citizenship.

Turkish and European proponents have plenty of work ahead of them if accession is to progress in the difficult times ahead, and it is clear that leadership and dialogue is what is needed most of all. European supporters of accession point to the fact that no enlargement has succeeded by looking only to popular opinion, putting emphasis on the time, work, and leadership that make enlargements successful. Swedish President Carl Bildt, who held the EU Council Presidency last term, expressed this opinion in the European Parliament's debates on enlargement last November.

We are all aware that there are those in our respective public opinions that would prefer to just shut the door to all of them [candidates seeking EU membership], hoping that the issue would go away, and opt for a far more closed idea of Europe. I belong to those who are convinced that this would be a mistake of historic proportions -- the consequences of which would haunt our Europe for a very long time to come.

Bildt echoed similar sentiments in an interview with Nigar Goksel, saying “the EU project and its important components, ranging from the euro to enlargement, have been the result of political leadership, not the result of a groundswell of love toward each other among different European nations. In fact, very little would have happened in the last 50 years without political leadership.” Here, arguments about the geostrategic importance of Turkey in terms of energy and influence in the Middle East, as well as Turkey-EU relations in terms of NATO, are all influential, and the more European leaders make them, the better.

Linking Turkey's Two Vocations -- Europe and Democracy

Final decisions about the "absorption capacity" of Europe for Turkish membership are a long way coming, but Turkey must do its part, too. While no accession has successfully taken place without European leadership, no accession has taken place without a groundswell of popular support in the acceding country for membership. Spain's accession to the European Union in many ways parallels Turkey in terms of the strong opposition Spain faced from countries fearing it relative economic deprivation and huge agricultural capacity; yet, the Spanish public was strongly supportive of EU membership and democratization following the Franco dictatorship, and success came with persistence. While there is indubitably more opposition to Turkish membership than Spain faced in the early 1980s, Turkey must overcome some of its political dysfunctions if it is to succeed. Nigar Goksel points to what the government might do to push forward in this endeavor.

While the EU process loses momentum, the agenda in Turkey has been consumed with clashing concepts of citizenship, competing patronage networks, colliding dogmatic visions, and culture wars. Loopholes in the constitutional system have allowed these battles to cause systemic deadlocks. The dysfunction in institutional checks and balances has led to a broad feeling of insecurity about the rule of law. By responding to this scene with patronizing and vengeful approaches, the government and its supporters only exacerbate the deficit of confidence and steepen the challenges for the government itself.

For the progressive taboo-breaking initiatives on the agenda to succeed, a concerted effort to reduce the perceived insecurity is called for. As long as the culture of reliance or vulnerability to the good graces of a political power persists, the fierce polarization that prioritizes personal and group interests over Turkey’s long-term interests will continue. The institutional and structural changes that the EU track will impose can curb this culture. However, rhetoric also matters. For the government to convince a critical mass about its commitment to its declared goals, rhetoric about freedoms and pluralism needs to be consistent across the ruling party’s ranks and across the range of issues on the agenda.

Rather than convince Turks of the benefits of EU membership for Turkey or sell its democratic values or culture to Europe, Turkey's government remains squarely focused on the technical aspects of accession, namely the EU chapters, and is frequently confrontational toward EU opponents. Neither is helpful. Essentially, the government has two jobs, both difficult: 1) sell Europe in Turkey, which is largely a rhetorical and public information effort, and 2) sell Turkey in Europe, which is a matter not only of satifying the EU acquis, but continuing to consolidate its democracy and pass reforms respecting human rights.

Selling Europe in Turkey

In regard to the first, building public support for accession would not only bolster the accession process, but also reforms the government would like to see passed -- and, now, with judicial reform all the more exigent, desperately need to be passed. Support for reforms as a function of EU membership is the lynchpin is critical to their realization. According to TESEV's Dilek Kurban, "For the people, Europe means a prosperous future. It is the only thing to inspire hope, to motivate people for change. This process is the only thing that holds the country together, Turks and Kurds, Muslims and others. If you lose it, what you’ll see is a disintegrating country." Even if one does not agree with the potential fallout Kurban identifies, most Turkish leaders would have a hard time denying the role the EU has in mobilizing reform, the motor the EU prospect provides when challenging the status quo and the powers that be. The entire reform process between 1999 and 2005, in addition to the meager reforms thereafter, were all largely driven by the EU, and the fact is hard to escape. EU reform is linked to accession, and when accession comes unglued, so does reform. This is one reason so many observers who know how determined the AKP is to pass reform on civil-military affairs and the judiciary have grown skeptical that the AKP is still in the pro-Europe camp.

Euroskeptics are not the only forces to blame for Turkey's low public morale for accession. Turkey's leaders must also own up, and do something about it as well -- otherwise, the alliance of the skeptics, and those who do not want to see Turkey in Europe, will win.

Selling Turkey in Europe

The government's constant confrontation with Turcoskeptics in Europe has done little to build support for accession in Europe, nor has it weakened the skeptics. Though frustration is understandable, countering Turcoskepticism is best left to European leaders supportive of Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan's calling out of a smirking Greek Cypriot politician at a lunch in Brussels did nothing to win Turkey friends or damage the credibility of the likely less than credible Greek Cypriot. For another example of less than helpful behavior, see Erdogan's remarks during a dinner he hosted for the diplomatic corps in Sept. 2008, during which the Prime Minister declared, "Forget about drawing water form this well. [The EU has] got the bucket so stuck in the bottom of the well, it'll be a miracle to get it out at all." Rather than attack Euroskeptics, or in the latter case, Europe as a whole, if the government is serious about accession, it must focus on the reform process and selling the democratic values it shares with the EU. To this extent, rather than paying attention only to opening acquis chapters, the government should draw on the synergy of the accession and reform processes, enthusiasically embrace Copenhagen, and move forward with broad-based democratic reform, including a new civilian constitution. Even if chapters are not opened, there is nothing to prevent the government from working on reforms in anticipation, nor in using the EU anchor for leverage in so doing.

In an interview to Today's Zaman, Spanish Ambassador to Turkey Joan Clos referenced his own country's accession.

In the Spanish accession process, when we talked about interests and strategy, we never succeeded in the argument. We never moved the hearts of the Europeans when we said we were close to the Strait of Gibraltar, were very important for Europe or when we said our agriculture was very important and we had the largest area of farmland.

. . . .

But when we talked with our European fellows and said, ‘Look, we want to be in the EU because we want to stabilize our democracy forever,’ this was something understood by every European citizen on the street. To give weight only to strategic and business reasons for European accession is purely an argument of interests. To put emphasis on values is a much deeper emotional question. There are countries which have geo-strategic value and position apart from Turkey, but the kind of democracy that you have reached with the republic and that you are trying to improve through governmental and everybody’s efforts makes the difference for Turkey in relation to your neighborhood. This should be the main driving force. Democratic Europe cannot lose a growing democracy in this part of the world. If you ask a German, Frenchman or Spaniard, ‘Do you want to help Turkey to be a European-like democracy with our values or not?’ the answer would be yes. This is more important than oil or agriculture.

Yet, Turkish politicans rarely, if ever, makes such arguments, choosing rather to focus on geopolitics, energy, and Turkey's economic weight and satisfaction of the economic/financial Maastricht criteria. (In a EurActiv interview with Bagis, the EU Chief Negotiator is keen to talk about Maastricht, but defensive on Copenhagen. The latter has to be broached by the interviewer, while the former is volunteered.) While it is obviously easier to talk about geopolitical significance and past achievements than shortcomings and future reforms, it is the latter that is badly needed. Several Turks, including Turkish politicians, often say "reform is for Turkey," which is all fine and well, but does little to unite Turkey's democratic vocation with its European vocation. When the two are united, both seem to benefit; when they are not, neither seems to go very far.

The Final Decision

Assuming Turkey can avoid a full-out confrontation with the European Council over Cyprus, which still hangs around its neck and provides ample ammunition and room for maneuvering to its detractors in Europe, a final decision on Turkish membership is still a long ways off. While this might be frustrating to some extent, it should also take the pressure off and encourage Turkish politicans to focus on reforms rather than criticisms of Europe. Sarkozy, nor Merkel, are likely to not be in power by the time a decision can actually be made, and though Austria and France have both expressed intentions to put Turkish membership to referendum, to talk about the European politics on Turkish accession now is more than premature given the rapidly changing dynamics of the region, and just as importantly, the more democratic, human rights-oriented Turkey could be if its politicians keep their eyes on the ball.

Turkish Ambassador to Germany Ahmet Acet urges European politicians to focus on the Turkey of the next 10 years, but the same applies to the government and the opposition. And, while the new government line recognizes that the final decision is a long ways off, it should also stress, as Clos instructs, the Turkey's passion for democracy and Europe, best evinced by the reforms to be hopefully realized in those next ten years. Turkey's entrance into the European Union would not only assist in the consolidation of Turkish democracy, but would also assuage the fears of AKP-opposition forces and skeptics who claim the AKP does not actually want European membership and is rather using the accession process to further its own "secret" political agenda. Since the vast majority of Turks want democratic reform, which the government also claims to want, tieing reform to the accession process is not only politically useful in this historically Westward-looking country, long-defined by a love-hate relationship with the West, but symbolically potent.

With few chapters left to open, Turkey must maintain a reasonable amount of momentum, and Copenhagen and Maastricht are both answers. To this extent, President Gul's comments that Turkey might choose to go the way of Norway are not particularly helpful, as they do little to unite Turkey's two vocations, which the AKP, as well as the opposition parties, all outwardly espouse. Rather, Europe, largely hesitant about Turkey's political turbulence and ambivalent relationship toward democracy and the West, needs to be convinced Turkey wants Europe and democracy. The government, and the opposition, can do better. Time will tell.

The EU Parliament: "Missing the Confederate Cyprus Train"

The Turkish government responded strongly last Wednesday to the European Parliament (EP)'s resolution on the European Commission's 2009 Progress Report, namely its call for Turkey to ratify the Addition Protocol of its association agreement with the European Union, remove its troops from Northern Cyprus, and return a section of Maras (Varosha) in the Cypriot town of Famagusta, which is currenty sealed off and occupied by the Turkish military. The resolution states that the EP

Deplores the fact that, for the fourth consecutive year, the Additional Protocol to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement has not been implemented by Turkey; calls on the Turkish Government to implement it fully without delay, in a non-discriminatory way, and recalls that failure to do so may further seriously affect the negotiating process;

36. Reiterates Turkey's unequivocal obligation to maintain good-neighbourly relations as provided for by the negotiating framework; underlines its undertaking together with all other parties to support the efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and to resolve any outstanding border disputes with neighbouring countries in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter;

37. Calls on the Turkish Government and all parties concerned actively to support the ongoing negotiations, and to contribute in concrete terms to the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation, in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the principles on which the EU is founded; calls on Turkey to facilitate a suitable climate for negotiations by immediately starting to withdraw its forces from Cyprus, by addressing the issue of the settlement of Turkish citizens on the island and also by enabling the return of the sealed-off section of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants in compliance with Resolution 550(1984) of the United Nations Security Council; . . .

Dutch MP Ria Oomen-Ruijten prepared the report, which was adopted by the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee by a vote of 65 for and 4 against, with 1 absention (EP press release). The resolution also called on Turkey to adopt numerous other measures also called for in the Progress Report, including a new constitution and political parties law, more rights for Kurds and religious minorities, and more work on the freedom of expression front, which the EP recognized as not being in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Yet, the real sticking point for the Turkish government is its strong words on Cyprus, which Ankara does not recognize to be rightfully part of the negotiation process.

Ankara's reaction was as could be expected. Prime Minister Erdogan denounced the report as biased, while Chief EU Negotiator Egeman Bagis said the report must not be taken seriously.

To some extent, the Cyprus dispute is linked to two competing narratives of what happened when the European Council agreed to start negotiations with Turkey at the European Council Summit in December 2004. Turkey claims it agreed to open its ports to Cyprus on the condition that the isolation of northern Cyprus be brought to an end. However, according to the EU, Turkey agreed to recognize all EU member states, including Cyprus, by signing the Additional Protocol to its EU Association Agreement. Turkey did sign the Association Agreement in 2005, but attached an explicit reservation to its signature asserting that its signature did not de facto mean it recognized Cyprus. The Additional Protocol has never been brought to parliament for ratification. Turkey's current position on Cyprus is that all embargoes be lifted simultaneously. Furthermore, Ankara asserts that since Greek Cypriot membership was not conditional on resolution of the Cyprus conflict, nor should the conflict be a factor in Turkey's accession process (see Bagis' interview with EurActiv.)

The Cyprus-Turkey-EU dilemma began in 1995 when Greece allowed Turkey to enter the Customs Union in exchange for Cyprus' EU candidature. In 1997, the EU and Cyprus concluded an association agreement that led to Cyprus' EU membership in 2004, though Cyprus had just rejected the UN-sponsored Annan Plan. In a referendum, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the UN-proposed solution. However, 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. The Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan did not hinder their entry into the EU despite a promise made in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit that Greek Cypriots would not stand in the way of a solution; instead, the Greek Cypriots entered the EU as representatives of the whole of Cyprus.

There is plenty of reason for Turkey to be frustrated with the EU's handling of the Cyprus conflict. With accession only a month away, Greek Cypriots had little reason to endorse the Annan Plan. Some European politicians did cry fowl, notably EU Enlargement Commissioner at the time Maxime Verheugen and External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten. Cyprus has since made the EU's relationship with Turkey difficult, as well as efforts to resolve its conflict with Turkish Cypriots in the north. Though the EU might well have made promises to end the north's isolation, Cyprus has blocked efforts to do so. Turkish Cypriots remain unable to directly trade with the EU and financial assistance has been hampered by Greek Cypriot intransigence. Additionally, despite ongoing negotiations, Cyprus continues to explore for oil in contested waters off its coast, which resulted in some serious naval showdowns with the Turkish Navy in November 2008. Since Cyprus has become a member, and having given up much of its leverage, the EU has done little to involve itself in reconciliation efforts. Instead, EU politicians opposed to Turkish membership have come to use Cyprus as an excuse to encumber the accession process while exerting little pressure on Cyprus now that it has full membership status. The Turks are, understandably, frustrated, and with now upwards of 23 chapters of the EU acquis blocked due to the Cyprus issue, Turkish accession is in jeopardy, as is the reform and external/internal security it helped bring about. The good news is that the European Summit in December took no action against Turkey on Cyprus, though it continues to be an albatross around the neck of the accession process, providing ample political fodder for EU opposition to Turkish membership and vice-versa. Additionally, as the International Crisis Group's Hugh Pope points out, as long as the question of Greek propeties in northern Cyprus remains unresolved, Turkey will continue to face costly verdicts at the European Court of Human Rights that not only imperil its future in the European Union, but also in the Council of Europe.

If Europe is serious about Turkish membership and a united Cyprus, lecturing Turkey without acknowledging past mistakes or the history of the conflict is not helpful. Pro-EU/reform columnist Mehmet Ali Birand on just why the current policy is unlikely to yield results:

The EU misses the confederate Cyprus train. The link has reversed. The EU does not notice but a new world is being established and Turkey is taking its place.

There is one other fact of which Europe is not aware. And that is that old balances no longer exist. Old connections, old accounts no longer exist in the heads of those who lead Turkey.

What I'm trying to say is very simple. Until now Western capitals and media established a connection between a solution in Cyprus and Turkey's membership of the EU. For years there was an equation established stating, 'Do this and that so we will give you what you want in the EU'.

In 1995 it was agreed with Greek Cypriots to start full membership negotiations in exchange for accepting Turkey into the customs union. And in 2004 in exchange for the acceptance of the Annan Plan, Turkey obtained candidacy status and negotiations started.

Do you know when this connection failed? It was when Turkey broke a huge taboo by accepting the Annan Plan whereas the Greek Cypriots denied and still received full membership. The Greek Cypriots were given the key to the door that leads to Turkey's full membership.

Europe played its cards boorishly. Thus the EU-Cyprus connection broke. The EU's former evasiveness no longer exists. In the Economist magazine dated 12 December, there was still a broad analysis trying to get a message across that implies, 'Turkey gets stuck in respect of the EU. In order to get out it needs to take steps toward a solution. Ankara needs to take action.'

How delusive an attitude. The magazine is probably not aware of the fact that the balance and certain things in Turkey have changed.

If European capital cities too think that way, I must say they are making a big mistake. The EU is no longer a matter that causes Turkey to make important sacrifices.

Turkey quickly changes. Europe is probably not aware that it is not only losing Turkey but also the possibility of creating a united Cyprus. The European Union for Turkey is no longer a piece of carrot worth catching.

I'd like to draw attention to the fact that this connection has been reversed. If Europe still targets or dreams about a united Cyprus and wants to prevent a split never to unite again, then it needs to change its attitude toward Turkey.

In order not to lose a united Cyprus, Europe needs to work up an appetite and prepare carrots to spurn the excitement for Turkey. Now the world is changing and Turkey will find its place in this newly established world."

While Bagis' statements that Turkey should ignore what the EU says are also not necesarily helpful to the accession process other than helping to keep Turkish hopes up, neither are ignoring where they are coming from -- and, yes, they too should be taken seriously. For Turkey's part, it should focus on the work ahead, taking positive steps to enact reforms requisite to accession while keeping the EU parliament resolution in perspective. Cyprus is indubitably a large impediment to the accession process, but a final decision on Turkey -- and in Turkey, on Europe -- is still a long ways ahead.

For more on the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus ahead of April elections, see analysis from Didem Aykel with the International Crisis Group. See also EurActiv's timeline and summary of Cyprus-EU-Turkey affairs.


UPDATE I (2/25) -- Today's Zaman reports that the EU Parliament's Turkey Rapporetuer Ria Oomen-Ruitjen said the resolution on Turkey was stronger this year due to changes in the European Parliament's composition after elections this summer.

Commenting on notes concerning Cyprus included in the EP's latest report on Turkey, Oomen-Ruijten said the parliament had similar demands from Turkey before.

Due to the "new balances formed in the European Parliament after the last elections," no amendments could have been made to the Cyprus paragraph of the report as Turkey expected, Oomen-Ruijten stated.

On Feb. 10, European lawmakers endorsed a resolution that called on Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, to resolve the issue of Turkish citizens settled on the island and to allow Greek Cypriot access to the Maraş region.

With a motion adopted in the general assembly afterwards, this call on Turkey to seek its active support for comprehensive peace talks on the island was expanded to include all relevant parties.

Negotiations between Talat and Demetrios re-commenced yesterday.

Obama Reigns in Era of New Opportunity in U.S.-Turkey Relations

PHOTO from the New York Times

President Obama's inauguration on Tuesday excited millions around the world hopeful that a new American administration -- led by a seemingly very different man -- might translate into real and meaningful change. Like elsewhere across the globe, Obama's message of change, perceived moderation, and calls for transparent government are well received by Turks. Upon Obama's election, 44 sheep were slaughtered in the eastern city of Van to commemorate Obama's election as the 44th president of the United States. A recent BBC poll (taken before the Gaza crisis) revealed that 51 percent of Turks believe Obama will strengthen American relations with the rest of the world, a number up from 11 percent just six months ago when most Turks seemed despairingly indifferent to the results of the U.S. election. Not only is the increase significant, but also the sheer number of hopeful people: Turks are one of the most anti-American populations in the world, and conspiracy theories about U.S. support for the PKK and Middle East designs abound (see "I Am Not in the CIA," June 11 post, for more background). With such political capital at his disposal, President Obama has a real opportunity to transform U.S.-Turkey relations for the better. The U.S. and Turkey have plenty of national interests in common and foreign policy areas ripe for mutual cooperation are many.

As I laid out in Foreign Policy in Focus in November, Turkey is teetering between East and West in its foreign policy orientation. Although Turkey has historically linked itself to the West, largely anchored by its European vocation and NATO membership, a growing number of Turks have begun to advocate that Turkey should strengthen relations with Eastern powers, especially Russia, and/or adopt a more isolationist posture. Essential to determining Turkey's future relations with the West will be the outcome of its accession to the European Union, as well as good relations with the United States. In order to assure both, the United States should do all it can to facilitate Turkish accession and come to terms with a Turkey more independent in its thinking, and with foreign policy aspirations more its own than at any time during the Cold War. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is in transition, and Cold War understandings of Turkey are anachronistic. Russia is now Turkey's largest trading partner, and Ankara is seeking better relations with Muslim capitals throughout the Middle East. The more complex relationship between Europe and the United States also plays a hand. Europe and America are not always on the same page, and Turkey should not be expected to choose between the two -- for an example, look no further than European opposition to the invasion of the Iraq. The ambitious foreign policy of Turkey's AKP-led government seeks to expand Turkey's soft power and restore relations with countries that were once provinces over which the Ottomans were suzerain (see Mustafa Akyol, Newsweek, Dec. 6). As Turkey endeavors to meet its foreign policy objectives -- and, discover their implications in so doing -- the United States should look for areas of overlapping interest, meanwhile doing all it can to anchor Turkey firmly to the West.

The United States should build multilateral ties with Turkish NGOs, businesses, and cultural/educational institutions. By way of this new multilateral approach (Cf. Mary Kaldor, Boston Review, Feb./March 2005), President Obama will not only bolster support for inter-state diplomacy, but build the kinds of deep, inter-penetrating social ties that will not only counter anti-Americanism inside Turkey, but provide the cement for friendly future relations. Obama would also do well to promote Turkey within NATO, praising the productive role it is playing in Afghanistan and the potential it has in brokering peace in the Middle East. In terms of NATO, Obama would do well to encourage Turkey to assent to the Berlin Plus Agreement, uniting Turkey with the rest of Europe in support of a mechanism important to the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy. President Obama would also be well-advised to encourage a diplomatic solution to Cyprus, taking advantage of the election of moderates on both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot sides so that a UN-sponsored bicommunal solution again becomes a viable option.

The Obama Administration should do everything in its power to support human rights and democracy in Turkey, strengthening governing institutions by standing firmly behind pro-reform/accession forces inside Turkey and the European Union. President Bush was rather lackadaisical in his support of the EU process, and criticism of human rights/support for democratic institutions in Turkey has been lacking in the past eight years. When sinister forces threatened to topple the AKP-elected government last year and sought to undermine the election of President Gül the year before that, the United States did little to voice its disapproval, leaving Europe largely alone in its vehement opposition to these anti-democratic posturings. While AKP survived the closure case, its leaders have not forgotten the lack of support(see Henri Barkey, Washington Post, Aug. 23). President Obama should address this lacuna quickly and steadfastly by expressing solidarity with Turkish democratization efforts, including the salvation of AKP at the Constitutional Court last July -- though, disappointingly, AKP was found guilty of the trumped up charges it faced, just barely escaping closure.

Concomitantly, President Obama will do well to ignore the falsehoods and propaganda coming from neoconservative think-tanks and journals like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Middle East Quarterly (see my posts of Nov. 24 and April 18; also, Avni Dogru, Foreign Policy In Focus, July 24). Turkish press have a tendency to fixate and generate conspiracy theories based on the publications and public statements of figures like Michael Rubin, and Obama would do the U.S.' relationship well if it makes clear from the beginning that these people have no influence in policy making.

And, finally, one last thing the United States might do to bulwark democratization is demonstrate its support for the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. Although the United States is well-advised to stay far removed from the volatile domestic politics in which the investigation is inextricably entangled, President Obama could further strengthen relations if he were to make a public statement expressing support for the opportunity the investigation offers to extirpate lingering elements of Turkey's historic 'deep state,' the shadowy, obfuscate network of anti-democratic forces hidden beneath state structures. In doing, the President should also call for government transparency during the investigation. The impact of such a position would bolster support for the United States within AKP and its political constituency, but might also -- depending on how it is made -- curry favor with secular leftist Turks, many of whom still remember the 1980 military coup in which deep state elements were indubitably involved. To add weight to this second point, it is appropriate to note the significant amount of conjecture about U.S. involvement in the anti-leftist coup ('Operation Gladio,' see 25/1/08 post), resentment around which is still a part of Turkish historical memory.

Obama foreign policy toward Turkey is not without its usual pitfalls and opportunities, though Ankara's neo-Ottoman foreign policy has perhaps made things a bit easier. The Armenian 'genocide' question still persists, as does the United States' role in Iraq, namely the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the use of northern Iraq as a safe haven for the PKK. However, thanks to Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia and the KRG, both situations, respectively, might be improved. More difficult will be the United States' support for Israel, which given the size and intensity of Turkish protests against Israel's recent invasion of Gaza, poses the risk of infecting good relations by the sheer potential preponderance of the issue. Ankara's new interest in the conflict, not to mention the demonstrated willingness of the Israelis to inflict mass civilian casualties, make the situation in the Palestine Occupied Territories even more explosive in terms of U.S.-Turkey relations.

Turkey's expanding foreign policy might well prove of mutual benefit to both states. There is hope that Turkey's symbiotic relationship with Iran places Turkey in a useful position to mediate between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Shortly after Obama's victory, identifying Iran as the United States' most vexing challenge, Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed Turkey's willingness to help the United States negotiate a solution. Further, Turkey's efforts to achieve an alliance between Caucasus states are critical to the security of Central Asia, a potentially effective way to protect the sovereignty of these newly-independent states.

And, as a hopeful aside, in December, Obama transition aides mentioned the President is considering a major speech debunking Huntington's infamous "Clash of Civilizations" thesis to be delivered in a Muslim capital -- might it be İstanbul?

(For a wonderfully concise analysis and fairly dead-on take on the U.S.-Turkey relationship and what Obama might do to improve it, see Spencer P. Boyer and Brian Katulis, "The Neglected Alliance Restoring U.S.–Turkish Relations to Meet 21st Century Challenges," Center for American Progress, December 2008.)

Erdoğan Unwisely Lambasts EU

At an iftar dinner on Tuesday, Prime Minister Erdoğan launched heavy criticisms against the EU, once again accusing EU politicians of holding Turkey to different standards than those to which other acceding countries have been held. From TDN:

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan Tuesday complained of the pace at which negotiations are being opened on the 35 policy areas that candidates must complete, and asked the EU be fair towards Turkey during its accession talks.

His remarks followed criticism from the Turkish foreign minister on the pace of the accession process.

The process of opening and closing chapters in membership negotiations with the EU was prolonged unnecessarily, Erdogan said during a fast breaking dinner hosted Tuesday in Ankara in honor of foreign ambassadors and heads of foreign missions in Turkey.

"The number of chapter headings were fewer before. Before we even entered this process, opening and closing of chapters was not even an issue. Chapters were opened and closed. But now we are struggling for this," he was quoted by Anatolian Agency as saying.

He said this was not a fair approach, adding Turkey expected the EU to adopt the same approach it did with other candidates.

The EU opened the negotiations on two chapters of "company law" and "intellectual property law" in June in the accession talks, which began in 2005.

Although the opening of two new chapters signals progress in membership negotiations, 15 of 35 chapters remain suspended. The EU had suspended eight chapters in December 2006 due to Turkey's refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels before the Union ends its isolation of Turkish Cypriots.

Erdogan also said Turkey was not asking for privileges.

"We say: we want you to give us the same rights you granted to others (candidates) before us. If you are seeing us as a burden --then that's a different story-- then say so. But you should know that Turkey is coming to relieve you of your burden, not to be a cause of burden. You should view Turkey like this," he said.

"However, we see that the EU is not as fast as Turkey in regards with negotiation chapters," said Erdogan, adding the EU made a habit of opening only two chapters at a time, thus slowing down the process.

Click here for the story from TDZ. For past analysis of the utter futility of these remarks, see Aug. 2 post. For a similar analysis of this most recent event, see Gareth Jenkins in today's EDM. From Jenkins:

There is no doubt that Erdogan has a point. It is no secret that although several EU member states are enthusiastic supporters of eventual Turkish accession, others—not the least France, which currently holds the EU presidency—have reservations about ever allowing the country to become a member. But the statements by both Erdogan and Babacan also demonstrated how far Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) remains from understanding the nature of the accession process or even the EU itself.

It has recently become fashionable in the pro-AKP media to blame the country’s current ills—including the economic slowdown and the government’s lack of attention to the EU accession process—on the closure case that was filed against the party on March 14 (see EDM, March 17). The AKP has, however, introduced no substantive EU reforms since the accession process was formally inaugurated in the early hours of October 4, 2005.

In his speech to the foreign ambassadors on September 16, Erdogan lambasted the EU for refusing to close any more chapters in the accession process. “In the past, chapters used to be opened and closed. Now, unfortunately, they are only opened,” lamented Erdogan (Radikal, Hurriyet, Vatan, Zaman, September 17).

Erdogan was referring to the EU’s decision in December 2006 to suspend negotiations on eight chapters and refuse to close any others until Turkey extended its 1996 customs union agreement with the EU to include the Republic of Cyprus, which became an EU member in May 2004. Turkey has long refused to recognize the Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus or its authority over the entire island. Nevertheless, in order to ensure the official opening of accession negotiations in October 2005, the AKP signed what has become known as the Ankara Protocol in July 2005, in which it agreed to extend its customs union to the Republic of Cyprus, including opening Turkey’s ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. It was Turkey’s refusal to honor this commitment that led to the December 2006 suspension of the eight chapters and the refusal to close any others. The AKP still appears unaware that refusing to sign the Ankara Protocol could have been defended as a matter of principle; signing and then refusing to implement it simply looks dishonest.

Goodbye Gül, Hello Erdoğan-Babacan . . . Goodbye Europe?

Now that AKP has been saved, relations of the party with Europe become a very important point of consideration for the party and Turkey's future . . .

With Gül now president and more excluded from AKP's ruling structure, many observers have noted that his aggressively pro-Europe foreign policy stance has been replaced by a much more antagonistic attitude toward the European Union. When Euro-phile Gül was foreign minister, rhetoric toward the EU was largely conciliatory. However, with the rhetoric of the Erdoğan-controlled Ali Babacan, Turkey has continually injured its chances at eventual EU membership by continually choosing to focus on the EU's alleged discriminatory treatment toward Turkey.

Often iterated are accusations that the EU holds Turkey to different standards than it held its new Eastern European members and that EU politicians are constantly seeking to undermine Turkey's membership status by attempting to draw it into accepting an offer less than full membership. While there is some warrant to these charges, they focus only on those EU politicians who are against Turkish membership and, in fact, play directly into these Turkophobes' hands. If Nicolas Sarkozy wants ammunition to use against Turkey's application, Erdoğan and Babacan have certainly given him plenty.

Instead of focusing on meeting the requirements of the EU acquis, Erdoğan and Babacan have instead antagonized Europe and even made accusations that European demands are constantly and unfairly changing. However, all one has to do to realize that this is indeed not the case is to take the time to actually sit down and read the annual progress reports coming from the European Commission. The demands have not changed, and much to the shame of both politicians, little has been done to meet the conditions of the acquis since Turkey was granted accession status in 2005. Consequently, while the reports sound remarkably the same, what is present is a growing tone of frustration.

If AKP is serious about membership, the goal is best served by focusing on meeting EU demands rather than criticizing the EU. While much of this criticism is directed toward politicians like Sarkozy, such diplomatic moves make it more difficult for pro-Turkey EU politicians, many of whom are in the EU Commission, to respond effectively to their anti-Turkey cohorts. Rather than being constructive, Turkish criticism of the EU gives Turkish diplomacy a semblance of childishness and detracts attention away from the real work to be done. When this criticism is added atop Turkish refusal to implement an agreement to implement the agreement it signed to open up its ports to Cyprus in accordance with the Customs Union, many Europeans are growing increasingly perturbed.

Instead of worrying about Sarkozy, Turkey is best served by focusing on the European Commission and the acquis, the real fulcrum on which Turkey's membership rests. Surely Erdoğan and Babacan know this, and their reluctance to move forward with the EU accession process in any real and meaningful way casts doubt on their true intentions. Unfortunately, like the growing Erdoğan-led authoritarianism that has come to shape the AKP with Gül out of the picture, the prime minister's control over foreign policy is also a cause for concern.

As I have repeatedly argued, the best thing for Turkey to do at this point in the game is to appoint a full-time representative to the European Union instead of having Babacan balance this tremendous responsibility along with a foreign policy portfolio that is growing and, as Gareth Jenkins writes, seems increasingly out-of-focus. Inşallah, Turkey will do the right thing by those who are hopeful that Turkey will again vigorously pursue EU membership.

From Gareth Jenkins at the Eurasia Daily Monitor:

From July 15 to 18 more than 200 Turkish diplomats, including 103 of the country’s ambassadors and heads of missions serving in different countries around the world, met in Ankara to discuss Turkey’s short and long-term foreign policy goals.

The unprecedented gathering of virtually all of the high-level personnel from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was the brainchild of Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, who described it as providing “a setting for a focused exchange of views and consultation” in order “to make coordination between the headquarters and our missions abroad more efficient and productive” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.mfa.gov.tr).

Since he succeeded Abdullah Gul as foreign minister in August 2007, Babacan has often appeared out of his depth. He has also frequently been upstaged by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In Gul’s absence, Erdogan has assumed a much more active role in foreign policy, retaining tight personal control over what he regards as important foreign policy initiatives and meetings and only trusting Babacan to assume complete responsibility for relatively minor issues.

As a result, the four-day conference in Ankara was probably designed as much to assert Babacan’s authority as to improve the coordination of the country’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, both Babacan’s opening address and the 19-paragraph statement released at the end of the conference underlined what appears to be an continuing shift in Turkey’s foreign policy priorities since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) first took office in November 2002.

. . . .

Perhaps more revealingly, Babacan insisted that the EU was solely responsible for Turkey’s stalled EU accession process. “Turkey should not be subjected to discrimination and different treatment in this process,” he said. “The messages coming from EU countries on the subject of Turkey’s membership should be of a consistent and encouraging nature” (www.mfa.gov.tr).

In contrast, Babacan absolved the AKP of any blame for problems in relations with the EU. “There is no deviation from our full membership goal,” he said. “Turkey will do what falls upon it and will continue with its reforms. There has not been the slightest change in the determination of our government in this respect” (www.mfa.gov.tr).

Few would deny that the EU is partly to blame for the slow pace of Turkey’s accession negotiations, particularly given the reservations about Turkish membership expressed by key member states such as France and Germany. However, Babacan’s claim that there has been no change in the AKP’s determination to fulfill the criteria for EU membership is contradicted by the contrast between the battery of democratizing reforms passed before Turkey opened accession negotiations in October 2005 and the virtual absence of any since. Nor has Turkey yet fulfilled a 2005 agreement to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes; a failure Babacan has repeatedly defended on the grounds that the EU only asked Turkey to sign the agreement not to implement it.

In this context, Babacan’s glittering vision of Turkey as a global power threatens not only diplomatic overreach but also the diversion of time and energy from more pressing concerns. It is impossible to argue that in the short or medium-term, Africa and Latin America have more to offer Turkey than EU membership. Nor is there any disputing the disparity between the enthusiasm with which Turkey has recently been cultivating closer ties with Africa and Latin America and its manifest failure to take any steps to restart the stalled EU accession process.

Unexpected Peace in Cyprus?

If the EU can indeed bring about a solution in Cyprus, a significant hurdle will be overcome in Turkey's EU accession process. Who knows . . . the peace might even reignite the reform process here in Turkey. From Hugh Pope in the Wall Street Journal Europe:

Nobody has ever lost money betting on the failure of the Cyprus peace process. But this year, the best chance in decades to end this conflict has quietly crept up on local and international policy makers, and the European Union now has one last opportunity to undo past mistakes.

. . . .

The U.N.'s policy chief for Cyprus, Undersecretary-General Lynn Pascoe, who has expertly shepherded the talks this far, last week judged progress better than expected. "I really do think we are on the path that is going to make it work this time," he told a news conference.

Walking the balmy streets of Nicosia, it's hard to feel the Cyprus dispute. Amid honey-stoned British colonial villas and palm tree-lined roads full of gleaming sports cars, the island looks more like a prosperous East Mediterranean emirate than a frozen conflict. Yet the status quo is as deceptive as ever.

With the island's Greek Cypriot part now in the EU, failure in these talks will come at a cost for the rest of Europe, too. The Greek Cypriots are already causing trouble by blocking the discussion of energy coordination between Brussels and Ankara as part of Turkey's EU accession talks. If all goes wrong, the Greek Cypriots will certainly use their EU membership to wreck the bloc's relations with Turkey, just like Greece held up EU financial aid to Turkey with damaging results in the 1980s and 1990s.

Turkey, in its turn, is already using its NATO membership to punish the EU. Ankara is holding back on joining peacekeeping missions and blocking formal EU-NATO cooperation. Turkey will doubtless go even further if the current talks crash.

In short, it's time for European leaders to put Cyprus on the front burner. What better way to demonstrate the EU's relevance after the Irish treaty rejection than by bringing peace to Cyprus? Spreading democracy and prosperity has been the EU's most noble goal and biggest success. It can do so again by helping Messrs. Christofias and Talat get right in 2008 what everyone got so badly wrong in 2004.

For background on Cyprus' role in Turkey's EU membership bid, see Jan. 19 post.

Article 301: An Anti-Imperialist Discourse

As AKP strengthens its resolve to push ahead with reform of Article 301, opposition parties have decried the moves in recent days as being influenced by Europe. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli even described it as a "test of honor" for AKP. What did he mean by this? It would be difficult for me to understand these remarks without having lived here for almost three months and I still do not think I fully understand the context of the remarks, but I now have a much stronger idea of their origin.

Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Republic, most Turks have adopted a certain sense of pride in the fact that the Republic was founded in spite of imperial designs. The Turkish Republic's creation out of the ruins wrought by the First World War—in lieu of the imperial designs Europe had to carve up the "Sick Man of Europe" among Western allies—is truly a remarkable feat and one of which Turks should be proud. However, there is a dark side to this pride as well: the idea that the Turkish Republic was and will always be resisting external forces determined to undermine its sovereignty and enslave its citizens. It is in the resonance of this much more somber side of the story that the current discourse about Article 301 inherits its meaning.

Turkish school children are taught at an early age that Atatürk's Independence War was fought against European imperialists who were intent to ruin the Turkish people and divide up their land to suit their own interests. Although there is much truth to this, it sets up a sort of defensiveness in the Turkish mind that such forces are at the very core of the state's existence and that it supports another item in the curriculum that is also inculcated in these young minds: Turkey has external and internal enemies and it is imperative that Turkey continue to resist them.

I have had the opportunity to ask four Turks about this subject in the past two days and each has confided to me that this idea is still very dominant in the Turkish mindset, is still taught in schools, and is quite accurate. Each of the four people I interviewed had no problem identifying themselves as "Kemalists" and three of the four also said they are comfortable with identifying themselves as "secularists." Examples of the internal enemies in Turkey might include those expressing hopes for greater recognition of Kurdish identity and increased autonomy for provinces in the Kurdish southeast and political Islamists whose aspiration it is to overturn the pillars of secularism and modernity upon which the Republic was built. As to external enemies, they have at times worked in cahoots with the internal enemies. One of the four people to whom I talked cited Italy's reluctance to surrender PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to Turkish authorities and three cited the United States' support for the PKK (see February post).

The fear of external enemies is linked directly to the concerns of protecting Turkish sovereignty and has played a role in the discourse of Turkey's EU detractors since Turkey first submitted its application to the EU in 1987. Some commentators have referred to this fear as the "Sèvres mentality," best described as the feeling by some Turks that Europe is still trying to re-establish the Treaty of Sèvres that carved up the Ottoman Empire following World War I and left the Turks without a state of their own. Some foreign policy analysts have argued that the "Sèvres mentality" still affects Turkey's relations with Europe. In the years before AKP's rise to power, EU negotiations were often discussed in reference to concerns about national security. To attribute these concerns to a "Sèvres mentality" might be overstating the case, but there is no doubt that Turkey's accession into the EU has been hampered at times by fiercely nationalist discourse.

Two wonderful examples are given in Philip Robins' excellent book on Turkish foreign policy, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War. The first are the comments Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz made following the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 in which the EU began accession talks with Cyprus and other Eastern European countries, but not Turkey. In the days following the summit, Yılmaz not only suspended dialogue with the EU, but gave it an ultimatum to reconsider its position or have Turkey withdraw its application. More provocative were his comments toward in Germany in reference to the integration of Central Europe. Yılmaz remarked that Germany's policy toward central European integration resembled the Nazi-policy of lebensraum, a term used by Hitler to refer to the Nazi state's need for raw materials to be supplied from countries to the east of Germany. The second example is the pejorative that State Minister Ayvaz Gökdemir hurled at three visiting female European MP's during their visit to Turkey in 1995. The three MP's had been critics of Turkish entry and Gökdemir referred to them as "the three prostitutes" at the same time the country was working to win support in the European Parliament for the Customs Union it signed with the EU that year in spite of Gökdemir's comments.

It is this same nationalist ideology that is driving the current discourse of Article 301's detractors. Although the discourse has fortunately been tempered in recent years, increased fatigue with the accession process and the old idea that Turkey must defend itself from meddling Europeans does indeed re-introduce the "Sèvres mentality" into European politics. When Bahçeli portrays AKP willingness to pass Article 301 reform as a "test of honor" for AKP he is drawing an analogy to Sèvres and intimating that the party should not sell out Turkish sovereignty.

The hostility toward Article 301 reform is further heightened by the idea that it and similar restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary to protecting the state from its internal enemies. In short, Turkey needs Article 301 to prosecute Kurdish separatists, radical leftists, and intellectuals who would otherwise malign Turkey and propagandize against the interests of the Republic. Each of the people to whom I talked concurred that freedom of expression must be restricted in Turkey and all countries because the result without such measures would be chaos. They emphasized that such restrictions were of particular importance to Turkey because it is unique in that the state is faced with a wide-array of internal enemies. One of the people to whom I spoke said that Europe is pressuring Turkey to lift Article 301 restrictions because it desires to see an independent Kurdistan. This is particularly interesting in that it suggests a desire on the part of Europe to meddle in Turkish affairs. According to this source, Europe's intent is to divide Turkey and it is already working with Kurds in the southeast to do just this. The student pointed to groups in Europe that are sympathetic to the PKK and Kurdish television stations that broadcast into the network from Europe. Turkey not only has internal and external enemies from which it is obliged to protect itself, but these enemies can work together.

This argument is part of a larger discourse that is indeed linked to the so-called "Sèvres mentality." In order to understand the history that has shaped such discourse, we should turn back to Europe's relations with the Ottomans and the time of the Capitulations signed between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. The Capitulations were bilateral agreements signed between the Ottomans and European states that created privileges for Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. They date to the sixteenth-century and basically functioned to establish a protectorate for Christians living in the Empire. If Christians and the French missionaries that worked throughout the Empire encountered discrimination or other problems, they would appeal to a French officer who would then take the complaint to the Ottoman Porte for redress. However, the Capitulations involved more than just the protection of Christian minorities and foreign missionaries, but also entailed subjects of commerce. As European mercantilism and then capitalism flourished, the Capitulations provided special rights to European merchants working in Ottoman territory and placed them effectively under the law of European powers rather than that of the Ottomans.

By the nineteenth century, the Capitulations system had evolved into a means by which often corrupt consuls were able to undermine the control of the Sultanate. The Capitulations granted foreign powers the right to vest Christian merchants special rights (barats) by which they gained advantages over their Muslim counterparts. Eventually, they had the effect of creating a different class of citizenship for Christians living under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultanate. Understandably, this created a great deal of antagonism between Christian and Muslim subjects and contributed to increased divisions within the structure of the Empire. When conflicts arose in this political scheme, the Capitulations facilitated the interference of foreign powers in Ottoman domestic affairs. Consequently, placing Christian citizens of the Empire on a different legal and commercial plane than its Muslim subjects not only created divisions among Ottoman citizens, but further decentralized the Ottoman Empire and initiated a great deal of foreign meddling in its affairs. Much reviled, one of the first things the Committee for Union and Progress did at the start of the war was abolish the Capitulations. Although they were restored in the Treaty of Sèvres, and end to such foreign control was one of the hallmarks of Turkey's signing of the much-celebrated Treaty of Lausanne following European recognition of its independence.

Since the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey has long guarded its national sovereignty and often sounded anti-imperialist rhetoric in the face of foreign encroachments. This rhetoric was present during the Turkish confrontation with Britain over oil-rich Mosul in 1924-1925, in its negotiations with Europe over payment of Ottoman debt, and in its attitude toward Hatay in the 1930s. Although Turkey closely allied itself with the West during the Cold War (applying for NATO membership in 1950) and seemed to reverse the neutralist stance of Kemalist foreign policy seen in the Republic's early years, its policy toward Cyprus still echoes the same nationalist-oriented ideology. Further, the discourse it shapes is very much a part of the dialogue between Turkey and Europe and, in the case of Article 301 reform, between political parties in Turkey.

Thus, it is no surprise that much fuss was made two days ago when it was rumored that AKP reforms are guided by a dossier of urgent reforms it received from Turkey's Secretariat General for European Union Affairs. The fact that the Secretariat-General for EU Affairs is an office in the democratically-elected Turkish government and not the EU bureaucracy seemed to be lost in much of this reportage. Nonetheless, AKP has dismissed claims that it is taking orders from Europe and that its reform agenda is directly influenced by the dossier. As reform to Article 301 is introduced as legislation in the coming days, more talk of honor, patriotism, sovereignty, and the Turkish need for self-defense is assured to be part of the political discourse.