The Path of the Pharaohs

PHOTO from Radikal

Before paying a trip to Washington, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu outlined on Turkish television a new Turkish approach to Syria he is expected to share and discuss while in town. The new approach includes plans for a "Friends of Syria" contact group akin to the Libya Contract Group that met in Istanbul in the weeks before rebels seized power in Tripoli.

According to Davutoglu, Turkey has exhausted diplomacy with Syria. It first attempted to deal directly with Assad, and when those efforts failed, it turned to the Arab League. After the Arab League failed to stop the violence despite what Davutoglu characterized as its best efforts, Turkey joined the United States and other countries to work through the United Nations. After the Chinese and Russian veto on Feb. 4, however, new steps are needed to resolve the conflict and bring relief to the Syrian people.

Over the weekend, Davutoglu responded to the UN Security Council's failure to adopt a resolution regarding Syria by declaring that Turkey would be opening up its doors to refugees escaping the violence that intensified after the vote.

Then, on Tuesday, Prime Minister Erdogan announced that Turkey would be launching a new initiative regarding Syria. Erdogan's news followed comments that Assad had chosen the "path of the pharaohs," and that he would be punished for his decision. The prime minister's remarks came on the thirtieth anniversary of Hafez al-Assad's massacre of hundred at Hama, in whose footsteps he said Bashar, Hafez's son, was now following. Speaking rhetorically to Assad, Erdogan then declared that Assad would reap what he sowed.

On yesterday, Davutoglu followed up with details as to the initiative, announcing plans for a contact group that will include the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries, in addition to the Arab League and members of the UN Security Council. The foreign minister also discussed possible plans for bringing humanitarian aid to Syria, which raises the possibility of establishing a humanitarian corridor inside Syria for which Turkey, along with other countries and most likely the United Nations, would be responsible.

Turkey had been waiting for the outcome of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavarov's talks with Assad to come to an end, and Davutoglu said that Assad's promises for reform announced soon after the meeting could not be trusted. 

Turkish newspapers report that Turkey is making plans to accommodate more refugees fleeing the conflict, including a container town to accommodate up to 10,000 refugees similar to that constructed in Van following Saddam Hussein's campaign against Iraqi Kurds. Syria has so far accepted 12,000 refugees.


UPDATE I (2/11/12) -- At the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Friday, Davutoglu linked the government's policies in Syria to Turkey's support for peoples instead of states. In the speech, Davutoglu reports that when asked why Turkey was friendly with Assad before the Arab Spring, he is able to easily respond that at this point Assad was not fighting against his own people.

The foreign minister's speech touched on the need to side with peoples instead of states in the new post-Cold War age, and he contextualized Syria as a state whereby the people had clearly turned against the state. Given this situation, Turkey could not be expected to continue to side with Assad.

I am sure CSIS is soon to post a transcript, but until then, you might read Davutoglu's remarks against Soli Ozel and Gencer Ozcan's recent article in the October issue of the Journal of Democracy on Turkish foreign policy and democracy promotion.

UPDATE II (2/15/11) --  Davutoglu met with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton where both reported Syria was at the top of their agenda. The leaders are expected to join representatives of the Arab League in Tunis on Feb. 24 to discuss a new approach to Syria. There still seems to exist difference on the American and Turkish sides as to whether Russia and China should be invited to the meeting. Also on the table will be the issue of a possible humanitarian corridor to be established in order to deliver aid to Syrians affected by the violence. Turkish papers are reporting Turkey to be in favor of opening up the corridor through the Mediterranean rather than using Turkish soil, a prospect Turkish officials are saying would pose a security risk.

Additionally, though Davutoglu continues to say all options are on the table, there seems to be little appetite for a buffer zone to be setup along the Turkish-Syrian border.

Also on Monday, and shortly after Davutoglu's visit with Cointon, U.S. Central Command head James N. Mattis held a meeting with Turkish Chief of General Staff Necdet Ozel presumably at which possible operations involving Syria were discussed.

According to Milliyet columnist Asli Aydintasbas, Syria is more keen for intervention than the United States and tabled a strategy to include military, diplomatic, and humanitarian elements while the American side is still reluctant to get to engaged in the conflict during an election year.

And, one more note: the Center for Strategic and International Studies has posted the video and transcript of remarks Davutoglu delivered there on Friday.

Financial Support to Libyan Opposition

Speaking on the sidelines of the third Libya contract group, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Aduvtoglu has pledged $100 million to fund the Libyan Transitional Council. From Hurriyet Daily News: 

"There is a real need for humanitarian access as well as for the natural needs of Libya like schools, hospitals and all those facilities," Davutoğlu said, according to a report by Reuters.

Davutoğlu was speaking to reporters at a summit of Western and Arab countries backing Libya's rebels and planned to prepare for a political structure after the departure of leader Moammar Gadhafi from power, Reuters reported on its website.

The statements came at the third meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. Davutoğlu was among participants at the meeting along with his counterparts from 21 countries. The participants also included U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The Contact Group, including the United States, European powers, allies from the Middle East and international bodies, was established during an international conference in London in March to lead international efforts to map out Libya's future. The group held its first meeting in Qatar, the second in Italy. The fourth meeting of the Libya Contact Group will be held in Turkey (click here for more).

Yesterday United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized Turkey alongside four other NATO member states for not doing enough to support NATO's ongoing military operations. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States have vowed not to quit the strikes until Gadhafi is removed from power. At the third Libyan contact group meeting, Turkey argued the Tripoli regime consisted of more personalities than just Gadhafi.

Gulen Schools in Texas

The New York Times has an extended investigative piece on Gulen schools operating in my home state of Texas. The schools, known as "Harmony Schools," are owned by the Cosmos Foundation, which the paper reports was founded by a group of Turkish businessmen and professors. The piece centers on the ways the school uses public monies. The Cosmos Foundation operates 33 charter schools in Texas, more than any other charter school operator, and receive $100 million in taxpayer money. An excerpt:

Some of the schools’ operators and founders, and many of their suppliers, are followers of Fethullah Gulen, a charismatic Turkish preacher of a moderate brand of Islam whose devotees have built a worldwide religious, social and nationalistic movement in his name. Gulen followers have been involved in starting similar schools around the country — there are about 120 in all, mostly in urban centers in 25 states, one of the largest collections of charter schools in America.

The growth of these “Turkish schools,” as they are often called, has come with a measure of backlash, not all of it untainted by xenophobia. Nationwide, the primary focus of complaints has been on hundreds of teachers and administrators imported from Turkey: in Ohio and Illinois, the federal Department of Labor is investigating union accusations that the schools have abused a special visa program in bringing in their expatriate employees.

But an examination by The New York Times of the Harmony Schools in Texas casts light on a different area: the way they spend public money. And it raises questions about whether, ultimately, the schools are using taxpayer dollars to benefit the Gulen movement — by giving business to Gulen followers, or through financial arrangements with local foundations that promote Gulen teachings and Turkish culture.

For more about earlier allegations as to the Gulen movement's abuse of the U.S. visa system (now the subject of an FBI investigation), click here. For more on the Gulen movement in Turkey, see past posts.

Return of the Mavi Marmara

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Thousands gathered in Taksim Square last night on the eve of the one-year anniversary of Israel's raid of the Turkish-flagged Mavi Marmara in which Israeli commandos eight Turkish citizens and one American of Turkish descent.

Yesterday morning, the International Relief Foundation (IHH) held a press conference announcing the organization is continuing to move forward with plans for 15 ships carrying 1,500 activists from 38 countries to sail to Gaza at the end of June. The Mavi Marmara is expected to be at the front-and-center.

Diplomatic relations also heated up around the one-year anniversary as Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said Turkey would retaliate should Israel once more carry out military operations on the ships. According to Israeli press reports, the Israel Defense Forces are mobilizing to meet the flotilla, though is focusing on counter-riot strategies. Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the flotilla will not be permitted to land in Gaza and that force will be used when and where necessary.

The United States is attempting to break the impasse, though Turkish government officials are have maintained their argument that they do not have the legal power to intervene to stop a Turkish NGO from carrying out such a mission.

In the meantime, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has extended the working period for the UN Panel of Inquiry currently investigating last year's raid.


UPDATE I (6/2) -- Hurriyet reports (in Turkish) the United States is planning to submit a proposal to Turkey by which Turkey would block IHH's flotilla plans in exchange for making Turkey the place of upcoming Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

UPDATE II (6/6) --  Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has publicly called on the IHH to delay plans to send a flotilla to Gaza. The IHH rejected the foreign minister's request, arguing that the flotilla was necessary to providing Gazans with much needed aid and asserting sovereignty over their ports. The government is arguing that the IHH should wait to see what happens in the wake of the Rafah border crossing being opened (it is opened for civilian crossings, but not for aid supplies) and plans to install a new Palestinian unity government.

Gul Urges Hamas to Recognize Israel

In reaction to Obama's Thursday speech on Mideast policy, President Gul has given an interview to the Wall Street Journal lauding Obama's seeming call for a two-state solution based on 1967 borders while calling on Hamas to recognize Israel. From Alternet:

Turkey's President Abdullah Gul has urged the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas to recognise Israel's right to exist, the Wall Street Journal reported on Saturday.

In an interview a day after U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a speech on the Middle East, Gul also hailed Obama's reference to creating a Palestinian state based on Israel's pre-1967 borders as "a very important step".

Turkey has regarded Hamas as a key factor in the Middle East peace process since it won Palestinian elections in 2006.

Gul said President Obama "has a point" when he said in his speech that Israel could not be expected to negotiate with a body that does not recognise Israel's right to exist.

Asked if he was willing to press Hamas on that issue, Gul said, "I already advised them."

In a meeting with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Ankara in 2006, Gul said he told Meshaal, "you have to be rational" about recognising Israel's right to exist.

Gul said he believed Hamas was ready to recognise Israel in its pre-1967 borders but wants that to happen simultaneously with Israel's recognition of a Palestinian state.

The AKP government has had friendly relations with Hamas since 2006 when a five-member delegation led by Meshaal first visited Ankara. Since that time the AKP government has been committed to improving relations between Hamas and the international community, a policy that has won the party few friends in Israel and in certain Washington policy circles. For background on the AKP government's relations with Hamas, see June 10 post.

Obama's speech aired live on Turkish state television Thursday night at a time when most Turks are still very much trying to figuring out their own country's position in the post-Arab spring Middle East.

Ankara is expected to facilitate negotiations between Hamas and Fatah next week.

Averting Another Flotilla Crisis

The Turkish NGO Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) is preparing another flotilla campaign involving vessels sailing from multiple European countries, including the Mavi Marmara, which will once again sail from Turkey. The vessels are set to sail after the Turkish elections on June 12.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon has said the United States is urging Turkey not to allow the IHH to send another flotilla. In testimony to the U.S. Senate before Congress yesterday, Gordon said, “In the year since the last flotilla episode, Israel has changed the humanitarian regime for Gaza [and] made it very clear that there are alternative ways to get humanitarian assistance to Gaza. We have been very clear with the Turkish government that that’s the case.”

The Turkish government, as before, has said that Turkey is in no position to prevent lawfully registered NGOs from setting sail for Gaza. The IHH is accepting applications for the campaign, heavily advertising in Turkey and throughout Europe.

For more on the IHH and last year's flotilla incident, click here. For my feature in the Jerusalem Post analyzing Turkey-Israel relations in the wake of the flotilla, click here.

United States Issues Annual Human Rights Report on Turkey

The United States Department has issued its annual report on human rights practices in Turkey. For the report, click here.

Though many accusations might be leveled at the United States for not taking a consistent position on democracy and human rights issues, a difficult task for any country, the State Department's reports on human rights are refreshingly objective and often come into conflict with other objectives of U.S. foreign policy making. Issued by the State Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the reports are issued independent of the State Department's other policy making arms. For more on the reports and how they are assembled, click here.

When Turkey Meant Jazz . . .

And a welcome connection between Turkey and the city in which I now find myself . . .

From National Public Radio:

The Embassy of Turkey and Jazz at Lincoln Center announced a series of six jazz concerts today, to be held throughout 2011 at the residence of the Turkish ambassador in Washington, D.C.

Wait, what? Why would the biggest jazz institution the world has ever seen work with the Turkish embassy? What kind of backroom dealings transpired to make this seemingly arbitrary alliance happen?

A hint: They happened in the '30s and '40s.

Perhaps you know of Atlantic Records, one of the most important record labels for jazz and R&B from 1947 onward. John Coltrane and Charles Mingus recorded seminal work for Atlantic; so did Ray Charles, Aretha Franklin and Sonny and Cher.

Atlantic was co-founded by Ahmet Ertegun, who was later joined by his older brother Nesuhi Ertegun (the big jazz buff of the company). The Ertegun brothers were the two sons of the second Turkish ambassador to the U.S., Mehmet Munir Ertegun; they were in their teens when their father accepted the position in Washington, D.C. in 1935. The brothers were huge music fans, and threw themselves into the city's jazz scene.

Rally Around the Flag (But Whose?)

In the more than two weeks that have passed since the flotilla crisis, AKP government officials continue to pound Israel, raising concern with Western alliances, favor in the Arab Street, and just as significantly, political points at home. Milliyet columnist Semih Idiz weighs in on the domestic side of the equation in today's Hurriyet Daily News:

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears set to milk the popularity he gained in the streets of Turkey and the Middle East after the Marmara crisis in which nine Turks were killed by Israeli forces in a seriously botched up military operation.

It is almost as if he was waiting for a new crisis with Israel to be able to work the streets in order to regain some of the political ground his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been loosing over bread and butter issues at home.

He and his party executives are clearly worried that the reinvigorated Republican Peoples Party, or CHP, may make headway given the successful manner in which its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been hitting at the government over topics that really matter for the average man on the street. He is also concerned that the Saadet (Felicity) Party, the other Islamist party, may steal votes from the AKP given the rising dissatisfaction among the public.

Turks are fickle though, and easily swayed emotionally even if this means that the bread and butter issues of vital importance to them are pushed to the background. It is clear that there is great public animosity towards Israel today. As for the almost endemic anti-Americanism among Turks, this is also adding grist to Erdogan’s populist mill.

So we see him increasingly turning up the volume of his demagoguery, and hitting at Israel and the United States at every opportunity that presents itself. No doubt he is keeping a close eye on the “political rating meter” as he sends his crowds to paroxysms of delirious applause with his remarks, some of which smack openly of anti-Semitism and reflect a growing anti-Western tendency.

After the Marmara incident he was not only quick to use the harshest and most insulting adjectives when referring to Israel, but also had thinly veiled warnings to Washington, suggesting openly that those who stood behind Israel were also culpable in the crimes committed by that country.

Over the weekend he went further and openly named the U.S. this time, thus revealing what lies in his heart-of-hearts. This is what he had to say while addressing an adoring crowd in Rize, on the Black Sea coast, where people are not only religious but also ultra-nationalist.

“They are asking us what Turkey is doing in the Middle East, in Palestine. Why is Turkey bothered about Gaza? But could they not be asked in return what America is doing in Iraq? What is it doing in Palestine? Could it not be asked what is it doing in Afghanistan? What are France, Britain, and Holland, and so on, doing in these places?”

Erdogan went on threateningly to say, “I am calling on the Israeli supported international media and their subcontractors at home: Turkey is not like other countries.” His only tribute to sophistication during this show of demagoguery was his reference to “the Israeli supported international media.”

Previously he had made references to the “Jewish controlled international media” but must have been warned by his advisors that this was too overtly “anti-Semitic,” and thus politically incorrect. This no doubt forced him to make a slight modification in his nevertheless anti-Semitic reference to the international media.

A survey conducted by METROPoll on June 3, just four days after the flotilla raid, found that nearly two-thirds of the 1,000 Turks surveyed thought the government response was too weak, a finding the AKP is no doubt aware. Winning votes is important for any government, and with the possibility of early elections looming as the constitutional reform package waits to be ruled on by the Constitutional Court, no doubt figures into AKP decisionmaking.

Additionally, there is reason to be concerned. A rejuvenated CHP might well take economically-minded and liberal (those that are left) voters away from the party at the same time the Israel issue has mobilized the Islamist right, possibly bringing votes to Saadet Partisi. Though Saadet has finished far under the 10 percent election threshold since the AKP came to power, an increased vote for the party could all the same take critical votes away from the AKP even if it does not pass the threshold. The question for me here is why did Erdogan let the Mavi Marmara sail knowing that what happened on May 31 was a definite possibility. If domestic politics figured in at all, a calculation may have been made to divert attention away from the Kurdish front and score political points, but was thought not given to what effect such a move could have on those right of the AKP, namely strengthening the hand of Saadet Partisi? Is this perhaps what was behind the warnings of Fethullah Gulen in his interview with the Wall Street Journal (see June 7 post)?

It is hard to say to what extent this figures into the AKP's anti-Israel rhetoric and foreign polcy posturing, but the domestic factor should not be ruled out. Injured by its failed Kurdish initiative and increasing PKK violence, the Israel imbroglio helps the AKP at home at a time when it needs all the help it can get, which might explain why the government is focusing on the larger Palestinian issue and the Mavi Marmara incident (though this has been more or less the case in its relations with Israel since the latter's incursion into Gaza in December 2008), often conflating the two, rather than the growing conflict in the southeast. Nationalism has always been a powerful force in Turkish politics, but now the Israeli flag also serves a potent a force at the moment as the Turkish one.


UPDATE I (6/18) -- Istanbul's municipal council has accepted a proposal made by the Saadet Partisi to make Gaza a sister city.

The Hamas Question

In the wake of the flotilla crisis, Prime Minister Erdogan has been issuing statements supportive of Hamas, characterizing the group as resistance fighters who won an election. These statements not only further heighten tensions with Israel, but also threaten Turkey-United States relations, prompting U.S. State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley to reiterate emphatically that the United States considers Hamas a terrorist organization. Just as importantly, the prime minister's statements have not gone without domestic criticism.

Turkish critics, many of whom are supportive of strongly condemning Israel's attack on the Mavi Marmara, fear the pro-Hamas rhetoric risks conflating Israel's raid on the Mavi Marmara (an issue between Israel and Turkey) with Israel's relations with Hamas. Some have even gone so far as to argue that Erdogan personally identifies with Hamas, a political organization that has gained popularity with Palestinians in part due to some Palestinians' perception that rival Fatah is elitist, too secularist, and out of touch with the masses.

Hamas, of course welcoming the prime minsiter's statements, has for its part expressed support for Erdogan's political model. Hamas Foreign Minister Ahmad Yusuf recently gave an interview to Hurriyet, more or less comparing Erdogan's politics with that of the Taliban. From the interview:

According to Yusuf, who said he is writing a book called “Erdoğan and a New Strategic Vision,” the Taliban is “opposed to everything,” including education and women’s rights.

“Erdoğan’s model, on the other hand, is liberal. It is a model that dares to take responsibility and change things and establishes good relations between the religious and secular elements of society,” he said. “It is a model that works for democracy and human rights, and supports an open society. That is what we want.”

Yusuf's statements fits within Hamas' broader attempts at what Thanassis Cambanis terms "tunnel diplomacy." From Cambanis'articel in Foreign Affairs:

Since Israel has claimed that it will end the Gaza blockade only if Hamas surrenders power, the movement has been willing to improvise and embrace whatever works -- a merchant’s approach of finding the best deal and then justifying it retroactively.

Hamas has applied the same formula to its diplomatic strategy. It has hedged its bets, alternately hectoring and wooing Egypt, cozying up to Iran and Turkey, and shaming the Gulf petro-states into giving it money and political cover. In January, Gaza’s prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, chastised Egypt from the minbar at Friday prayers in Gaza City for “losing its compass” and joining the ranks of those who “criminalize the resistance.” The Arabs, he argued, must draw close to Turkey: “We are working to build a new balance against the Israelis in the region.”

Since the 2006 elections, Hamas’ brain trust has been trying to plot a path out of global isolation. Ahmed Yousef leads the effort, drawing on his experience running an Islamic think tank in what he calls the “paradise” of Washington, D.C., for more than a decade. The number-two official in Hamas’ foreign ministry in Gaza, he is at once a consummate politician and a fierce defender of Hamas’ resistance ideology. He may be a conciliator, but he is no moderate.

“We want the West to understand it can do business with us,” he told me in January during a long conversation in his Gaza City office. “They want to know if we are more like the Taliban or like [Turkey’s Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip] Erdogan. They will see that we are closer to Erdogan. We are flexible.”

Diplomatically, Hamas has cast a wide net. The group has launched Web sites in English and Turkish and has dispatched senior officials to meet with any influential Westerners willing to talk, in public or in secret. Now, Hamas is benefiting from the results of its diplomatic groundwork. The flotilla that it did not organize has played right to Hamas’ strategy, earning it a spate of attention and summoning international pressure on Israel to loosen the blockade.

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Hamas began in 2006 when a five-man delegation headed by Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal visited Ankara.

Not writing about the AKP government's identification with Hamas, bur rather the Palestinians as a whole, Orhan Kemal Cengiz had a provocative column yesterday in Today's Zaman. An excerpt:

Erdoğan’s defense of human rights of the Palestinians is based on identification. This makes him reactionary and prevents him from playing a vital role in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since he could not rise above the problem, his way of engaging with the Palestinian question has the serious potential of making Turkey a part of the problem, rather than contributing to a solution.

Can we contribute to the solution of this problem if we turn a blind eye to the sins of Hamas, which is responsible for grave human right violations, has created an oppressive regime in Gaza and has killed many innocent victims in its endless suicide attacks? Can we seriously and effectively defend the rights of the Palestinians while we are turning a blind eye to human rights violations in Darfur and in Iran?

Can we be taken seriously when we try to draw attention to the war crimes Israel has committed in Gaza while we still refrain from endorsing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?

Erdoğan and his government could be a perfect mediator between Israelis and Palestinians if they end this identification. I cannot imagine any other government in the world which could show Hamas that their obsession with the extinction of Israel is actually one of the biggest obstacles to the solution of this problem. I cannot imagine any other government which could convince Iran and Syria that they could peacefully coexist with a peaceful Israel in the region.

But instead we will witness the dance of anger for a while.

Never the Same? -- A Reading of Turkey After the Mavi Marmara

Protests in Istanbul continued on Saturday, drawing crowds in the thousands. AP Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Upon the return of Turkish Ambassador Oguz Celikkol to Ankara, President Gul declared that Turkey's relations with Israel "will never be the same."

Departing for Ireland the day Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara in international waters, I left Istanbul's Taksim Square with the images of enraged protestors fully in my mind. From Ireland, reports of continued mass protests drawing crowds of up to 10,000 and feiry statements of Turkish government officials flooded Irish radio and the BBC.

Ireland, too, was not without protest: the Irish-flagged Rachel Corrie, part of the same flotilla, had lagged behind the other vessels and the Irish government was insisting that it be allowed to reach Gaza without incident. Protests occurred in Dublin and Belfast, as they did in other places across the world. Though Ireland was much less at the center of the raid than Turkey, it was clear that the Israeli raid would affect not only Turkey-Israel relations, but how Israel was perceived throughout the world.

I won't take the time here to regurgitate the news surrounding the raid and the deaths of nine Turkish citizens, one of them also a dual citizen of my own country, other than to focus on the Turkish response and Turkey's demand that a UN-backed investigatory commission be authorized to investigate the incident (which Israel rejects) -- an insistence all the more justified in Turkish minds following the release of autopsy reports revealing that the nine victims had been peppered with bullets and some shot at a very close range.

Soon after the raid, the Turkish government condemned the Israeli action as tantamount to murder, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu describing the actions in front of the UN Security Council as "piracy" and "banditry." The response elicted from Prime Minister Erdogan, who flew back from a trip to Chile, was just as strong. Erdogan issued aggresive statements throughout the week, comparing the incident to Sept. 11, iterating the commandment not to kill in multiple languages before the glare of video cameras, and characterizing Hamas as an organization comprised of "resistance fighters."

Meanwhile, Israel moved quickly to portray the Turkish citizens killed as Islamic exremists and terrorists bent on waging global jihad against Israel, linking the still murky Turkish humanitarian aid organization at the center of the incident with global terrorist organizations, including al-Qa'ida (for more on the humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), see Yigal Schleifer's article in the Christian Science Monitor).

The difference in narratives striking, tempers waged throughout the week as the bodies of those killed were returned to Turkey amidst more protests and calls for Turkey to cut off all relations with Israel. The Turkish government recalled its ambassador, cancelled joint military exercises scheduled with Israel, and suspended work on energy projects. The Turkish parliament issued a strong resolution calling on the government to reconsider military and eocnomic ties with Israel.

Calls for an even stonger reaction resided throughout the Turkish public and were not limited to supporters of the AKP or stronger Islamist parties (see this poll), or even to particularly religious people for that matter. Criticism from Turkish opposition parties often urged the government to take stronger action, and newly-elected CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, while urging calm, has criticized the government for being "two-faced": "They’re saying ‘one minute’ in front of cameras, and ‘yes please’ behind closed doors."

Over the weekend, Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu engaged in mutual finger-pointing, both accusing the other of being under the undue influence of Israel. Referring to recent statements made by Fetullah Gulen and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc that revealed a rift in the party over how to deal with Gaza, Kilicdaroglu declared that the "Tel Aviv advocate" is within the AKP. Tucked away in Pennsylvania, Gulen gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal in which he criticized the IHH's failure to reach an agreement with Israel. In the interview, Gulen seemed to warn the Turkish government to be careful in its posturing vis-á-vis Israel for fear of damaging relations with the United States. Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mehmet Ali Birand picked up on this message in his column today:

Gülen explicitly warns Turkey.

He opposes entering such a process with the National View. For, the IHH is according to him a radical Islamic movement and he believes turning this humane help attempt into an Islamic help movement would harm Turkey very much.

Gülen with his approach does not oppose the AKP. He just criticizes IHH’s attitude. He warns that such steps might go as far as cutting off relations between Turkey, the United States and Israel. He draws attention to how dangerous the situation is. It seems as if he says, “These guys are about to cause trouble for the country, stop them.”

According to Birand, AKP Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc might well have heeded Gulen's call when he said on Friday, "The hoca points in the right direction."

In an interview with KanalTurk on Sunday, Arinc expressed that more tension with Israel should be avoided, seeming to call on the IHH and other organizations to the right to back off. Whether Gulen and Arinc's statements are made for fear of weakening ties with the United States and Israel and/or are motivated by concern that Islamist parties to the right of the AKP might get a boost out of the incident in the same way they did after Israel's incursion into Gaza at the end of 2008 is unclear (see Jan. 14, 2009 post), but the question should be on the radar of those observing the AKP's Israel policy in coming weeks.

If Turkey-Israel relations are to be normalized, and even more importantly, if the United States is to preserve good relations with Israel, efforts should be made to come to a consensus on the investigatory commission proposed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Ankara has put the commission forward as essential to its normalization of relations with Tel Aviv, and while Tel Aviv, for its part, continues to resist, it is no doubt looking to gain the approval of the Obama Administration as it moves to craft its own internal investigation. For the United States, the Turkey-Israel alliance forged in 1996 is one of the few bright spots in the Middle East, and given the amount of political ill will toward nine Turkish citizens being killed by Israeli commandos in international waters, it would make sense to do everything in its power to somehow bring Turkey and Israel into some sort of compromise.

Turkey took a powerful first step despite all the feiry -- and, at times, more than unseemly -- rhetoric coming from government officials this week insomuch as it welcomed a rather vague statement coming from the UN Security Council last week without making too much fuss (the statement, falling short of a resolution, condemned "those actions" resulting in death, without assigning responsibility).

Given the gravity of animus toward Israel inside Turkey at the moment, as well as calls from other governments around the world for an independent investigation (including the UN Human Rights Council, the resolution of which the United States voted against), it would make sense for the all parties to do everything in its power to assure a comprehensive and open investigation of both the Israeli military's actions and the activities of the IHH.

For more on Turkey-Israel relations, see past posts.


UPDATE I (6/7) -- Two interesting analyses worth drawing attention to are Hugh Pope's piece in Friday's The Guardian and Steven A. Cook's assessment of Turkey-U.S. relations in Foreign Policy. Pope urges that Turkey's rift with Israel not be looked at as a turn away from the West, but rather as the response to a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. For Pope, when one objectively looks at Turkish policy in the Middle East in recent years, the country can be seen as "explicitly imitating lessons from the EU that proved how such convergence can end cycles of conflict." Cook, examining crucial foreign policy differences between Turkey and the United States, portrays the two countries as "frenemies," concluding the two countries competing strategic powers in the Middle East. See also a very insightful, albeit tragic, analysis by Alon ben Meir thanks to Jenny White at Kamil Pasha.

UPDATE II (6/8) -- Hosting the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Istanbul, Turkey took the opportunity of the conference to condemn Israel in an attachment to the conference's final declaration. 21 of the 22 countries in attendance, all save Israel and including Russia, joined the statement, calling for an international investigatory commission to be setup and condeming Israel's use of force in international waters. Though not linking the statement to the flotilla incident, Russian President Vladmir Putin said the Blue Steam II natural gas project, linking Russian gas supplies to Israel and Turkey, might not extend to Israel due to lack of demand.

UPDATE III (6/9) -- For a decent summary of the military, economic, and energy ties between Turkey and Israel and potential ramifications of the flotilla affair, see Saban Kardas' analysis in the Eurasia Daily Monitor. Though trade with Israel constitutes only one percent of Turkey's total foreign trade, much of it food imports, Ha'aretz reports that some Israeli supermarkets are already boycotting Turkish goods.

Turkey in a Multipolar World

Last month, I wrote skeptically that Turkey might be risking too much in its efforts to secure an agreement with Iran over its nuclear program (see April 21 post). Though the future of the deal Brazil and Turkey brokered with Iran is far from certain, the ability of both to contradict the popular notion (especially in Washington) that a deal could only be reached under the pressure of sanctions is a true accomplishment that will boost recognition of both countries' emergent roles as diplomatic powers. The news last week that Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva would be travelling to Tehran and that he might well be joined by Prime Minister Erdogan should the Iranians be serious about brokering a deal raised hopes for a deal, prompting contradictory reactions from Washington that can be interpreted any number of different ways. Announced on Monday, the deal (full text) will indubitably lend greater creedence to Turkey's efforts to pursue a dynamic role in rits onal and global politics, further breaking away from its Cold War role as a staunch ally of Wahsington. Taking a look at commonalities between Turkey and Brazil as aspirant powers, former New York Times Turkey correspondent Stephen Kinzer writes in The Guardian:

Turkey and Brazil, though half a world apart geographically, have much in common. Both are large countries that spent long years under military dominance, but have broken with that history and made decisive steps towards full democracy. Both are led by dynamic and ambitious leaders who have presided over remarkable economic booms. Both have already emerged as regional powers, but have grander ambitions to become world powers on the level of Russia, India and perhaps even China. Neither could fulfil those ambitions alone. Together, however, they form a partnership that holds tantalising possibilities.

No two countries have opened more new embassies around the world in the last couple of years than Turkey and Brazil. Senior Turkish diplomats return to Ankara once a year for a grand strategic conference, and at this year's meeting, held in January, Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim, was among the main speakers.

Turkey and Brazil were once near-automatic supporters of Washington, but they have struck out on their own path. Distressed by what they saw as blundering American unilateralism that destabilised entire regions of the world, they have sought to defuse international confrontations and promote peaceful compromises instead. By felicitous coincidence, both are now nonpermanent members of the security council. This gave them special leverage over Iran. They have used it deftly.

During the cold war, the non-aligned movement tried to become a "third force" in world politics, but failed because it was too large and unwieldy. Turkey and Brazil are now emerging as the global force for compromise and dialogue that the non-aligned movement never was.

That said, the problems inherent in the deal, especially following Iran's announcement that it would continue to enrich uranium up to 20%, gives reason to think it might not work. Should the deal prove nothing more than a delaying tactic for Iran, the current ebullience surrounding the deal will surely diminish, as will to some degree the optimism of some that Turkey's foreign policy ambitions can play a constructive force in global politics.

The BDP in Washington

The BDP has opened an office in Washington, a decision no doubt sparked by the United States' continued cooperation and backing of the AKP in relation to Turkey's Kurdish problem. Since 2007, the United States has loaned its support to Turkish efforts to eliminate the PKK inside northern Iraq through various air raids, offering up intelligence to support the Turkish military in such missions and helping to ease tensions between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) that arise during such operations. Pressured to some extent by increased diplomatic and trade ties between the Turkish government and the KRG, the BDP is likely hoping the office will at least give it a presence in Washington. On Tuesday, BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas and Ahmet Turk participated in a panel sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (moderated by Henri Barkey). Click here for Carnegie's briefing of the event, during which politicians explained the BDP's opposition to the constitutional package and Turk outlined three demands (an inclusive constitutional re-structuring of Turkish citizenship, cultural rights for all, and more administrative control for predominantly Kurdish municipalities). For more coverage of the office and the BDP delegation in Washington, see Hurriyet Daily News columnist Ilhan Tanir's comments.

Another Missed Opportunity?: A Look Back at the 'Kurdish Opening'

Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir
DHA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

I am re-posting the timeline I originally posted on April 20 with updates. I will continue to update the timeline, but will not re-post it. The updated timeline can be easily accessed from the link under "Kurdish Timeline" on the right-hand sidebar.

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With many opinion leaders and observers of Turkish politics considering the 'Kurdish Opening' "closed," the government has fallen relatvely silent in recent months as it has moved to focus on constitutional reform. The Ergenekon investigation and revelations about a potential closure case against the AKP seem to have put the government's Kurdish initiative on the shelf for a while longer yet. Following harsh attacks by the opposition since the initiative's announcement, much strengthened by the botched Oct. 19 crossover of 34 Kurds from Iraq, eight of them former PKK militants, the government had already shown signs of watering down previous plans. Writing for the Middle East Information Research Project's Middle East Report Online after the Oct. 19 public relations disaster, Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden summed up the 'Kurdish opening' this way:

The AKP, assuming it intends to create momentum for peace anew, will find this task difficult. Even though the governing party enjoys considerable EU support, it will again encounter resistance from the parliamentary opposition, as well as the armed forces, who have accused the AKP of surrendering to “the terrorists.” What is more, a large part of the AKP’s constituency comes from the nationalist mainstream and is unsupportive of expansive overtures to the Kurds. The party leadership, beginning to look ahead to the 2011 elections, is already loath to rock the boat.

In 2009, the phrase of the moment was “road map” -- whether in the TESEV report [click here] or Öcalan’s shelved opus. Deniz Baykal invoked the phrase sardonically to distance his party from the Kurdish opening, bidding the AKP, “Bon voyage!” The problem, though, is that the Turkish government appears to have been without a road map. Its journey has accordingly seemed meandering, its leaders driving blind. A slightly different metaphor, however, of peace as a process, does seem to describe events as they have transpired. Erdoğan might still be prevaricating when he claims the “democratic opening” is a seven-year work in progress with short-, medium- and long-term objectives. But this concept does offer some hope, a glass with something in it, even if it is far from half-full. And Erdoğan is not wrong to emphasize how much progress has been made.

The politics of pushing throuh the initiative, especially an amnesty for former PKK militants, is no easy task, and especially at a time when the AKP is embattled in efforts to amend the constitution. Understandably, with the CHP now red-hot over judicial reform, the AKP does not want to offend nationalist voters and gain the wrath of the MHP, a party with which the AKP heavily competes for votes in conservative Anatolia.

Yet, the AKP has plenty of room to save itself and re-ignite the process. If the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Part (BDP) can be properly engaged and the process yield results in terms of decreasing terrorist attacks and reinvigorating enthusiasm lost in October, the popular enthusiasm for the government's initiative recorded in polls last summer might also be rejuvenated. The road is not easy. The Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA)'s Hatem Ete, back in August, wrote that the AKP's task at hand involves the government involving all parties in the initiative, from the ultra-nationalist MHP to the BDP, and that as daunting a feat as this is, that should the AKP be able to get state institutions involved, most importantly the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the initiative might just yield results. While Ete rejects any form of mediated talks with the PKK, he does acknowledge an important role for Kurdish nationalist politicans to play. With the looming threat of increased violence and yet indications from imprisoned PKK former leader Abdullah Ocalan that he is willing to allow for more distance between the PKK and the BDP, engagement is indeed possible at this time and will prove essential to successful reform efforts in the future. Ongoing operations against suspected members of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan - KCK), a group functioning as go-between for the PKK and the BDP, have badly damaged relations and, as Huseyin Yayman explains, only served to consolidate support for the PKK by leding creedence to their rhetoric of "elimination." Bridges burnt between the AKP and the BDP in recent months can be rebuilt, but only with diligent, sustained effort and willignness on the part of the AKP to engage in dialogue to begin with -- something the party did not seem keen to do even at the earliest stages of the initiative.

The AKP's initiative is not the first significant gesture a Turkish government has made in regard to the Kurdish problem, but it could be the first to succeed. In 1991, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel boldly declared, "Turkey has recongized the Kurdish problem," and before then, President Turgut Ozal had been holding secret negotiations with the PKK throgh indirect contacts. In 1993, despite the ocnflcit's later escalation, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller spoke of the Kurdish conflcit as parallel to Spain's conflict with the Basques, suggesting that a limited autonomy solution might be possible. (In November 2008, the same was suggested by then Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission co-chairman Joost Lagendijk.) And, in 1999, after the Helsinki Summit, Mesut Yilmaz instructed, "The road to the European Union passes through Diyarbakir." The ending of the unilateral PKK ceasefire in 2004 and rising Turkish nationalism has since complicated the journey, but it is not too late to forge onward.

However, as Lagendijk informed at the end of his tenure, the path taken must first be chosen by Turkey. Erosion of support for the EU accession process and skepticism about the wave of trips the EU paid to the southeast in the first years of the accession have soured the efficacy of the EU in the process while the United States' role is beleaguered by its role in Iraq and widespread accusations of its having imperial designs. (Notably, in recent months, Ocalan has sent signals that he is now more willing to deal positively with the EU.) And, there is drive in Turkey t do, however dissipated it might be in this moment. In a recent op/ed response to an argument that the BDP has not changed while the government has, Radikal columnist Oral Calislar writes that Kurdish nationalism is a fact that must be dealt with, and that, in fact, both Kurdish nationalists and the government have changed. This, indeed, is a product of the peace process, and it leaves much hope to be had. Several Turks realize that the formation of the Kurdish Regional Govoernment (KRG) changes the name of the game, and that the continued polarization and relative deprivation of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey could have profound effects in the future if the issue is not solved in the soon to near future (for examples in English, see these op/eds by Omer Taspinar and Cengiz Aktar; for a taste of recent nationalist rhetoric, see AFP's interview with BDP deputy chairwoman Meral Danis Bestas).

Recognizing the Kurdish problem to be his problem, Prime Minister Erdogan made a bold first step when he addressed an audience in Diyarbakir in 2005, and recognizing"Kurdish nationalism" will be another big step yet. But, this is what a peace process is all about. The government was never going to solve the Kurdish problem in one fell swoop, but the initiative was, and should it be re-energized, a step in the right direction.

Below is a timeline I have assembled documenting developments in the 'Kurdish opening' from February 2009 to last week's attack on Ahmet Turk. I would more than appreciate any additions of important events/details I have left out. For events before February 2008, see my post, "Beyond Bananas: Hopes for the Kurdish Minority in 2009," Jan. 8, 2009, in addition to this article by the European Stability Initative's Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere that appeared in Turkish Policy Quarterly.


A TIMELINE

February 2009

2/15 -- Protestors marking the tenth anniversary of Abdullah Ocalan's capture clash with police throughout the southeast.

2/22 -- Prime Minister Erdogan visits Diyarbakir to launch TRT-6 under threats from the PKK. Despite the government's efforts to seell the station in the southeast, the new channel is largely seen as an election ploy. The DTP does not support the channel, largely seeing it as a superficial attempt by the AKP to undermine its clout before elections.

2/24 -- DTP leader Ahmet Turk, observing UNESCO World Language Week, illegally speaks Kurdish in parliament to the outrage of nationalist politicians. Turkish national television immediately cuts off feed.

2/27 -- Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug expresses support for limited cultural rights.

March 2009

The PKK declares a unilateral ceasefire.

3/9 -- Iraq President Jalal Talabani calls on the PKK to lay down its arms following a bilateral meeting in Anakra with President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan. Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). President Massoud Barzani supported Talabani's call much to the betrayal of some Kuridish nationalists in Turkey.

3/10 -- President Gul, talking to reporters in Tehran, sends the first signal of what would become known as the 'Kurdish Opening,' declaring, "There are already good things happening. We are resolving our own internal problems."

3/23 -- Prime Minister Erdogan visits the KRG to urge cross-border cooperation in stopping PKK attacks incursions into Turkey. It was the first time a Turkish leader had visited the region in more than 30 years.

Newroz celebrations result in few incidents of violence and the expected calls for the state to negotiate with the imprisoned Ocalan and the PKK. Ocalan calls on followers to resist KRG-led resolution efforts, harshly criticizing KRG President Massoud Barzani and telling followrs to stay away from a planned summit Barzani was reported to be planning in Arbil. The Arbil summit never came to fruition. Leyla Zana denounces the calls of KRG politicians for the PKK to lay down arms, echoing Ocalan's call to stay away from the planned summit in Arbil. United States involvement is also denounced.

3/25 -- Diyarbakır AKP deputy İhsan Arslan said that those “who want to solve the Kurdish problem cannot disregard the DTP, the PKK or Abdullah Öcalan.”

3/29 -- In municipal elections, the DTP wins landslide victories across the southeast, losing many districts in which the AKP had done well in 2004. Academic and member of Turkey's PEace Assembly told Bianet before the election that "it's a referendum on if the PKK-DTP line should be regarded as the main address for a dialogue to solve the Kurdish issue or not. . . . The state and the government are trying to avoid that and hope to render conservative Kurds as their counterpart. I believe that DTP, which claims to be the main actor, will gain strength in the elections."

April 2009

4/20 -- Over 120 suspected members of Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan - KCK), a group functioning as go-between for the PKK and the DTP, are detained, including senior members of the DTP. The arrests are widely seen by Kurdish nationalists as a response to the DTP's March electoral victories. The detentions and arrests that follow will be the first in a series of operations against the KCK. These are still underway.

4/27 -- An extensive police operation in Istanbul against a leftist organization linked to the PKK results in a five-hour shootout in which three police officers are killed. The militant on the other end of the gunfight, Orhan Yilmazkaya, turns out to be 0ne of the top three leaders of the Revolutionary Headquarters.

4/29 -- 10 soldiers are killed in Diyarbakir and Hakkari provinces in violation of the PKK's unilateral ceasefire.

May 2009

5/13 -- Ocalan announces plans to release a roadmap for peace, later issuing a statement through his attorneys that the roadmap would be relased on Aug. 15. Though the roadmap was never released, stories about its would-be content continue to be published in Turkish newspapers through the summer, including in a much talked about government-sanctioned interview with Ocalan conducted by Hurriyet journalist Ertegrul Ozkok. Details included a wiseman commission to mediate an amnesty between the Turkish state and the PKK. Ocalan informs that any mediation should be done without participation from the United States or European Union. Ocalan's roadmap, as it was part and parcel revealed, also resembled the vague four-point plan the DTP would later float around. PKK Commander Murat Karayilan, in an April interview with Milliyet's Hasan Cemal, laid out similar plans (see also Jenny White's post, including a link to the interview in Turkish).

5/18 -- President Gul says Turkey has a "historic opportunity" to solve the Kurdish question.

5/22 -- In a speech in Duzce, Prime Minister Erdogan argues that Turkey should begin fairly dealing with its minorites. From the speech: "Over many years, suspicions toward foreigners existed in this country. This mindset has seemingly not changed. They have chased members of various ethnic groups out of this country. Have we won? We should think about this. Actually, this was a result of a fascist mentality."

5/26 -- A mine explodes in Diyarbakir province killing six Turkish soldiers in violation of a unilateral PKK ceasefire in effect since March.

5/31 -- The PKK extends its ceasefire to July 15 in anticipation of Ocalan's roadmap.

June 2009

6/13 -- A Turkish soldier and a PKK militant are killed in a firefight exchanged at the Turkish border.

July 2009

7/15 -- The PKK extends its unilateral ceasefire to Sept. 1.

7/22 -- Prime Minister Erdogan announces that the government is preparing its own comprehensive plan for peace. Soon after, AKP deputies appear for the first time in six years on Roj-TV and state that “all political actors [including Ocalan] should be considered if they positively contribute to the peace process." Interior Minister Besir Atalay gives a televised press conferece. From the conference: "We have the intention to take determined, patient and courageous steps." MHP leader Devlet Bahceli and other ultranationalist leaders vociferously denounce the plan while some PKK opinion leaders welcome it, hoping that it might lead to dialogue between the government and the PKK.

7/29 -- Leaders from Turkey, Iraq, and the United States meet in Ankara to discuss how to deal with the PKK in the context of a tripartite mechanism setup between the countries to arrange for cooperation between them on the issue.

August 2009

8/1 -- CHP Deputy Chairman Yılmaz Ates joins a show on pro-PKK Roj-TV, stating that “we need to have self-criticism about what happened that we [Turks and Kurds] have become foes.” Divisions seem to emerge within the CHP as to how to approach the government's intiative.

8/3 -- The Turkish National Police Academy hosts Interior Minister Besir Atalay and a group of opinion leaders to discuss the Kurdish question. The workshop, titled “The Solution to the Kurdish Question: Toward the Turkish Model,” was attended by 15 participants, all warm to the government's plans.

8/12 -- Prime Minister Erdogan delivers an emotive speech to his party's parliamentary group. Referring to the "Kurdish Opening" as a "democratic project." Erdogan asks, “If Turkey had not spent its energy, budget, peace and its young people on [fighting] terrorism, if Turkey had not spent its last 25 years in conflict, where would we be today?”

"The DTP's Deputy-Chairman Selehattin Demirtas, list[s] four demands as the basis for any peace settlement including: forming a new constitution that fully supports democracy; amending article 66 of the constitution, which defines a Turkish citizen as anyone 'bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk, in order to emphasize the non-ethnic qualification for citizenship; removing the ban on using the Kurdish language in education and media and empowering the local municipalities'" (Emrullah Uslu, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Aug. 14, 2009).

8/20 -- Ocalan delivers his 160-page handwritten roadmap to his attorneys whereupon it is confiscated by prison officials at Imrali.

8/25 -- The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) General Staff express support for the government's plan to grant limited cultural rights and improve economic development in the southeast. However, the TSK drew red lines on negotiating with the PKK, undermining the unitary structure of the Turkish state, or making Kurdish an official language.

The end of August proved to be a turning point. First, harsh criticism of the AKP poured forth from the parliamentary opposition, replete with dire warnings of the impending downfall of the republic. This invective was followed by a message from the chief of general staff, İlker Başbuğ, posted on the army’s website, which reiterated the military’s commitment to the “unitary” Turkish state and the struggle against terrorism. The top general rebuffed the DTP call upon the government to negotiate with Öcalan, saying, “There should be a good look at who is responsible for the bloodshed. You cannot put martyrs who sacrificed their souls for their country and terrorists in the same corner.” In response to the push for political and cultural autonomy for Kurds, Başbuğ continued, “The state of Turkey, the country and the nation, is an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009).

September 2009

9/2 -- Prime Minister Erdoğan, attending an iftar meal (to break the daily Ramadan fast) with police at a Special Operations Department branch, declare[s], “I say this very clearly and openly: Neither the state nor the government of the Republic of Turkey will sit down with terrorists or treat a terrorist organization as a party to negotiations. This can never, ever be a subject for discussion” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009).

9/5 -- Prominent AKP MPs turn[] a discussion of the Kurdish opening into a recitation of old slogans, denouncing the PKK as “baby killers” and exalting Turkey as “one nation with one flag.” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009.)

9/10 -- The Higher Education Council (YOK) gives Artkulu University in Mardin the permission to teach Kurdish language education courses. The language was offered alongside Farsi, Arabic and Syriac at a new "Living Languages in Turkey" institute. YOK Chair Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, announced that language courses would train academics to teach minority languages. A similar initiative at Dicle University in Diyarbakir for teaching courses only in Kurdish under the heaidng of a "Kurdish" faculty was rejected.

9/14 -- The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) apply to the parliament to prolong its mandate to conduct military operations in northern Iraq.

9/23 -- Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug once again expresses cautious, but heavily guarded support for the government's intiiative. For coverage from Bianet, click here.

9/23 -- The PKK issues a press statement criticizing the "Kuridsh opening" for not recognizing Ocalan as a negotiating figure and not suspending anti-PKK military and police operations. DTP members argue the government's initiative presents old policies in a new package.

October 2009

10/8 -- After refusing to meet with Interior Minister Besir Atalay, CHP leader Deniz Baykal sends a letter to Prime Minister Erdogan agreeing to meet with the prime minister. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said the government might be forced to hold a referendum on some elements in the "Kurdish Opening," of which the details had still not been disclosed.

10/19 -- At the request of Ocalan, 26 refugees from the Makhmour UN refugee camp in northern Iraq and eight former PKK members cross into Turkey at the Habur Gate as a "peace group." Though the eight former PKK members were detained at the border, they were released within 24 hours. The next day, prosecutors brought charges against five of the former guerillas, but the important thing is that they were not detained, the government citing that they had not committed crimes during their times with the organization.

Interor Minister Besir Atalay, who helped coordinate the crossover, said returning group was considered the beginning of the laying down of arms by the PKK, but later the process ceased after scenes of celebration interpreted to be pro-PKK flooded Turkish television screens. Opposition political parties harshly criticized the AKP, raising public ire over the incident and accusing the government of cooperating with terrorists. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli denounced AKP's actions as treason, and a number of anti-PKK rallies took places throughout the country. Prime Minister Erdogan held the DTP responsible for the celebrations, deeming them to be provocative. Significantly, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), for its part, criticized the celebratory nature of the return, but said nothing of the return in itself being wrong (Interview with Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere, The Balkans Project, Nov. 16, 1009)

The DTP most definitely used the rallies to their advantage, but after the first day, Ahmet Turk ordered participants not to wear PKK regalia and tried to minimize the gatherings being perceived as pro-PKK. Another group from Europe was expected to turn themselves in, but their arrival was cancelled after the Turkish embassy in Brussels withheld their entry visas. [See Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009.]

10/28 -- Fifteen NGOs in Diyarbakir issue a press statement criticizing the DTP for not playing a more constructive role in the "Kurdish opening."

November 2009

11/12 -- Interior Minister Besir Atalay announces a six-point action plan. An amnesty is not included in the plan.

11/13 -- The AKP introduces part of its "Kurdish Opening" in parliament. The legislation includes the easing of restrictions on private Kurdish-language television stations and Kurdish language faculties in universities, as well allowing towns and villages to use their original Kurdish names once again.

11/21 -- The AKP meets to discuss opposition to the "Kurdish opening" and designates certain party members to discuss the initiative. There is talk about removing Atalay as the main voice of the initiative. From Today's Zaman:

The party leadership decided on individuals who will have the authority to make statements for the party and the government in the initiative process. These individuals are Prime Minister Erdoğan, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek, Chief EU negotiator Egemen Bağış, deputy chairmen of the AK Party Hüseyin Çelik, Salih Kapusuz and Ömer Çelik; and deputy chairmen of the AK Party’s parliamentary group Bekir Bozdağ and Suat Kılıç. According to the new strategy, nobody except these individuals has the authority to make statements on the initiative.

AK Party deputies were again given the red lines that are never to be crossed when implementing reforms to actualize the democratic initiatives. Every move has to comply with the first three articles of the Constitution. According to this, Turkey’s unitary structure, flag and official language will not be changed.

11/22 -- A DTP-organized convoy touring Izmir is attacked by Turkish nationalist youth. Protests broke out in Hakarri after the attack.

11/25 -- Ocalan complains to his attorneys after he is moved to new prison facilities and his isolation ended. However, Ocalan sends messages through his attoneys that the new prison facilities are worse than before. The government had invited the the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) to tour the new facilities and meet with Ocalan and other inmates. A protest in Diyarbakir draws five thousand people, all answering the DTP’s call to protest Ocalan’s prison conditions.

11/26 -- In Bamaric, in Canakkale province, a clash between Kurdish and Turkish youth incites widespread violence against Bamaric's Kurdish minority. Three Kurdish teenagers are jailed, and a lynch mob of thousands gathers outside where they are being held.

11/29 -- A group of PKK supporters in Diyarbakir launches Molotov cocktails at the offices of Sura-Der, a pro-Hizbullah association. In response, a thousand Hizbullah supporters assemble to protest the PKK.

11/29 -- The KCK issues a statement saying the “attacks” against Ocalan show that the intention of the Turkish government is to eliminate the PKK leader. “This is a war project against Ocalan and our organization and the Kurdish people. If Ocalan is not released from the ‘death cell’ where he was put, our organization is not responsible for further developments.”

11/30 -- The "peace group" that returned in October issue a statement on Ocalan's prison conditions in a press release made by the Diyarbakir Branch of the Human Rights Association (IHD). The statement is now being used in a case against them being pursued by prosecutors in Diyarbakir. For more on the case, see Bianet.

December 2009

12/6-7 -- Weekend protests of Ocalan's prisons conditions draw thousands, and include more violent clashes with police. A 23-year-old university student is killed by a bullet in the back.

12/7 -- A PKK attack in Tokat kills seven Turkish soldiers. Three soldiers are wonded in a separate attack on a military vehicle.

12/7 -- The DTP's Emine Ayna gives a controversial interview (in Turkish) to Radikal in which she says the PKK gave the DTP the political space to do politics. She further goes onto say that no one should expect the DTP to deny or back away from this fact, adding that Kurds can always "go to the mountains," a metaphor for joining the PKK. Unsurprisingly, there is now a lawsuit being pursued in relation to the interview. Ayna has used the interview for her own political gain and remains in parliament while DTP doves Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk are banned from politics.

12/8 -- The Constitutional Court begins to hear arguments in the DTP closure case.

12/11 -- The Constitutional court announces its decision to close the DTP and ban 38 DTP politicians from politics for a period of five years, including chairmen Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk. Dramatic protests and clashes with police follow. See Dec. 20 post.

12/15 -- Shop owner Turan Bilen, whose store was attacked and car set on fire during protests of DTP's closure in Bulanik (Mus province) , opens fire on demonstrators, killing two and injuring seven.

12/23-24 -- To purportedly end allegedly KCK-organized street violence, police raid various addresses and arrest approximately 100 alleged KCK members, including human rights activists, politicians, students and ten mayors. For a list of some of those detained, including Diyarbakir Human Rights Association Chairman Muharrem Erbey, click here. For more on Erbey and a bit of insight into the operations, see this brief from Human Rights Watch. A petition followed the arrests. The so-called 'KCK operations' started in April following the DTP's sweeping election victories, prompting charges that the state/government are using the operations to target the party.

The National Security Council (MGK) announces full support of the government's Kurdish initiative and announces plans to publish a roadmap of its own in 2010. The roadmap has not yet been published. Rumors persist that Interior Minister Besir Atalay will be removed from his charge of coordinating the initiative.

12/28 -- An additional 24 alleged KCK affiliates are detained in Batman and Van.

12/30 -- Ahmet Turk's granddaughter, Ruken Turk, is sentenced to 10 years in prison for attending a pro-PKK demonstration.

12/31 -- DTP's closure and the 5-year political bans of DTP parliamentarians Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk go into effect upon publication in the Official Gazette. Turk and Tugluk's parliamentary immunity is terminated. Without Turk and Tugluk, and following a call from Ocalan, the remaining representatives of the DTP have decided to stay in parliament, joining the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which was strategically formed shortly after the closure case was opened against DTP in November 2007 as a fallback should the DTP be closed. Independent deputy Ufak Uras had agreed to also join the party, giving the party the 20 required members it needs to form a parliamentary group and be represented in parliament.

January 2010

1/10 -- Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu makes a tour of Mardin in support of the Kurdish opening.

1/10-11 -- Police detain two of the PKK returnees who crossed into Turkey as part of the Oct. 19 "peace group."

1/15 -- Atalay holds a press conference in attempt to reignite enthusiasm for the Kurdish opening.

1/15 -- Radio Ses in Mersin begins broadcasting in Kurmanci, Zaza, and Arabic. According to Bianet, "Radio Ses ('Voice') airs four programs in the Kurdish Kırmançi dialect, one in the Zaza language spoken by the Zaza people in eastern Anatolia and one broadcast in Arabic per week.

1/19 -- Former DTP member Hasip Kaplan announces that he has applied to the Europpean Court of Human Rights (ECHR) , arguing the Constitutional Court's decision to close the DTP violates the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


1/22 -- Gendarmerie forces detain approximately 60 alleged KCK members, including Igdir mayor Mehmet Nuri Gunes. Protests in Igdir are to follow.

1/24 -- Approximately 60 people are detained in another KCK sweep. 400 people are involved in clashes with police during a demonstration in Dogubeyazit.

1/24 -- The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistan -- TAK) issues a new declaration, in which TAK threatens to hit economic targets and civilians who play critical roles in maintaining the existing political system. TAK further warns tourists not to come to Turkey, and criticizes the PKK for being too passive in its struggle against the state.

1/25 -- Conflict erupts in Igdır between pro-Kurdish demonstrators and police following a DTP demonstration. Shops mostly belonging to ethnic Azeris are stoned during the course of events, provoking violent reactions from Turkish ultranationalists.

1/26 -- A delegation from the CPT visits Ocalan's facilities at Imrali and interview him and other prisonmates. Click here for coverage from Bianet.

February 2010

2/1 -- The BDP elects leaders Selahattin Demirtas and Gultan Kisanak as its co-chairs at its first party congress.

2/2 -- The day following the BDP's first party congress, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in Ankara opens an investigation of the party. The investigation is launched on alleged crimes of “turning people against the military,” “contradicting the Political Parties Act” and “praising crime and criminals,” according to the Anatolia News Agency.

2/3 -- PKK Commander Murat Karayilan releases his own roadmap for a future peace agreement between the state and the PKK.

2/3 -- U.S. general Ray Odierno, top commander in Iraq, meets with Turkish government officials as part of tripartite mechanism setup between the United States, Turkey, and Iraq. Discussed are details of how to evacuate the Makhmour U.N. refugee camp, where 10,000 Turkish Kurd refugees have been residing since 1993. Makhmour is a major source of recruitment for the PKK and its closure will be an important part of any peace settlement. (Click here for coverage from Hurriyet Daily News. For U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarks on the meeting, click here.)

2/3 -- Police detain 16 former DTP members.

2/3-4 -- The EU-Turkey Civil Commission (EUTCC) hosts its sixth international conference on the Kurdish question.

2/6 -- Following Ocalan’s advice, BDP leader Selehattin Demirtas declares, “The PKK and the BDP are two separate organizations. If the PKK want to say something they have the right to say so. We will not be their voice.” In an interview a few days later, Demirtas thanks Ocalan for allowing the BDP to develop its own political program as an independent party from the PKK. According to Emrullah Uslu,

With the BDP, Öcalan seems be at a point where he wishes to cooperate with the EU, so he has ordered the BDP to distance itself from the PKK. In parallel with Öcalan’s demand, BDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş outlined his party’s relations with the PKK, saying, We will not be the voice of the PKK.” During
another interview, Demirtaş thanked Öcalan for letting his party develop its own policies separate from the PKK. Based on this information, one can assume that the pro-Öcalan Kurds are pursuing a double-sided strategy. The BDP, of course, under the direction of Öcalan, is pursuing policies more independent of the PKK.

The PKK, on the other hand, plans to pursue its own policies through a more violent terror campaign. In an interview, Cemil Bayık revealed the PKK’s 2010 strategy to remove the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the Kurdish region. According to Bayık, the Turkish state thinks the AKP is the last resort for it to establish relations with Kurdish communities. If the PKK removes the AKP from the region, Bayık thinks, the Turkish state will have no choice but to sit down with the PKK and negotiate peace.

Unlike its traditional strategy, the PKK this time will use proxies to terrorize society. The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), an offshoot PKK organization that terrorized the country, especially tourist destinations and metropolises, in 2006 and 2007, will be the proxy organization for the PKK in 2010. The reason why I underline the TAK’s role is because this mysterious organization has recently issued a declaration threatening to resume its intense terror campaign in 2010.

2/6 -- Today's Zaman reports on Interior Ministry plans to restructure the village guard system in line with a report prepared by the parliament's human rights commission issued following the Bilge massacre. However, to date, no concrete measure has been taken. The Council of Europe has long called for the system's abolishment.

2/8 -- Unidentified individuals in an automobile open fire on BDP headquarters in Ankara. Interior Minister Besir Atalay calls BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, describing the act as a "provocation" and conveying the AKP's concern over the incident.

2/9 -- Rojda, Turkey's most popular Kurdish female singer, is arrested on charges of "spreading propaganda for an illegal organization." More than one month later, Rojda is convicted and sentenced to one year and eight months in prison after she had been invited to attend a meeting of artists Prime Minister Erdogan had assembled to discuss the Kurdish opening.

2/9 -- More than 90 civil society organizations, including business associations, chambers, professional unions, human rights activists and women's organizations, launch the “two minutes of darkness” protest, which will run through the month.

2/11 -- The first hearing in Ankara occurs in a case involving two off-duty police officers who shot to death a Kurdish man following a confrontation in a bar triggered by the man singing songs in Kurdish.

2/13 -- Police detain another 69 people in an effort purported to assuage expected demonstrations marking the eleventh anniversary of Ocalan's capture. More detentions and arrests occur the next day. According to Bianet, more than 100 people are arrested over the weekend, mostly members of the BDP.

2/15 -- Demonstrations marking the eleventh anniverary of Ocalan's capture draw clashes with police. From Bianet: "According to Fırat News Agency, 25 people got injured in the demonstrations, 21 people were taken into detention, 17 of them children. Overall, 110 demonstrators were arrested including 35 children."

2/19 -- A trial of 61 alleged members of the KCK gets underway in Diyarbakir.

2/20 -- Prime Minister Erdogan hosts popular artists to discuss the Kurdish opening in an effort to garner popular support.

2/22 -- In one of the many cases brought against her, Aysel Tugluk is acquitted of charges of "spreading propaganda for a terror organization." Tugluk was tried together with two of Ocalan's lawyers, Irfan Dundar and Fırat Aydinkaya, who received sentences of 10 months each.

2/23 -- At an event organized by the Civil Society Development Center (STGM), Kurdish civil society leaders expressed frustration at not having their voices adequately heard by the governmnet. Today's Zaman quotes Levent Korkut: “It will be difficult for the democratization process to move on if dialogue and cooperation between civil society and the state is not ensured."

2/24 -- Mehmet Ali Aydin, head of Diyarbakir's BDP branch, is formally arrested after showing up for a morning court proceeding.

2/26 -- Van BDP deputy Fatma Kurtulan submits a motion to parliament to open an investigation into the death of former president Turgut Ozal.

2/26 -- Italy arrests 11 suspected PKK members. Dutch authorities apprehend the PKK's lead operator in the Netherlands. And, on the same day, a German court lifts the gag on Roj-TV, which had been in pace since 2008.

March 2010

3/2 -- France arrests nine Turkish citizens suspected of recruiting for the PKK.

3/4 -- Belgium detains 30 people for suspected links to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, after conducting raids on 25 locations, including a studio of Roj-TV. Nine were arrested, including Kongra-Gel (PKK) Chairman Remzi Kartal and executive Zübeyir Aydar.

3/7 -- CHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu hints that the CHP would support a general amnesty, only to back away from his comments the following week under presumed pressure from his party. The remarks triggered a strong reaction in the Turkish press.

3/7 -- Commemorating International Women's Day, in a speech delivered in Urfa Prime Minister Erdogan called on all women to contribute to the government’s efforts to end the terror problem.

3/12 -- Siirt BDP deputy Osman Ozcelik submits a motion to parliament calling for an investigation into a recent wave of suicides among former members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The motion read: “The opinion that the TSK is covering up certain incidents is gaining ground among the public. The fact that most of the military personnel who are reported to have killed themselves are of Kurdish origin, and statements from families of alleged suicide victims that they do not find the TSK statements on the alleged suicides convincing give way to suspicions that there is ethnic discrimination in the military and even cases where executions are covered up as suicides.”

3/15 -- Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan regional administration in northern Iraq, met with Aydın Selcen, Turkey’s first consul general in Arbil, the de facto capital of the semi-autonomous region.

3/15 -- Turkish Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug defends the village guard system as essential to Turkey's "fight against terrorism."

3/15 -- BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas meets with Interior Minister Besir Atalay to discuss the safety of Newroz observances.

3/17 -- 14 people are detained in Siirt in another KCK-sweep, including Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) provincial head Sıdık Taş, the Human Rights Association’s (İHD) Siirt branch head, Vetha Aydın, provincial council member Belkıza Epözdemir, Tüm Bel-Sen branch head Ferit Epözdemir, and several administrators from various unions and associations.

3/18 -- Newroz celebrations begin in Hakkari under tight security. Celebrations continued throughout the week with few disturbances, accompanied by the usual Kurdish nationalist fanfare. Celebrations in Istanbul were confined to Kazlicesme in Zeytinburnu. For more in-depth coverage of festivities, including excerpts from message a from Ocalan delivered by BDP members, click here.

3/19 -- Siirt Mayor Sidik Tas is formally arrested.

3/20 -- Prime Minister Erdogan hosts another meeting with Turkish artists.

3/21 -- The PKK leadership's People's Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) Executive Council Presidency announced a "new phase" in the organization's struggle. Karayılan said in an interview with Ayla Jean Yackley from Reuters News Agency that a political solution has grown increasingly difficult to be reached, pointing to the DTP's closure. "We can end the ceasefire and resume the armed struggle," Karayılan warned.

3/22 -- The Public Prosecutor's Office in Diyarbakır launches cases against Turk and Tugluk for various speeches made by the politicians. Another case against both politicians is being pursued in Ankara.

3/25 -- Demirtas tells Today's Zaman that the BDP will support the government's constitutional package if all restrictions on campaigning in Turkish are lifted (not just the oral use of the language, but also written and broadcast materials), Treasury money is fairly disbursed between parties, and the election threshold is lowered. The following week, BDP co-Chairwoman Gultan Kisanak echoed Demirtas in her party's group meeting, iterating that the BDP's support of the package is conditional on the government's "extensive acceptance" of its recommendations. For more on the BDP's position, including analysis from former Chairman of the Diyarbakir Bar association Sezgin Tanrikulu, see this article from Today's Zaman's Ayse Karabat. Ocalan has said that Kurds should not support the constitutional reform package until the Anti-Terrorism Law (TMK) is lifted.

April 2010

4/6 -- Prosecutors in Diyarbakir begin to pursue a case against members of the October "peace group." From Today's Zaman: "At the time of the Kandil-Makhmour returnees, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was critical of the jubilatory nature of the group’s reception and had said: “Is the attitude seen at Habur correct? Is it a unifying attitude? Is it an attitude that makes people uneasy? Is there freedom and peace in the attitude?”' See also this report from Bianet.

4/8 -- Former MP of the closed Democracy Party (DP) Leyla Zana is sentenced to three years' imprisonment under charges of "propaganda for a terror organization" on the grounds of calling PKK leader Öcalan the "Leader of the Kurdish People". See also coverage from Today's Zaman.

4/12 -- A man attacks Ahmet Turk outside the Bilen trial in Samsun. Turk is hospitalized, and questions emerge about the security with which the former DTP leader was provided. Protests and highly questionable clashes with police breakout throughout the country (see also reportage from Bianet). Shops are closed in Hakkari, Yüksekova, Şemdinli, Van, Başkale and some areas of Mersin in protest of the attack. Emerging from the hospital, Turk urges calm. From Today's Zaman: Later, Interior Minister Besir Atalay, "speaking to a TV program, said Turk is known for being courteous and moderate and urged people to remain calm in the wake of his attack and look to his example as a model of a reasoned and measured response to injustice. He added that they will not tolerate attempts at provocation, and he cautioned security forces to take better measures to prevent such attacks in the future." For reactions from the Turkish press, click here.

4/13 -- Demirtas gives a sharply critical speech at his party's group at a podium blazoned with a banner reading "1,483 BDP members still detained." At the meeting, Demirtas declares, "we have seen nothing else but cruelty from AKP during the past eight years. Not one single area of freedom created by AKP was for the benefit of the people". Bianet gives a summary of the "KCK operations," which commenced in April 2009 following DTP victories in the southeast.

4/15 -- Hurriyet columnist Yılmaz Ozdil writes, "The person who punched Ahmet Türk on his nose was an interpreter of the feelings of many people in this country." Lawyers from the Diyarbakir Bar Association file a lawsuit against Ozdil for "inciting hatred and hostility amongst the public and humiliation of the public."

4/19 -- A gymnastics teacher attacks Energy Minister Taner Yildiz in Kayseri, yelling, " “This is the fist of the Turkish people. Here is [a Kurdish] initiative.” Yildiz was attending the funeral of a soldier killed in a PKK attack.

May 2010

5/7 -- Two more Turkish soldiers were killed in two separate incidents of PKK-placed landmine explosions in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces.

5/8 -- BDP Istanbul Provincial Chairman Mustafa Avci describeds the KCK operations as "political genocide," characterizing them as retaliation won for the electoral victories the DTP won in March 2009's local elections.

5/9 -- For Mother's Day, the southeastern NGO Peace Mothers staged a sit-in in Ankara. More than 100 protestors called for an end to the Turkish military's operations against the PKK.

5/11 -- Riots between students at Dokuz Eylul University in Mugla result in a police officer shooting a Kurdish student. The riots are later said to have had an ethnic dimension.

5/13 -- Former DTP leader Aysel Tugluk is acquitted in two of the multiple cases that have been brought against her since her parliamentary immunity was removed following DTP's closure.

5/16 -- Milliyet runs a statement by Ocalan, issued through his lawyers, that he will no play an active role in settling the conflict if officials do not meet with him by May 31. He warns of attacks and broad rebellions in Turkish cities.

5/16 -- To protest continued operations against the PKK, a group of BDP deputies and a large crowd form a human shield in an effort to block military operations in Lice (Diyarbakir).

5/17 -- The BDP announces that it will begin taking the cases of those arrested in the KCK operations to the European Court of Human Rights.

5/20 - 5/24 -- An additional 120 people alleged to members of the KCK are detained.

5/20 -- The Turkish military carries out air strikes against PKK positions inside northern Iraq. The military later reports it killed 19 PKK fighters.

5/21 -- Six people are arrested for insighting the attack on Ahmet Turk in Samsun. Proescutors are demanding four years for Turk's attacker.

Manouchehr Zonoozi, a former director of Roj-TV in Denmark, recently gave an interview to a Danish newspaper in which he spoke of the close links between Roj-TV and the PKK.

5/26 -- The Turkish military reports to have killed four PKK fighters in clashes in Tunceli. Early the next morning, one Turkish soldier and four others are wounded in continued clashes.

5/27 -- A PKK attack in Siirt on a military vehicle kills one Turkish gendarme.

5/31 -- A PKK attack on a naval base in Iskenderun (Hatay) leaves six Turkish soldiers dead. It was the first attack on a Turkish naval base in the history of the Turkish Republic, and a sign that the PKK is intent on expanding the conflict. Some government officials, opposition leaders, and public opinion leaders begin speculating that the attack is linked to Israel's raid on the Mavi Marmara.

June 2010

6/1 -- An additional six people are arrested in Van in the course of the KCK operations. Seven more people are arrested there on Friday (6/4).

Three Turkish soldiers are injured in an attack in Cukurca (Hakkari).

Six PKK members surrender at the Habur Gate in Silopi province, and another in Adiyaman province.

6/2 -- A security summit is held in response to increased violence in the southeast. The professionalization of the military is discussed, as well as increasing the response to unrest in the southeast. Interior Minister Besir Atalay expressed the government's commitment to the political and economic solutions laid out in the announcement of the Kurdish opening last summer, but again, failed to give any specifics.

6/3 -- KRG President Massoud Barzani meets with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The two discuss trade between the KRG and Turkey, as well as the deteriorating security situation in the southeast. Barzani reiterates his opposition to the PKK's decision to end the ceasefire, and meets with DP leaders following his meeting with Davutoglu.

Violence continues in Cukurca with an attack on an armed police vehicle that injures three Turkish police officers. The local police department and police housing facilities fell under attack the night before. Another two police officers are injured in another attack on Friday.

6/7 -- An indictment is finally issued for the over 1,500 people who have been detained in the ongoing KCK operations. The indictment includes 15 BDP-elected Kurdish mayors.

6/8 -- A bombing in Istanbul's Kucucekmece district injures 15 military officers and two civilian bystanders. Five suspects are arrested after the bombing.

6/9 -- Ten people are arrested in KCK operations in Hakkari, including Hakkari BDP provincial head Sıddık Akış, BDP deputy co-chairperson Berivan Akboğa, former provincial head of the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP) Huvzullah Kansu, Dicle News Agency reporter Hamdiye Çiftçi and party members Baki Özboğanlu and İzzet Belge. Protests in Hakkari's city center following the arrests draw clashes with police.

6/11 -- A bomb placed beside a road linking Tunceli and Elzig injures 13 Turkish soldiers, some of whom were conscripts who had just been discharged after completing their mandatory military service. Police report to have foiled an attempted bombing in Izmir.

6/15 -- At the AKP's parliametary group meeting, Prime Minister Erdogan denounces the BDP, accusing the party of supporting the PKK: "Saying peace won’t bring peace. Those who are in direct or indirect contact with the PKK are accomplices to murder." Erdogan's remarks draw a strong response from BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, who accuses the prime minister for essentially calling for the closing of the BDP.

A PKK-planted landmine in Sirnak kills one Turkish soldier and injures another three.

6/16 -- A PKK attack on a military border post in Sirnak kills one Turkish soldier. The Turkish military responds by sending three commando divisions and a specialized battalion to chase the attackers into northern Iraq.

6/17 -- Ten members of the group of eight PKK memers and 26 residents of the Makhmour refugee camp who crossed at Habur in October are arrested at the first trial against them.

6/18 --


July 2010

August 2010