Why the Prime Minister Cares About Paul Auster

PHOTO from Hurriyet

Paul Auster and Prime Minister Erdogan stirred a controversy after Auster gave an interview to Hurriyet in late January in which the Jewish-American author said he would not visit Turkey due to the number of imprisoned writers. Prime Minister Erdogan fired back at his party's parliamentary group meeting a few days later, calling Auster "ignorant" and hypocritical for visiting Israel, which the author visited in 2010. The spar between the two men only ratcheted up when Auster issued a response in the New York Times in which the prominent author reiterated his concerns about press freedom in Turkey. CHP opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu soon jumped into the fray, inviting Auster to come to Turkey at his invitation, after which another back-and-forth ensued in which Erdogan said Kilicdaroglu and Auster should "go for a picnic together" atop a hill in Israel overlooking Gaza.

Just why these remarks triggered such a firestorm is something of a mystery to outsiders of Turkey (I have had four people ask me this in the past two days), but it has a lot to do with the sensitivity of the prime minister and the political opportunism involved on all sides. After all, this is politics. If Erdogan had simply let the author's comments go by the wayside when first they were issued, this would be a non-story. Yet Erdogan decided to attack Auster, not only contradicting his claim writers were being imprisoned in Turkey for expressing their views (according to Erdogan's public statements, these writes are "terrorists," people who plotted to overthrow the government or who supported the PKK), but linked Auster to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a move sure to win him popular support among the party's base.

As far as I can tell, Auster has been largely ambivalent on the issue of Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, but at the same time, Erdogan's ad hominem attack on Auster is more deflection than reasoned response, and in turn, Kilicdaroglu's backing of Auster an attempt to put raise the profile of the continued attacks on press freedom in Turkey, and of course, win political points in so doing. To me, what is significant here is that Auster's comments, whose Jewish ancestry and shakiness on the issue of occupation make for an easy target, were so singled out by prime minister. Erdogan's remarks, while not necessarily anti-Semitic, show the familiar lack of control for which the prime minister has often been criticized by friends and enemies alike.

Most interesting here is how Erdogan and others in the AKP, as well as AKP-friendly public opinion leaders, were quick to label Auster as either a victim or perpetrator of a massive smear campaign designed to discredit the party. Sabah columnist Nazli Ilacak portrays Auster as seriously misinformed, but places the blame on an organized psychological campaign being carried out against the AKP-led government. Is the misinformation that made its way to Auster the product of Ergenekon? Is this the kind of black-ops for which former General Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug is currently imprisoned?

According to AKP Vice President Bulent Gedikli, the answer is yes. In a statement made yesterday, Gedikli said, "Paul Auster is part of the plot." "What plot?" I might ask, but many in the AKP, including a number of their supporters, would dismiss me as a fool -- and do so quite sincerely.

The narrative of many in and supportive of the AKP is defined by victimage, of shadowy forces conspiring to keep them at the bottom ranks of society and far removed from political power even when every indication of the Turkey that exists after nearly ten years of AKP rule is that the reality could be further from the truth.

Unfortunately, this narrative is largely a by-product of real policies in over 80 years of Turkish history that were designed to do just this -- most significant among them, at least in terms of the historical memory of those currently in power, the Feb. 28 process that brought down the elected Refah party government in 1997 and the policies to follow that were designed to, though not so successfully, to keep political Islam in its place and guard against the rise of a pious majority. The narrative is one of oppression, and democracy, for many, therefore understood solely in terms of allowing for the majority, long downtrodden, to finally take the reigns of power. For those who imagine plots at every corner and shadowy networks bent on destruction, democracy is about liberation, but it is not necessarily liberal.

What the recent Auster imbroglio reveals is that these myths are not gone from historical memory, and despite ten years of dominant party politics, will likely not be gone anytime soon. Also revealed is that playing on these anxieties, especially if the opponent is as easy a target as Auster, can garner a good bit of political capital. At the end of the day, Erdogan likely emerged stronger and the victim mentality ever more entrenched while few will remember who Paul Auster is in a few months time.

Come Again??

AA PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Campaigning over the weekend, Prime Minister Erdogan said the recent op-ed in The Economist endorsing the CHP was the work of "international gangs" and linked the magazine's support of the CHP to the opposition party's policy supposedly more friendly policy toward Israel. In an interview with the TRGT news channel on Saturday evening, the prime minister said, "This international media, as they are supported by Israel, would not be happy with the continuation of the AKP government. . . . Of course, they have their hands on Turkey nowadays." Is it a Zionist conspiracy? Or, is it that the prime minister simply cannot endure criticism or dissenting opinions?

In all fairness, emotional outbursts are common in Turkish politics, especially less than two weeks away from an election. At the same time, if the prime minister is looking to counter criticisms that he is thin-skinned, authoritarian, and intolerant of dissent, such baseless and strongly accusatory remarks are not winning him or his party any points.

Fellow party cadres Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis have also chimed in. According to Davutoglu, The Economist "violated media ethics" in printing the op-ed. From Bagis's point of view, the op-ed is mere "rubbish" and must have been ordered by "dark powers" inside Turkey (see Radikal columnist Cuneyt Ozdemir (in Turkish)). Okay . . . so not the work on international gangs . . . Ergenekon?

For more in English, see this story from Hurriyet Daily News.

Return of the Mavi Marmara

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Thousands gathered in Taksim Square last night on the eve of the one-year anniversary of Israel's raid of the Turkish-flagged Mavi Marmara in which Israeli commandos eight Turkish citizens and one American of Turkish descent.

Yesterday morning, the International Relief Foundation (IHH) held a press conference announcing the organization is continuing to move forward with plans for 15 ships carrying 1,500 activists from 38 countries to sail to Gaza at the end of June. The Mavi Marmara is expected to be at the front-and-center.

Diplomatic relations also heated up around the one-year anniversary as Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said Turkey would retaliate should Israel once more carry out military operations on the ships. According to Israeli press reports, the Israel Defense Forces are mobilizing to meet the flotilla, though is focusing on counter-riot strategies. Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the flotilla will not be permitted to land in Gaza and that force will be used when and where necessary.

The United States is attempting to break the impasse, though Turkish government officials are have maintained their argument that they do not have the legal power to intervene to stop a Turkish NGO from carrying out such a mission.

In the meantime, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has extended the working period for the UN Panel of Inquiry currently investigating last year's raid.


UPDATE I (6/2) -- Hurriyet reports (in Turkish) the United States is planning to submit a proposal to Turkey by which Turkey would block IHH's flotilla plans in exchange for making Turkey the place of upcoming Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

UPDATE II (6/6) --  Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has publicly called on the IHH to delay plans to send a flotilla to Gaza. The IHH rejected the foreign minister's request, arguing that the flotilla was necessary to providing Gazans with much needed aid and asserting sovereignty over their ports. The government is arguing that the IHH should wait to see what happens in the wake of the Rafah border crossing being opened (it is opened for civilian crossings, but not for aid supplies) and plans to install a new Palestinian unity government.

Gul Urges Hamas to Recognize Israel

In reaction to Obama's Thursday speech on Mideast policy, President Gul has given an interview to the Wall Street Journal lauding Obama's seeming call for a two-state solution based on 1967 borders while calling on Hamas to recognize Israel. From Alternet:

Turkey's President Abdullah Gul has urged the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas to recognise Israel's right to exist, the Wall Street Journal reported on Saturday.

In an interview a day after U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a speech on the Middle East, Gul also hailed Obama's reference to creating a Palestinian state based on Israel's pre-1967 borders as "a very important step".

Turkey has regarded Hamas as a key factor in the Middle East peace process since it won Palestinian elections in 2006.

Gul said President Obama "has a point" when he said in his speech that Israel could not be expected to negotiate with a body that does not recognise Israel's right to exist.

Asked if he was willing to press Hamas on that issue, Gul said, "I already advised them."

In a meeting with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Ankara in 2006, Gul said he told Meshaal, "you have to be rational" about recognising Israel's right to exist.

Gul said he believed Hamas was ready to recognise Israel in its pre-1967 borders but wants that to happen simultaneously with Israel's recognition of a Palestinian state.

The AKP government has had friendly relations with Hamas since 2006 when a five-member delegation led by Meshaal first visited Ankara. Since that time the AKP government has been committed to improving relations between Hamas and the international community, a policy that has won the party few friends in Israel and in certain Washington policy circles. For background on the AKP government's relations with Hamas, see June 10 post.

Obama's speech aired live on Turkish state television Thursday night at a time when most Turks are still very much trying to figuring out their own country's position in the post-Arab spring Middle East.

Ankara is expected to facilitate negotiations between Hamas and Fatah next week.

Averting Another Flotilla Crisis

The Turkish NGO Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) is preparing another flotilla campaign involving vessels sailing from multiple European countries, including the Mavi Marmara, which will once again sail from Turkey. The vessels are set to sail after the Turkish elections on June 12.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon has said the United States is urging Turkey not to allow the IHH to send another flotilla. In testimony to the U.S. Senate before Congress yesterday, Gordon said, “In the year since the last flotilla episode, Israel has changed the humanitarian regime for Gaza [and] made it very clear that there are alternative ways to get humanitarian assistance to Gaza. We have been very clear with the Turkish government that that’s the case.”

The Turkish government, as before, has said that Turkey is in no position to prevent lawfully registered NGOs from setting sail for Gaza. The IHH is accepting applications for the campaign, heavily advertising in Turkey and throughout Europe.

For more on the IHH and last year's flotilla incident, click here. For my feature in the Jerusalem Post analyzing Turkey-Israel relations in the wake of the flotilla, click here.

Informing the Turkish Public?

A Turkish Jewish association in Israel is attempting to present the Israeli side of the recent rift in relations between Jerusalem and Ankara. From Hurriyet Daily News:

A website from the group, HASTÜRK, at www.hasturktv.com, has been online since July 20 and is attempting to provide news from the Israeli press and official statements made by the Israeli government in the Turkish language.

Rafael Sadi, a spokesman for the organization, said he hoped the initiative would serve the friendship between both countries.

"This idea grew almost 10 years ago due to the anti-Israel attitude in the Turkish press in the wake of the second intifada of 2000. As a Turk and Israeli who was born in Turkey and has been living in Israel for 10 years, that concerned me a lot," Sadi told the Hürriyet Daily News.

"Turkish society has become anti-Israeli within 10 years’ time," he said.

Explaining the main objective of the project, Sadi said: "As people who live in Israel, who speak Turkish and who know Israel very well, it is us who can better explain Israel to Turkish society. It is only us who can understand how deep is the impact and the harm dealt by inaccurate news.”

He said the website would post stories from the Israeli press and Israeli Foreign Ministry statements in Turkish.

"That will be an interesting service for Turkish people who want to see the reality," according to Sadi. "The whole matter is to provide Turkish readers with accurate news without disseminating any hostility and without distorting the facts."

There are almost 100,000 Turkish Jews in Israel and the union has almost 3,000 members.

Turkish press reports and opinion pieces in the wake of the Gaza flotilla incident were indeed quite strong, and some newspapers did run rather sensational headlines. At the same time, anti-Israel sentiments did not simply arise in Turkey in the past ten years with the intifada or the election of the AKP, though it has surely intensified under the party and with increasing international criticism of Israel's policy toward Gaza. For more context here, see my recent article in the Jerusalem Post.

Though most Jews of Turkish descent re-located to Istanbul at various times following the foundation of the Turkish republic, there are approximately 23,000 Turkish Jews in Turkey, most residing in Istanbul.

Erbakan Moves Defeated in Saadet Congress

An internal rift inside the Saadet Party (SP) came to the forefront during the party's congress this past Sunday. Necmettin Erbakan, a veteran figure in Turkish Islamist politics and former prime minister of the Refah Party (RP), which was effectively removed from politics in Turkey's 1997 post-modern coup (also known as the Feb. 28 process), attempted to introduce a party list comprised of supporters and relatives. The list was rejected by another wing in the SP led by party leader Numan Kurtulmus.

The rift in the party, and its future, is significant in that the SP stood to gain from the Israeli rad on the Gaza flotilla. The IHH, the Turkish Islamist charity behind the Mavi Marmara, has strong connections to the SP, though it also seems to have worked with the AKP. The IHH thanked both parties before setting off on what turned out to be a dramatic collision course with Israeli security forces.

According to one analyst with whom I talked, the AKP might well have loaned support to the flotilla, or at least stood by and let the Mavi Marmara sail, in an attempt to outstage the SP, not thinking that Israel would respond in the way it did. Now that tensions are high, the AKP most surely has to pay mind to the SP and other factions on the Islamist right, which in the absence of strong action from the AKP and with the continued presence of the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the Turkish political agenda, could garner a significant (though still small) number of votes from AKP supporters. Though the SP is highly unlikely to reach the 10 percent threshold, every percentage point matters for the AKP now that it is under increased pressure from a re-juvenated CHP.

In this environment, signs of problems in the SP, including an old and apparently contentious Erbakan, are surely positives for the party. Here is a report of the congress from Today's Zaman:

Even though there was only one candidate, a quarrel erupted during the congress for the party's new Central Executive Board (MYK). Delegates who support Erbakan and those behind current leader Kurtulmuş fought over the party administration list. During the party congress, Kurtulmuş presented his "white list" for the party's MYK. However, Erbakan presented another list, titled the "green list," for the MYK.

Erbakan wanted to include his daughter Elif Erbakan, his son Fatih Erbakan, his son-in-law Mehmet Altınöz, Orhan Altınöz -- the older brother of his son-in-law -- and Ayşenur Tekdal, who is the daughter of Ahmet Tekdal, a die-hard supporter of Erbakan, and one of the party's elders. Kurtulmuş was listed as the leader on the green list.

Kurtulmuş and his followers refused to be listed or a part of the green list. The fight began at this point, and Erbakan asked his supporters to leave the congress. The crisis erupted when Kurtulmuş, who got angry over Erbakan including close friends and family members, announced that he withdrew from Erbakan’s “green list.” Kurtulmuş included only one person on his own list who was on Erbakan’s list, Recai Kutan. Erbakan’s supporters later began leaving the meeting, calling on everyone who loves Erbakan not to cast a vote. The voting session began in the wake of these disputes, and despite everything, Kurtulmuş was re-elected during the third round with 310 votes. Kurtulmuş was elected to the leadership during the 2008 congress with the support of 924 of 946 delegates.

Although Kurtulmuş emerged as victor and was re-elected, the fact that he was able to be re-elected only during the third round is a sign that a tough period has begun within the party since Kurtulmuş was able to get the support of only 310 out of 1,250 delegates. Only 634 delegates cast a vote since Erbakan’s supporters had left the congress. The resignation of many delegates is expected soon.

Turkey, Iran, the Arab Street (And the Other Reality)

A recent op/ed in the New York Times penned by Elliot Hen-Tov and Bernard Haykel examines Turkey's rising regional role in the Sunni Middle East, arguing that Turkey's gaining popularity is largely Iran's loss. From the piece:

Since Israel’s deadly raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara last month, it’s been assumed that Iran would be the major beneficiary of the wave of global anti-Israeli sentiment. But things seem to be playing out much differently: Iran paradoxically stands to lose much influence as Turkey assumes a surprising new role as the modern, democratic and internationally respected nation willing to take on Israel and oppose America.

While many Americans may feel betrayed by the behavior of their longtime allies in Ankara, Washington actually stands to gain indirectly if a newly muscular Turkey can adopt a leadership role in the Sunni Arab world, which has been eagerly looking for a better advocate of its causes than Shiite, authoritarian Iran or the inept and flaccid Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf.

. . . .

While most in the West seem to have overlooked this dynamic, Tehran has not. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad used a regional summit meeting in Istanbul this month to deliver an inflammatory anti-Israel speech, yet it went virtually unnoticed among the chorus of international condemnations of Israel’s act. On June 12 Iran dispatched its own aid flotilla bound for Gaza, and offered to provide an escort by its Revolutionary Guards for other ships breaking the blockade.

Yet Hamas publicly rejected Iran’s escort proposal, and a new poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 43 percent of Palestinians ranked Turkey as their No. 1 foreign supporter, as opposed to just 6 percent for Iran.

Turkey has a strong hand here. Many leading Arab intellectuals have fretted over being caught between Iran’s revolutionary Shiism and Saudi Arabia’s austere and politically ineffectual Wahhabism. They now hope that a more liberal and enlightened Turkish Sunni Islam — reminiscent of past Ottoman glory — can lead the Arab world out of its mire.

You can get a sense of just how attractive Turkey’s leadership is among the Arab masses by reading the flood of recent negative articles about Ankara in the government-owned newspapers of the Arab states. This coverage impugns Mr. Erdogan’s motives, claiming he is latching on to the Palestinian issue because he is weak domestically, and dismisses Turkey’s ability to bring leadership to this quintessential “Arab cause.” They reek of panic over a new rival.

As much talk has been made in recent years of the rising power of Iran and a Shi'a Middle East, Ankara's new position, thanks to its increasing coziness with Hamas and the anti-Israel rhetoric, is indeed interesting to say the least. However, there is another side to the equation. As Turkey seeks to expand its regional role and, in search of new markets, its trade ties with the Middle East, popularity in the Arab World also seems a double-edged sword. Authoritarian governmentmes in the Middle East alarmed at Turkey's rising regional role, might well be less likely to cooperate with Ankara in the future. After all, the leaders of these governments are the real holders of power, not those on the Arab street now enamored with Erdogan. Will Arab governments tolerate a new Nasser, especially if he is Turkish?

Rally Around the Flag (But Whose?)

In the more than two weeks that have passed since the flotilla crisis, AKP government officials continue to pound Israel, raising concern with Western alliances, favor in the Arab Street, and just as significantly, political points at home. Milliyet columnist Semih Idiz weighs in on the domestic side of the equation in today's Hurriyet Daily News:

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears set to milk the popularity he gained in the streets of Turkey and the Middle East after the Marmara crisis in which nine Turks were killed by Israeli forces in a seriously botched up military operation.

It is almost as if he was waiting for a new crisis with Israel to be able to work the streets in order to regain some of the political ground his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been loosing over bread and butter issues at home.

He and his party executives are clearly worried that the reinvigorated Republican Peoples Party, or CHP, may make headway given the successful manner in which its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been hitting at the government over topics that really matter for the average man on the street. He is also concerned that the Saadet (Felicity) Party, the other Islamist party, may steal votes from the AKP given the rising dissatisfaction among the public.

Turks are fickle though, and easily swayed emotionally even if this means that the bread and butter issues of vital importance to them are pushed to the background. It is clear that there is great public animosity towards Israel today. As for the almost endemic anti-Americanism among Turks, this is also adding grist to Erdogan’s populist mill.

So we see him increasingly turning up the volume of his demagoguery, and hitting at Israel and the United States at every opportunity that presents itself. No doubt he is keeping a close eye on the “political rating meter” as he sends his crowds to paroxysms of delirious applause with his remarks, some of which smack openly of anti-Semitism and reflect a growing anti-Western tendency.

After the Marmara incident he was not only quick to use the harshest and most insulting adjectives when referring to Israel, but also had thinly veiled warnings to Washington, suggesting openly that those who stood behind Israel were also culpable in the crimes committed by that country.

Over the weekend he went further and openly named the U.S. this time, thus revealing what lies in his heart-of-hearts. This is what he had to say while addressing an adoring crowd in Rize, on the Black Sea coast, where people are not only religious but also ultra-nationalist.

“They are asking us what Turkey is doing in the Middle East, in Palestine. Why is Turkey bothered about Gaza? But could they not be asked in return what America is doing in Iraq? What is it doing in Palestine? Could it not be asked what is it doing in Afghanistan? What are France, Britain, and Holland, and so on, doing in these places?”

Erdogan went on threateningly to say, “I am calling on the Israeli supported international media and their subcontractors at home: Turkey is not like other countries.” His only tribute to sophistication during this show of demagoguery was his reference to “the Israeli supported international media.”

Previously he had made references to the “Jewish controlled international media” but must have been warned by his advisors that this was too overtly “anti-Semitic,” and thus politically incorrect. This no doubt forced him to make a slight modification in his nevertheless anti-Semitic reference to the international media.

A survey conducted by METROPoll on June 3, just four days after the flotilla raid, found that nearly two-thirds of the 1,000 Turks surveyed thought the government response was too weak, a finding the AKP is no doubt aware. Winning votes is important for any government, and with the possibility of early elections looming as the constitutional reform package waits to be ruled on by the Constitutional Court, no doubt figures into AKP decisionmaking.

Additionally, there is reason to be concerned. A rejuvenated CHP might well take economically-minded and liberal (those that are left) voters away from the party at the same time the Israel issue has mobilized the Islamist right, possibly bringing votes to Saadet Partisi. Though Saadet has finished far under the 10 percent election threshold since the AKP came to power, an increased vote for the party could all the same take critical votes away from the AKP even if it does not pass the threshold. The question for me here is why did Erdogan let the Mavi Marmara sail knowing that what happened on May 31 was a definite possibility. If domestic politics figured in at all, a calculation may have been made to divert attention away from the Kurdish front and score political points, but was thought not given to what effect such a move could have on those right of the AKP, namely strengthening the hand of Saadet Partisi? Is this perhaps what was behind the warnings of Fethullah Gulen in his interview with the Wall Street Journal (see June 7 post)?

It is hard to say to what extent this figures into the AKP's anti-Israel rhetoric and foreign polcy posturing, but the domestic factor should not be ruled out. Injured by its failed Kurdish initiative and increasing PKK violence, the Israel imbroglio helps the AKP at home at a time when it needs all the help it can get, which might explain why the government is focusing on the larger Palestinian issue and the Mavi Marmara incident (though this has been more or less the case in its relations with Israel since the latter's incursion into Gaza in December 2008), often conflating the two, rather than the growing conflict in the southeast. Nationalism has always been a powerful force in Turkish politics, but now the Israeli flag also serves a potent a force at the moment as the Turkish one.


UPDATE I (6/18) -- Istanbul's municipal council has accepted a proposal made by the Saadet Partisi to make Gaza a sister city.

The Hamas Question

In the wake of the flotilla crisis, Prime Minister Erdogan has been issuing statements supportive of Hamas, characterizing the group as resistance fighters who won an election. These statements not only further heighten tensions with Israel, but also threaten Turkey-United States relations, prompting U.S. State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley to reiterate emphatically that the United States considers Hamas a terrorist organization. Just as importantly, the prime minister's statements have not gone without domestic criticism.

Turkish critics, many of whom are supportive of strongly condemning Israel's attack on the Mavi Marmara, fear the pro-Hamas rhetoric risks conflating Israel's raid on the Mavi Marmara (an issue between Israel and Turkey) with Israel's relations with Hamas. Some have even gone so far as to argue that Erdogan personally identifies with Hamas, a political organization that has gained popularity with Palestinians in part due to some Palestinians' perception that rival Fatah is elitist, too secularist, and out of touch with the masses.

Hamas, of course welcoming the prime minsiter's statements, has for its part expressed support for Erdogan's political model. Hamas Foreign Minister Ahmad Yusuf recently gave an interview to Hurriyet, more or less comparing Erdogan's politics with that of the Taliban. From the interview:

According to Yusuf, who said he is writing a book called “Erdoğan and a New Strategic Vision,” the Taliban is “opposed to everything,” including education and women’s rights.

“Erdoğan’s model, on the other hand, is liberal. It is a model that dares to take responsibility and change things and establishes good relations between the religious and secular elements of society,” he said. “It is a model that works for democracy and human rights, and supports an open society. That is what we want.”

Yusuf's statements fits within Hamas' broader attempts at what Thanassis Cambanis terms "tunnel diplomacy." From Cambanis'articel in Foreign Affairs:

Since Israel has claimed that it will end the Gaza blockade only if Hamas surrenders power, the movement has been willing to improvise and embrace whatever works -- a merchant’s approach of finding the best deal and then justifying it retroactively.

Hamas has applied the same formula to its diplomatic strategy. It has hedged its bets, alternately hectoring and wooing Egypt, cozying up to Iran and Turkey, and shaming the Gulf petro-states into giving it money and political cover. In January, Gaza’s prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, chastised Egypt from the minbar at Friday prayers in Gaza City for “losing its compass” and joining the ranks of those who “criminalize the resistance.” The Arabs, he argued, must draw close to Turkey: “We are working to build a new balance against the Israelis in the region.”

Since the 2006 elections, Hamas’ brain trust has been trying to plot a path out of global isolation. Ahmed Yousef leads the effort, drawing on his experience running an Islamic think tank in what he calls the “paradise” of Washington, D.C., for more than a decade. The number-two official in Hamas’ foreign ministry in Gaza, he is at once a consummate politician and a fierce defender of Hamas’ resistance ideology. He may be a conciliator, but he is no moderate.

“We want the West to understand it can do business with us,” he told me in January during a long conversation in his Gaza City office. “They want to know if we are more like the Taliban or like [Turkey’s Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip] Erdogan. They will see that we are closer to Erdogan. We are flexible.”

Diplomatically, Hamas has cast a wide net. The group has launched Web sites in English and Turkish and has dispatched senior officials to meet with any influential Westerners willing to talk, in public or in secret. Now, Hamas is benefiting from the results of its diplomatic groundwork. The flotilla that it did not organize has played right to Hamas’ strategy, earning it a spate of attention and summoning international pressure on Israel to loosen the blockade.

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Hamas began in 2006 when a five-man delegation headed by Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal visited Ankara.

Not writing about the AKP government's identification with Hamas, bur rather the Palestinians as a whole, Orhan Kemal Cengiz had a provocative column yesterday in Today's Zaman. An excerpt:

Erdoğan’s defense of human rights of the Palestinians is based on identification. This makes him reactionary and prevents him from playing a vital role in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since he could not rise above the problem, his way of engaging with the Palestinian question has the serious potential of making Turkey a part of the problem, rather than contributing to a solution.

Can we contribute to the solution of this problem if we turn a blind eye to the sins of Hamas, which is responsible for grave human right violations, has created an oppressive regime in Gaza and has killed many innocent victims in its endless suicide attacks? Can we seriously and effectively defend the rights of the Palestinians while we are turning a blind eye to human rights violations in Darfur and in Iran?

Can we be taken seriously when we try to draw attention to the war crimes Israel has committed in Gaza while we still refrain from endorsing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?

Erdoğan and his government could be a perfect mediator between Israelis and Palestinians if they end this identification. I cannot imagine any other government in the world which could show Hamas that their obsession with the extinction of Israel is actually one of the biggest obstacles to the solution of this problem. I cannot imagine any other government which could convince Iran and Syria that they could peacefully coexist with a peaceful Israel in the region.

But instead we will witness the dance of anger for a while.

Pushing Western Alliances

EU Chief Negotiatior Egeman Bagis called on NATO to help end what he characterized as an illegal the Israeli imposed blockade of Gaza, even suggesting that it send a fleet of ships to protect the safety of Palestians and Israelis. Though Turkey has not made such a request in the formal framework of NATO, the call, combined with Bagis' characteriation of EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton's response to the flotilla incident as a "joke," is unlikely to win Turkey many friends in NATO or the European Union.

In other flotilla-related news, see Ha'aretz's report on the work of Medi Nahmyaz and Nathalie Alyon, two Israeli citizens of Turkish descent who were called to translate for Turkish citizens detained by Israel during the flotilla affair. According to the two translators, the majority of Turkish citizens on board the flotilla were unaware of the military blockade. The women reported that most were uneducated, came from pious backgrounds, and most significantly, thought that everything had been arranged for their safe arrival in Gaza. from the report:

Many passengers spoke of coming "to help children in Gaza, orphans, hungry children," or "to bring humanitarian assistance." Alyon and Nahmyaz got the impression that many of them believed before they left Turkey that everything had been arranged and they would reach Gaza. They also did not seem to have broad political knowledge or a distinct ideology.

The medical team was very nice, say the interpreters, and people almost apologized for feeling unwell or saying it was hard to breathe. "That's very Turkish," says Alyon. "The doctor is such a big and important man, who am I to bother him?" The activists from Western Europe were blatantly different. They spoke loudly, demanded their rights and refused to talk until their representatives arrived.

Also relevant

Never the Same? -- A Reading of Turkey After the Mavi Marmara

Protests in Istanbul continued on Saturday, drawing crowds in the thousands. AP Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Upon the return of Turkish Ambassador Oguz Celikkol to Ankara, President Gul declared that Turkey's relations with Israel "will never be the same."

Departing for Ireland the day Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara in international waters, I left Istanbul's Taksim Square with the images of enraged protestors fully in my mind. From Ireland, reports of continued mass protests drawing crowds of up to 10,000 and feiry statements of Turkish government officials flooded Irish radio and the BBC.

Ireland, too, was not without protest: the Irish-flagged Rachel Corrie, part of the same flotilla, had lagged behind the other vessels and the Irish government was insisting that it be allowed to reach Gaza without incident. Protests occurred in Dublin and Belfast, as they did in other places across the world. Though Ireland was much less at the center of the raid than Turkey, it was clear that the Israeli raid would affect not only Turkey-Israel relations, but how Israel was perceived throughout the world.

I won't take the time here to regurgitate the news surrounding the raid and the deaths of nine Turkish citizens, one of them also a dual citizen of my own country, other than to focus on the Turkish response and Turkey's demand that a UN-backed investigatory commission be authorized to investigate the incident (which Israel rejects) -- an insistence all the more justified in Turkish minds following the release of autopsy reports revealing that the nine victims had been peppered with bullets and some shot at a very close range.

Soon after the raid, the Turkish government condemned the Israeli action as tantamount to murder, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu describing the actions in front of the UN Security Council as "piracy" and "banditry." The response elicted from Prime Minister Erdogan, who flew back from a trip to Chile, was just as strong. Erdogan issued aggresive statements throughout the week, comparing the incident to Sept. 11, iterating the commandment not to kill in multiple languages before the glare of video cameras, and characterizing Hamas as an organization comprised of "resistance fighters."

Meanwhile, Israel moved quickly to portray the Turkish citizens killed as Islamic exremists and terrorists bent on waging global jihad against Israel, linking the still murky Turkish humanitarian aid organization at the center of the incident with global terrorist organizations, including al-Qa'ida (for more on the humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), see Yigal Schleifer's article in the Christian Science Monitor).

The difference in narratives striking, tempers waged throughout the week as the bodies of those killed were returned to Turkey amidst more protests and calls for Turkey to cut off all relations with Israel. The Turkish government recalled its ambassador, cancelled joint military exercises scheduled with Israel, and suspended work on energy projects. The Turkish parliament issued a strong resolution calling on the government to reconsider military and eocnomic ties with Israel.

Calls for an even stonger reaction resided throughout the Turkish public and were not limited to supporters of the AKP or stronger Islamist parties (see this poll), or even to particularly religious people for that matter. Criticism from Turkish opposition parties often urged the government to take stronger action, and newly-elected CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, while urging calm, has criticized the government for being "two-faced": "They’re saying ‘one minute’ in front of cameras, and ‘yes please’ behind closed doors."

Over the weekend, Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu engaged in mutual finger-pointing, both accusing the other of being under the undue influence of Israel. Referring to recent statements made by Fetullah Gulen and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc that revealed a rift in the party over how to deal with Gaza, Kilicdaroglu declared that the "Tel Aviv advocate" is within the AKP. Tucked away in Pennsylvania, Gulen gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal in which he criticized the IHH's failure to reach an agreement with Israel. In the interview, Gulen seemed to warn the Turkish government to be careful in its posturing vis-á-vis Israel for fear of damaging relations with the United States. Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mehmet Ali Birand picked up on this message in his column today:

Gülen explicitly warns Turkey.

He opposes entering such a process with the National View. For, the IHH is according to him a radical Islamic movement and he believes turning this humane help attempt into an Islamic help movement would harm Turkey very much.

Gülen with his approach does not oppose the AKP. He just criticizes IHH’s attitude. He warns that such steps might go as far as cutting off relations between Turkey, the United States and Israel. He draws attention to how dangerous the situation is. It seems as if he says, “These guys are about to cause trouble for the country, stop them.”

According to Birand, AKP Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc might well have heeded Gulen's call when he said on Friday, "The hoca points in the right direction."

In an interview with KanalTurk on Sunday, Arinc expressed that more tension with Israel should be avoided, seeming to call on the IHH and other organizations to the right to back off. Whether Gulen and Arinc's statements are made for fear of weakening ties with the United States and Israel and/or are motivated by concern that Islamist parties to the right of the AKP might get a boost out of the incident in the same way they did after Israel's incursion into Gaza at the end of 2008 is unclear (see Jan. 14, 2009 post), but the question should be on the radar of those observing the AKP's Israel policy in coming weeks.

If Turkey-Israel relations are to be normalized, and even more importantly, if the United States is to preserve good relations with Israel, efforts should be made to come to a consensus on the investigatory commission proposed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Ankara has put the commission forward as essential to its normalization of relations with Tel Aviv, and while Tel Aviv, for its part, continues to resist, it is no doubt looking to gain the approval of the Obama Administration as it moves to craft its own internal investigation. For the United States, the Turkey-Israel alliance forged in 1996 is one of the few bright spots in the Middle East, and given the amount of political ill will toward nine Turkish citizens being killed by Israeli commandos in international waters, it would make sense to do everything in its power to somehow bring Turkey and Israel into some sort of compromise.

Turkey took a powerful first step despite all the feiry -- and, at times, more than unseemly -- rhetoric coming from government officials this week insomuch as it welcomed a rather vague statement coming from the UN Security Council last week without making too much fuss (the statement, falling short of a resolution, condemned "those actions" resulting in death, without assigning responsibility).

Given the gravity of animus toward Israel inside Turkey at the moment, as well as calls from other governments around the world for an independent investigation (including the UN Human Rights Council, the resolution of which the United States voted against), it would make sense for the all parties to do everything in its power to assure a comprehensive and open investigation of both the Israeli military's actions and the activities of the IHH.

For more on Turkey-Israel relations, see past posts.


UPDATE I (6/7) -- Two interesting analyses worth drawing attention to are Hugh Pope's piece in Friday's The Guardian and Steven A. Cook's assessment of Turkey-U.S. relations in Foreign Policy. Pope urges that Turkey's rift with Israel not be looked at as a turn away from the West, but rather as the response to a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. For Pope, when one objectively looks at Turkish policy in the Middle East in recent years, the country can be seen as "explicitly imitating lessons from the EU that proved how such convergence can end cycles of conflict." Cook, examining crucial foreign policy differences between Turkey and the United States, portrays the two countries as "frenemies," concluding the two countries competing strategic powers in the Middle East. See also a very insightful, albeit tragic, analysis by Alon ben Meir thanks to Jenny White at Kamil Pasha.

UPDATE II (6/8) -- Hosting the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Istanbul, Turkey took the opportunity of the conference to condemn Israel in an attachment to the conference's final declaration. 21 of the 22 countries in attendance, all save Israel and including Russia, joined the statement, calling for an international investigatory commission to be setup and condeming Israel's use of force in international waters. Though not linking the statement to the flotilla incident, Russian President Vladmir Putin said the Blue Steam II natural gas project, linking Russian gas supplies to Israel and Turkey, might not extend to Israel due to lack of demand.

UPDATE III (6/9) -- For a decent summary of the military, economic, and energy ties between Turkey and Israel and potential ramifications of the flotilla affair, see Saban Kardas' analysis in the Eurasia Daily Monitor. Though trade with Israel constitutes only one percent of Turkey's total foreign trade, much of it food imports, Ha'aretz reports that some Israeli supermarkets are already boycotting Turkish goods.

No Room for Mistakes

As if any fuel needed to be added to the fire of either Turkey-Israel relations or the Kurdish conflict, some Turkish politicians and opinion leaders have been speculating that Israel's raid of the Mavi Marmara and the PKK's attack on the naval base in Iskenderun are linked. Occurring just hours after Israeli commandos stormed the Mavi Marmara, the attack in Iskenderun has raised new questions about links between the PKK and Israel. The speculation is not new and received much ado in Turkish public discourse a few years ago amid Turkish concerns that the Iraq War would further destabilize the security situation in the southeast.

Last week, Deputy AKP Chairman Huseyin Celik said the government did not think the two attacks were a coincidence, implying that Israel was somehow using the PKK to intimidate Turkey. CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu also linked the two events: "Various circles have concerns over this issue. Seven soldiers were killed. This is something very important. As the Israeli marines continue operations, such an attack took place in Turkey. This is very intriguing." Interior Minister Besir Atalay echoed Celik, though more cautiously, warning that "these subjects require careful and hard work, and we need to avoid careless statements lacking tangibility." However, rumors and conspiracy theories filled Islamist and nationalist newspapers. An example of this conjecturing appeared in Today's Zaman under the headline, "Suspicion gorwing about possible link between PKK and Israel." Citing the "suspicion" as "deepening," the story re-hashes old accusations that PKK militant are receiving military training from Israel. Like other stories in the Turkish press, it also cites Sey Hersh's reportage on the United States' purported efforts to use Kurdish militant groups inside Iran to undermine the Iranian regime. These groups included PJAK, which has since the United States has since recognized as a terrorist organization (see Feb. 9, 2009 post).

While I am no expert on the PKK's networks, and certainly not knowledgeable enough to categorically rule possible connections between the two groups, conspiracy that the two incidents happened in tandem should certainly be taken with a grain of salt unless hard evidence is produced. On this point, see Hurriyet Daily News columnist Sedat Ergin:

A serious result of the situation is that it could misdirect decision-makers. And if you misevaluate a threat, you make deadly mistakes as you try to retaliate. For instance, while you look at the PKK but overlook the big support and the infrastructure they have and while you see the organization as the one being used by foreign power centers only, you make deadly mistakes in the fight on terror and in the solution of Kurdish question. Now that doesn’t mean that external powers do not, or will not, use the PKK. I am only saying that if that is your assessment over the PKK, you make a mistake.

There is little room for mistakes in producing solutions to either one of these situations.


UPDATE I (6/7) -- See also Yigal Schleifer's take on this linkage at Istanbul Calling. Included in Schleifer's post is a link to a story he wrote in 2003 exploring similar alleged connections between Israel and Kurds based on Massoud Barzani's "Jewish roots."

More Trouble with Israel

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
AP Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Batsheva Simon, reporting for the LA Times, writes:

The latest episode in the ongoing drama of Israeli-Turkish relations could be a partial arms embargo, according to Turkish media, quoting Jane's Defence Weekly. Now, say reports, SIBAT -- the body that handles foreign defense assistance and export procurement and contracts for Israel's defense ministry -- will review Turkish requests for buying defense systems case by case; Turkey has expressed interest in a number of systems, including guided anti-tank weapons and heavy infantry fighting vehicles, as well as electronic-warfare systems.

This further weakens the practical part of the alliance's strategic component, which already took a number of blows when Turkey dis-invited Israel from the joint military exercise Anatolian Eagle last year and also refused to allow the Israeli air force to deploy fighter jets in Turkey or use its airspace. Now, the press reports, Israel is looking for new long-range training options.

But they're still working to save the other aspects of bilateral relations. In the eighth Israel-Turkey Bilateral Economic Dialogue on Thursday, both sides expressed their strong support to further enhance bilateral trade and economic relations and called the business communities to "engage in active cooperation."

Meanwhile, many Israelis don't quite know what to make of the up-one-day, down-the-next ties with Turkey. Outraged over repeatedly harsh words for Israel from Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, many decided to boycott Turkey -- a tough principle to stick to, as Turkish clubs and resorts are a favorite for a close, affordable indulgence. Last month, Turkey launched a $2-million campaign to bring Israeli tourists back. Many did. But some workplaces didn't want to buy packages for Passover vacations. How would it look if we sold our patriotism for $99, they asked.

And Anastassia Tal has her own embargo. The 16-year-old model from Israel turned down a job offer from a Turkish jewelry company, saying (in Hebrew) that under no circumstances would she "be the 'face' of a Turkish company so long as their prime minister lashes out at Israel and its leaders in such a unilateral, humiliating manner." Tal said she was a proud Israeli and that money wasn't everything.

For the Today's Zaman story quoting Jane's Defence weekly, click here. In other Israel news, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu once more brought the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons to the table in an address to foreign ministers of NATO countries on Thursday. Davutoglu argues that NATO should consider disarmament alongside nuclear deterrence.

The Trouble With Reality

From Hurriyet Daily News:

Turkey urged Iran on Tuesday to take steps to defuse international concerns over its nuclear program, emphasizing its willingness to mediate between Tehran and world powers.

Iran needs to show goodwill and commitment to the international community to reduce concerns over its nuclear program, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said in Tehran on Tuesday, adding that he had made some concrete proposals to the Iranians.

“We are continuing to work to stop unwanted developments that could hurt Iran, Turkey and our entire region. We are discussing new alternatives. We should work on reaching them together,” Davutoğlu told reporters at a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr Mottaki.

Davutoğlu arrived in Tehran late Monday and conducted high-level talks with Iranian officials Tuesday. He met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Secretary-General Said Jalili of the National Security Council before departing for Serbia in the late afternoon.

“There are some new concrete proposals made by us. We have conveyed our thoughts to the Iranians and I can tell you that I observed a very good atmosphere and response here,” said Davutoğlu in Tehran. The foreign minister said he would engage more and discuss Iranian responses with Western nations.

The Tehran conference Davutoglu attended is largely viewed as an attempt to counter the summit the Obama Administration organized in Washington two weeks ago. Turkey attended both summits, and again, the question is as it has been before: Does Turkey have the diplomatic clout to pull off a deal and appease both the West and Iran, and if it does not, what will failure do to its "zero problems" with neighbors policy? Turkey is in deep diplomatic waters here, risking much at a time when tensions continue to rise regardless. The trouble with reality is that sometimes it requires hard choices, and Turkey's policy toward Iran at the moment is seen by many as a test of just where the country will go in the future. I think this is more than a bit of an overstatement, but there are plenty of fixed eyes on Ankara waiting to see if Turkey can prove itself a bridge here. For a skeptical response by U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley, click here. For recent commentary on Turkey's posturing, including Turkey's position on Israel and and its nuclear program, see Yigal Schleifer's post from a few days ago.

Another Harsh Exchange of Words . . .

Leaders of Turkey and Israel exchanged more harsh words for each other after Prime Minister Erdogan said that Israel was the main threat to Middle East peace during his recent state visit to France. From Hurriyet Daily News:

“If a country uses disproportionate force in Palestine, in Gaza - uses phosphorous shells - we're not going to say 'bravo,’” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared at a breakfast meeting in Paris, referring to Israel's deadly January 2009 on the Gaza Strip. Operation Cast Lead left around 1,400 Palestinians dead and destroyed thousands of homes.

Erdoğan said Israel's justification for the offensive was based on “lies” and cited a report by U.N. investigator Richard Goldstone, a South African judge who accused both Israel and Palestinians of war crimes.

“Goldstone is a Jew and his report is clear,” the Turkish leader told reporters invited to meet him at the Paris Ritz Hotel. “It's not because we are Muslims that we take this position. Our position is humanitarian. It's Israel that is the principal threat to regional peace,” said Erdoğan speaking in Turkish, through a French interpreter.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hit back at what he said were Turkey's repeated attacks. “We are interested in good relations with Turkey and regret that Erdogan chooses time after time to attack Israel,” he said at a Jerusalem news conference held to review his first year in office.

“It is a regrettable occurrence which I don't think serves the interests of stability and improved relations in our region,” said Netanyahu, adding that he had not discussed the issue with Erdoğan.

Erdoğan’s remarks came as Israel’s firebrand foreign minister likened him to the leaders of Libya and Venezuela. On Tuesday, Ankara “vehemently condemned” remarks attributed to Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that compared Erdoğan to Muammar al-Gadhafi of Libya and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.

Israeli Web site Ynet quoted Lieberman as saying on Monday that Erdoğan is "slowly turning into Gaddafi or Hugo Chavez" and added: "It's his choice. The problem is not Turkey, the problem is Erdoğan."

On Friday, Netanyahu announced that Israel would not be attending tomorrow's conference on nuclear proliferation in Washington for fears that Turkey (and Egypt) would use the conference to raise the issue of Israel and the NPT.

In other Israel-related news, Turkey announced that it will be recalling Ambassador Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, who was involved in the now infamous chair debaucle of last January. Celikkol will be replaced with Kerim Uras.

On the domestic front, see Claire Berlinksi's recent reflections on anti-Semitism in Turkey. From Berlinski's piece in World Affairs:

Erdogan’s behavior at Davos has given his critics here a kind of grim satisfaction. But it has not caused me to revise my own opinion of the AKP. My view is that the leadership of the AKP isn’t so much radical as cynical. If appealing to Islam helps them grasp power and keep it, they are more than happy to do so, whatever the consequences. They have discovered how to use religious sentiment to get votes, and thus to get rich, without bringing the hammer of the secularist military down upon themselves. They assume they can now use anti-Semitism in just the same way.

Many of the AKP’s senior figures rose to prominence in the now-banned Refah Party, led by ousted prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Refah, and the larger Milli Görüs¸ movement associated with it, unquestionably did represent a deeply sinister strain of Islamic radicalism, giving the lie to the claim that there exists no such tradition in Turkey. Erbakan came to power promising to “rescue Turkey from the unbelievers of Europe,” wrest power from “imperialists and Zionists,” and launch a jihad to recapture Jerusalem. One of his first acts, upon taking office, was to fly to Iran and fawn over Khomeini.

In 1997, Erbakan was ousted by the army. Refah was banned. The AKP’s senior figures, including the prime minister and the president, have publicly renounced Erbakan and his ideology. But the AKP’s enemies find it frankly preposterous to imagine that the leaders of the AKP have experienced some kind of road-to-Damascus conversion (so to speak). Necdet, as I will call him, a middle-aged man in the construction business, put it to me this way: “Once an Islamist, always an Islamist. There’s no such thing as moderate Islam. You Americans don’t understand that. That was your biggest mistake, supporting the Taliban against the Soviet Union. You can’t make Muslims into your allies. It isn’t possible.”

I sympathize with this view, but suspect the truth is closer to this: Erdogan used Erbakan for as long as it was convenient—Refah was the only party that would allow a ruffian from the slums like Erdogan to get his foot in the door. When Erdogan realized that he would never attain power through Refah, he ditched it and the rhetoric associated with it. Power, not Islamic hegemony, motivates him. He is afraid of losing it now that his Potemkin economic miracle is on the verge of exposure, and if he needs to return to the gutter to keep it, well, one does what one needs to do.

The danger is that Erdogan and his intimates may be cynical, but the people to whom they are now appealing are not. They believe what he says. The AKP is conjuring up a genie it may not be able to master.

Berlinksi also reports on a visit she made to the office of Saadet Partisi.

Relatedly, worth taking a look at is Today's Zaman colmnist Dogu Ergil's recent column, which curiously examines allegations of Israeli ties to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). I have heard these murmurings from Turks before, and true or not, they will likely be played up by some anti-Semitic forces as more fodder for the masses. Tough times ahead indeed.

For more on anti-Semitism, click here.

"Ayrilik" Resurfaces (This Time in Saudi)

The 13-part Turkish television series "Separation: Palestine in Love and War"("Ayrilik") has been sold to a Saudi and an Emirati television channel. The television series ran on state television in Turkey last year, and along with the "Valley fo the Wolves" ("Kurtlar Vadisi") series, drew scorn from Israel and eventually resulted in the Ayalon affair this past January. The series documents Israeli soldiers shooting Palestinian civilians, killing a newborn baby girl and an elderly man making their way back from Mecca. The first broadcast on the Saudi channel shows tonight. Jenny White has analysis of the series at Kamil Pasha, including a glimpse of some of the violence via a link provided by Ha'aretz.

The Resolution Saga Continues, Erdogan Points to "Jewish Lobby"

Prime Minister Erdogan said today that Ankara has no plans to send Turkish Ambasador to the United States Namik Tan back to Washington until it receives a clear signal that the resolution is dead. On Friday, the Obama Administration announced that it had reached a deal with American congressional leaders that would stop the resolution in its tracks. However, for Ankara, this is apparently not enough. Upon Tan's return this week, the government continued to issue strong rhetoric, for which there is no doubt a public demand. Fighting "genocide" resolutions is one of the few things that pulls otherwise polarized Turkish politicans together. Suat Kiniklioglu, the AKP's deputy chairman for external affairs, threatened major consequences" should the resolution pass the full United States House of Representatives.

Provocatively, the prime minister pointed his finger at Washington's Israel lobby. (Hurriyet Daily News refers to the Israel lobby as the "Jewish lobby," a term the prime minister also presumably used, but which is inaccurate.) Erdogan said the attitude of Israel lobbyists had changed. While this is indeed the case, it is not accurate to say the Israel lobby "supported" the resolution; rather, they did nothing to stop it, in some cases possibly giving a greenlight to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who otherwise might have voted against the resolution (see, for example, the positon of the Anti-Defamation League and the use of the resolution by AIPAC and other organizations to pressure Turkey on its position on Iran and Gaza). From Washington-based journalist Jim Lobe in the Asia Times:

In 2007, the Foreign Affairs committee approved a similar "genocide" resolution. However, it was never referred to the floor of the house due to intense opposition by the administration of president George W Bush backed by the powerful "Israel Lobby", which has frequently intervened in congress on Turkey’s behalf since the late 1980s when Ankara and Israel began building a strategic alliance.

But Israeli-Turkish ties have become increasingly strained in recent years, particularly since Israel's "Cast Lead" military campaign in Gaza, which Erdogan strongly denounced in a heated exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in late January last year, just days after the offensive had ended.

A number of subsequent incidents, most recently the apparently deliberate televised humiliation in January by Israel's deputy foreign minister of Ankara's ambassador in Tel Aviv, have added to the strains.

Indeed, some analysts in the US and in Turkey suggested that the resolution's passage was due as much to the Israel Lobby's failure to oppose it, as to the Obama administration's delay in coming out against it. Several key lawmakers who are considered close to the Lobby, notably Gary Ackerman, Brad Sherman and committee chair Howard Berman, spoke in favor of its approval.

"In the past, the pro-Israel community has lobbied hard against previous attempts to pass similar resolutions, citing warnings from Turkish officials that it could harm the alliance not only with the United States but with Israel ...," noted the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on Friday.

"In the last year or so, however, officials of American pro-Israel groups have said that while they will not support new resolutions, they will no longer oppose them, citing Turkey's heightened rhetorical attacks on Israel and a flourishing of outright anti-Semitism the government has done little to stem," it asserted.

And, for a look at the victors of Thursday's vote, see Omer Taspinar's column in Today's Zaman. According to Taspinar, Armenian lobbyists (who want to stay in business) and Azerbaijan (which wants to see no rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia until Nagorno-Karabakh is settled) won significant points Thursday. With the protocols now dead in the water, the resolution is likely to keep coming up, and lobbyists will be there to push for and pull against it. Azerbaijan had already successfully appealed/threatened the Turkish government to tie Nagorno-Karabakh to ratification, and the deal is most certainly imperiled. I would also add Turkish ultra-nationalists and anti-American elements inside Turkey to the list of winners as both groups successfully used the resolution in appeals to their core groups. The Turkish government is claiming the resolution has greatly damaged ratification in Turkey.

For more talk in Washington, see former Ambassador to Turkey Mort Abramowitz's interview with the Center for American Progress' Middle East Progress, especially on the status of the protocols. According to Abramowitz, the Turkish government did not adequately prepare for Azeri opposition, instead hoping something would come from American and Russian efforts to settle Nagorno-Karabakh. For Abramowitz, the "real question is can the Turks move forward without doing something for the Azeris?" For my analysis of the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan triangle, which the protocols should have done more to take into account from the beginning, see Jan. 24 post.

Yet Another "Valley of the Wolves" . . .

Reuters' Simon Akam reports on a coming sequel to the very popular 2006 film, "Valley of the Wolves" (see March 17, 2008 post). The films followed the popular television series, an episode of which recently featured a Turkish child kidnapped by Israeli soldiers and sparked the Celikkol controversy last January. Both the film and the television series play on Turkish nationalist sentiments, including the destructive Sevres syndrome. From Akam:

"Valley of the Wolves: Palestine" is projected to cost over $10 million, making it one of the most expensive Turkish films.

Scheduled for a November release, the new project follows the 2006 feature "Valley of the Wolves: Iraq."

That film, which showed American soldiers running amok in northern Iraq, racked up 4.2 million ticket sales in Turkey and accusations of rampant anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.

"After Iraq, we decided that in the next Polat movie we are going to tell again an international story," said scriptwriter Bahadir Ozdener, sitting in an office lined with antique cameras in Nisantasi, an upscale Istanbul neighborhood.

The series' hero is Polat Alemdar, a gun-toting agent with a fondness for sharp tailoring and a dearth of facial expressions.

Played by Necati Sasmaz - who had never acted before - and dubbed by another actor, Polat is sometimes described as the Turkish James Bond. Millions of young Turks idolize him, imitating his mannerisms and speech.

In the new film Ozdener says his intention is "to shed light on the history, on what's really going on in Palestine."
He described the conflict as "a very good example of the imperialists' targets."

. . . . .

The Valley of the Wolves franchise - made by production company Pana Film - has enjoyed tremendous success in Turkey.

The title evokes mythological images from a story beloved by nationalists of a lone wolf that guided Turks out of a Central Asian valley where they had been trapped by enemies.
The television series, known as 'Kurtlar Vadisi' in Turkish, first aired in 2003. The initial, mafia-focused plot saw Polat Alemdar tasked to penetrate Turkish organized crime.

With a regular quota of gunfights and mayhem the series rapidly gained and maintained an enormous following. Today, Pana claims between 20 and 40 million Turks watch each week.

Then came Valley of the Wolves: Iraq, the 2006 feature film, which saw Polat Alemdar avenging in fiction the real-life events of July 2003, when American forces captured and hooded a team of Turkish Special Forces in northern Iraq.

Styled like a Hollywood blockbuster, the film prominently featured abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.

After Iraq, Pana Film began a series about Turkey's long conflict against Kurdish separatist guerrillas. But government pressure forced them to shelve Valley of the Wolves: Terror after just one episode as the subject was too sensitive.

The next series cast Polat as a secret agent defending Turkey against foreign threats.

Styled like a Hollywood blockbuster, Turkish film critic Alin Tasciyan believes Valley of the Wolves carries a very different message.

She called the 2006 Iraq film, "Anti-American in the most American way possible."

The Morning After

Newly-appointed Turkish Ambassador to the United States Namik Tan
PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Though with less of a majority than expected, the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Thursday again passed a resolution recognizing the mass deportations organized by the Ottoman Committee for Union and Progrss (CUP) as genocide. By a vote of 23-22, the non-binding resolution now waits to be moved to the House floor for a vote by the entire 435-member body, though it is unclear whether House Speaker Nancy Pelosi will do so.

For the first time since the protocols stalled, the Obama Administration has expressed its open opposition to the resolution, asking Pelosi, a long-time supporter of Armenian "genocide recognition," not to put the resolution to a House vote. The White House and Department of State's reticence in the past two months has largely been interpreted in Ankara as pressure to ratify the protocols, though the Turkish Foreign Ministry continues to maintain that it will not be pressured and that it is hopeful the resolution will not clear a full House vote. This is what happened in 2000, 2005, and 2007. Despite similarities to past efforts, as April 24 and a floor vote lingers on this particular resolution, other issues will also play a role, including Turkey's position on Iran and its relations with Israel (apparently Israel was not asked to deliver U.S. Jewish organizations this time around). Washington and Ankara are treading treacherous new ground, though the close vote, the renewed opposition from the Administration, and the continued reliance on American air force bases in Turkey make a resolution unlikely this time around. The full House has passed the resolution before -- once in 1975, and another time in 1984.

Following yesterday's vote, Ankara recalled its ambassador to Ankara, sent diplomats to Moscow to seek Russian support, and re-stated its demand that Swiss and American mediators attach a written guarantee to the protocols that the Armenian Constitutional Court's decision will not affect the operation of the rather naively conceived, and still quite vague historical commission between Armenian and Turkish historians the protocols would set up. (From the beginning, the Turks wanted the historical commission to examine the events of 1915 while the Armenians viewed the commission as a means to discuss the ex-poste facto results of what the Armenian state considers genocide. For more on this point, see past posts, including Nigar Goksel's analysis in an interview with the Institue for Policy Studies' Balkans Project.)

For polar views in the United States on the issue, see 60 Minutes' recent broadcast in which the American news magazine speaks with Armenian historians who claim the Nazis used the Armenian genocide as a blueprint for the Shoa, a claim that Yigal Schleifer correctly points out is "even harder for Ankara to swallow." The piece earned a good deal of scorn in the Turkish press and sparked a campaign by Turkish Americans. For American arguments against the resolution, based largely on geo-strategic reasons, see this statement in The Hill authored by members of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey. Defense contractors, anxious not lose business with Turkey, are also opposed to the resolution, as are a large number of military experts concerned with maintaining access to U.S. air bases in Turkey, through which 70 percent of all supplies going into Iraq currently pass. For another view, see American Turkey expert Henri Barkey's op/ed in the Washington Post in which Barkey discusses the problems with politicizing genocide.

For American diplomats, journalists, and scholars of Turkey, and I suspect, of Armenia, navigating countering, complex narratives of the events of 1915 have long been problematic. (For an example, see historian James R. Russell's response to a 2001 piece in the New York Review of Books by former Economist correspondent Christopher de Bellaigue. Bellaigue has a new book, Rebel Land: Among Turkey's Forgotten Peoples, in which he considers the narratives of 1915 as they continue to influence the politics of Turkey.) Although both Turkey and Armenia agree horrible atrocities were committed, the numbers killed, the level of organization by the Ottoman State, and the intent of the mass deportations that led to the massacre of thousands on thousands of Armenians are in dispute, and not only between Turks and Armenians, but among Turks themselves. Neither citizenry is monolithic, though competing narratives are very much entrenched in the politics of both countries, and in Armenia's case, in its construction as a nation-state. Apart from basic questions about geoolitics and the U.S.-Turkey relationship, a critical question the U.S. Congress must ask is whether a resolution labeling 1915 "genocide," notwithstanding its historical and legal validity, will help Turks and Armenians come to terms with history and move forward for the mutual benefit of Turks and Armenians. The answer here seems clear, though it seems to matter little in Washington, where nuance is too often forsaken for lobby-driven politics.


UPDATE I (3/5) -- Ambassador Tan is on his way back to Ankara. And, for another perspective, see Stephen Kinzer's op/ed in The Guardian.

UPDATE II (3/6) -- The Washington Post is quoting an anonymous U.S. official saying that the Obama Administration and House leaders have reached an agreement that Thursday's resolution will not reach the House floor, consigning it to the fate of past resolutions that cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee.