"The Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security" -- Say What?

Parliament passed a law on Wednesday creating an Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security. Hurriyet reports that "[f]unctioning under the auspices of the Interior Ministry, the new unit will produce new anti-terror policies while recruiting 94 personnel from different state institutions, including the National Intelligence Organization, or MİT, the General Staff, the gendarmerie and the police department." Apparently the institution will attempt to coordinate intelligence gather operations to provide for more effective counter-terror operations. The CHP has said it would annul the law, and some figures in opposition parties have said it will enable the AKP to set up its own "deep state."

Just where did this come from, and how does it figure into the Ergenekon investigation? Will the new Undersecretariat have much success in terms of "coordinating" intelligence over institutions with cultures and processes very much their own? What powers will it have to do so, and what cooperation is it likely to expect from MIT, the General Staff, the Jandarma, and the National Police Department? Will there be any oversight in addition to the Interior Ministry, which has a troubled history of its own under other governments? And, just how will the Undersecretariat affect Turkey's operations against PKK terrorism?

TESEV Releases 2006-2008 Security Almanac

From Hürriyet:

’Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight’ focuses on information about the security sector as a whole in Turkey and aims to accumulate information for civilian surveillance of the sector. Funded partially by the European Commission, the almanac includes an extensive scan of documents and legislation.

Tension is racking the heated political agenda in light of debates over curbing the influence of the military in politics. In a recent study the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, or TESEV, concluded that there is no improvement but a regression on the civilian control of the security sector since 2005.

Released in a panel Wednesday at Conrad Hotel, "Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight," aims to provide information about the security sector in Turkey for strengthening civil supervision over the sector. The almanac’s articles examine the relations between civilian and security institutions, as well as the security perception of civilian institutions. It also includes widespread scanning of security documents, laws, media stories and analysis.

For the complete TESEV report, click here. There is an introduction in English.

In the Eurasia Daily Monitor, Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu offers further analysis of the report.

Talking State Security After Ergenekon

From TDZ:

The current undersecretary, Emre Taner, is famed for his efforts to "get his house in order" and reform the organization.

A former senior Turkish intelligence official has warned against weaknesses in Turkey’s intelligence-gathering mechanisms, suggesting that an intelligence coordination unit should be established under the Prime Ministry.

“There has been a lack of will for ensuring coordinated intelligence gathering in Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should address this problem. Due to the absence of coordination, Turkish institutions in charge of gathering intelligence are jealous of each other. Thus, they refrain from sharing information that they have been gathering among themselves,” said Ertuğrul Güven, former deputy undersecretary of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), in an interview with Sunday’s Zaman.

Güven’s remarks come at a time when the MİT has been linked to an alleged member of the Ergenekon terror organization. Eighty-six defendants are facing trial for suspected membership in Ergenekon, a criminal network that is believed to have been plotting to overthrow the government.

Tuncay Güney, who currently resides in Canada as a rabbi, was captured by police in Turkey in 2001 on suspicions of gang membership. What he told the police at that time has helped prosecutors expose the activities of Ergenekon.

According to an MİT document published by the Sabah daily last month, Güney purposefully infiltrated Ergenekon and JİTEM, an illegal intelligence unit in the gendarmerie, to gather information for the intelligence organization.

In a press release, the MİT confirmed the authenticity of the document, but denied that Güney, a former journalist whose name has featured prominently in the Ergenekon trial, was an agent employed by the organization.

“As far as I can remember, Güney was not an MİT agent,” Güven said.

The MİT counterterrorism unit, together with the problems it had created, was taken out of the MİT organizational chart in 1997, the same press release explained. Mehmet Eymür, a former MİT official who was implicated in a number of intelligence scandals, was the head of this unit.

However, Güven declined to speak about the details of the Güney incident or Eymür.

. . . .

Güven has also warned against assigning nationwide intelligence gathering duties to the police under a plan to create a new counterterrorism unit under the Interior Ministry.

"Internal security issues cannot directly be affiliated to the Security General Directorate, otherwise there will be problems. For example, there is an organization in Germany to protect the constitution. This is directly affiliated with an undersecretary at the German Interior Ministry. Similarly, the German police are also affiliated with this undersecretary. The security directorate can have its internal intelligence gathering mechanism, but cannot have nationwide intelligence-gathering duties. There needs to be a mechanism of control over the intelligence-gathering organizations," Güven said.

For full article, click here.