The Opening Salvo?

PHOTO from Girgir
Prime Minister Erdogan and religious leader Fethullah Gulen play a game of chess. Erdogan declares, "I have taken all of your pawns," to which Gulen retorts, "My child, you will force me to take your king."

Hakan Fidan is not a name soon to be forgotten nor is the recent row between the Gulen movement and the Erdogan government. Yet the row does not center on Fidan alone, but is rather a larger struggle for control sparked by the government's increasing uneasiness with the control Gulen wields over the judiciary and police -- or, what Vatan columnist Rusen Cakir (for English, thanks to Hurriyet Daily News, click here) points to as the "axis of courts with special authorities" by which the movement has been able to use police, prosecutors, and judges to target political opponents.

This week included announcements by some AKP officials that specially-authorized courts had gone too far, and included more aggressive talk of reforming Articles 250 and 251 in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) by which these courts derive their power. Reform of these articles has been discussed for sometime, but never with as much focus. On Wednesday, Parliament Speaker Cemil Cicek called for new arrangements to regulate the power of specially-authorized courts, though noting their past utility in dealing with state terrorism, namely Ergenekon. Yet, according to Cicek, while the courts are still needed, more focus needs to be paid to how they work in practice -- the implementation of Articles 250 and 251.

And, so what does this mean? Why is it significant? And why the shift in attitude? Let's start with the last question first. As prominent Islamic liberal Yeni Safak columnist Ali Bayramoglu explains in what is a fairly polemical interview with Cakir, the Hakan Fidan affair should be read as an intervention by Gulen -- a challenge to the AKP's authority. Tensions between Erdogan and Gulen have been on the rise given the amount of bad publicity the government has received thanks to the Ergenekon investigation, in particular the arrests of journalists Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener last March. Following these arrests, Erdogan dismissed Ergenekon lead prosecutor Zekeriya Oz, who is known to be close to the movement and a mastermind of the  Ergenekon probe (see past post).

As Radikal columnist Omer Sahin writes, Erdogan was content to use the Ergenekon prosecution to purge anti-government forces from the state, namely those perched in high places in the military and in the Turkish press. Gulen and Erdogan supported each other in this push from the AKP's 2002 entry into office up to just more than a year ago. Yet, as Bayramoglu observes (see his Wednesday column), now that the government has largely defeated resistance within the Turkish Armed Forces, things have changed.

This shift is further explained, as Bayramoglu continues, by the sheer frustration of Erdogan with the blatantly adversarial nature of the investigations. In August 2010, prosecutors went after police chief Hanefi Avci, who once sympathetic to Gulen, was arrested two days prior to a scheduled press conference at which Avci was going to present evidence as to how the movement had infiltrated the judiciary. The next year he was charged with membership in Ergenekon, as were Sik and Sener following similar attempts to bring light to the nexus between the Gulen organization and the police.

The cost of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations are simply no longer worth the effort, and now that prosecutions seem to be targeting figures with whom the AKP has friendly relations (i.e. Fidan) and potentially elements in the military that are now pro-AKP, Erdogan, wary of power that is not his own, is likely to come down hard on Gulen. He will do this by curtailing the judicial and police power the Gulen movement has established for itself, and the first target will likely be weakening the axis of power to which Cakir refers.

Yet still unexplained is the sheer tenacity of the Gulen organization toward the Erdogan government in this first serious battle. It is true that the past weeks have evinced tension building between the two groups (stirs over the match-fixing scandal and the Uludere strike, by which Gulen figures also tried to smear the MIT -- see past post), but the source of this latest conflict is still unsure. Perhaps it was an attempt to test Erdogan. Or, it might have been a way to express Gulen's opposition to the state's efforts to negotiate with the PKK, which could be restarted in coming months. A combination of the two? We are probably unlikely to ever know.

What we can say, though, is that what was witnessed last week was a serious test of Erdogan's authority. As Bayramoglu tells Cakir, the Gulen movement expressed a unique determination this time around: first, it mobilized its media outlets and network to smear the MIT (my question: was Uludere an opening act?); second, even when Erdogan expressed that he would standby Fidan, prosecutor Sadrettin Sarikaya not only continued in his pursuit of Fidan, but upped the ante by issuing arrest warrants for four high-ranking intelligence officials. It was only when Erdogan suspended top brass officials in the police that Gulen seemed to back down.

But the end is likely not over. Bayramoglu conjectures that Gulen may take to the sidelines, realizing that Erdogan is not likely to allow Gulen to continue such free-wielding control of the police and judiciary, though not all are so sure. For sure, Erdogan does not want to see a shakeup before he ascends to the presidency in 2014 and passes a new constitution that he likely still hopes will bolster his power once there but at the same time it is unclear if Gulen will be so comfortable with his rise -- and, just what the exiled leader might do about it. As Cakir writes, rather fatalistically I might add, such a clash will largely be spectacle for most Turks, third parties will not matter, and as TUSIAD head Umit Boyner expressed last week, will simply observe in horror.


UPDATE I (2/25) -- Today's Zaman columnist Emre Uslu had a column on Friday which I nearly missed and in which the columnist postulates a conspiracy against the Gulen movement in which he implies the government is complicit. According to Uslu, the government has long been intent on curbing the powers of specially-authorized courts, and this latest episode rather was an operation against the Gulen movement. From Uslu:

If this insistent call for the amendment of Articles 250 and 251 of the anti-terror bill had been made in conjunction with the MİT crisis, I would believe that it had something to do with the MİT crisis. However, this call was made 10 days before the outbreak of the MİT crisis, in a report by the Sabah daily. The report said: “It is possible to associate every offense with terror charges, which could be further subjected to special investigation and trial procedures. To ensure the right to a fair trial, Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the Code on Criminal Procedure [CMK] on the workings of special courts and their procedures shall be revised.”

The insistent calls after the MİT crisis made reference to the same points. The meaning of this is obvious: The KCK investigations will be conducted more leniently, and KCK suspects will be released.

If you live in a country like Turkey; are aware that the KCK investigations will be ceased and the relevant parties to those protocols agreed to the release of KCK suspects; if you have read in a paper, known for its staunch support of the government before the outbreak of the MİT crisis, that Articles 250 and 251 will be revised; and all writers and columnists supportive of the KCK-AKP-MİT equation insistently called for the amendment of Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the CMK when the MİT crisis erupted; and if you call all of these a coincidence, you are surely naïve.

And for these reasons, I would say that the situation presented to us as an MİT crisis is in fact an operation jointly conducted by MİT, the pro-negotiation figures within the AKP and some pro-negotiation intellectuals. The prosecutor and the police department were framed in this operation; MİT planned and executed this operation. The signals from the AKP show that this operation will be completed, despite the decision by the Court of Appeals that the KCK is a terror organization. You will see that Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the CMK will be amended, the KCK suspects will be released and pro-Gülen movement bureaucrats will be removed from duty."

Sabah is a paper friendly to Prime Minister Erdogan, and according to Uslu, it is the government to blame for the excesses of the Ergenekon investigation, not the Gulen movement. Of course, this is highly unlikely given that it is the prime minister who ordered Oz's dismissal after the Sik/Sener arrest and the targeting of Avci, but the accusation is there all the same. Uslu also does a good job of further smearing the AKP by including a desire to release KCK/PKK suspects as part of the operation, thereby using the Kurdish issue to heighten tension.

While several figures, especially those in the government such as Yalcin Akdogan, have done their best to play down tensions, revelations of Uslu and others point to some sectors in the Gulen movement who are not so content to simply sit by sidelines.

Still in Hot Water

PHOTO from Hurriyet

One of the stories I overlooked last week was the Supreme Court of Appeals' rejection of a petition to hear the case of former Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug. The court ruled that it could not hear Basbug's case because he had been charged with terrorism, and that therefore the specially-authorized court responsible for his launching his prosecution had jurisdiction.

Last month's news of Basbug's arrest caught nearly everyone by surprise, and ratcheted up questions as to just how far the specially-authorized courts charged with the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations are willing to go. For background on Basbug and the controversy over whether it should be the Supreme Court or the specially-authorized court that brought the indictment, in addition to some background as to the division within the AKP thanks to pro-Gulen forces, click here.

At the same time, it appears specially-authorized prosecutors are also digging deeper into figures involved in the Feb. 28 process, the 1997 postmodern coup that brought about the demise of Erbakan's Islamist Refah-party and its governing coalition. Leading figures in the AKP have long resented the Feb. 28 process, and historical memory of the events continues to influence AKP politicians and its supporters (see Feb. 7 post).

The event is known as the Feb. 28 process since this is the date on which the National Security Council (MGK) met to begin a protracted process through the spring that ultimately resulted in the government's falling and a series of new laws and restrictions on Islamist political activity. Standards of education were changed to counter the rising popularity of imam-hatip high schools (religious high schools where students receive a mix of standard and theological curriculum), regulations on the headscarf were strengthened, the Refah party was closed, and numerous Islamist politicians, including the prime minister, banned from politics and tried in courts for offenses against the secular unity of the state.

According to Milliyet, four civilian officers working in the MGK at the time have been asked to give testimony as part of the investigation. The paper reports that the officers were working in the high ranks of the institution, and played a role in writing the various orders and memos that guided the coup.

At the same time, government officials are starting to talk about possible reform of laws allowing for specially-authorized courts and prosecutors. These developments follow the crisis with Hakan Fidan and apparent power move by elements supported by religious leader Fethullah Gulen. Yet it seems for the moment that Basbug's trial will go on despite President Gul's call for the former chief to have his case heard at the higher court. Critics of Erdogan have pointed out that the prime minister had no problem in saving Fidan from prosecution, but are willing to take no such measure to save Basbug despite the apparent cooked-up charges against him.

The specially-authorized court has accepted the 39-page indictment against Basbug in which he is charged with planning to topple the government multiple times, the last and most critical to the charges being through a plan to create numerous websites that would spread black propaganda ("psychological operations") against the government and foment the conditions for a coup. The indictment also alleges that when Basbug was Land Forces Commander he also planned to overthrow the government, but gave up when he realized he did not have the resources to carry through his plans.

Evidence in the indictment is shoddy at best, largely consisting of various accusations and innuendo, as well as circumstantial links to other figures charged with terrorism, including former Cumhuriyet columnist Mustafa Balbay. Basbug gave an interview to Balbay in 2004 on negotiations with Cyprus, but did so at the time anonymously.

Basbug has denied the charges in the indictment, saying that he did not even have a computer in his office and that if the military truly planned to overthrow the government, it had more powerful means at its disposal than websites.

Division in the Ranks

PHOTO from Radikal

Though Turkish society is pretty evenly divided between those who support the ruling AKP and those who do not, perhaps the more important divide in terms of determining the county's trajectory is within the government.

AKP officials have been careful to play down any division within party ranks, but events over the past year hint of a fissure between a faction in the party loyal to Prime Minister Erdogan and another closely aligned with Fethullah Gulen, a religious leader based in Pennsylvania who runs the Hizmet movement, a powerful network consisting of tens of thousands of followers (of those sympathetic to the movement, there are estimates well over 5 million) that has sought to exert its influence within the state and Turkish society.

Though Gulen and his supporters have stopped short of forming a political party, they have managed to gain key positions within state institutions and the ruling party.  (For a nuanced take of the movement's engagement with state institutions, including its tactics and ruminations of its overall strategy, see Berna Turam's Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement.)

Further, critical investigations into the movement's activities have not been welcome. As foreign journalist Justin Vela explored last week in Foreign Policy, allegations have long existed that the movement is behind the operations against Ergenekon, the opaque deep-state organization accused of terrorism and plots to overthrow the state. Indeed, it was the Gulen movement journalist Ahmet Şık was investigating when he was charged as a member of Ergenekon.

While Gulenists wield considerable influence in the AKP, they do not necessarily determine the direction of the party, and divisions within AKP's ranks in recent months indicate what, according to many observers, is a power struggle between the Hizmet/Gulen movement and Prime Minister Erdogan.

These include a debate last month on a law that reduced sentences for wealthy businessmen charged with fixing football matches, as well as a difference in approaching the air strikes at Uludere that killed 34 Kurdish smugglers. In the latter instance, Prime Minister Erdogan defended the military and intelligence services while Gulen-affiliated press leveled accusations that the strikes were the work of the "deep state." For an example, in Turkish, see this op-ed in Zaman criticizing the government for not noticing what the author alleges is a deep-state conspiracy.

The most recent evidence of a difference of opinion between the two parties centers on whether former Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug, who was arrested little more than a week ago, should be tried at the Constitutional Court or by the specially-authorized court that issued the warrant for his arrest. Most interestingly, President Gul, thought to be friendly to the Gulen movement, has broken ranks with it and called for Basbug to be tried at the Constitutional Court in accordance with what seems like a relatively clear dictate (Article 148) in the Turkish Constitution that chiefs of staff and force commanders are to be tried at the Supreme Court (for more on Basbug, and the rather nonsensical charges of how the former commander could overthrow the government using website, see past posts and this excellent bit of analysis by Gareth Jenkins). Prime Minister Erdogan, for his part, has said he supports Basbug's release pending trial.

Yet AKP members close to the Gulen movement disagree with both these positions. Instead, they have asserted that Basbug can be tried by the specially-authorized court because the charges against him are not related to his duties as Chief of General Staff and that the release of Basbug and other serving and retired military officials charged in connection with membership in Ergenekon would only encourage further acts of terrorism.

One of the most outspoken of these members is deputy chairman Huseyin Celik, who is known to be quite close to the Hizmet movement and before served as Minister of Education. In response to Gul, Celik reaffirmed his position that Basbug can be tried before the specially-authorized court. Gulen-affiliated Zaman ran Celik's comments last Thursday (in Turkish, click here). Other AKP members known to be close to Gulen have also taken Celik's view, including deputy chairman Mustafa Elitas, who contended that the president's views were not important, as well as Ayhan Sefer Ustun and Burhan Kuzu, who are, respectively, heads of the parliament's human rights and constitutional commissions.

 Enough is Enough?
 
At the same time parliament appears divided on the issue of Basbug, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc announced last Wednesday that elected CHP deputies Mustafa Balbay and Mehmet Haberal, who are also accused of membership in Ergenekon, should be released and take their seats in parliament. His words were followed by those of Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, who announced that the party would soon unveil judicial reform to shorten detention periods and bring about speedier trials.

Arinc and Ergin's announcement followed the release of a critical report on detention and specially-authorized courts by Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights. For the full report, click here.

As Vatan columnist Bilal Cetin reflected last week, recent developments lead to the conclusion that the winds are changing in Ankara. Has the prime minister grown further wary of international criticism pertaining to long detention times and jailed members of parliament? Is there a significant segment within the party, the prime minister included, that have themselves grown wary of the unwieldy nature of the Ergenekon investigation?  There were hints of this when Ergenekon investigator Zekeriya Oz was replaced last March following Şık and Nedim Şener's arrest (see past post). Is enough simply enough?

Now that the AKP has a firm grip on the military, Erdogan might well be less interested in purging current and former military officials who were once in opposition to the AKP's ascendancy. As Rusen Cakir writes, for all intents and purposes, the AKP now controls the military -- and, given the most recent bout of judicial reforms, perhaps the state. Rather than participating in the old status quo or joining "deep state" elements, the AKP has created its own status quo.

If, as some critics like Gareth Jenkins assert, the alliance between the Gulen movement and the AKP was a marriage of convenience, we might indeed be looking at a potential divorce, but not without more vying for power. Where President Gul and Bulent Arinc stand in all of this is still a bit of a mystery (Arinc is also thought to be quite sympathetic to Gulen, and both are rumored to be potential contenders for prime minister once Erdogan departs), but there is no doubt that the next year will be interesting for the party.

What's Going On?

Over the weekend Basbug denied charges of trying to overthrow the government, asking how he, in the time command of 700,000 troops, could or would opt to use websites to stage a military coup. Basbug assumed head of the Armed Forces in August 2008, and in February 2009, following news about the websites that appeared in Taraf, an Istanbul prosecutor launched an investigation that has led us to where we are today -- virtually clueless as to exactly what is going on, who is behind it, and why.

According to Basbug, the chief of general staff who preceded him, Yasar Buyukanit, launched many of the websites. Further, Basbug rejected accusations that he setup four new websites as evidenced by the document outlying the plan, and which Col. Dursun Cicek confirmed as authentic this past August.  Indeed, according to Basbug, he shut many of the websites down. In comparison to Buyukanit, Basbug was seen as more moderate, and in reality, behaved with greater civility toward AKP than his more hardline predecessors.

One of the questions now is whether the retired general will stand trial in front of the Istanbul court that has arrested him, or whether his case will go before the Constitutional Court.

Will the case raise alarm with American and European officials who have heralded Turkey as a model for secular democracy in the Middle East?

A Historic Arrest

PHOTO from Hurriyet

For the first time in Turkey's history, a former Chief of General Staff has been arrested. Ilker Basbug, who resigned from the post in August 2010, is charged with masterminding an attempt to overthrow the AKP government by setting up website that would spread propaganda aimed at ultimately bringing about an end to the party's almost 10-year hold on power.

Word of the potential arrest appeared earlier this week when news broke that a probe launched by an Istanbul prosecutor into the website conspiracy included Basbug. 22 other suspects, including seven generals, have been identified by the prosecutor as allegedly creating black-ops websites setup by the Turkish Armed Forces to disseminate fallacious rumors that would eventually bring about the overthrow of the government.

The website conspiracy began to surface this August when Col. Dursun Cicek confirmed the authenticity of a document outlying a plan to use the websites for propaganda purposes and said the operation was under the control of the General Staff, which was at the time of the document's production headed by Basbug. Days later Rt. Gen. Hakan Igsiz was arrested and allegedly testified that Basbug was responsible for the campaign. At the time, Islamist-oriented Yeni Akit called for Basbug's arrest.

Hurriyet columnist Ismet Berkan breaks down the history of the website conspiracy. In 2000, Bulent Ecevit called on state institutions to act against Islamist and separatist propaganda. According to Berkan, the General Staff responded to the call by setting up dozens of websites to do just this. When the AKP came to power in 2002 the websites released multiple stories highlighting the party's alleged anti-secular activities, many of which turned up in Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya's 2008 indictment to close the party. The websites made news in 2009 when Taraf ran a story about the websites that linked them to the General Staff.

It is hard to believe that the generals in question thought they could overthrow the government using websites, and as to Basbug's role in the affair, he alleges to have closed down many of the sites when he took power over the institution. Just what is going on here is still widely speculated, and should make for an interesting week ahead.

A Lot of Noise Against Coups (But Maybe Not the Right Type)

Former president and general Kenan Evren, leader of Turkey's 1980 military coup, could face trial at the age of 94. On Jan. 3, a prosecutor filed an indictment with an Ankara court alleging Evren, as well as former Air Force Commander Tahsin Sahinkaya, now 87, masterminded violent unrest later used to justify their military putsch. For more, in Turkish, click here.

PHOTO from Milliyet

The violence preceding the coup was some of the worst in Turkey's history, including a series of shootings against peaceful protestors gathered in public squares and assassinations of leftist figures, including the murder of Milliyet editor Abdi Ipekci with whose assassination the indictment against the two men alleges they are complicit. These attacks were carried out by rightist militias mainly in command of the infamous ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves, and combined with the series of detentions and military trials after the coup, decimated the Turkish left (for more, see here).

The charges against the generals are facilitated by constitutional amendments passed in the September 2010 referendum, and were some of the few amendments that enjoyed broad public support, including that of the CHP opposition. A past attempt to bring charges against Evren made by former prosecutor Sacit Kayasu resulted in the prosecutor's disbarment. There is another investigation ongoing into the use of torture during the coup years. The coup brought about the assassination of 571 people, and over 700,000 people were detained in its aftermath. Torture was rampant, prison conditions horrible, and black-listings widespread.

Ozel Regrets "Terrorist" Label

PHOTO from Milliyet

Milliyet's Fikret Bila has run an interview with Chief of General Staff Necdet Ozel in which the head of the Turkish Armed Forces says he would not like to call PKK fighters "terrorists" since they, too, are citizens of Turkey.

According to Ozel, many PKK fighters have been deceived, a fact which the top general laments at the same time he gives casualty figures of how many terrorists have been killed in the past six months. Turkish forces in Turkey's near 18-year conflict with the PKK. That number is at 165, according to Ozel, while 112 have surrendered and another 50 have been captured.

Ozel's intimation that PKK fighters should not be labeled as "terrorists" has infuriated many Turks, and nationalist-minded bloggers are clamoring to criticize Ozel as ineffective, and many not simply vis-á-vis the Kurdish question, but in regard to the treatment of army generals who have been arrested in the ongoing Ergenekon investigations.

In the interview, Ozel also dismissed reports that the PKK has adopted a truce, arguing that the opposite is in fact true and that PKK operations have continued throughout the winter. He also said unequivocally that the Turkish Armed Forces were in no way involved in the negotiations between MIT and the PKK that seem to have ended at the end of 2009 or beginning of 2010. Ozel further states that he is against recognizing Kurdish as an official language or integrating it into school education and using it to administer public services.

The general goes on to state that the United States has provided assistance from northern Iraq, though the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has done little to assist with the situation. Iraqi officials have told Ankara that there is little they can do (see an account of TRT's interview, in Turkish, with Iraq Vice President Tariq Hashimi on Oct. 30). Meanwhile Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani and KRG president Massoud Barzani, much to the likely frustration of Turkish officials, continue to dialogue with the BDP, urging the party, albeit without much visible success, toward peace.

Turkey's Madisonian Dilemma: The Constitution and Why "Neighborhood Pressure" Matters

On Monday the AKP made public its proposed package of constitutional amendments over stark protestations from opposition parties and some figures in the judicary who have issued public statements against the package. There is dissent about both the content of the amendments, as well as allegations about the AKP's intentions and the means the party is employing to push the package into law.

For several in Turkey who view the AKP as a sinister force bent on consolidating its own power and, for some people, pushing through an "Islamist" agenda, the constitutional package is nothing more but an attempt to aggrandize executive powers, shifting the separation of powers in its favor by diminishing the role of the judiciary. Yet, for others, the package is the only hope for meaningful reform, especially in regard to the judiciary, which has consistently used its authority to annul legislation and threaten political parties with closure. A majority in Turkey, in some polls well upward of 60 percent, think a new constitution is necessary, but that support does not necessarily translate into support for the proposed constitutional package, which the AKP admits is less than perfect, but the only means to reform in a political climate where drafting a new constitution is but a pipe dream. Yet, in either scenario, there is little doubt that the current momentum behind the constitutional package and the AKP's firm commitment to seeing it passed is related to the current polarization between it and the judiciary, including the possibility of yet another closure case (see Feb. 20 post). Going the route of the constititutional package means that the AKP has put itself on the track of advancing incremental reforms versus seeking a complete overhaul, which it had promised to do in 2008 before being faced with the closure case it survived by the skin of its teeth. (For a bit of background, see Feb. 5 post and March 7 post.) The party presented the constitution to opposition parties on Tuesday and Wednesday.

What's in the Package?

The most significant areas of reform include new law on the closure of political parties and a re-design of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the latter of which the European Union has consistently stated is in sore need of reform in order to shore up the independence of the judiciary. The number of judges on the Constitutional Court would be increased from 11 to 19, each judge serving a 12-year term and being ineligible for re-election therafter. The vast majority of the judges, 16, would be appointed by the president, who thanks to a constititional amendment passed in 2007, is now popularly elected. Three judges would be appointed by parliament. Some AKP supporters have pointed to this as a significant area of compromise since it is common in many systems to have constitutional judges appointed by parliament to begin with.

The majority of HSYK members would be increased to 21 and its powers reduced, a move that has establishment figures in the judiciary in a fervor. The HSYK currently consists of seven members -- five from the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State, and two from the Justice Ministry (the Minister, who heads the Council, and the undersecretary). An additional 10 provisional members would be appointed. Of the 21, four would be chosen by the president, one by the Constitutional Court, three by the Supreme Court of Appeals, one by the State Council, seven by judges and prosecutors from among judges and prosecutors of the highest rank, and three by administrative judges and prosecutors of the highest rank. The re-structuring of appointments gives more power to the president and to lower ranks of the judiciary. Also importantly, decisions by the HSYK to remove a prosecutor (as happened in the case of Erzurum prosecutor Osman Sanal) would be subject to further appeal.

In terms of making it more difficult to close political parties, another move long recommended by the European Union and the Council of Europe, political party closures would require parliamentary approval. Instead of the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals preparing an indictment to be pursued at the Constitutional Court, the Chief Prosecutor would instead be required to petition a parliamentary commission setup for the express pruposes of dealing with potential closures. All parties with a parliamentary group would be equally represented in the commission, and a 2/3 secret vote would be required before a case could be launched at the Constitutional Court. Evidence used and rejected in past closure cases could not be used again. And, in terms of political bans on politicians pursued in line with closures cases, and which are more politically destructive than party closures, any imposed ban would be reduced from five to three years and banned parliamentarians would be able to retain their seats (and, presumably, their immunity) until the end of their term. One significant lacuna here is the lack of inclusion of the Venice Criteria, which define reasons why political parties can be closed. Officials from the Venice Commission have largely welcomed the package of amendments despite the exclusion of the criteria.

One other amendment would also make radical changes to the current order of things by allowing for the trial of military officers in civilian courts. As a result of new amendments, decisions by the High Military Council could be challenged in civilian courts and the body would be theoretically subject to standards of judicial independence. The Constitutional Court annulled a law passed last summer to try military officers in civilian courts.

Other items in the package would open up political parties finances to auditing by the Court of Accounts, limit the reasons for which a citizen could be banned from international travel, protect personal data, and remove provisional Article 15, which granted immunity to individuals involved in the 1980 coup of which Turkey's current constitution is a product. The last move is largely symbolic and has broad support across political parties, though some have argued for prosecutions of who are by this time some very old generals. Also of potential significance are laws pertaining to labor, women, and children, which many critics suggest were, along with amendment of Article 15, as "sweeteners." Civil servants would be given the right to collectively bargain, though not to strike. An arbitration commission would be established to settle disputes, the decisions of which would be final. This is unlikely to gain much support from Tekel workers and others who are staunchly opposed to the neoliberalism of the AKP. Also, disciplinary decisions reached by boards of public agencies would be subject to judicial review. As to women, measures assuring positive discrimination would be introduced, though some women's groups have demanded that the operative term here should be "actual equality."

Addressing the Madisonian Dilemma

The AKP's plans to push the package through by referendum should it not be approved by an unlilely 2/3 majority of parliament raises important questions about majoritarian democracy and those whoare very much afraid that their rights are threatened by the more devout Sunni Muslim majority the AKP is thought to represent. Though the AKP constantly claims that it represents all citizens of Turkey, passing constitutional reforms that enhance executive power and diminish the role of the judiciary, however much needed, is a sensitive issue and should not be dealt with lightly. American constitutional theorist Robert Bork refers to the need to resolve the tension between values associated with what he refers to as competing moral demands for civility and toleration. Canadian political theorist Colin Farrelly expounds:

Civic liberalism takes seriously what Robert Bork (1990) calls the ‘Madisonian Dilemma’. This is the dilemma between the moral demands of the virtues of toleration and civility. Respect for toleration leads us in the direction of limited government, government that does not unjustly interfere with individual liberty. This concern for individual rights provides the normative basis for constitutionalism. This can be contrasted with the moral demands of civility, demands which leads us to majority rule and the idea of self-government. If we take only the moral dimensions of these two virtues into account, it seems that we cannot resolve the Madisonian Dilemma. For we have two contradictory prescriptions- limited government and self-government. But civic liberalism inspires a public philosophy that gives due attention to both the moral and pragmatic dimensions of these virtues. It does not seek to give an absolute priority to any of the moral demands of toleration or civility. Rather, it seeks to reconcile the diverse demands of toleration, civility and fairness. As such, civic liberalism does not see the Madisonian Dilemma as paradoxical. This apparent dilemma reinforces the case for invoking a virtue-oriented approach rather than a principle-oriented approach to government. Civic liberalism defends a virtue-oriented conception of liberal democracy that takes both sides of the Madisionian Dilemma seriously. A public philosophy that takes the complexities of the Madisionian Dilemma seriously is one that will seek to steer a middle path between judicial and legislative supremacy.

Steering such a path in Turkey is no easy task, but it is a road about which the Turkish government, judiciary, and most importantly, Turkish citizens should think hard on and debate fervently. Much of the criticism of the AKP's constitutional package centers precisely on this lack of debate, which is only compounded by the self-interests of the AKP that would be advanced by the package (for example, see this piece from "The Bosporus Straight"). The AKP's previous attempt to draft a new civilian constitutional was also subject to such criticism, though the latter argument about the AKP's self-interests could not gain near as much traction since the draft came after the party's huge electoral victories in 2007. Yet, replete with the liabilities that come with a lack of public consultation and consensus-seeking, a lack of public discourse opens the package up to serious, and some case, warranted criticism, however difficult discourse and consultation-seeking is given the recalcitrance of opposition parties, the lack of coalition building and dialogue in Turkish civil society, and the authoritarian nature of political parties and the policymaking process. At an event last night, one woman broke into near tears as she conveyed her fears, however valid they may be, that the AKP was leading Turkey down a path contrary to its "republican" and "secular" heritage. Rather than dismissing such fears as paranoid or delusional, or placing this woman in the position of being the member of an "elite" who does not want to lose power in a system that has historically benefitted members adhering to her values and ideological orientations more than devout Sunni Muslims, the AKP should take steps to allay these fears by addressing them head-on, addressing the limitations of state power and majoritarian democracy when it comes to values and lifestyles shared by a minority. Here, "neighborhood pressure" again becomes part of the discourse, and rather than dismissing the term and the validity of the phenomenon, the AKP should do everything in its power to engage citizens who fear what is perceived by many as its creeping conservatism. From my Aug. 1, 2008 post following the Constitutional Court's narrow decision not to close the AKP:

For those skeptical to affirm AKP's center-right identity, the party must move away from the intra-party authoritarianism that characterizes all of Turkey's political parties, open its eyes and ears to the complaints of liberal reformers, and renew its commitment to constitutional reform—change that seeks to expand personal liberties and redefine Turkish citizenship along lines much more agreeable to contemporary understandings of democratic pluralism.

So far, the party has done very little in this regard. For those fearful of AKP's more Islamist tendencies, the judiciary and the military, and for that matter, the state's laicist understanding of secularism, exist to protect civil liberties and freedoms (including to do such things as drink alcohol, not wear the headscarf, watch Western films, etc.). Until conservative Turkish governments can assuage fears that liberties and freedoms are not at risk, measures that reduce the power of the military or the judiciary will continue to be strongly resisted and seen by many as part of a hidden, alternative agenda. However much the AKP compares itself to center-right parties in Europe, few in Germany think the Christian Democrats are out to turn Germany into a strictly-conceived "Christian state." While the validity of perceptions that the AKP is out to do so might be open to question, this does not negate the need of the government to address the, and in doing, pursue the deliberation and dialogue necessary to resolve the Madisonian dilemma in the context of Turkish constitutional democracy.


UPDATE I (3/26) -- The Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), the Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Unions (TİSK), the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş), the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-İş), the Turkish Tradesmen and Artisans’ Confederation (TESK), Turkish Public Workers’ Labor Union (Kamu-Sen) and the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers (TZOB) have released a joint statement in which the unions said they would lend conditional support to the constitutional package, through they stressed a need for a new constitution. TUSIAD also expressed its desire for a new constitution, which some EU officials have said will prove a prerequisite for Turkish accession. TUSIAD stressed the importance of lowring the 10 percent threshold political parties must meet in order to form a parliamentary group -- a measure left out of the reform package, and which some have used as evidence that the AKP is concerned only with strengthening its own position. The fragmentation of opposition parties, many of which have not and are unlikely not to reach this threshold, has benefitted the AKP, especially in the 2002 elections that saw the party into power. The package will be presented to the parliament on Monday.

Abramowitz and Barkey on the AKP and the Future of Turkey

In an insightful piece in The Wall Street Journal, former Ambassador to Turkey and Century Foundation Senior Fellow Morton Abramowitz and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Vistiting Fellow Henri Barkey give a brief summary analysis of recent goings-on in Turkey. From the piece:

Shortly after the 2002 AKP electoral victory, elements of the Turkish military, including senior commanders, began worrying that the AKP would transform Turkey from the secular democracy inherited from Ataturk to a more religious and authoritarian state. Some, as we now know, began plotting against the new government. Their fears turned out to be correct, not because the AKP has turned Turkey into an Islamic state—it has not and is not likely to—but because it has gone very far in eliminating the military's role in Turkish political life. That is an extraordinary achievement, although it is not AKP's alone. Rather, it is the result of a profound and long-coming societal change—namely, the emergence of a conservative and pious middle class.

Shaken by the arrests, a tough response from the Turkish military cannot be ruled out. Senior judges and prosecutors remain squarely in the military's camp even if their subordinates do not, and the military may rely on the Turkish judiciary to somehow check the AKP, as it has tried to do before. Even if that succeeds, it would be a Pyrrhic victory and, in the end, be unlikely to change the course of Turkish politics' steady civilianization. The Turkish military will, of course, not lose its importance. It is a formidable force in an unstable area and Turks cherish its patriotism and its contributions to the country's security. It will retain much of its independence and remain a thorn in the side of the AKP. But its days as a kingmaker of governments are coming to an end.

The military's past attempts at interfering in political issues, ranging from the selection of the president to judicial processes, have served to undermine its own legitimacy, while helping the AKP win a second electoral victory in 2007. Still, the paralysis and distraction engendered by the court cases against the military have also taken a toll on the AKP. The party remains the most popular and powerful, but it is more vulnerable than ever, with its poll numbers dropping.

The AKP has done much to modernize and democratize Turkey—something only a pious and conservative party could have achieved. However, its increasingly combative style and its modus operandi of picking domestic fights rather than carrying out meaningful economic and political reforms have helped reduce its popularity. Its all-powerful prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has turned into an increasingly authoritarian leader, contemptuous of criticism. Mr. Erdogan's proclaimed activist foreign policy in the Middle East, especially his softness on the Iranian nuclear program and harshness on Israel, has won him domestic and occasional foreign plaudits, but it has also contributed to his sense of invincibility. Neither will his international efforts, however popular at home, compensate for rising unemployment and stalled reform efforts. A party cannot live by foreign policy alone, especially when it also sets the stage for serious overreaching and the alienation of friends and allies. Mr. Erdogan's remarkable outburst threatening to expel all "100,00 Armenians living illegally in Turkey" in retaliation for the adoption of resolutions in some countries recognizing the 1915 Armenian Genocide, is likely to call into question Turkey's sincerity in reconciling with its neighbor Armenia, and has even earned him criticism at home.

Turks will make up their own minds about how to deal with the AKP. Turkey's tragedy has been the absence of a serious opposition to challenge the AKP. The resulting vacuum has usually been filled by the military. The inability of the opposition to focus effectively on economic or judicial reforms may be a major boon to the ruling party, but it has seriously undermined Turkish democracy.

Despite Turkey's impressive strides under AKP rule and the praise it has received from the West, the U.S. and other Western countries still have to put their money where their mouths are. While a genuinely free-market party, the AKP is not a liberal party in the traditional sense—Mr. Erdogan rules his party with an iron fist. Nor does the AKP appear to have much time for the needs of those who oppose it. It has ignored the legitimate fears of pro-secular groups, especially women, and it is intent on subduing the media rather than reforming it. It has also yet to effectively tackle the major cleavages in Turkish life: It made a start on the Kurdish issue but has lost its appetite; has long ignored the need to overhaul its authoritarian constitution and unfair election practices; and has failed to make clear to the public whether it is a truly secular party, as it proclaims.

Turkey will only move forward if the AKP reshapes itself and acts on its promises to make Turkey a better-functioning democracy. That will not be easy, since politics in Turkey have been a zero-sum game this past decade. The West has praised the AKP until now, but it does Turks no favors by shying away from declaring that major changes are essential for Turkey to be a part of the EU and the wider democratic world. If the AKP doesn't hear and heed that message, it may engender precisely what Turkey's Western friends would loathe to see: The re-emergence of an authoritarian society, or even the military's political comeback.

More Detentions, More Confusion, and Plenty of Talking

AFP Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

More Ergenekon-related drama unfolded this week when 28 active and retired military personnel were detained. These detainess are reported to be linked to retired police chief Ibrahim Sahin who was charged in 2009 as an Ergenekon conspirator, though the detentions were not explicitly linked to the Ergenekon investigation. On Friday, an Istanbul court indicted 33 suspects accused of being part of the Cage Plan, including three retired admirals.

The week started with a bang when the Sunday edition of Milliyet ran an interview with Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug, wherein Basbug said Operation Sledgehammer (see Jan. 25 post) was the most serious of the various coup plans and confirmed that the military was conducting a "comprehensive and multi-dimensional" probe of Colonel Cicek, who is accused of masterminding the "Action Plan Against Reactionary Forces." Meeting with journalists on Monday, Basbug gave a highly-charged speech in which he told reporters he was in "a challenging mood" and, according to Today's Zaman, warned journalists they could face charges for reporting stories that undermine relations between superior and junior officers under Article 95 of the Military Penal Code. Star columnist Mehmet Altan responded to Monday's speech with claims that Basbug could be charged under Turkey's Penal Code for interfering with the Ergenekon investigation and influencing the judiciary. Basbug has rejected claims in the media that some military officers threatened to resign in reaction to the detentions and arrests of colleagues, and harshly criticized a recent seizure by police of a civilian truck carrying hand grenades for the military. Police seized the truck on March 10 on a tip that the truck was carrying weapons to be used in violence to be carried out in the southeastern city of Mus during Newroz, though t was later announced that the military had clarified the incident and that no investigation would be launched. Basbug also defended his relationship with President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan, saying there is nothing inappropriate in the state of civil-military relations and that future disputes would be settled within the same framework of the meeting the three held following last month's mass detentions and arrests of top officers. Baykal's remarks follow criticism from CHP leader Deniz Baykal, who has openly questioned what he refers to as the "bargaining" between the government and the military.

For a good briefing of the Ergenekon investigation (up to March 9) and some background into past military coups, see Bilgi University Professor Ilter Turan's analysis released in conjunction with the German Marshall Fund's "On Turkey" series.


UPDATE I (3/23) -- Another 10 people were arrested yesterday. From Bianet:

Accordiong to CNN Türk, Erikel is the lawyer of Lieutenants Noyan Çalıkuşu, Eren Mumcu, Önder Koç,Hasan Hüseyin Uçar, Mehmet Ali Çelebi ile Neriman Aydın, Kemal Aydın, Durmuş Ali Özoğlu, İbrahim Özcan and Hamza Demir, defendants in the second Ergenekon case. The lawyer was said to be among the ten people arrested and being interrogated on Monday.

A Moderate on the Constitutional Court?

Constitutional Court President Hasim Kilic
PHOTO from Today's Zaman

According to a story from Today's Zaman, Constitutional Court President Hasim Kilic irritated some of his fellow jurists when he made remarks at a conference on judicial reform this Wednesday. As the AKP plans to push for judicial reform, and uses the EU accession process as momentum to do so, Kilic said, "It is a big dishonor that is unacceptable in terms of judicial ethics for one to hide behind the independence of the judiciary in order to better serve one's allies, beliefs or ideology." He recognized that several parties have called for judicial the Political Parties Law and the electione Political Parties Law and the election law. (I presume here he was referring to the 10 percent thresold as well.) In terms of Ergenekon, Kilic said, "No matter who uses state power, they should know that they must account for their actions if they act in an illegal way. This power cannot be used as a tool to make society toe the line by resorting to illegal means. The officials to whom state power is entrusted to do not have the right to threaten, intimidate or scare society by using this power.”

Kilic was the only judge on the Constitutional Court not to vot in favor of sanctioning the AKP in the 2008 closure case, and has been regarded a reasoned moderate (see also Ergun Ozbudun's analysis in 2008). I seem to remember Kilic calling for political parties reform shortly after the closure case, but cannot find a citation.

On Friday, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin met with judges from Supreme Court of Appeals and Council of State to discuss judicial reform, including the AKP's plans to have the government play a greater role in appointments made to the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), long regarded a bastion of secularist power. He met with Kilic later in the day. On Wednesday, President Gul had met with Kilic, who expressed support for judicial reform, but told the president he could not advise the government on a legislative package since the Constitutional Court could well review the constitutionality of the potential reforms at some point in the future.

Prime Minister Erdogan Speaks

AP Photo in Hurriyet Daily News

In Spain this week as the arrests started, Prime Minister Erdogan returned home to shortly after hold a meeting with President Gul and Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug, after which the three released a statement reading that the current showdown with the General Staff will be resolved within the constitutional oder of Turkey and urging all parties to act responsibly. On Friday, the prime minister spoke at a meeting of provincial AKP party chairmen, warning the judiciary to respect the powers of the executive and not exceed its authority. Erdogan said, “Nobody needs to worry. Turkey is its raising standards for the rule of law en route to full accession to the European Union.”

The Prime Minister also spoke against critical newspapers and columnists, saying it was his responsibility to protect financial markets and the stability of Turkey. Hurriyet translates the Prime Minister's statements as follows:

“I want to call the bosses of these newspapers. You cannot say, ‘I cannot intervene in what the columnist writes.’ Nobody has a right to increase tension in this country. I cannot let such articles upset financial balances. You pay the salary of that columnist and tomorrow you will have no right to complain.”

He added: “Please, everyone should be aware of their limits. At that point, I need to warn.”

UPDATE I (3/2) -- As expected, Erdogan's remarks drew sharp criticism from many newspapers. Hurriyet runs a brief assessment of the reaction. The European Union has issued no public response to the remarks. Today the Prime Minister said his comments were "misunderstood."

UPDATE II (3/5) -- 47 columnists from a variety of perspectives have signed a petition expressing concern over Erdogan's remarks.

Crisis Coming . . . Here?

Gen. Ibrahim Fırtına, Gen. Ergin Saygun, Navy Cmdr. Özden Örnek, Gen. Çetin Doğan and Lt. Gen. Ayhan Taş
PHOTOS from Hurriyet Daily News

Two days off from blogging, and . . .

After an unprecedented meeting of the Turkish Armed Forces on Tuesday, all eyes are turned on the state of civil-military relations after the most recent Ergenekon developments. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) released a statement, characterizing the detentions as a "serious situation." Over 40 people were detained on Monday in the most wide-reaching Ergenekon sweep yet, and at least seven have been formally charged in connection to "Operation Sledgehammer," revealed by Taraf last month. According to Hurriyet, "Ergenekon prosecutors have now detained all top commanders from 2003 and 2004 except Hilmi Özkök, the former chief of General Staff" (for an accounting of Monday's detentions, click here.)

President Gul is said to be organizing a meeting between Prime Minister Erdogan, recently returned from Spain, and Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug. Erdogan has refrained from personally criticizing the unauthorized TSK meeting, but deputy Salih Kapusuz remarked, “Everything that happens and is said today will be brought onto the country’s agenda in the future, too." There are rumors that all top commanders could resign, though as Mehmet Ali Birand concludes, what that means is unclear.

Meanwhile, though Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya has dismissed stories that there is a closure case pending against the AKP, a closure case could well be in the making and would only further de-stabilize the situation. Coming on the heels of last week's judicial showdown, Turkey's political situation is, indisputably, remarkably tense. In Spain, Prime Minister Erdogan promised to submit constitutional amendments pertaining to judicial reform to referendum if a compromise with the CHP and MHP cannot be reached. Meanwhile, opposition parties have called for early elections, claiming such a move will help relieve tensions.


UPDATE I (2/25) -- Following a meeting this morning between President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, and Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug, the three leaders declared that recent tensions would be solved within the constitutional order of things. At the moment, that order still allows closure of the AKP should a case be filed, or any other number of scenarios.

Also, the Christian Science Monitor's Scott Peterson takes a look at the recent arrests and Tuesday's meeting, providing a good summary of the context in which all of this is happening.

UPDATE II (2/25) -- Two recent columns from two very different opinion leaders warrant a reading in that both agree that what is essentially happening is a power between two elites -- one old, established, and orthodox; the other, newly risen, eager to challenge the powers that be, and equally rigid. Mehmet Ali Birand writes that "a great mutual psychological war is being fought," drawing on Babug's earlier statement that forces opposed to the military are waging psychological war against it (Taraf, for instance).

Fellow Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mustafa Akyol writes about "polyarchy," which Akyol describes as a "system with more than one power center, and even a crude system of "checks and balances." Not to be confused with Robert Dahl's conception of democracy, this "polyarchy" is far from democratic -- a power struggle between elites with its own set of rules and logic that the public can only speculate on. Akyol's analysis does not go this far, but he does give the example of the "ascending role of the police in relation to the military." While writing that AKP is "nepotistic," "prone to authoritarianism and intolerance," and that "a Turkey totally dominated by the AKP would really not be fun - nor free and democratic," he endorses the new system over the old, declaring that "an ongoing struggle between opposing powers, is better than the previous one, which was a dominance of a single power." Akyol does not give much of a warrant for this, but its honesty is certainly striking.

UPDATE III (2/25) -- The AKP is sending two of its deputies to the parliament's disciplinary board following statements both made implying the Ergenekon case and recent arrests were about afflicting revenge. The referrals are presumably an attempt by the AKP to preempt the statements being used in the potential closure case. Should the disciplinary board expel the two deputies from parliament, the AKP would lose two MPs at a time when it is considering the risky move of bringing constitutional amendments to referendum.

UPDATE IV (2/26) -- Late on Thursday, three of those detained earlier this week were released, including top geneals Ibrahim Firtina and Ozden Ornek, former commanders of the Air Force and Navy respectively, and Ergin Saygun, former commander of the First Army. The releases were made based on their low flight risk, though prosecutors said the investigation will continue, keeping open the possibility of future arrest. Today 11 more were formally arrested and remanded into custody, including two active duty admirals and former General Cetin Dogan, who has made frequent appearances on Turkish televisionin recent weeks de-bunking the Ergenekon investigation. General Engin Alan, former head of the Specaial Forces, also appeared before the court. Meanwhile, in another sweep, 18 mostly active-duty juniors officers were detained. The total number of officers formally arrested and jailed this week was 31 out of a total of 67 detained.

Gareth Jenkins discusses the politicization of the Ergenekon investigation in a piece up on BBC Turkish (in Turkish). For Jenkins' take on the investigation, see "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation" (published last fall).

UPDATE V (3/1) -- Two more officers were formally charged on Sunday. From Reuters:

The state-run news agency Anatolian said Colonel Huseyin Ozcoban, commander of the paramilitary gendarmerie force in the city of Konya, and Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Kelleli were charged late on Sunday in an Istanbul court.

Into the Bunkers?

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

The Turkish Armed Forces and Interior Ministry's recent annulment of the secret Police-Security Cooperation Protocol (EMASYA) on February 4 has re-focused Turkish political observers on the transformative state of civil-military relations here. EMASYA allowed the military to intervene in domestic affairs without seeking approval from civilian authorities, though its exact contents remain unknown to the public. According to TESEV's 2006-2008 Security Almanac, the Protocol laid out the command structure that would follow suit during the course of such an intervention. Bianet translates the EMASYA section of TESEV's report (in Turkish, save for a short summary):

The EMASYA protocol is one of the most typical examples for perceiving the protocol and its legislations superior to the law, for applications contrary to the law and for one of the privileged devices of the military tutelage system.

The interior security doctrine restructured after 28 February was build upon the EMASYA Protocol. The Protocol consists of 27 articles regarding the Provincial Administration Law (no. 5332) article 11/D and was worked out by the General Staff Presidency and the Ministry of the Interior on 7 July 1997. In cases deemed necessary, the protocol directs the intervention of military forces in situations of incidents regarding internal public order and security.

In accordance with the EMASYA Protocol, internal security operations and regional police task forces, village guards, gendarmerie internal security units and gendarmerie units conjoin with the highest ranking Land Forces Command (KKK) unit in the region upon the consent and approval of the governor. Police special operation task forces are subordinate to EMASYA Region and Subsector Commands; provisional village guards report to the regional Gendarmerie Command which again is subordinate to the EMASYA Command. Therefore, in terms of territorial issues the gendarmerie is not connected to the Ministry of the Interior but to the military authorities in such situations.

The "Public Order and Security Centres" established in each province garrison are made dependent on the military in terms of organizing the provincial police and civil chiefs of intelligence, assessment and planning. Due to this structure, the entire information gathered by civilian units and the intelligence can be obtained by the military. Again, the military can intervene in civilian incidents without permission of the civilian superior in situations deemed necessary. Thus, interior security is in fact provided by the military since provincial civilian structures are outranked by the armed forces.

According to the Protocol, internal security operations and the regional operation command are subordinate to the highest ranking military unit of the region. This unit is connected to the KKK in a large part of the country. In the south-eastern provinces of the country the operational status is not temporary but permanent, which means that public order is under control of the military in wide parts of the country.

One of the means to expand the Gendarmerie's jurisdiction is to deprive the governors of their duty in individual incidents or issues pending for more than one year which would normally be covered by the police forces. The previously mentioned article 10(c) of the Law on Gendarmerie Operation, Duties and Authority has been issued according to article 11/D of the Provincial Administration Law which is shaped by the EMASYA Protocol. At the same time, joint operations by the gendarmerie and police forces upon the permission of the civil superior and the directive of the prosecutor become increasingly common. This situation is highly compatible with the internal security doctrine of the military authorities and is indirectly relevant to the EMASYA Protocol.

Though Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug has said that EMASYA is not necessary because much of it is stipulated in existing law, namely Article 11 of Law No. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration Code, its repeal does mean that such an intervention will not be allowed to take place unless a provincial governor asks the military to intervene. From Hürriyet:

“As you know, EMASYA originated from public order, civilian and military cooperation. As a matter of fact, article 11 of law no. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration clarifies the issue. Actually, if it was consummately read, that much discussion would not take place,” Başbuğ said.

“Yet, what is important here to us is the rule of law. It is out of the question even for the EMASYA protocol to go over the law, and it should not be inconsistent with the law, as well. Law no. 5442 is very clear: “The governor is superior to all general and local law enforcement officers.” This is irrevocable under any circumstances. Everything is under the command of the governor,” he said.

. . . .

Asked if the protocol could be annulled, Başbuğ said: “It may be annulled, this protocol is not needed, the capacity already is in the law. All in all, the law is the basis for us about EMASYA. It is impossible for the EMASYA protocol to pass over other laws. This protocol has been given excessive importance and has been misunderstood. And its confidentiality has created more trouble in the process.”

Basbug also commented on Article 9 of EMASYA, which gave the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) permission to intervene in "social incidents." According to Basbug, this is not the TSK's job, stating that a strong distinction be made between terrorism and the former, the meaning of which is still unclear, but from Basbug's words, seem to pertain to mass meetings, such as protests and marches.

Prime Minister Erdogan was the first to announce plans for the annulment of EMASYA, and President Gul followed up soon after with a statement urging the government and military to repeal the controversial protocol, which the European Commission has long listed as an impediment to Turkey's accession to the European Union (see the latest progress report). The EMASYA annulment follows revelations about the alleged Balyoz coup plans, which the TSK maintains were merely war games scenarios.

The Red Book

With EMASYA gone, questions have arisen as to whether the National Security Document (MGSB) may face similar annulment or overhaul. The MSGB is also known as the "Red Book," and critics have long characterized it as a kind of secret constitution, another secret document facilitating government intervention in internal security matters. The Human Rights Association (IHD) and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) are challenging the MSGB; their lawyer, Ozturk Turkdogan, is currently arguing the case before the Council of State. However, so far the government has refused to respond to questions from the Council of State about the contents of the MSGB, responding that the document is a "state secret." Turkdogan claims the MSGB is unconstitutional since the document was never submitted to parliament, to which the constitution stipulates the cabinet answer in regard to national security matters.

In addition to the government drafted MSGB, there are also significant concerns about the broad powers the current constitution enumerates to the Armed Forces. Though reforms in 2004 reduced the powers of the National Security Council to advisory and increased the number of civilians who sit on the Council, reformers claim the constitution still leaves broad room for the military to maneuver. The Feb. 28 process is still fresh in the minds of many of these reformers, and further reform of the constitution in this area is also critical to the accession process.

The State of Civil-Military Relations

While public support or the TSK is still high (estimated at above 80 percent), support seems to be dropping, leading some military refor advocates like Ibrahim Kalin, a policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, to argue that the military is conscious of the public demand for it to "stay in the bunkers" and taking steps to make that happen. While some Kemalist/secularist Turks see the repeal of EMASYA and the military stepping back from civilian affairs as dangerous, painting the military retreat as further empowering political parties and groups they perceive as anti-secular, chief among them the AKP, many reformers, AKP supporters and not, have long called for the military to step away from poltics, a necessary condition they see for the consolidation of Turkish democracy. The Economist ran a decent summary this week of the state of civil-military relations in Turkey, including analysis of the TSK's "blighted image" and loss of public support in the wake of the Ergenekon investigation and the Daglica affair. However, the article also notes that "for millions of secular Turks the army remains the sole guarantor of their freewheeling lifestyle." The article quotes Eric Edelman, a formers ambassador from the United States to Turkey: "One might feel better about the military’s loss of power if Turkey had a balanced political system with the possibility of alternance of government.”

At the heart of the civil-military relationship is Basbug, who is in the increasingly diffcult position of negotiating between hardliners in the TSK and demands for the military to keep out of politics. While several press organizations ocntinue to rail against Basbug, especially for his "talkative" relationship with the pro-secularist/Kemalist press, Basbug also consented to the EMASYA reform and recently expressed regret to Hürriyet that Prime Minister Erdogan's wife could not enter a military facility while wearing a headscarf. Yet, after making this statement of regret, unthinkable by a head of the TSK just a few years ago, Basbug gave a 5-hour interview with Haberturk (for a two-part series that ran this week) in which he criticized press he routinely characterizes as out to get the TSK and fomented disbelief at recent coup accusations within the Naval Forces Command. Saying the TSK's patience is limited, both with the press and those seemingly inside the military who are leaking information, he said the TSK had a slieu of secret documents he could release, intimating that the TSK taking such an action would smear its opponents. There has been plenty of speculation in the Turkish press about just what these documents might contain and who they might damage. Ihsan Dagi comments on Basbug's troubled position:

He told Hürriyet that he wished the GATA incident had not happened. Could his harsh remarks to Habertürk have come because of his ‘wish’? He may have delivered those harsh remarks to calm ‘covert groups’ within the military and avoid their criticism [?] . . . .

To me, Gen. Başbuğ can’t wait for August to remove the ‘ordeal’ of his uniform. Just like [former chiefs of general staff] generals Hilmi Özkök and Yaşar Büyükanıt did.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- The Natioanl Security Council (MGK) met on Friday, Feb. 20, and are assumed to have discussed amending the National Secuirty Document (MGSB). Some observers think the MGK might remove contests pertaining to Islamist threats. The other two main threats the MGSB identifies are extreme leftism and ethnic separatism.

Making Sense of Sledgehammer

Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug / PHOTO from AFP

On Wednesday, yet another alleged coup plot was revealed by Taraf, this one centering on alleged plans by some military officers to create a level of chaos in Turkey conducive to a military coup. Code-named "Operation Sledgehammer" (Balyoz, in Turkish), the 2003 plan centers on creating a level of national chaos conducive to facilitating a military takeover. From Hürriyet:

. . . measures included bombing two major mosques in Istanbul, an assault on a military museum by people disguised as fundamentalists and the raising of tension with Greece through the usual dogfights between the fighter planes of the two countries over the Aegean Sea. The allegations even include shooting down a Turkish plane and blaming it on Greece.

Newspapers and talk shows on TV gave almost blanket coverage to the Sledgehammer affair, with the reporting and views generally split along the familiar lines of the pro-government media and mainstream media. The former saw the latest revelations as proof of a nefarious military while mainstream news outlets focused on the General Staff’s explanation that the reports were constructed entirely on "scenario exercises." Many also questioned the timing of the revelations, which coincided with a Constitutional Court ruling on civil vs. military judicial jurisdiction.

Taraf wrote that they have over 5,000 pages of printed documents, CDs and voice recordings as proof. They delivered copies of the mentioned documents to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office after a criminal complaint was filed on the allegations by a group of intellectuals from the platform of “70 million steps against a coup,” a coalition of various political parties and nongovernmental organizations. Taraf yesterday made a call to the General Staff, which said records of such “scenarios” are destroyed after four years, and told the General Staff the paper can send the documents to them also if requested.

The Hürriyet story goes on to explain the Turkish press' reaction to the story, including its polarization as evinced by the differences between newspapers' editorial lines. Indeed, it seems everyone either believes in the coup story or thinks it total hogwash. Joost Lagendijk takes a different position, writing in a Hürriyet op/ed that what matters is not so much whether the story is true or not, but that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) did not carry it out. Assuming the story is true, Lagendijk points out the fact it went nowhere points to "a split in the TSK between, on the one hand, generals who still believe it is their task to kick out democratically elected politicians when they feel they have to do so and, on the other hand, generals who think those days are over." Lagendijk proceeds by asking,

If that is true, why do the anti-coup officers not speak out clearly in public against their plotting colleagues? Because they don’t want to harm the public perception of the military? I am convinced that, by not doing so, they harm that same image much, much more.
Peer group exposure should be one part of the new, post Sledgehammer scenario for a democratic Turkey.

While the Turkish media and politicians obsess about the validity of Sledgehammer, the real pressure should be on the military to stop playing defensive and move forward. By doing so, they have the opportunity to eschew the chaotic, often lunatic discourse, and actually move Turkey in the right direction.

Lagendijk, making another critical point in his second recommendation, suggests

a government initiative for a total overhaul of the present, totally outdated National Security Strategy, which still focuses on internal threats such as Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. The time has come for elected politicians, after having seriously considered the advice from the military, to spell out what according to them are the real dangers facing Turkey now and in the foreseeable future. That would include (possible) external threats such as al-Qaeda or a nuclear armed Iran, which should be dealt with by a modern, professional military.

If only these were the things Turkey was talking about. Sadly, they are not -- and, yes, for that, it seems the military plays a role by at least enabling the controversy over Sledgehammer to continue. If I am wrong, and the TSK is indeed still controlled by dark, sinister forces secretly plotting to blowup airliners, then Turkey is in seriously dire circumstances.

Sledgehammer comes on the heals of other alleged coup plots to be made public since the now defunct newspaper Nokta revealed Golden Maiden (Sarıkız, in Turkish) in 2007. In March 2009, the second indictment of the Ergenekon investigation revealed the details of three more coup plans in addition to the first (Moonlight, Ayışığı in Turkish; Sea Sparkle, Yakamoz in Turkish; and Glove, in Turkish Eldiven). In June 2009, Taraf reported on a plan to weaken Islamic reactionaries, allegedly drafted by Colonol Dursun Cicek in the Army's psychological warfare unit. The alleged plan targeted the AKP and the Gulen movement. This past November, Taraf reported on the Cage Operation Plan (Kafes, in Turkish), which the Naval Forces command allegedly designed to wreak havoc by targeting non-Muslim minorities.

For more on the Ergenekon investigation, which continues unabated, see this timeline from Liam Hardy at American Anatolian Viewpoint. For a critical, yet quite comprehesive view, see Gareth Jenkins' July 2009 report, "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation."


UPDATE I (1/25) -- The TSK's Chief of General Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug lambasted the accusations waved at it by Taraf, saying patience of the Armed Forces was limited. See also Today's Zaman's interview with Taraf's deputy editor-in-chief Yasemin Congar, in which she dismisses the military's claim that Sledgehammer was but a scenario taken out of context by Taraf.

UPDATE II (2/2) -- 27 of the 36 journalists laid out to be arrested in Balykoz have filed a criminal complaint.