The Opening Salvo?

PHOTO from Girgir
Prime Minister Erdogan and religious leader Fethullah Gulen play a game of chess. Erdogan declares, "I have taken all of your pawns," to which Gulen retorts, "My child, you will force me to take your king."

Hakan Fidan is not a name soon to be forgotten nor is the recent row between the Gulen movement and the Erdogan government. Yet the row does not center on Fidan alone, but is rather a larger struggle for control sparked by the government's increasing uneasiness with the control Gulen wields over the judiciary and police -- or, what Vatan columnist Rusen Cakir (for English, thanks to Hurriyet Daily News, click here) points to as the "axis of courts with special authorities" by which the movement has been able to use police, prosecutors, and judges to target political opponents.

This week included announcements by some AKP officials that specially-authorized courts had gone too far, and included more aggressive talk of reforming Articles 250 and 251 in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) by which these courts derive their power. Reform of these articles has been discussed for sometime, but never with as much focus. On Wednesday, Parliament Speaker Cemil Cicek called for new arrangements to regulate the power of specially-authorized courts, though noting their past utility in dealing with state terrorism, namely Ergenekon. Yet, according to Cicek, while the courts are still needed, more focus needs to be paid to how they work in practice -- the implementation of Articles 250 and 251.

And, so what does this mean? Why is it significant? And why the shift in attitude? Let's start with the last question first. As prominent Islamic liberal Yeni Safak columnist Ali Bayramoglu explains in what is a fairly polemical interview with Cakir, the Hakan Fidan affair should be read as an intervention by Gulen -- a challenge to the AKP's authority. Tensions between Erdogan and Gulen have been on the rise given the amount of bad publicity the government has received thanks to the Ergenekon investigation, in particular the arrests of journalists Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener last March. Following these arrests, Erdogan dismissed Ergenekon lead prosecutor Zekeriya Oz, who is known to be close to the movement and a mastermind of the  Ergenekon probe (see past post).

As Radikal columnist Omer Sahin writes, Erdogan was content to use the Ergenekon prosecution to purge anti-government forces from the state, namely those perched in high places in the military and in the Turkish press. Gulen and Erdogan supported each other in this push from the AKP's 2002 entry into office up to just more than a year ago. Yet, as Bayramoglu observes (see his Wednesday column), now that the government has largely defeated resistance within the Turkish Armed Forces, things have changed.

This shift is further explained, as Bayramoglu continues, by the sheer frustration of Erdogan with the blatantly adversarial nature of the investigations. In August 2010, prosecutors went after police chief Hanefi Avci, who once sympathetic to Gulen, was arrested two days prior to a scheduled press conference at which Avci was going to present evidence as to how the movement had infiltrated the judiciary. The next year he was charged with membership in Ergenekon, as were Sik and Sener following similar attempts to bring light to the nexus between the Gulen organization and the police.

The cost of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations are simply no longer worth the effort, and now that prosecutions seem to be targeting figures with whom the AKP has friendly relations (i.e. Fidan) and potentially elements in the military that are now pro-AKP, Erdogan, wary of power that is not his own, is likely to come down hard on Gulen. He will do this by curtailing the judicial and police power the Gulen movement has established for itself, and the first target will likely be weakening the axis of power to which Cakir refers.

Yet still unexplained is the sheer tenacity of the Gulen organization toward the Erdogan government in this first serious battle. It is true that the past weeks have evinced tension building between the two groups (stirs over the match-fixing scandal and the Uludere strike, by which Gulen figures also tried to smear the MIT -- see past post), but the source of this latest conflict is still unsure. Perhaps it was an attempt to test Erdogan. Or, it might have been a way to express Gulen's opposition to the state's efforts to negotiate with the PKK, which could be restarted in coming months. A combination of the two? We are probably unlikely to ever know.

What we can say, though, is that what was witnessed last week was a serious test of Erdogan's authority. As Bayramoglu tells Cakir, the Gulen movement expressed a unique determination this time around: first, it mobilized its media outlets and network to smear the MIT (my question: was Uludere an opening act?); second, even when Erdogan expressed that he would standby Fidan, prosecutor Sadrettin Sarikaya not only continued in his pursuit of Fidan, but upped the ante by issuing arrest warrants for four high-ranking intelligence officials. It was only when Erdogan suspended top brass officials in the police that Gulen seemed to back down.

But the end is likely not over. Bayramoglu conjectures that Gulen may take to the sidelines, realizing that Erdogan is not likely to allow Gulen to continue such free-wielding control of the police and judiciary, though not all are so sure. For sure, Erdogan does not want to see a shakeup before he ascends to the presidency in 2014 and passes a new constitution that he likely still hopes will bolster his power once there but at the same time it is unclear if Gulen will be so comfortable with his rise -- and, just what the exiled leader might do about it. As Cakir writes, rather fatalistically I might add, such a clash will largely be spectacle for most Turks, third parties will not matter, and as TUSIAD head Umit Boyner expressed last week, will simply observe in horror.


UPDATE I (2/25) -- Today's Zaman columnist Emre Uslu had a column on Friday which I nearly missed and in which the columnist postulates a conspiracy against the Gulen movement in which he implies the government is complicit. According to Uslu, the government has long been intent on curbing the powers of specially-authorized courts, and this latest episode rather was an operation against the Gulen movement. From Uslu:

If this insistent call for the amendment of Articles 250 and 251 of the anti-terror bill had been made in conjunction with the MİT crisis, I would believe that it had something to do with the MİT crisis. However, this call was made 10 days before the outbreak of the MİT crisis, in a report by the Sabah daily. The report said: “It is possible to associate every offense with terror charges, which could be further subjected to special investigation and trial procedures. To ensure the right to a fair trial, Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the Code on Criminal Procedure [CMK] on the workings of special courts and their procedures shall be revised.”

The insistent calls after the MİT crisis made reference to the same points. The meaning of this is obvious: The KCK investigations will be conducted more leniently, and KCK suspects will be released.

If you live in a country like Turkey; are aware that the KCK investigations will be ceased and the relevant parties to those protocols agreed to the release of KCK suspects; if you have read in a paper, known for its staunch support of the government before the outbreak of the MİT crisis, that Articles 250 and 251 will be revised; and all writers and columnists supportive of the KCK-AKP-MİT equation insistently called for the amendment of Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the CMK when the MİT crisis erupted; and if you call all of these a coincidence, you are surely naïve.

And for these reasons, I would say that the situation presented to us as an MİT crisis is in fact an operation jointly conducted by MİT, the pro-negotiation figures within the AKP and some pro-negotiation intellectuals. The prosecutor and the police department were framed in this operation; MİT planned and executed this operation. The signals from the AKP show that this operation will be completed, despite the decision by the Court of Appeals that the KCK is a terror organization. You will see that Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the CMK will be amended, the KCK suspects will be released and pro-Gülen movement bureaucrats will be removed from duty."

Sabah is a paper friendly to Prime Minister Erdogan, and according to Uslu, it is the government to blame for the excesses of the Ergenekon investigation, not the Gulen movement. Of course, this is highly unlikely given that it is the prime minister who ordered Oz's dismissal after the Sik/Sener arrest and the targeting of Avci, but the accusation is there all the same. Uslu also does a good job of further smearing the AKP by including a desire to release KCK/PKK suspects as part of the operation, thereby using the Kurdish issue to heighten tension.

While several figures, especially those in the government such as Yalcin Akdogan, have done their best to play down tensions, revelations of Uslu and others point to some sectors in the Gulen movement who are not so content to simply sit by sidelines.

Still in Hot Water

PHOTO from Hurriyet

One of the stories I overlooked last week was the Supreme Court of Appeals' rejection of a petition to hear the case of former Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug. The court ruled that it could not hear Basbug's case because he had been charged with terrorism, and that therefore the specially-authorized court responsible for his launching his prosecution had jurisdiction.

Last month's news of Basbug's arrest caught nearly everyone by surprise, and ratcheted up questions as to just how far the specially-authorized courts charged with the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations are willing to go. For background on Basbug and the controversy over whether it should be the Supreme Court or the specially-authorized court that brought the indictment, in addition to some background as to the division within the AKP thanks to pro-Gulen forces, click here.

At the same time, it appears specially-authorized prosecutors are also digging deeper into figures involved in the Feb. 28 process, the 1997 postmodern coup that brought about the demise of Erbakan's Islamist Refah-party and its governing coalition. Leading figures in the AKP have long resented the Feb. 28 process, and historical memory of the events continues to influence AKP politicians and its supporters (see Feb. 7 post).

The event is known as the Feb. 28 process since this is the date on which the National Security Council (MGK) met to begin a protracted process through the spring that ultimately resulted in the government's falling and a series of new laws and restrictions on Islamist political activity. Standards of education were changed to counter the rising popularity of imam-hatip high schools (religious high schools where students receive a mix of standard and theological curriculum), regulations on the headscarf were strengthened, the Refah party was closed, and numerous Islamist politicians, including the prime minister, banned from politics and tried in courts for offenses against the secular unity of the state.

According to Milliyet, four civilian officers working in the MGK at the time have been asked to give testimony as part of the investigation. The paper reports that the officers were working in the high ranks of the institution, and played a role in writing the various orders and memos that guided the coup.

At the same time, government officials are starting to talk about possible reform of laws allowing for specially-authorized courts and prosecutors. These developments follow the crisis with Hakan Fidan and apparent power move by elements supported by religious leader Fethullah Gulen. Yet it seems for the moment that Basbug's trial will go on despite President Gul's call for the former chief to have his case heard at the higher court. Critics of Erdogan have pointed out that the prime minister had no problem in saving Fidan from prosecution, but are willing to take no such measure to save Basbug despite the apparent cooked-up charges against him.

The specially-authorized court has accepted the 39-page indictment against Basbug in which he is charged with planning to topple the government multiple times, the last and most critical to the charges being through a plan to create numerous websites that would spread black propaganda ("psychological operations") against the government and foment the conditions for a coup. The indictment also alleges that when Basbug was Land Forces Commander he also planned to overthrow the government, but gave up when he realized he did not have the resources to carry through his plans.

Evidence in the indictment is shoddy at best, largely consisting of various accusations and innuendo, as well as circumstantial links to other figures charged with terrorism, including former Cumhuriyet columnist Mustafa Balbay. Basbug gave an interview to Balbay in 2004 on negotiations with Cyprus, but did so at the time anonymously.

Basbug has denied the charges in the indictment, saying that he did not even have a computer in his office and that if the military truly planned to overthrow the government, it had more powerful means at its disposal than websites.

Division in the Ranks

PHOTO from Radikal

Though Turkish society is pretty evenly divided between those who support the ruling AKP and those who do not, perhaps the more important divide in terms of determining the county's trajectory is within the government.

AKP officials have been careful to play down any division within party ranks, but events over the past year hint of a fissure between a faction in the party loyal to Prime Minister Erdogan and another closely aligned with Fethullah Gulen, a religious leader based in Pennsylvania who runs the Hizmet movement, a powerful network consisting of tens of thousands of followers (of those sympathetic to the movement, there are estimates well over 5 million) that has sought to exert its influence within the state and Turkish society.

Though Gulen and his supporters have stopped short of forming a political party, they have managed to gain key positions within state institutions and the ruling party.  (For a nuanced take of the movement's engagement with state institutions, including its tactics and ruminations of its overall strategy, see Berna Turam's Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement.)

Further, critical investigations into the movement's activities have not been welcome. As foreign journalist Justin Vela explored last week in Foreign Policy, allegations have long existed that the movement is behind the operations against Ergenekon, the opaque deep-state organization accused of terrorism and plots to overthrow the state. Indeed, it was the Gulen movement journalist Ahmet Şık was investigating when he was charged as a member of Ergenekon.

While Gulenists wield considerable influence in the AKP, they do not necessarily determine the direction of the party, and divisions within AKP's ranks in recent months indicate what, according to many observers, is a power struggle between the Hizmet/Gulen movement and Prime Minister Erdogan.

These include a debate last month on a law that reduced sentences for wealthy businessmen charged with fixing football matches, as well as a difference in approaching the air strikes at Uludere that killed 34 Kurdish smugglers. In the latter instance, Prime Minister Erdogan defended the military and intelligence services while Gulen-affiliated press leveled accusations that the strikes were the work of the "deep state." For an example, in Turkish, see this op-ed in Zaman criticizing the government for not noticing what the author alleges is a deep-state conspiracy.

The most recent evidence of a difference of opinion between the two parties centers on whether former Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug, who was arrested little more than a week ago, should be tried at the Constitutional Court or by the specially-authorized court that issued the warrant for his arrest. Most interestingly, President Gul, thought to be friendly to the Gulen movement, has broken ranks with it and called for Basbug to be tried at the Constitutional Court in accordance with what seems like a relatively clear dictate (Article 148) in the Turkish Constitution that chiefs of staff and force commanders are to be tried at the Supreme Court (for more on Basbug, and the rather nonsensical charges of how the former commander could overthrow the government using website, see past posts and this excellent bit of analysis by Gareth Jenkins). Prime Minister Erdogan, for his part, has said he supports Basbug's release pending trial.

Yet AKP members close to the Gulen movement disagree with both these positions. Instead, they have asserted that Basbug can be tried by the specially-authorized court because the charges against him are not related to his duties as Chief of General Staff and that the release of Basbug and other serving and retired military officials charged in connection with membership in Ergenekon would only encourage further acts of terrorism.

One of the most outspoken of these members is deputy chairman Huseyin Celik, who is known to be quite close to the Hizmet movement and before served as Minister of Education. In response to Gul, Celik reaffirmed his position that Basbug can be tried before the specially-authorized court. Gulen-affiliated Zaman ran Celik's comments last Thursday (in Turkish, click here). Other AKP members known to be close to Gulen have also taken Celik's view, including deputy chairman Mustafa Elitas, who contended that the president's views were not important, as well as Ayhan Sefer Ustun and Burhan Kuzu, who are, respectively, heads of the parliament's human rights and constitutional commissions.

 Enough is Enough?
 
At the same time parliament appears divided on the issue of Basbug, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc announced last Wednesday that elected CHP deputies Mustafa Balbay and Mehmet Haberal, who are also accused of membership in Ergenekon, should be released and take their seats in parliament. His words were followed by those of Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, who announced that the party would soon unveil judicial reform to shorten detention periods and bring about speedier trials.

Arinc and Ergin's announcement followed the release of a critical report on detention and specially-authorized courts by Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights. For the full report, click here.

As Vatan columnist Bilal Cetin reflected last week, recent developments lead to the conclusion that the winds are changing in Ankara. Has the prime minister grown further wary of international criticism pertaining to long detention times and jailed members of parliament? Is there a significant segment within the party, the prime minister included, that have themselves grown wary of the unwieldy nature of the Ergenekon investigation?  There were hints of this when Ergenekon investigator Zekeriya Oz was replaced last March following Şık and Nedim Şener's arrest (see past post). Is enough simply enough?

Now that the AKP has a firm grip on the military, Erdogan might well be less interested in purging current and former military officials who were once in opposition to the AKP's ascendancy. As Rusen Cakir writes, for all intents and purposes, the AKP now controls the military -- and, given the most recent bout of judicial reforms, perhaps the state. Rather than participating in the old status quo or joining "deep state" elements, the AKP has created its own status quo.

If, as some critics like Gareth Jenkins assert, the alliance between the Gulen movement and the AKP was a marriage of convenience, we might indeed be looking at a potential divorce, but not without more vying for power. Where President Gul and Bulent Arinc stand in all of this is still a bit of a mystery (Arinc is also thought to be quite sympathetic to Gulen, and both are rumored to be potential contenders for prime minister once Erdogan departs), but there is no doubt that the next year will be interesting for the party.

Ozel Regrets "Terrorist" Label

PHOTO from Milliyet

Milliyet's Fikret Bila has run an interview with Chief of General Staff Necdet Ozel in which the head of the Turkish Armed Forces says he would not like to call PKK fighters "terrorists" since they, too, are citizens of Turkey.

According to Ozel, many PKK fighters have been deceived, a fact which the top general laments at the same time he gives casualty figures of how many terrorists have been killed in the past six months. Turkish forces in Turkey's near 18-year conflict with the PKK. That number is at 165, according to Ozel, while 112 have surrendered and another 50 have been captured.

Ozel's intimation that PKK fighters should not be labeled as "terrorists" has infuriated many Turks, and nationalist-minded bloggers are clamoring to criticize Ozel as ineffective, and many not simply vis-á-vis the Kurdish question, but in regard to the treatment of army generals who have been arrested in the ongoing Ergenekon investigations.

In the interview, Ozel also dismissed reports that the PKK has adopted a truce, arguing that the opposite is in fact true and that PKK operations have continued throughout the winter. He also said unequivocally that the Turkish Armed Forces were in no way involved in the negotiations between MIT and the PKK that seem to have ended at the end of 2009 or beginning of 2010. Ozel further states that he is against recognizing Kurdish as an official language or integrating it into school education and using it to administer public services.

The general goes on to state that the United States has provided assistance from northern Iraq, though the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has done little to assist with the situation. Iraqi officials have told Ankara that there is little they can do (see an account of TRT's interview, in Turkish, with Iraq Vice President Tariq Hashimi on Oct. 30). Meanwhile Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani and KRG president Massoud Barzani, much to the likely frustration of Turkish officials, continue to dialogue with the BDP, urging the party, albeit without much visible success, toward peace.

New Security Measures?

At a security summit called by President Gul in response to the attacks over the weekend, government and military officials announced that "short and medium-term solutions," in contrast to "daily and temporary solutions," would be found in order to address perceived intelligence failures.

A statement after the meeting announced that military and intelligence personnel in the southeast will be restructured and that greater effots will be made to attain inteligence from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the United States. Importantly, sweeping security measures associated with a declaration of a state of emergency (OHAL) in the southeast were not brought up, and firmly rejected by Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug, who did not attend the summit, but addressed the violence and the military response in a speech delivered in Canakkale.

Prime Minister Erdogan, Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul and Interior Minister Besir Atalay, as well as senior military commanders and the head of the intelligence agency, participated in the meeting. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The threefold anti-terror strategy announced Monday will see Turkey review current operations, intensify cooperation with neighboring countries and work to boost the nation’s morale while psychologically weakening terrorist groups.

The government’s announcement, however, was not met with full support from opposition parties, which called such “daily and temporary measures” insufficient to stop the bloodshed.

“The fight against terror was widely assessed and in light of recent developments, additional short- and mid-term measures were decided to be taken,” read a written statement issued following a security summit chaired Monday by President Abdullah Gül with the participation of top civil and military officials, including the heads of the intelligence service and the newly established civilian anti-terror unit.

Twelve troops died over the weekend in clashes with the PKK, largely as a result of the outlawed group’s assault on a military outpost in the Şemdinli district of Hakkari province. Forty-six Turkish troops have been killed in the last two months, prompting renewed concerns about the threat the PKK poses to the country.

Participants in the summit agreed to review the intelligence-gathering operations and structure of the military personnel serving in the country’s Southeast, where the PKK is very active. This decision was seen as an acknowledgement that security officials are aware of the lack of information on the moves of terrorist groups, though the military and the National Intelligence Organization, or MİT, have denied allegations of the existence of such gaps.

The military has also been criticized for sending new recruits to a region where the fight against the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, requires more expertise. Military experts suggested deploying only the best troops to the region and strengthening the military outposts in the area

The second part of the new strategy calls for intensifying coordination with neighboring countries and others related to the fight against the PKK, a change that is likely to bring more talks with Iraq and especially Massoud Barzani, the head of the Regional Kurdish Administration in northern Iraq. During his landmark visit to Turkey in early June, Barzani was given strong evidence and information on the PKK’s moves in his region. Though some progress has been observed, Turkish diplomats said they are still far from satisfied with Barzani’s support for anti-terrorism efforts.

The subject is also expected to be part of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s likely meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama during the G-20 summit in Toronto on June 26 and 27. “The joint fight against terror will be on our agenda if this meeting is set,” a diplomat told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review on Monday.

Before relations soured following Israel’s attack on a Gazi-bound aid flotilla, Turkey received crucial support from Israel in its fight against the PKK and the Turkish military still uses Israeli-made drones to provide intelligence about the terrorist group.

The third part of the strategy calls for a solid psychological “war” to keep up the nation’s morale without giving courage to the terrorists through press headlines. “The media should be more sensitive in informing the public opinion,” the statement issued Monday said.

According to government sources, the meeting Monday will be followed by others to review the state of the fight against the PKK, and will be accompanied by meetings with opposition parties to try and secure the entire country’s support.

Among those critical of the military response is AKP parliament speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin, who said over the weekend that the parliament had a responsibility to exercise review over the military and that he was waiting for an adequate explanation of what happened at Hakkari.

After the summit, Gul also met with opposition leaders. CHP leader Kemal Kilicaroglu repeated his calls for economic solutions to the conflict, again eschewing any discussion of Kurdish demands on the cultural/minority rights front, while MHP leader Devlet Bahceli used the attacks to call for total annihilation for the PKK.

Leaving the Past Behind: Re-setting Greek-Turkish Relations?

AFP Photo from The Guardian

Before Prime Minister Erdogan's arrival in Greece on Friday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called the prime minister's visit a "revolution" in Turkish-Greek relations. No doubt eager to use the visit as a means to demonstrate its "zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy, the Turkish government hyped the visit for weeks before with talk of disarming the Aegean and ensuring a new era of cooperation in which tension between the two neighbors would become a thing of the past.

Last month, Turkey and Greece signed five "confidence-building measures," including one that assured regular joint parliamentary meetings between them, the first of which resulted in 21 bilateral cooperation agreements signed Friday.

Coupled with Turkey's EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis' call in March for both countries to reduce arms procurements, Erdogan's visit and April's confidence-building measures do indeed signal a will by some politicians in both countries for mutual cooperation between the two countries, but the fundamental problem of territorial disputes and continued aerial confrontations between the two countries' air forces, as well as different approaches to reconciliating Cyprus, will continue. For further explanation of these, see Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mehmet Ali Birand's column in which Birand excerpts snippets from an interview he conducted with Greek Prime Minister Georges Paprendreou.

In Athens, Erdogan reiterated Bagis' earlier call for arms reduction, as well as proposed that both countries file flight plans with NATO and with each other in effort to avoid dogfights over disputed airspace over the Aegean wherein Greek planes continue to fly with full payload, another issue Erdogan broached.

However, such moves seem difficult in Greece, where some Greek nationalist politicians have warned that Greece should not be duped into falling victim to what are sometimes characterized as Turkish tricks just because Greece's economy is in dire straights (in fair part, due to military spending efforts to keep up with Turkey -- see April 27 post).

It is also not clear whether there is such will on the Turkish side. On the morning of Erdogan's visit, the Turkish miitary flew six F-16s into disputed air space, resulting in mock dog fights with the Greek pilots. Bagis had told Greek television before the meeting that the continued dog fights were also a problem for the Turkish government, hinting that the military and the government are not necessarily on the same page.

The cooperation agreements signed pertained to areas ranging from immigration to tourism to technology and trade. One of the more important deals brokered pertains to Turkey's facilitation of the return of illegal immigrants who have re-located from Turkey to Greece, an issue that has long annoyed Greece. All in all, 10 Turkish cabinet ministers travelled with Erdogan to Athens to participate in the joint meeting, haled as a "high-level cooperation council."

Also along for the ride were an approximate 100 Turkish business people, key to Ankara and Athens stated goal of expanding bilateral trade and investment opportunities, likely to be the hardest immediate concrete result of the meeting.


UPDATE I (5/22) -- Greece has rejected Erdogan's proposal that Greek planes fly without payload when on patrol in the Aegean. Greek deputy Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas told Greek newspaper Imerissia, "Greek warplanes are armed because they are scrambled to face an unknown threat, because the Turkish side does not file flight plans to enter the Athens Flight Information Region."

"The Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security" -- Say What?

Parliament passed a law on Wednesday creating an Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security. Hurriyet reports that "[f]unctioning under the auspices of the Interior Ministry, the new unit will produce new anti-terror policies while recruiting 94 personnel from different state institutions, including the National Intelligence Organization, or MİT, the General Staff, the gendarmerie and the police department." Apparently the institution will attempt to coordinate intelligence gather operations to provide for more effective counter-terror operations. The CHP has said it would annul the law, and some figures in opposition parties have said it will enable the AKP to set up its own "deep state."

Just where did this come from, and how does it figure into the Ergenekon investigation? Will the new Undersecretariat have much success in terms of "coordinating" intelligence over institutions with cultures and processes very much their own? What powers will it have to do so, and what cooperation is it likely to expect from MIT, the General Staff, the Jandarma, and the National Police Department? Will there be any oversight in addition to the Interior Ministry, which has a troubled history of its own under other governments? And, just how will the Undersecretariat affect Turkey's operations against PKK terrorism?

Into the Bunkers?

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

The Turkish Armed Forces and Interior Ministry's recent annulment of the secret Police-Security Cooperation Protocol (EMASYA) on February 4 has re-focused Turkish political observers on the transformative state of civil-military relations here. EMASYA allowed the military to intervene in domestic affairs without seeking approval from civilian authorities, though its exact contents remain unknown to the public. According to TESEV's 2006-2008 Security Almanac, the Protocol laid out the command structure that would follow suit during the course of such an intervention. Bianet translates the EMASYA section of TESEV's report (in Turkish, save for a short summary):

The EMASYA protocol is one of the most typical examples for perceiving the protocol and its legislations superior to the law, for applications contrary to the law and for one of the privileged devices of the military tutelage system.

The interior security doctrine restructured after 28 February was build upon the EMASYA Protocol. The Protocol consists of 27 articles regarding the Provincial Administration Law (no. 5332) article 11/D and was worked out by the General Staff Presidency and the Ministry of the Interior on 7 July 1997. In cases deemed necessary, the protocol directs the intervention of military forces in situations of incidents regarding internal public order and security.

In accordance with the EMASYA Protocol, internal security operations and regional police task forces, village guards, gendarmerie internal security units and gendarmerie units conjoin with the highest ranking Land Forces Command (KKK) unit in the region upon the consent and approval of the governor. Police special operation task forces are subordinate to EMASYA Region and Subsector Commands; provisional village guards report to the regional Gendarmerie Command which again is subordinate to the EMASYA Command. Therefore, in terms of territorial issues the gendarmerie is not connected to the Ministry of the Interior but to the military authorities in such situations.

The "Public Order and Security Centres" established in each province garrison are made dependent on the military in terms of organizing the provincial police and civil chiefs of intelligence, assessment and planning. Due to this structure, the entire information gathered by civilian units and the intelligence can be obtained by the military. Again, the military can intervene in civilian incidents without permission of the civilian superior in situations deemed necessary. Thus, interior security is in fact provided by the military since provincial civilian structures are outranked by the armed forces.

According to the Protocol, internal security operations and the regional operation command are subordinate to the highest ranking military unit of the region. This unit is connected to the KKK in a large part of the country. In the south-eastern provinces of the country the operational status is not temporary but permanent, which means that public order is under control of the military in wide parts of the country.

One of the means to expand the Gendarmerie's jurisdiction is to deprive the governors of their duty in individual incidents or issues pending for more than one year which would normally be covered by the police forces. The previously mentioned article 10(c) of the Law on Gendarmerie Operation, Duties and Authority has been issued according to article 11/D of the Provincial Administration Law which is shaped by the EMASYA Protocol. At the same time, joint operations by the gendarmerie and police forces upon the permission of the civil superior and the directive of the prosecutor become increasingly common. This situation is highly compatible with the internal security doctrine of the military authorities and is indirectly relevant to the EMASYA Protocol.

Though Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug has said that EMASYA is not necessary because much of it is stipulated in existing law, namely Article 11 of Law No. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration Code, its repeal does mean that such an intervention will not be allowed to take place unless a provincial governor asks the military to intervene. From Hürriyet:

“As you know, EMASYA originated from public order, civilian and military cooperation. As a matter of fact, article 11 of law no. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration clarifies the issue. Actually, if it was consummately read, that much discussion would not take place,” Başbuğ said.

“Yet, what is important here to us is the rule of law. It is out of the question even for the EMASYA protocol to go over the law, and it should not be inconsistent with the law, as well. Law no. 5442 is very clear: “The governor is superior to all general and local law enforcement officers.” This is irrevocable under any circumstances. Everything is under the command of the governor,” he said.

. . . .

Asked if the protocol could be annulled, Başbuğ said: “It may be annulled, this protocol is not needed, the capacity already is in the law. All in all, the law is the basis for us about EMASYA. It is impossible for the EMASYA protocol to pass over other laws. This protocol has been given excessive importance and has been misunderstood. And its confidentiality has created more trouble in the process.”

Basbug also commented on Article 9 of EMASYA, which gave the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) permission to intervene in "social incidents." According to Basbug, this is not the TSK's job, stating that a strong distinction be made between terrorism and the former, the meaning of which is still unclear, but from Basbug's words, seem to pertain to mass meetings, such as protests and marches.

Prime Minister Erdogan was the first to announce plans for the annulment of EMASYA, and President Gul followed up soon after with a statement urging the government and military to repeal the controversial protocol, which the European Commission has long listed as an impediment to Turkey's accession to the European Union (see the latest progress report). The EMASYA annulment follows revelations about the alleged Balyoz coup plans, which the TSK maintains were merely war games scenarios.

The Red Book

With EMASYA gone, questions have arisen as to whether the National Security Document (MGSB) may face similar annulment or overhaul. The MSGB is also known as the "Red Book," and critics have long characterized it as a kind of secret constitution, another secret document facilitating government intervention in internal security matters. The Human Rights Association (IHD) and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) are challenging the MSGB; their lawyer, Ozturk Turkdogan, is currently arguing the case before the Council of State. However, so far the government has refused to respond to questions from the Council of State about the contents of the MSGB, responding that the document is a "state secret." Turkdogan claims the MSGB is unconstitutional since the document was never submitted to parliament, to which the constitution stipulates the cabinet answer in regard to national security matters.

In addition to the government drafted MSGB, there are also significant concerns about the broad powers the current constitution enumerates to the Armed Forces. Though reforms in 2004 reduced the powers of the National Security Council to advisory and increased the number of civilians who sit on the Council, reformers claim the constitution still leaves broad room for the military to maneuver. The Feb. 28 process is still fresh in the minds of many of these reformers, and further reform of the constitution in this area is also critical to the accession process.

The State of Civil-Military Relations

While public support or the TSK is still high (estimated at above 80 percent), support seems to be dropping, leading some military refor advocates like Ibrahim Kalin, a policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, to argue that the military is conscious of the public demand for it to "stay in the bunkers" and taking steps to make that happen. While some Kemalist/secularist Turks see the repeal of EMASYA and the military stepping back from civilian affairs as dangerous, painting the military retreat as further empowering political parties and groups they perceive as anti-secular, chief among them the AKP, many reformers, AKP supporters and not, have long called for the military to step away from poltics, a necessary condition they see for the consolidation of Turkish democracy. The Economist ran a decent summary this week of the state of civil-military relations in Turkey, including analysis of the TSK's "blighted image" and loss of public support in the wake of the Ergenekon investigation and the Daglica affair. However, the article also notes that "for millions of secular Turks the army remains the sole guarantor of their freewheeling lifestyle." The article quotes Eric Edelman, a formers ambassador from the United States to Turkey: "One might feel better about the military’s loss of power if Turkey had a balanced political system with the possibility of alternance of government.”

At the heart of the civil-military relationship is Basbug, who is in the increasingly diffcult position of negotiating between hardliners in the TSK and demands for the military to keep out of politics. While several press organizations ocntinue to rail against Basbug, especially for his "talkative" relationship with the pro-secularist/Kemalist press, Basbug also consented to the EMASYA reform and recently expressed regret to Hürriyet that Prime Minister Erdogan's wife could not enter a military facility while wearing a headscarf. Yet, after making this statement of regret, unthinkable by a head of the TSK just a few years ago, Basbug gave a 5-hour interview with Haberturk (for a two-part series that ran this week) in which he criticized press he routinely characterizes as out to get the TSK and fomented disbelief at recent coup accusations within the Naval Forces Command. Saying the TSK's patience is limited, both with the press and those seemingly inside the military who are leaking information, he said the TSK had a slieu of secret documents he could release, intimating that the TSK taking such an action would smear its opponents. There has been plenty of speculation in the Turkish press about just what these documents might contain and who they might damage. Ihsan Dagi comments on Basbug's troubled position:

He told Hürriyet that he wished the GATA incident had not happened. Could his harsh remarks to Habertürk have come because of his ‘wish’? He may have delivered those harsh remarks to calm ‘covert groups’ within the military and avoid their criticism [?] . . . .

To me, Gen. Başbuğ can’t wait for August to remove the ‘ordeal’ of his uniform. Just like [former chiefs of general staff] generals Hilmi Özkök and Yaşar Büyükanıt did.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- The Natioanl Security Council (MGK) met on Friday, Feb. 20, and are assumed to have discussed amending the National Secuirty Document (MGSB). Some observers think the MGK might remove contests pertaining to Islamist threats. The other two main threats the MGSB identifies are extreme leftism and ethnic separatism.

Making Sense of Sledgehammer

Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug / PHOTO from AFP

On Wednesday, yet another alleged coup plot was revealed by Taraf, this one centering on alleged plans by some military officers to create a level of chaos in Turkey conducive to a military coup. Code-named "Operation Sledgehammer" (Balyoz, in Turkish), the 2003 plan centers on creating a level of national chaos conducive to facilitating a military takeover. From Hürriyet:

. . . measures included bombing two major mosques in Istanbul, an assault on a military museum by people disguised as fundamentalists and the raising of tension with Greece through the usual dogfights between the fighter planes of the two countries over the Aegean Sea. The allegations even include shooting down a Turkish plane and blaming it on Greece.

Newspapers and talk shows on TV gave almost blanket coverage to the Sledgehammer affair, with the reporting and views generally split along the familiar lines of the pro-government media and mainstream media. The former saw the latest revelations as proof of a nefarious military while mainstream news outlets focused on the General Staff’s explanation that the reports were constructed entirely on "scenario exercises." Many also questioned the timing of the revelations, which coincided with a Constitutional Court ruling on civil vs. military judicial jurisdiction.

Taraf wrote that they have over 5,000 pages of printed documents, CDs and voice recordings as proof. They delivered copies of the mentioned documents to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office after a criminal complaint was filed on the allegations by a group of intellectuals from the platform of “70 million steps against a coup,” a coalition of various political parties and nongovernmental organizations. Taraf yesterday made a call to the General Staff, which said records of such “scenarios” are destroyed after four years, and told the General Staff the paper can send the documents to them also if requested.

The Hürriyet story goes on to explain the Turkish press' reaction to the story, including its polarization as evinced by the differences between newspapers' editorial lines. Indeed, it seems everyone either believes in the coup story or thinks it total hogwash. Joost Lagendijk takes a different position, writing in a Hürriyet op/ed that what matters is not so much whether the story is true or not, but that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) did not carry it out. Assuming the story is true, Lagendijk points out the fact it went nowhere points to "a split in the TSK between, on the one hand, generals who still believe it is their task to kick out democratically elected politicians when they feel they have to do so and, on the other hand, generals who think those days are over." Lagendijk proceeds by asking,

If that is true, why do the anti-coup officers not speak out clearly in public against their plotting colleagues? Because they don’t want to harm the public perception of the military? I am convinced that, by not doing so, they harm that same image much, much more.
Peer group exposure should be one part of the new, post Sledgehammer scenario for a democratic Turkey.

While the Turkish media and politicians obsess about the validity of Sledgehammer, the real pressure should be on the military to stop playing defensive and move forward. By doing so, they have the opportunity to eschew the chaotic, often lunatic discourse, and actually move Turkey in the right direction.

Lagendijk, making another critical point in his second recommendation, suggests

a government initiative for a total overhaul of the present, totally outdated National Security Strategy, which still focuses on internal threats such as Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. The time has come for elected politicians, after having seriously considered the advice from the military, to spell out what according to them are the real dangers facing Turkey now and in the foreseeable future. That would include (possible) external threats such as al-Qaeda or a nuclear armed Iran, which should be dealt with by a modern, professional military.

If only these were the things Turkey was talking about. Sadly, they are not -- and, yes, for that, it seems the military plays a role by at least enabling the controversy over Sledgehammer to continue. If I am wrong, and the TSK is indeed still controlled by dark, sinister forces secretly plotting to blowup airliners, then Turkey is in seriously dire circumstances.

Sledgehammer comes on the heals of other alleged coup plots to be made public since the now defunct newspaper Nokta revealed Golden Maiden (Sarıkız, in Turkish) in 2007. In March 2009, the second indictment of the Ergenekon investigation revealed the details of three more coup plans in addition to the first (Moonlight, Ayışığı in Turkish; Sea Sparkle, Yakamoz in Turkish; and Glove, in Turkish Eldiven). In June 2009, Taraf reported on a plan to weaken Islamic reactionaries, allegedly drafted by Colonol Dursun Cicek in the Army's psychological warfare unit. The alleged plan targeted the AKP and the Gulen movement. This past November, Taraf reported on the Cage Operation Plan (Kafes, in Turkish), which the Naval Forces command allegedly designed to wreak havoc by targeting non-Muslim minorities.

For more on the Ergenekon investigation, which continues unabated, see this timeline from Liam Hardy at American Anatolian Viewpoint. For a critical, yet quite comprehesive view, see Gareth Jenkins' July 2009 report, "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation."


UPDATE I (1/25) -- The TSK's Chief of General Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug lambasted the accusations waved at it by Taraf, saying patience of the Armed Forces was limited. See also Today's Zaman's interview with Taraf's deputy editor-in-chief Yasemin Congar, in which she dismisses the military's claim that Sledgehammer was but a scenario taken out of context by Taraf.

UPDATE II (2/2) -- 27 of the 36 journalists laid out to be arrested in Balykoz have filed a criminal complaint.

Court Says No to Civilian Courts

The other big story in civil-military relations last week occurred Thursday when the Constitutional Court struck down an amendment to the Constitution allowing military officers to be tried in civilian courts for crimes involving threats to national security, constitutional violations, the organization of armed groups, and attempts to topple the government in peace time. The Court ruled the amendment to the Code on Criminal Procedure infringed on Article 145 of the Constitution. As Hürriyet reports, the law leaves cases involving military officers prosecuted in the Ergenekon investigation and various coup plans in legally murky waters. The AKP passed the reform in June, after which the CHP applied to the Court for its annulment.

As part of Turkey's accession process, the European Union has long reiterated Turkey try military officers in civilian courts for civilian crimes. The AKP is set to announce its plans to pass amendments to the constitution next month.

Ergenekon Heightens Divisions in Turkish Society

In a press conference yesterday, Gen. Metin Gürak accused prosecutors of violating the constitutionally enshrined principle of the presumption of innocence. Gürak's comments are a reflection of heightened criticism of the Ergenekon investigation emanating from the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) following this latest tenth wave of arrests (see a summary from Bianet, Jan. 12). This most recent criticism comes in response to accusations made by police informer Tuncay Güney on television yesterday against Ret. Gen. İsmail Hakkı Karadayı. President Gül warned that putting pressure on the judiciary while the Ergenekon investigation is underway will undermine the investigation and further polarize Turkish politics. However, it is clear that the judiciary, the military, politicians, and the Turkish press are already very polarized, creating tremendous doubt as to whether objectivity -- by the judiciary, or any other sector of Turkish society -- is in fact possible.

Recent analysis by Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu considers divisions within the TSK as to the proper position the TSK should take in regard to the Ergenekon investigation, cleavages between Asianists and Europhiles, pro and anti-coup forces. Sarııbrahımoğlu assesses the TSK's reluctance to denounce Ergenekon and some recent infighting as a possible function of NATO involvement in TSK affairs. The TSK is far from a monolithic entity, and throughout recent years, chiefs of staff have taken different positions toward international affairs and intervention in domestic politics.

See also Emrullah Uslu's analysis of different actors in the Turkish judiciary. The Ankara and Istanbul Bar Associations, as well as the Judges and Prosecutors Union and some sitting judges have expressed criticism of the investigation, while others have refrained from comment. These divisions manifest themselves on the Supreme Court of Appeals. The arrest of the Court's former prosecutor, Sabih Kanadoglu, has increased tensions in the judiciary.

Adding to the drama of the last wave of arrests is the apprehension of Ret. Brig. Gen. Levent Ersöz, who just narrowly escaped to Russia last July before police could apprehend him. Ersöz is thought to have worked directly underneath Ret. Maj. Gen. Veli Küçük, and to have been the leader of the clandestine (and illegal) JITEM gendarmerie intelligence unit. Ersöz and JITEM are likely responsible for mass atrocities committed against Kurds, including the forced disappearances of HADEP politicians Ebubekir Deniz and Serdar Danış in 2001, Turkey's failure to open an investigation into which resulted in an ECHR ruling against it and an order that €170,000 be paid in damages.

In other news, more weapons caches were also discovered near Ankara and İstanbul.

More Ergenekon Arrests

Detentions of 10 military officers in conjunction with the Ergenekon investigation resulted in Gen. İlker Başbuğ, Chief of Turkey's General Staff, calling a meeting Wednesday that included the heads of each branch of Turkey's armed services. After the meeting, Başbuğ met with Prime Minister Erdoğan. The officers were arrested with 20 other individuals amidst doubt that the investigation into "deep state" forces -- long hidden away from public scrutiny -- would go much further. From Emrullah Uslu at EDM:

It appears that the TSK was expecting the operation. The Ankara Central Command reportedly told the security units of the military compounds where active and retired generals live not to allow police and prosecutors to enter the compounds, even with a search warrant, without the command's permission (Taraf, January 9).

As usual, the Ergenekon investigation has once again divided Turkish intellectuals into two camps. On the one hand, Kemalists and neo-nationalist intellectuals argue that it is politically motivated. They maintain that it is no coincidence that the government opposition is the target of the investigation. Some of the pro-Ergenekon intellectuals went so far as to call the arrests of such well-known people “state terror” (Hurriyet, January 8). Chairman of the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) Deniz Baykal harshly criticized the investigation, claiming that it was an attempt to change the Turkish state regime. Baykal even saw parallels to the developments during the preparatory stages of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Aksam, January 8).

On the other hand, some intellectuals say that the Ergenekon investigation is a well-organized investigation and a golden opportunity to punish those who plot against the civilian government (Sabah, Yeni Safak, January 9).

The police reportedly have video tapes of meetings where military plots against the AKP government were discussed (Taraf, December 19). Although these reports need confirmation; it is no secret that Tuncer Kilinc was the first person to advocate that Turkey leave the U.S. and EU camp and form a new pact with Russia and Iran (see EDM, December 2). The Ergenekon network believes that a military coup is the only way to control the government (Sabah January 9).

The recent arrests took place at a time when people had started asking whether the prosecutors could really go any deeper. The recent wave of arrests has shown just how serious the prosecutors are about investigating the Ergenekon network. The wave of arrests has triggered deep concern within the TSK leadership. After the long meeting with other commanders, it appears that Basbug wants to intervene in the due process of the Ergenekon investigation and trial. It will not be the first time that he has actively taken the side of Ergenekon suspects. The day of his appointment as Chief of the General Staff he sent a general to visit retired Generals Hursit Tolon and Sener Eruygur at the prison where they were being held awaiting trial.

The investigation known into Ergenekon is impenetrable for even the most expert in Turkish politics, and media coverage and information released by the government and police is heavily influenced by partisan politics. Both the New York Times and the Financial Times ran brief stories on the recent arrests. For a feel as to just how entangled the politics of Ergenekon are in terms of the government's relationship with the military, read this analysis by Bill Clark, a professor at King's College. The controversies surrounding Dağlica and Aktütün are both documented in this blog, as is the evolving relationship between AKP and the General Staff since the closure case.

Also, perhaps useful, though of course not free from bias, is a recent account by TDZ documenting the investigation from its beginnings last January.



UPDATE 1/10 -- A weapons cache was found in the home of İbrahim Şahin, a former head of the National Police Department’s Special Operations Unit and one of the total of 36 arrested on Wednesday. From TDZ:

The operation started when Şahin, whose phone conversations had been tapped by police for at least two months, recently gave the order to finalize plans to assassinate Armenian community members in the city of Sivas. Twelve others were detained in Sivas during Wednesday’s operation. Police also found evidence that the group was plotting to kill prominent figures including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Former Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt, Police Department Intelligence Unit Chief Ramazan Akyürek, journalist Fehmi Koru, author Orhan Pamuk and some politicians, including members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP).

The fields brought to mind a large number of depots of NATO arms found buried during an investigation launched by Italian prosecutor Felice Casson, who discovered the existence of Operation Gladio, a NATO stay-behind paramilitary force left over from the Cold War. In a panel discussion he participated in in İstanbul last April, Casson said these weapons were found buried in cemeteries, under churches and even in caves. Ergenekon is also thought to be a remnant from the original Turkish Gladio, which was founded against a possible Soviet invasion during the Cold War, but later turned into an organization trying to cut off Turkey's ties with the West. The retired generals arrested in the Ergenekon investigation seem to have an anti-European Union and anti-NATO stance favoring a closer relationship between Turkey and Russia and Eurasian nations.

The article further speculates that the uncovered cache might be linked to violence in the Gölbaşı district of Ankara following the infamous Susurluk incident, the most significant happening since the 1980 coup to raise serious question about the existence of Turkey's deep state.

Also, see Gareth Jenkins' quote in the Guardian yesterday:

Gareth Jenkins, an Istanbul-based expert on Turkish security affairs, said: "The army will have issued a stern warning to the government to back off and that this has to be the last of such arrests. Most of those arrested on Wednesday were not involved in the Ergenekon plot.

"It was just a political move, and has destroyed any hope that the probe will find the real culprits. The question is what happens next. What we are going to see is a power struggle between two fundamentally undemocratic forces using their influence in the judicial system."