Israeli Intelligence Charges Erdogan with Anti-Semitism

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan /
PHOTO by Alessandra Benededeti/Corbis

An intellegence report authored by the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Center for Political Research levels accusations that Prime Minister Erdogan is an anti-Semite, has turned a blind eye to rising anti-Semitism in Turkey despite evidence of its rising fervor, and often uses anti-Semitic remarks in his populist politics. The report alleges that despite Erdogan's public condemnations of anti-Semitism, the prime minister "incites and encourages" anti-Semitism by making low-brow remarks designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator of Turkish political society. From Hürriyet:

A government official said Tuesday the seven-page report accuses Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of inflaming Turkish public opinion against Israel with his repeated allegations that Israel committed war crimes during its Gaza offensive last winter, according to a report by The Associated Press. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the report is confidential.

He said the report also acknowledged Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon seriously offended Turkey's ambassador when he summoned the diplomat to protest a Turkish TV show that portrayed Israeli intelligence agents as cruel. Still, it said that the incident made clear that Turkey "reached the outer limits of the Israeli government's patience."

The report came as Turkey stated Tuesday that it would pursue its determination against anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia and discrimination with its belief in mutual understanding, tolerance, freedom, security and democracy.

. . . .

In Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Ayalon, both of Yisrael Beiteinu, are the leaders of the government's aggressive anti-Turkey faction, while Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Industry Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, both of Labor, head the conciliatory, pro-Turkey faction.

The report was written by the Center for Political Research, which performs the ministry's in-house intelligence analysis, and has already been distributed to Israeli embassies and consulates abroad. It was submitted to the key seven cabinet ministers a few days ago, Israel’s Haaretz reported.

Regarding Ayalon's humiliation of Ambassador Oğuz Çelikkol, the report said that while this seriously offended the Turks for many years to come, “at the same time, the manner in which senior Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, ended the crisis may indicate that Turkey recognizes that it entered the red-line zone and [reached] the outer limits of the Israeli government's patience, and that this was liable to lead to it losing Israel, which would damage Turkey's international legitimacy."

But most of the report focuses on the Turkish prime minister, who it considers the main source of the current friction. “In our estimate, ever since his party took power, Erdoğan has conducted an ongoing process of ... fashioning a negative view of Israel in Turkish public opinion,” via endless talk of Palestinian suffering, repeatedly accusing Israel of war crimes and even “anti-Semitic expressions and incitement,” it said.

Though in international forums Erdoğan always stresses that anti-Semitism is “a crime against humanity," the report continued, in reality, he “indirectly incites and encourages” anti-Semitism in Turkey. "For Erdoğan and some of those around him," it explained, "there is no distinction between 'Israeli' and 'Jewish,' and therefore, [their] anti-Israel fervor and criticism became anti-Jewish."

One result, according to the report, is articles in the Turkish press questioning whether Turkish Jews are loyal to their country – something that could endanger Turkey's Jewish community.

In some cases, it added, Erdoğan simply does not understand the anti-Semitic nature of his remarks – such as "Jews are good with money," which "he sees as a compliment."

While charges of anti-Semitism levelled by Israeli leaders against those critical of Israel are quite common, some of those made by the report have also been echoed in the Turkish liberal press and among intellectuals. While accusing Erdogan of anti-Semitism is quite bold, it does seem that the prime minister has a bizarre understanding of Judaism and Israel. Yigal Schleifer gives one illuminating example from last January when Erdogan alluded to an obscure Jewish saxophonist and anti-Semite named Gilad Atzmon. For more on the AKP response to the wave of anti-Semitism that struck Turkey following Israeli war crimes in Gaza, see Emrullah Uslu's analysis from last January. Also see post-Gaza post from last February, in addition to my post on some Washington neoconservatives' targeting of Turkey and some of the pieces of the puzzle its exponents conveniently leave out.


CLARIFICATION (1/27) -- The analysis from Emrullah Uslu that I linked here contains a factual error. Uslu cites Article 312 as a speech law in Turkey's penal code that has traditionally been used to punish hate speech. While this was the case prior to April 2005, in September 2004 Turkey adopted a new penal code. This penal code basically replaced Article 312 (offense and incitement to religious or racial hatred) with Article 216 (inciting hatred or hostility). I had missed this, and thanks to Bulent for pointing it out.

In the Wake of Davos

My inbox filled up quickly this past weekend after Prime Minister Erdoğan walked out of the World Economic Forum in Davos on Friday. Although insistent in his desire to normalize relations with Israel damaged by previous remarks (see Jan. 22 post), Erdoğan lambasted Israeli President Shimon Peres in a panel discussion on Gaza.



David Ignatius of the Washington Post moderated the panel, which also included UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Arab League Secretary-General and Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr-Moussa. After Erdoğan condemned Israel's indiscriminate targeting of civilians in Gaza and its illegal use of white phosphorus gas in populated areas, Peres angrily responded that Turkey would do the same if Istanbul was faced with rocket fire. In retort to Peres' raised voice and finger-pointing, Erdoğan asked Ignatius for time to respond. Regretfully, Ignatius denied the request, giving Erdoğan only a minute to respond to Peres' scolding. A visibly frustrated Erdoğan ignored Ignatius, who rather thoughtlessly responded that it was time "to get people to dinner," patting Erdoğan's shoulder for a while in a move that some read as disrespecting. Talking over Ignatius, Erdoğan proceeded to excoriate Peres, prefacing his remarks with the Sixth Commandment and Peres' "guilty conscience." Throwing up his hands, the Prime Minister then indignately remarked that Peres had been given 25 minutes to speak while he had been granted only 12. (Ignatius had, in fact, given Peres more time, but by five minutes.) Erdoğan -- the crowd, including Obama advisor Valerie Jarrett, now stupefied -- declared himself done with Davos, soon after walking abruptly off the stage. Shortly after, Erdoğan's wife, Emine, reinforced her husband's sentiments, dramatically standing before reporters in tears to denounce everything Peres said as a lie. The whole panel discussion can be viewed on the YouTube link above. To skip ahead to Erdoğan's fiery, yet surprisingly crisp retort, go to 1:01 on the video.

Ecstatic crowds made for a hero's welcome when Erdoğan arrived in Istanbul later that night. (Click here for video footage from the BBC.) Talking before thousands of people, Erdoğan struck a nationalist tone, calling his response a matter of honor for Turkey and her people, but also urged that the future of Turkey-Israel relations should not be determined in anger. Turkish television and newspapers cheered the Prime Minister throughout the weekend, his actions viewed as demonstrable of an independent foreign policy. Even those who have been commitedly in opposition to Erdoğan and the AKP lauded his response at Davos, largely a function of Turkey's national pride and sense of itself being under siege. CHP opposition leader Deniz Baykal praised Erdoğan at Davos, forecasting that AKP is likely to win with a majority of the vote. Self-identified "secularist" friends have sent emails extolling Erdoğan, and Davos makes it highly unlikely that AKP will lose votes to the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the conservative Felicity Party (SP), the latter of which received an injection of popularity during the war in Gaza (see January 14 post).

The future of Turkey-Israel relations is yet to be determined. Taken in light of Peres' raised voice and finger-pointing, it would have been politically disastrous for the Prime Minister not to respond strongly. Wisely, after the meeting, both leaders qualified their exchange: Erdoğan said his choler was directed mainly toward Ignatius and the uneven format of the debate, while Peres apologized for raising his voice, explaining he had raised it because he was told it was difficult to hear in the auditorium. And, though the conservative Israeli press has pounded Erdoğan in the past few days, the reaction could have been much worse. Israeli Foreign Minister and Kadima's candidate for PM in upcoming Israeli elections did argue that Erdoğan should show more respect for the important strategic partnership that premises Turkey-Israel relations, but criticism has for the most part been tempered.

Also to be seen is how Erdoğan's remarks will impact Turkey's ambition to mediate between Israel and Syria, not to mention Hamas, and just what Turkish diplomacy in Gaza means for its position in the Middle East. Ironically, now a hero in the eyes of many Arabs, Erdoğan has placed Turkey in a potentially precarious position. While popularity in the Arab World should be welcome, the authoritarian leaders of Arab States are unlikely to sit by and watch Erdoğan's popularity grow lest it further undermine the legitimacy of their own regimes. And, even more problematic is that Turkey's diplomatic capital is now largely dependent on Hamas. Should Hamas leaders provoke Israel and/or act in any way particularly unbecoming to international norms, Turkey's support of Hamas -- as it is being read in the Arab World -- will need to be re-evaluated. In such an event, it is highly unlikely that Turkey would stand by Hamas, as doing so would devastate relations with Israel and the United States, raise important questions in Europe (which has been laudatory of Turkey's engagement with Hamas), and further discomfit Arab leaders (whose skill in maintaining the status quo should not be underestimated). If Hamas acts foolishly and loses the support of the international community it has garnered thanks to Israel's disproportionate response, Turkey will be placed in an untenable situation, and surely this reality is not lost on Hamas leaders.

Another problem in the wake might manifest itself come expected efforts by the Armenian diaspora in the United States to renew efforts to pass a resolution in the United States Congress recognizing as genocide the 1915 massacres of Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire. The powerful Jewish lobby has historically come to the assistance of Turkey to counter such pushes.

Peripherally, it will be interesting to see how Erdoğan's indignation will effect Turkey's policy toward the Kurds and its hosting figures like Omar al-Bashir, hypocrisies involving which have been pointed out by foreign and domestic press alike. It will also be interesting to see if ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo's announcement that he is exploring ways to prosecute IDF commanders guilty of war crimes commited in Gaza will bolster support for the ICC.

Anti-Semitism

As before, there is concern that Erdoğan's remarks at Davos will fuel anti-Semitism, though the Prime Minister has repeated that Jews and Israelis should not be confused with the Israeli state. Before Friday prayers, Mustafa Çağırcı, head cleric of Istanbul's mosques, reportedly urged all imams to refrain from any comments that might be interpreted as anti-Semitic. Despite Erdoğan's repeated rejection of anti-Semitism, Yigal Schleifer is understandably troubled by the Prime Minister's mention of anti-Semitic performer Gilad Atzmon, asking the question of just where Erdoğan picked up Atzmon's name and whether it is reflective of who is advising him on Middle East policy. While Erdoğan also cited the work of Avi Schlaim, dropping the name of the less than savory figure of Atzmon understandably disconcerts Schleifer. Bemoaning evidence of a flurry of anti-Semitism, Schleifer explores the "online conversion" of Ignatius, who was falsely reported to be Jewish by the secular-leaning Hürriyet. Turkey is rife with what Schleifer calls "citizen propaganda," and correct in drawing attention to the proliferation of virulent anti-Semitism in discourse as of late.


UPDATE 2/3 -- The Jerusalem Post is reporting that the Israeli Defense Ministry's Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Organization (SIBAT) is re-evaluating several recently submitted arms requests made by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The paper cites an anonymous official in the Defense Ministry: Turkey is eyeing moderate Arab countries and is hoping to strengthen its ties with them . . . . Just like we don't sell advanced military platforms to Jordan and Egypt, we may decide not to sell to Turkey." According to the Post,

In December, subsidiaries of IAI and Elbit Systems signed a $140 million deal to supply the Turkish Air Force with targeting pods. Israeli Military Industries (IMI) recently completed a $700m. deal signed several years ago with Turkey to upgrade the country's fleet of aging Patton-series M60 tanks. IAI also recently supplied Turkey with its advanced long-range Heron unmanned aerial vehicle.

Sources in defense industries expressed hope that the crisis with Ankara would pass and would not have a negative impact on sales to Turkey.

UPDATE 2/4 -- Evidence of discomfited Arab leaders thanks to EDM's Emrullah Uslu:

Foreign ministers of nine Arab countries-Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Egypt, Palestine, Yemen, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates-met in Abu Dhabi as part of a growing Arab process of consultation and increasing Arab solidarity. A statement issued after the meeting noted, "We are working to overcome this difficult time in the Arab world and ensure that unwelcome, non-Arab parties do not become involved in our affairs in an unconstructive manner" (www.khaleejtimes.com, www.haberturk.com, February 3). The Turkish press maintains that this "unwelcome, non-Arab party" is Turkey and that Arab leaders are not happy about Erdogan's response to the Gaza crisis (www.haberturk.com, February 4).

For full article, click here. On Jan. 15, Uslu wrote that Erdoğan is positioning himself as a new Nasser, and as noted above, a Turkish Nasser is not a prospect likely to be passively accepted by Arab leaders.

Also, I wrote above that Israeli press coverage has been much less incendiary than it could be. While I still think this is for the most part true, Yigal Schleifer writes today of some pretty shoddy coverage that made its way into Ha'aretz. The paper recently reported that vandals burned down a synagogue in Bursa, an event that simply did not happen, but which Ha'aretz did not correct.

After the War

Prime Minister Erdoğan has gained popularity throughout the Muslim world for his renunciation of Israel's invasion of Gaza, but what will the future hold for Turkey-Israel relations and Turkey's aspirations to become a key player in the region? PHOTO from Le Monde

Last Saturday's ceasefire brought an end to one of the worst humanitarian tragedies of this century. Many eyes were on Turkey throughout three horrific weeks of Israeli operations, and with Operation Cast Lead brought to a close, questions remain as to just how Gaza will affect Turkish foreign policy in the region. Throughout the conflict, Turkey conducted fast-pace shuttle diplomacy between Damascus, where prominent Hamas leaders are stationed, and Cairo, where Egypt attempted to use its diplomatic clout in order to attain a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas. At dispute were Israel's continued chokehold of the Gaza Strip and the steady supply of munitions that make their way to Hamas through Egypt. Throughout the three-week ordeal, Turkey used its newly acquired UN Security Council position to argue for an immediate ceasefire, journeyed to Arab capitals throughout the Middle East, and offered forces to act as peacekeepers to patrol the Refah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Turkey, which hopes to bolster its diplomatic clout by proving itself capable of successfully mediating Mideast conflict, not only has plans to facilitate negotiations between Hamas and Israel, but also Hamas and Fatah. All the while, Turkey has kept relations with Tel Aviv home, and though the Turkey-Israel relationship is no doubt more complicated after the war, it is unlikely that relations between the two countries will be permanently affected.

Although some have accused Turkey of hypocrisy or held its diplomacy to be confused, its balancing act is a function of its ambition to be an important player in the region. Since these larger regional aspirations are premised on good relations with Israel, the Arab World, and even Iran, the appearance of any emotionally-clad violent conflict lands Turkey on difficult terrain. Therefore, Turkey has an interest in eschewing conflict, making Turkish diplomacy a valuable force for peace in the Middle East. Additionally, as aforementioned, conflict -- although to be avoided -- provides fertile opportunity to prove its diplomatic credentials as evinced by Turkey's recent attempt to broker a Syrian-Israeli peace accord. With neo-Ottoman ambitions to restore to the MENA region the relative peace it once knew under the Ottomans, Turkey hopes its soft power will become a defining force in the region. In attempt to resolve the lonf-standing dispute between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights, four low-level talks were held last year (see Gareth Jenkins, EDM, April 29), although plans for more were halted with the crisis in Gaza. The real question now is just where Gaza leaves Turkey's chips. Within what limits -- and with what caveats -- can Turkish diplomats act, and just what exactly can they acheive within these boundaries?

While Gaza bolstered Prime Minister Erdoğan's popularity in the Arab world (see Emrullah Uslu, EDM, Jan. 15), at question is just what Turkey will do to mend relations with Israel. Turkish rhetoric, especially from Prime Minister Erdoğan, has been especially vitriolic. Other less than cordial diplomatic exchanges included the denial of Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's request to visit Ankara, and Erdoğan and snub of Israel during the Prime Minister's tour through the Middle East just after Israeli operations began. Erdoğan refused to meet with Israeli officials until a ceasefire had been acheived, decrying the Israeli incursion as an affront to all humanity, characterizing it as ruthless and savage, losing no opportunity to denounce Israel's illegal use of white phosphorus gas, DIME explosives, and indiscrimnate strikes on women and children, particularly those taking refuge in UN schools and other supposed "safe" facilities. In one set of remarks, Erdoğan pointedly declared that God will punish those who kill innocents. At no point during Turkey's intensive efforts did any Turkish officials make any attempt to reach out to Israel. Returning the cold shoulder, Amos Gilad, Ha'aretz reports that the head of the Israeli Defense Ministry's Diplomatic-Security Bureau, refused to meet with President Gül this weekend, citing Erdoğan's rhetoric as the reason.

Government action is not the only problem. Each day the conflict continued, the crescendoing scale of Israel's attacks drew larger and larger protests across Turkey. The size and anger of the protests increased pressure for the government -- already pushing the envelope with Israel and the U.S. -- to cut off diplomatic relations with Israel in their entirety. Apart from demonstrations, protests included boycotts, e.g. the Turkish Consumer Association's boycott of Israeli goods. Some Israelis, in turn, have called for boycotts on Turkish goods and services, including Turkish hotels. And, just as the Turkish press has been quite critical of Israel, Israeli press have lost few opportunities to launch shots at Turkey. However, observers should also appreciate that despite over 1,300 violent deaths in Gaza and the massive international outcry that ensued, Erdoğan nor any other government official used the word "genocide" to describe Israel's actions, which was not the case in other countries across the region. Turkish reaction to bloodshed in Gaza was indeed so intense that protests united Kurds and Turks in Diyarbakir, where demonstrations drew together over 50,0000 people.

However, despite recent tensions, it is unlikely that much will fundamentally change between Turkey and Israel. On Friday, just one day before the ceasefire, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan re-affirmed his dedication to keep channels of communication open, expressing hopes that Turkey might play a constructive role in a permanent end to hostilities. Israel is simply too valuable to Turkey, too instrumental to its larger foreign policy objectives to cast aside. However, the real issue is just how Turkey's damaged relations with Israel will affect its ability to mediate in the region, and to this end, Turkey is faced with the same double-edged sword that has confronted past mediators.

President Gül met with other leaders in Sharm el-Sheikh on Sunday to discuss the ceasefire, and still unclear is just what role might Turkey play to make the current ceasefire sustainable? Hamas had agreed to a Turkish troop presence because of its "respect to Turkey as an Islamic nation." Hamas' assent occurred reluctantly, and with likely pressure from Egypt. The news was enthusiastically welcomed by the Turkish press, and public enthusiasm is quite high for such participation. However, details of such an arrangement have yet to be worked out. This did not stop chief foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu from claiming credit for the ceasefire shortly after it was concluded. If Davutoğlu is correct in his prideful evaluation of Turkish influence, then Turkey's diplomatic hopes to promote peace in the region should not be dismissed.

Playing Both Sides

Despite expressed intentions to normalize relations with Israel, Erdoğan did not seem to have second thoughts about characterizing Western countries' treatment of Gaza as hypocritical, saying in Brussels on Sunday that the U.S. and EU were much more quicker to intervene to stop ethnic cleansing in Georgia this summer than they were to stop the mass atrocities we have seen in Gaza. More provocative, though, were statements undermining Mahmoud Abbas' leadership. Couched in a call that Western powers and Fatah recognize Hamas as the legitimately elected representative of the Palestinian people, Erdoğan insinuated that failure to recognize and negotiate with Hamas is a contradiction of democratic principles. The Brussels comments won praise in Tehran. Earlier this month, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, praised Turkey's efforts to mediate a truce with Hamas as constructive, but it is not clear what position the EU will take on Turkey's expressed intent to become an arbiter between the Palestinians. However, the EU has invited Turkey to take part in its own efforts to make Saturday's ceasefire holds.

Although Iran and Syria have called on all Muslim countries to break relations with Israel (Qatar and Mauritania have done so), Turkey has different designs. As aforementioned, Turkey needs good relations with Israel in order to hold onto its diplomatic clout in the region; however, it also needs a relationship with Hamas, thereby filling a gap in Palestine-Israel diplomacy. While Arab autocracies like Qatar and Saudi Arabia are ambivalent toward Hamas, Turkey recognizes the potential of its working relationship with Hamas leaders. Ans, whereas Egypt lost much of its credibility in the Arab world when it failed to open up its borders to Gazan refugees, Turkey is relatively unscathed. Its Islamic-leaning government is inspiring when held against the authoritarianism of Egypt or Jordan, and because it is not an Arab state, Turkish diplomats are able to operate outside of Arab internicene politics.

Turkey's relationship with Hamas first began to develop in 2006 when Turkey hosted Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal, after which Turkey has repeatedly recognized Hamas' role as necessary to any resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict. Relations with Israel are underpinned by a 1996 bilateral agreement. Israel sells and repairs Turkey weapons, including tanks, combat aircraft, unmanned spy planes to monitor PKK activity in the southeast of Turkey, and -- in a most recent deal -- radar, electronic warfare and intelligence systems technologies. In hopes of perpetuating good relations on all sides, Turkey will find itself in a precarious position over the coming months. There is talk that President Gül has plans to make a conciliatory trip to Israel in the coming month, and government officials are drawing up plans for a Middle East Security and Cooperation Conference. Turkey's role in negotiating a sustained peace between Israel and Hamas is yet to be determined, and should a decision be made by Israel or the United States to pursue negotiations with Hamas, Turkey is well-positioned to play an important role. It has already become Hamas' de facto representative at the Security Council.

Anti-Semitism

Throughout the Gaza imbroglio, Erdoğan insisted that his criticism against Israel was not anti-Semitic. However, many anti-Israel demonstrations also contained elements of anti-Semitism, as many demonstrators were not anywhere near so cautious as to draw a difference between Jews and the Israeli state. Political rhetoric has also failed to make the distinction. According to Hürriyet, Hasan Karakaya, a columnist at Vakit, recently wrote: "Jew equals terrorist." Similar statements have appeared in print and broadcast media throughout Turkey, as well as on placards, posters, and billboards. Hürriyet also reports that some Turkish hotels in Antalya put up signs declaring that Jews are not to be welcomed, although Minister of Culture and Tourism, Ertuğrul Günay, expressed concern with the signs. Worries about anti-Semitism held constant throughout the crisis in Gaza -- e.g. Emrullah Uslu, EDM, Jan. 7. And, despite Erdoğan's denials to the contrary, according to respectable Turkey expert Henri Barkey, the Prime Minister's rhetoric drew on traditional anti-Semitic prejudices.



UPDATE 1/22 -- For an an analysis of Turkey's potential peacekeeping role, see Uslu's consideration of both the risks and the benefits. Uslu recalls Abbas' 2007 request for Turkish peacekeepers be sent to Gaza, which Hamas rejected. Is Turkish public support for the deployment of Turkish peacekeepers sustainable?

UPDATE 1/24 -- The American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith International, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs sent a letter to Prime Minister Erdoğan expressing their concern about the recent wave of anti-Semitism in Turkey. As TDZ reports, "the Jewish Telegraphic News Agency, an online news portal, noted that "the organizations that signed on to the letter declined to support a 2007 US congressional resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide, concerned that such legislation could harm the relationships between the United States and Turkey and Israel and Turkey."

And, not to discount concern about anti-Semitism, see President Gül's welcome response to a recent op/ed by Leyla Navarro, a profesor of psychlogy at Boğaziçi University. Navarro's article -- summarily titled "Being a Jew in Turkey: Loneliness of 500 years" -- responds to Erdoğan's remark about Jews being welcome in Turkey since the Spanish Inquisition, asking why Turkish citizens who are ethnically or religiously Jewish are still treated as guests in a country where they have full citizenship rights.

UPDATE 1/28 -- Babacan has told Turkish newspapers that Hamas should renounce violence and lay down its arms. From the Khaleej Times:

‘Hamas should make a decision: is it going to be an armed organisation or a political movement? We advise them to be part of the political process,’ Babacan told the popular Milliyet daily.

The minister spoke amid criticism at home that Ankara acted as a supporter of Hamas—considered a terrorist group by the West—during the Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip, dealing a blow to its ties with the Jewish state, a key regional ally.

‘We cannot approve of what Hamas is doing, but peace cannot be achieved by ignoring Hamas,’ Babacan said in further remarks, published in the liberal Radikal.

‘A mid-way formula should be found... Hamas is a reality in Gaza,’ he said.

The call is likely an attempt by the AKP-led government to qualify its relationship with Hamas. Domestic and foreign critics alike accuse the government of taking an unbalanced approach to the conflict, especially in its dealings with Hamas. For an example of such criticism, see Millyet's Sedat Ergin's op/ed, "Why is PM's Gaza Rhetoric Problematic?" Ergin argues that Hamas terrorism should be firmly rejected by Turkey and that its fault in the conflict should not be dismissed. Erdoğan will meet with Israeli President Shimon Peres on Thurday at the World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland. The meeting comes amidst other signals that Turkey is moderating its position, including a phone call late last week between President Gül and Mahmoud Abbas, a move which led to speculation about a schism in the Gül and Erdoğan's approach.

Yesterday UN Humanitarian Affairs Chief John Holmes criticized Hamas at the UN Security Council for using civilians as human cover throughout the 22-day crisis. Holmes criticized both sides for their involvement in the humanitarian tragedy, arguing both sides-- but especially Israel as the occupying power -- have a responsibility to allow humanitarian supplies to move uninterrupted over and within Gaza's borders.

Another Harsh Exchange of Words . . .

Leaders of Turkey and Israel exchanged more harsh words for each other after Prime Minister Erdogan said that Israel was the main threat to Middle East peace during his recent state visit to France. From Hurriyet Daily News:

“If a country uses disproportionate force in Palestine, in Gaza - uses phosphorous shells - we're not going to say 'bravo,’” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared at a breakfast meeting in Paris, referring to Israel's deadly January 2009 on the Gaza Strip. Operation Cast Lead left around 1,400 Palestinians dead and destroyed thousands of homes.

Erdoğan said Israel's justification for the offensive was based on “lies” and cited a report by U.N. investigator Richard Goldstone, a South African judge who accused both Israel and Palestinians of war crimes.

“Goldstone is a Jew and his report is clear,” the Turkish leader told reporters invited to meet him at the Paris Ritz Hotel. “It's not because we are Muslims that we take this position. Our position is humanitarian. It's Israel that is the principal threat to regional peace,” said Erdoğan speaking in Turkish, through a French interpreter.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hit back at what he said were Turkey's repeated attacks. “We are interested in good relations with Turkey and regret that Erdogan chooses time after time to attack Israel,” he said at a Jerusalem news conference held to review his first year in office.

“It is a regrettable occurrence which I don't think serves the interests of stability and improved relations in our region,” said Netanyahu, adding that he had not discussed the issue with Erdoğan.

Erdoğan’s remarks came as Israel’s firebrand foreign minister likened him to the leaders of Libya and Venezuela. On Tuesday, Ankara “vehemently condemned” remarks attributed to Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that compared Erdoğan to Muammar al-Gadhafi of Libya and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.

Israeli Web site Ynet quoted Lieberman as saying on Monday that Erdoğan is "slowly turning into Gaddafi or Hugo Chavez" and added: "It's his choice. The problem is not Turkey, the problem is Erdoğan."

On Friday, Netanyahu announced that Israel would not be attending tomorrow's conference on nuclear proliferation in Washington for fears that Turkey (and Egypt) would use the conference to raise the issue of Israel and the NPT.

In other Israel-related news, Turkey announced that it will be recalling Ambassador Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, who was involved in the now infamous chair debaucle of last January. Celikkol will be replaced with Kerim Uras.

On the domestic front, see Claire Berlinksi's recent reflections on anti-Semitism in Turkey. From Berlinski's piece in World Affairs:

Erdogan’s behavior at Davos has given his critics here a kind of grim satisfaction. But it has not caused me to revise my own opinion of the AKP. My view is that the leadership of the AKP isn’t so much radical as cynical. If appealing to Islam helps them grasp power and keep it, they are more than happy to do so, whatever the consequences. They have discovered how to use religious sentiment to get votes, and thus to get rich, without bringing the hammer of the secularist military down upon themselves. They assume they can now use anti-Semitism in just the same way.

Many of the AKP’s senior figures rose to prominence in the now-banned Refah Party, led by ousted prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Refah, and the larger Milli Görüs¸ movement associated with it, unquestionably did represent a deeply sinister strain of Islamic radicalism, giving the lie to the claim that there exists no such tradition in Turkey. Erbakan came to power promising to “rescue Turkey from the unbelievers of Europe,” wrest power from “imperialists and Zionists,” and launch a jihad to recapture Jerusalem. One of his first acts, upon taking office, was to fly to Iran and fawn over Khomeini.

In 1997, Erbakan was ousted by the army. Refah was banned. The AKP’s senior figures, including the prime minister and the president, have publicly renounced Erbakan and his ideology. But the AKP’s enemies find it frankly preposterous to imagine that the leaders of the AKP have experienced some kind of road-to-Damascus conversion (so to speak). Necdet, as I will call him, a middle-aged man in the construction business, put it to me this way: “Once an Islamist, always an Islamist. There’s no such thing as moderate Islam. You Americans don’t understand that. That was your biggest mistake, supporting the Taliban against the Soviet Union. You can’t make Muslims into your allies. It isn’t possible.”

I sympathize with this view, but suspect the truth is closer to this: Erdogan used Erbakan for as long as it was convenient—Refah was the only party that would allow a ruffian from the slums like Erdogan to get his foot in the door. When Erdogan realized that he would never attain power through Refah, he ditched it and the rhetoric associated with it. Power, not Islamic hegemony, motivates him. He is afraid of losing it now that his Potemkin economic miracle is on the verge of exposure, and if he needs to return to the gutter to keep it, well, one does what one needs to do.

The danger is that Erdogan and his intimates may be cynical, but the people to whom they are now appealing are not. They believe what he says. The AKP is conjuring up a genie it may not be able to master.

Berlinksi also reports on a visit she made to the office of Saadet Partisi.

Relatedly, worth taking a look at is Today's Zaman colmnist Dogu Ergil's recent column, which curiously examines allegations of Israeli ties to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). I have heard these murmurings from Turks before, and true or not, they will likely be played up by some anti-Semitic forces as more fodder for the masses. Tough times ahead indeed.

For more on anti-Semitism, click here.

"The Rabbi of Jews in Turkey" and Combating Anti-Semitism

Rabbi Isak Haleva

From the JC.com:

The Turkish Chief Rabbi, Isak Haleva, has complained to the government after it stalled for months on authorising elections for a new holder of the office.

Rabbi Haleva's seven-year term of office expired last autumn, but elections could not be held because of a row between the Turkish authorities and the community over the official title of the post.

The authorities refused, for reasons that were never explained, to allow the next holder of the post to be called "Chief rabbi of Turkey", and insisted instead on simply "Chief rabbi".

A compromise was eventually reached in which the post-holder would be called "Chief rabbi of Turkish Jews", and a letter was sent allowing the Jewish community to go ahead with the election. A vote should take place shortly, with Rabbi Haleva widely expected to win a second term.

Liberal Turkish paper Milliyet reported that the row was part of a wider governmental strategy to stop non-Muslim communities appointing leaders and force all minority faiths to appoint one joint representative.

Rabbi Haleva made the complaint to the government during a meeting with the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis about the problems of non-Muslim communities in the country.

The meeting was also attended by Greek, Armenian and other religious leaders.

Other issues he raised include the legal ban on Jewish and other minority schools admitting students of foreign nationality.

The Jewish High School in Istanbul, like the Greek and Armenian schools, cannot admit students who hold foreign citizenship, including Israelis.

He also asked the government to consider including provisions in the penal code to justify legal action against antisemitic material in the press, a particular problem in some pro-Islamist publications.

The official view over complaints about antisemitic articles in the past has been that there is no legal basis for legal action.

Jews in Turkey are an officially recognized minority under the Lausanne Treaty, and the United States Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report estimates their number at 23,000. Anti-Semitism in Turkey has been rising since Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, and took a dramatic turn for the worse following Israel's invasion of Gaza in December 2008. Anti-Semitic comments, as the JC.com article notes, are common in Islamist newspapers and the political rhetoric of religiously conservative parties.

Gaza Imbroglio Places Turkey in Unique Role

Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the UN Security Council meeting on Tuesday. PHOTO from Today's Zaman

While Turkey presses on in its efforts to secure a cease fire in Gaza, using its newly acquired position at the UN Security Council to call for an end to Israeli military operations, Ankara is positioning itself to play a major diplomatic role. President Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, and chief foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu are all engaged in serious shuttle diplomacy, all hoping to prove Turkey has the diplomatic clout necessary to reach a satisfactory resolution of the conflict. At stake is Turkey's historic relationship with Israel (and the United States), its potential to prove itself a worthy foreign policy ally in Europe, and probably most in the minds of the Turkish government, its ambitions to become a major regional player, the latter of which also rests squarely on its perception in the Arab world.

Turkey's recent diplomacy might well have bolstered its foreign policy credentials with the EU. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, praised Turkey's efforts to mediate with Hamas as constructive. And, encouraging words from the Guardian's Simon Tisdall:

Turkey, on the other hand, has played an important role as an intermediary. This should not come as a big surprise. Why the Germans and others (including Sarkozy) cannot accept what a great addition to the EU Ankara's membership would be is hard to understand.

If the proposed cease fire brokered by France and Egypt is actually accomplished, Turkey might well play a pivotal role in future peacekeeping. However, Ankara's foreign policy is very much a balancing act, and there exist plenty of opportunities for it to go awry. Criticizing Erdoğan and the government's dealing with Hamas, Hürriyet issued an editorial arguing that the government should take care in its relations with Hamas, questioning the government's consideration of Hamas as a "responsible actor," and urging the 300+ parliamentarians who are members of the Turkish-Israeli Interparliamentary Friendship Group to play a greater diplomatic role. However, the government's position is unlikely to change. Ha'aretz is reporting that Ankara rejected a proposed visit by Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni following Prime Minister Erdoğan's remarks earlier this week. The explanation reportedly given by Turkish diplomats is that there is no reason for Livni to come unless she is prepared to discuss a cease fire. Turkish diplomats have neither confirmed nor denied the report. Although the recent imbroglio in Gaza is unlikely to change the fundamentals of the Turkey-Israel relationship (see Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu, Dec. 31), it has caused numerous Turkish commentators to be more confident in asserting that ultimately Israel needs Turkey more than the other way around -- for example, see Bülent Kenes in the Guardian.

In other news, Jordan's Queen Rania, Syria's Asma Assad, Qatar's Sheikha Mozah and Lebanon's Wafaa Sleiman joined the Turkish prime minister's wife Emine Erdoğanin İstanbul to call for an end to hostilities between Israel and Hamas. And, in continued solidarity with the people of Gaza, donations continue to flow into local mosques for distribution in Gaza while street protests show no signs of disappearing. In evidence of just how high feelings run, Turkish basketball fans halted a game between a Turkish and Israeli team on Tuesday.

And, not to be lost in the ether, news of anti-Semitism from Bianet:

Criticizing anti-semite comments and reactions in protests against Israel's offensive in Gaza, former head of the conservative rights organization MAZLUMDER Ayhan Bilgen and rights activist –and a Turkish Jew- Avi Haligua underlined the error of identifying a state's policies with its people.

. . . .

"It's a grose error to bill the faults of the Israeli state to Jews living in other parts of the world" said Bilgen. "We must clearly distinguish between demands of peace in the Middle East and demands that would instigate further ethnic and religious fights. One should not forget that the most powerful reaction to Israel's policies comes from within the country, from Israeli peace activists"

Noting he had covered most of the demonstrations in Istanbul, "I'm not comfortable faced with demands to account for Israel's actions" said Haligua.

While this is the case, he also reacts to PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan saying "we've welcomed Jews as our guest here 600 years ago".

"I'm not a Israeli citizen says Haligua. "Utilization of the notion of 'guest' after 600 years shows how deep anti-semitism goes. AKP exploits the situation for the upcoming elections just as the Israeli government does."

He notes that the media lays ground to racist comments through sentimental approaches. "We should demand peace instead of revenge."

Wise words indeed, and on that message, I recommend American progressive Bill Moyers' recent commentary on Gaza and the struggle for peace in the region.

Rally Around the Flag (But Whose?)

In the more than two weeks that have passed since the flotilla crisis, AKP government officials continue to pound Israel, raising concern with Western alliances, favor in the Arab Street, and just as significantly, political points at home. Milliyet columnist Semih Idiz weighs in on the domestic side of the equation in today's Hurriyet Daily News:

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears set to milk the popularity he gained in the streets of Turkey and the Middle East after the Marmara crisis in which nine Turks were killed by Israeli forces in a seriously botched up military operation.

It is almost as if he was waiting for a new crisis with Israel to be able to work the streets in order to regain some of the political ground his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been loosing over bread and butter issues at home.

He and his party executives are clearly worried that the reinvigorated Republican Peoples Party, or CHP, may make headway given the successful manner in which its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been hitting at the government over topics that really matter for the average man on the street. He is also concerned that the Saadet (Felicity) Party, the other Islamist party, may steal votes from the AKP given the rising dissatisfaction among the public.

Turks are fickle though, and easily swayed emotionally even if this means that the bread and butter issues of vital importance to them are pushed to the background. It is clear that there is great public animosity towards Israel today. As for the almost endemic anti-Americanism among Turks, this is also adding grist to Erdogan’s populist mill.

So we see him increasingly turning up the volume of his demagoguery, and hitting at Israel and the United States at every opportunity that presents itself. No doubt he is keeping a close eye on the “political rating meter” as he sends his crowds to paroxysms of delirious applause with his remarks, some of which smack openly of anti-Semitism and reflect a growing anti-Western tendency.

After the Marmara incident he was not only quick to use the harshest and most insulting adjectives when referring to Israel, but also had thinly veiled warnings to Washington, suggesting openly that those who stood behind Israel were also culpable in the crimes committed by that country.

Over the weekend he went further and openly named the U.S. this time, thus revealing what lies in his heart-of-hearts. This is what he had to say while addressing an adoring crowd in Rize, on the Black Sea coast, where people are not only religious but also ultra-nationalist.

“They are asking us what Turkey is doing in the Middle East, in Palestine. Why is Turkey bothered about Gaza? But could they not be asked in return what America is doing in Iraq? What is it doing in Palestine? Could it not be asked what is it doing in Afghanistan? What are France, Britain, and Holland, and so on, doing in these places?”

Erdogan went on threateningly to say, “I am calling on the Israeli supported international media and their subcontractors at home: Turkey is not like other countries.” His only tribute to sophistication during this show of demagoguery was his reference to “the Israeli supported international media.”

Previously he had made references to the “Jewish controlled international media” but must have been warned by his advisors that this was too overtly “anti-Semitic,” and thus politically incorrect. This no doubt forced him to make a slight modification in his nevertheless anti-Semitic reference to the international media.

A survey conducted by METROPoll on June 3, just four days after the flotilla raid, found that nearly two-thirds of the 1,000 Turks surveyed thought the government response was too weak, a finding the AKP is no doubt aware. Winning votes is important for any government, and with the possibility of early elections looming as the constitutional reform package waits to be ruled on by the Constitutional Court, no doubt figures into AKP decisionmaking.

Additionally, there is reason to be concerned. A rejuvenated CHP might well take economically-minded and liberal (those that are left) voters away from the party at the same time the Israel issue has mobilized the Islamist right, possibly bringing votes to Saadet Partisi. Though Saadet has finished far under the 10 percent election threshold since the AKP came to power, an increased vote for the party could all the same take critical votes away from the AKP even if it does not pass the threshold. The question for me here is why did Erdogan let the Mavi Marmara sail knowing that what happened on May 31 was a definite possibility. If domestic politics figured in at all, a calculation may have been made to divert attention away from the Kurdish front and score political points, but was thought not given to what effect such a move could have on those right of the AKP, namely strengthening the hand of Saadet Partisi? Is this perhaps what was behind the warnings of Fethullah Gulen in his interview with the Wall Street Journal (see June 7 post)?

It is hard to say to what extent this figures into the AKP's anti-Israel rhetoric and foreign polcy posturing, but the domestic factor should not be ruled out. Injured by its failed Kurdish initiative and increasing PKK violence, the Israel imbroglio helps the AKP at home at a time when it needs all the help it can get, which might explain why the government is focusing on the larger Palestinian issue and the Mavi Marmara incident (though this has been more or less the case in its relations with Israel since the latter's incursion into Gaza in December 2008), often conflating the two, rather than the growing conflict in the southeast. Nationalism has always been a powerful force in Turkish politics, but now the Israeli flag also serves a potent a force at the moment as the Turkish one.


UPDATE I (6/18) -- Istanbul's municipal council has accepted a proposal made by the Saadet Partisi to make Gaza a sister city.

Yet Another "Valley of the Wolves" . . .

Reuters' Simon Akam reports on a coming sequel to the very popular 2006 film, "Valley of the Wolves" (see March 17, 2008 post). The films followed the popular television series, an episode of which recently featured a Turkish child kidnapped by Israeli soldiers and sparked the Celikkol controversy last January. Both the film and the television series play on Turkish nationalist sentiments, including the destructive Sevres syndrome. From Akam:

"Valley of the Wolves: Palestine" is projected to cost over $10 million, making it one of the most expensive Turkish films.

Scheduled for a November release, the new project follows the 2006 feature "Valley of the Wolves: Iraq."

That film, which showed American soldiers running amok in northern Iraq, racked up 4.2 million ticket sales in Turkey and accusations of rampant anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.

"After Iraq, we decided that in the next Polat movie we are going to tell again an international story," said scriptwriter Bahadir Ozdener, sitting in an office lined with antique cameras in Nisantasi, an upscale Istanbul neighborhood.

The series' hero is Polat Alemdar, a gun-toting agent with a fondness for sharp tailoring and a dearth of facial expressions.

Played by Necati Sasmaz - who had never acted before - and dubbed by another actor, Polat is sometimes described as the Turkish James Bond. Millions of young Turks idolize him, imitating his mannerisms and speech.

In the new film Ozdener says his intention is "to shed light on the history, on what's really going on in Palestine."
He described the conflict as "a very good example of the imperialists' targets."

. . . . .

The Valley of the Wolves franchise - made by production company Pana Film - has enjoyed tremendous success in Turkey.

The title evokes mythological images from a story beloved by nationalists of a lone wolf that guided Turks out of a Central Asian valley where they had been trapped by enemies.
The television series, known as 'Kurtlar Vadisi' in Turkish, first aired in 2003. The initial, mafia-focused plot saw Polat Alemdar tasked to penetrate Turkish organized crime.

With a regular quota of gunfights and mayhem the series rapidly gained and maintained an enormous following. Today, Pana claims between 20 and 40 million Turks watch each week.

Then came Valley of the Wolves: Iraq, the 2006 feature film, which saw Polat Alemdar avenging in fiction the real-life events of July 2003, when American forces captured and hooded a team of Turkish Special Forces in northern Iraq.

Styled like a Hollywood blockbuster, the film prominently featured abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.

After Iraq, Pana Film began a series about Turkey's long conflict against Kurdish separatist guerrillas. But government pressure forced them to shelve Valley of the Wolves: Terror after just one episode as the subject was too sensitive.

The next series cast Polat as a secret agent defending Turkey against foreign threats.

Styled like a Hollywood blockbuster, Turkish film critic Alin Tasciyan believes Valley of the Wolves carries a very different message.

She called the 2006 Iraq film, "Anti-American in the most American way possible."

The Resolution Saga Continues, Erdogan Points to "Jewish Lobby"

Prime Minister Erdogan said today that Ankara has no plans to send Turkish Ambasador to the United States Namik Tan back to Washington until it receives a clear signal that the resolution is dead. On Friday, the Obama Administration announced that it had reached a deal with American congressional leaders that would stop the resolution in its tracks. However, for Ankara, this is apparently not enough. Upon Tan's return this week, the government continued to issue strong rhetoric, for which there is no doubt a public demand. Fighting "genocide" resolutions is one of the few things that pulls otherwise polarized Turkish politicans together. Suat Kiniklioglu, the AKP's deputy chairman for external affairs, threatened major consequences" should the resolution pass the full United States House of Representatives.

Provocatively, the prime minister pointed his finger at Washington's Israel lobby. (Hurriyet Daily News refers to the Israel lobby as the "Jewish lobby," a term the prime minister also presumably used, but which is inaccurate.) Erdogan said the attitude of Israel lobbyists had changed. While this is indeed the case, it is not accurate to say the Israel lobby "supported" the resolution; rather, they did nothing to stop it, in some cases possibly giving a greenlight to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who otherwise might have voted against the resolution (see, for example, the positon of the Anti-Defamation League and the use of the resolution by AIPAC and other organizations to pressure Turkey on its position on Iran and Gaza). From Washington-based journalist Jim Lobe in the Asia Times:

In 2007, the Foreign Affairs committee approved a similar "genocide" resolution. However, it was never referred to the floor of the house due to intense opposition by the administration of president George W Bush backed by the powerful "Israel Lobby", which has frequently intervened in congress on Turkey’s behalf since the late 1980s when Ankara and Israel began building a strategic alliance.

But Israeli-Turkish ties have become increasingly strained in recent years, particularly since Israel's "Cast Lead" military campaign in Gaza, which Erdogan strongly denounced in a heated exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in late January last year, just days after the offensive had ended.

A number of subsequent incidents, most recently the apparently deliberate televised humiliation in January by Israel's deputy foreign minister of Ankara's ambassador in Tel Aviv, have added to the strains.

Indeed, some analysts in the US and in Turkey suggested that the resolution's passage was due as much to the Israel Lobby's failure to oppose it, as to the Obama administration's delay in coming out against it. Several key lawmakers who are considered close to the Lobby, notably Gary Ackerman, Brad Sherman and committee chair Howard Berman, spoke in favor of its approval.

"In the past, the pro-Israel community has lobbied hard against previous attempts to pass similar resolutions, citing warnings from Turkish officials that it could harm the alliance not only with the United States but with Israel ...," noted the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on Friday.

"In the last year or so, however, officials of American pro-Israel groups have said that while they will not support new resolutions, they will no longer oppose them, citing Turkey's heightened rhetorical attacks on Israel and a flourishing of outright anti-Semitism the government has done little to stem," it asserted.

And, for a look at the victors of Thursday's vote, see Omer Taspinar's column in Today's Zaman. According to Taspinar, Armenian lobbyists (who want to stay in business) and Azerbaijan (which wants to see no rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia until Nagorno-Karabakh is settled) won significant points Thursday. With the protocols now dead in the water, the resolution is likely to keep coming up, and lobbyists will be there to push for and pull against it. Azerbaijan had already successfully appealed/threatened the Turkish government to tie Nagorno-Karabakh to ratification, and the deal is most certainly imperiled. I would also add Turkish ultra-nationalists and anti-American elements inside Turkey to the list of winners as both groups successfully used the resolution in appeals to their core groups. The Turkish government is claiming the resolution has greatly damaged ratification in Turkey.

For more talk in Washington, see former Ambassador to Turkey Mort Abramowitz's interview with the Center for American Progress' Middle East Progress, especially on the status of the protocols. According to Abramowitz, the Turkish government did not adequately prepare for Azeri opposition, instead hoping something would come from American and Russian efforts to settle Nagorno-Karabakh. For Abramowitz, the "real question is can the Turks move forward without doing something for the Azeris?" For my analysis of the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan triangle, which the protocols should have done more to take into account from the beginning, see Jan. 24 post.

USCIRF Reports on Religious Freedom

Turkey appears in the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom's 2008 annual report on the status of religious freedom in 22 different countries. Founded in 1998 to monitor religious freedom in conjunction with the State Department, USCIRF considers Turkey a country under review rather than a country of of particular concern or in which religious freedom violations warrant being put on its watch list. Nonetheless, USCIRF observes the country's struggle with its laicist understanding of religion and the state, as well as state discrimination against Muslim minorities, e.g. the requirement that Alevi children be subject to Sunni religious education. The report also includes a description of discrimination against Turkey's non-Muslim minorities, e.g. the lack of legal recognition afforded to the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates. The report also alludes to the anti-Semitism still encountered in the Turkish media and other sectors of civil society.

USCIRF joins other groups in criticism of the recently passed Foundations Law. Although the Foundations Law is a positive step in the right direction of returning property of religious minorities seized by the state, it makes no provision for the re-appropriation of property sold by the state to third parties. Admirably, the bill does allow non-Turkish citizens to open up foundations and reduces legal barriers to gaining foundation status for Turkish citizens as well.

Başbuğ to Prove a More Apt Political Player

General İlker Başbuğ is by all intents and purposes set to replace current head of the Turkish General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt when the Supreme Military Council(YAS) meets in August to consider promotions and transfers. Although Erdoğan and Gül must approve his appointment, their objection would be quite unorthodox, and therefore, unexpected. Embroiled in the recent Ergenekon mess and the chaotic, sloppy media uproar surrounding the politicized investigation, Başbuğ has found himself in quite a difficult position. However, his cool handling of the situation suggests that he will be a much more apt political player than his hot-headed predecessor.

From Gareth Jenkins:

On July 2 General Ilker Basbug, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, issued a public statement calling for calm in the wake of the unprecedented wave of detentions of hard-line secularists on July 1, in which a number of high-ranking retired military personnel were taken into custody (see EDM, July 1).

“Turkey is going through difficult days,” Basbug told reporters. “We must all show common sense, remain calm and behave coolly and responsibly” (Milliyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Yeni Safak, July 3).

Basbug bluntly refuted media speculation that in a meeting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had warned him in advance that the police were planning to detain high-ranking military personnel, such as former gendarmerie commander General Sener Eruygur and former First Army commander General Hursit Tolon. “I want to be very clear about this. The issue was not raised in any form at the meeting,” said Basbug (Milliyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Yeni Safak, July 3).

. . . .

Basbug is widely regarded within the military as one of the most able officers of his generation. After graduating from infantry school in 1963, he served in variety of positions both in Turkey and abroad, including two postings to NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. A fluent English speaker, he is renowned within the military for his calculated calmness even under intense pressure; unlike the more volatile Buyukanit, who during his two year command sometimes appears to have allowed his heart to rule his head and has issued emotional, poorly prepared public statements condemning the AKP. Like most senior members of the TGS, Basbug shares Buyukanit’s hard-line interpretation of secularism and has frequently expressed concern that the AKP is committed to its eventual erosion.

The detentions of July 1 have thus left Basbug in a dilemma. The vast majority of the members of the Turkish officer corps will have interpreted the detentions, and particularly the manner in which they were conducted, as a direct assault by the AKP-controlled Interior Ministry on the military as an institution. There was already a degree of restlessness among some hard-liners in the military at Buyukanit’s failure to combat the AKP, particularly after the failure of his attempt in 2007 to prevent AKP foreign minister from being appointed President of Turkey. Consequently, Basbug would have been expected to issue a public statement condemning the July 1 detentions, but if the statement were too harsh, he could have presented the AKP with an excuse to veto his appointment as chief of the TGS in August.

Even before the July 1 detentions, AKP supporters had already launched a defamation campaign against Basbug (see EDM, June 18); as they also did in 2006 to try to prevent Buyukanit from being appointed chief of staff. It is an alarming indication of the continuing depth of anti-Semitism in Turkey that in each case the most damning calumny they could level at the generals was to imply that they were Jewish. Neither is.

Basbug’s statement of July 2 was a typically measured response at a time when emotions would have been running extremely high in the TGS: he combined a call for calm with a concise rebuttal of rumors being spread by the Islamist media, while avoiding saying anything inflammatory that could give the AKP grounds to veto his appointment. The statement was also a further indication that if he is formally appointed in August, Basbug will prove, from the perspective of the AKP, a considerably more formidable opponent than his predecessor.

The Hate Speech Debate

In the past two weeks following Hurriyet columnist Yilmaz Ozdil's seeming praise of the April 12 attack on Ahmet Turk, a lively debate emerged in the Turkish press about the value of a new law regulating hate speech in the Turkish press (for a short summary, see Today's Zaman columnist Fatma Disli Zibak). Some opinion leaders argue that Article 215 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), which criminalizes speech that "incites hatred and hostility amongst the public" is simply not enough. For instance, Today's Zaman columnist Yavuz Baydar argues that

Article 216 of the Penal Code, covering ‘inciting hatred’, must be more clearly formulated as to include racism and anti-Semitism. It must be rigorously implemented. But in order to avoid, court rulings, the media outlets must set a filter mechanism inside newsrooms.

. . . .

Columns that contain hate speech must be prevented from going to print or edited out. Each media outlet must internally ‘educate’ its reporters and editors on the subject. And, both ombudsmen and the press councils must pay attention to violations. Lastly, civil society must display vigilance and monitor the media on a daily basis and publicly complain or file for indictment.

At a conference held earlier this month by the Hrant Dink International Foundation, a study was unveiled that documented hate speech in the Turkish press among members of ethnic and religious minority groups. The study did not include other marginalized groups, such as women, LGBT people, or people with disabilities, nor did it cover all minority groups subject to hate speech or claim to do so. From Today's Zaman:

The study, which made public the results of the foundation’s study of the Turkish national press, looked into 24 newspapers with high levels of circulation, leaving aside their supplements.

The most targeted groups were Turkish citizens of Kurdish and Armenian origin. Greeks, Christians in general and Jews were also often the subjects of news stories or columns that contained hate speech.

The study considered bad language/defamation/insult; animosity/wartime discourse; exaggeration/ascribing/distortion; and stereotyping while examining the articles.

Three quarters of the hate speech identified by the researchers was found in columns; the rest was in news articles. The study examined newspapers published in August, September, October and November of last year.

While hate speech found its way easily to the pages of the H.O. Tercüman, Ortadoğu, Vakit, Yeniçağ, Sözcü and Türkiye dailies -- considered nationalist and conservative, and somewhat marginalized with their limited circulation -- it was also in the mainstream Hürriyet and Star dailies, although less so in the latter.

For more on the conference, see this Bianet report. For Baydar's op/ed on the subject in Today's Zaman, wherein the columnist also points a strong accusative finger at Hurriyet and the Dogan Media Group, click here.

For more on the lawsuit filed by the Diyarbakir Bar Association against Yilmaz Ozdil, see this Bianet report.

Further, it should be noted that Article 216 has been used against minority groups before. While a new law may well be needed, I am skeptical as to just how it would work and who all might be using it. For more on this point, see Jan. 24 post. Hate speech legislation is rarely easy, even with a well-functioning judiciary.

The Gaza Dilemma

Protests across Turkey are targeting the government's vicissitudinous relationship with Israel. Here, protestors organized by the Felicity Party hold placards with photos of Erdogan shaking the hand of Olmert. PHOTO from Istanbul Calling


A recent poll has found that AKP is facing a considerable lack of support given public perception of its association with Israel. Despite Prime Minister Erdogan's invectives of last week, many Turks -- still very much incensed at the deteriorating human rights tragedy in Gaza -- see AKP as wavering in its position toward Israel, many demanding that Ankara take bold steps to make its disgust known and perhaps exert a modicum of pressure on the Israelis. However, diplomatic action taken against Israel risk good relations that are very much essential to Turkey maintaining its diplomatic clout in the region -- premised on the fact that Turkey has good relations with all countries. Even more problematic is that relations with Washington are likely to be worsened should Turkey decide to strengthen its condemnation of Israel.

With local elections coming up, and AKP already facing the prospect of losses due to competition in what has become an increasingly fragmented race, the party might well lose power to parties who have taken stronger positions against Israel. Troubling is that many of these parties constitute the extreme religious right in Turkey, their platforms anathema to the moderation for which AKP has so been lauded. In a poll by ANKA News Agency, the Felicity Party (SP -- Saadet Partisi) has increased its share of the vote to over 8 percent. More on Erdogan's tightrope from Yigal Schleifer:

With Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) facing local elections this March, the government’s relations with Israel could be a liability. Placards are appearing at protests showing Erdogan and Olmert shaking hands and accusing the AKP of "collaborating" with Israel.

Erdogan may also find himself walking a tightrope when it comes to distancing Turkey from Israel. Ankara has long depended on Israel to act as a conduit to the Washington and to American Jewish organizations, who have frequently acted as a kind of surrogate lobby for Turkey in Washington. In the past, Jewish organizations have been instrumental in helping Turkey block efforts to introduce resolutions in Congress recognizing the Armenian genocide of 1915.

"There is real anger with Erdogan on Capital Hill and among people who follow Turkey in Washington," says a Washington-based consultant who closely monitors Turkish affairs. "Nobody is threatening anything right now, or knows if there are going to be repercussions, but this is going to have an effect."

Adds the consultant: "There is a sense that Erdogan’s used up a lot of good will."

However, to turn the other side of the coin, the United States is using up much of its good will, too. Yesterday, President Olmert boastfully declared that his call to President Bush was responsible for the United States' singular abstention from the Security's Council's otherwise unanimous resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. The action is likely to anger Turks (and, not just religious conservatives!), making Erdogan's position all the more untenable domestically.

In terms of relations with the United States and Israel, right-wing politicians in America and Israel will no doubt come down hard on Turkey, especially AKP (for an example, see the Likud-sympathetic Jerusalem Post, Jan. 5). These critics are unlikely to be sympathetic to AKP's domestic political concerns, and as Juan Cole observes, might just be able to stick around and cause more harm.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is scheduled to meet with Erdogan on Friday. In effort to show its solidarity with Gazans, AKP Education Minister Huseyin Celik ordered a minute of silence in schools.

And, on another note, Schleifer intimated earlier this month that the Gaza conflict should lead Turkey to re-think its own policies toward its Kurdish minority. A recent decision by Israel to ban two Arab political parties -- both of which claim to represent a significant sector of Israel's Arab minority population of approximately 1.2 million people -- should make Turkish policy makers think twice about banning DTP. Also, for Turkey to consider is its opposition to an international treaty banning the use of cluster bombs. The bombs -- which, left unexploded, detonate like land mines long after conflict has concluded -- have been used in the Israeli operations, alongside white phosphorus gas.

On Saturday, I closed my post on Gaza with a note about anti-Semitism. Below is a video documenting protests in Tel Aviv by PeaceNow, an Israeli peace group. PeaceNow advocates Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, and has called repeatedly for a ceasefire and an end to the Israeli operations in Gaza.



UPDATE 1/14 -- The Spanish newspaper El Mundo is reporting that Hamas is prepared to conclude a short-term ceasefire on the condition -- among others -- that Turkey be the guarantor of any peacekeeping force. Hamas also indicated it is ready to consent to international monitors, and listed their deployment among conditions for the ceasefire. The Syrian faction of Hamas has been the most recalcitrant in negotiations, arguing that any short-term ceasefire should be conditional on Israel giving up something in return.