Torn Between Worlds

Hranuysh Hagopyan, Armenia’s diaspora minister, walks with acting Patriarch Aram Atesyan after an award ceremony in Istanbul on Sunday.  PHOTO by Hasan Altinisik / Hurriyet Daily News

A group of Turkish Armenians were recently honored in Istanbul in a ceremony involving Archbishop Aram Atesyan, and significantly, Armenia's minister responsible for dealing with the Armenian diaspora, Hranuysh Hagopyan. Many Turkish Armenian intellectuals, newspaper, and some of the honorees questioned whether the presence of the diaspora minister was desirable. From Hurriyet Daily News:

“I would prefer not to have a diaspora minister in Turkey,” author Mıgırdıç Margosyan told the Hürriyet Daily News before receiving his gold medal from Armenian minister Hranuysh Hagopyan.

“I’ve been living on the land that [we have] been living on for thousands of years. I am not in the diaspora. This is a terrible irony,” Margosyan said. The writer also directed his criticism toward the Turkish government, saying the lack of a Turkish state official at the ceremony was disappointing.

. . . .

After attending the Global Summit of Women in Istanbul, Hagopyan handed out medals to 15 Turkish Armenians, including Margosyan, composers Garo Mafyan and Cenk Taşkan and Alis Manukyan, the first Armenian female vocalist in Turkey’s State Opera and Ballet.

“We are living in the lands where we have to live. And we continue to pay our debt to these lands,” Mafyan, who is arguably the best-known popular music composer, told the Daily News. He added that he is ready to do everything he can to make sure dialogue continues between Turkey and Armenia.

“It is [still] very important to receive an award from Armenia for contributing to Turkish popular music,” he said.

Turks of Armenian descent or Turkish Armenians or Armenian Turks or however one would group them are a population of at least 60 million people. Most belong to the Armenian Orthodox Church, which has a Turkish Patriarchate in Istanbul apart from Yerevan. Some Turkish Armenians are Catholics, and there are yet others of Armenian descent that do not enjoy minority status under Turkish law and whose numbers are not counted in official government numbers. This "hidden" Armenian minority, consists of people, sometimes referred to as crypto-Armenians, who converted to Islam in the latter half of the nineteenth-century and early part of the twentieth-century when Armenians began to face sharp discrimination, and eventually, Ottoman state-engineered ethnic cleansing.

Under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Armenians, along with Greek Orthodox Christians and Jews, enjoy "minority status" based on religion. The status granted these minorities rights certain rights vis-a-vis the new republican Turkish state, and essentially granted two separate legal regimes: one for ordinary Turkish citizens, and another for the minorities granted status under the Treaty of Lausanne. (Syriac Christians, Alevis, Caferis, as well as ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, were denied such rights.)

However, some Armenians, Greeks, and Jews complain of being treated as second-class citizens. These minorities are still sometimes accused of collaborating with foreign enemies, and even in the context of receiving EU accession monies designed to protect and promote minority rights, face criticism from some nationalist circles for seeking to undermine the Turkish state.Armenians, in particular, have long faced suspicion of being linked to Armenian terrorist groups and secretly desiring the dissolution of the Turkish state, which many Turks are taught has two main enemies: the external enemies of imperial Europe, and the internal enemies, i.e. minorities who see the disintegration of the country. To make matters worse, Turkish Armenians often get caught in the middle of Turkey's politics with Armenia and other countries, such as when Prime Minister Erdogan responded to a genocide resolution in Sweden by threatening to expel Armenian immigrants in radio interview last March. (This is not to say that the poor Armenian immigrants were not more caught.)

At the same time, Armenians also face criticism from Armenians in Armenia, as well as from the sizable Armenian diaspora. As a result, Turkish Armenians are torn between Turkish citizenship, their relation to the diaspora, of which they are not a part since, unlike even the vast majority of Armenians living in Armenia, they did not immigrate. The vast majority of Turkey's Armenian population are the descendents of Armenians who migrated to cosmopolitan Istanbul following the hard times of the 1890s and onward under the Ottoman Empire (and before 1915), and so escaped the massacres at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the mass dislocation into Syria, the Soviet Union, and scores of other countries that followed.

Vahe Sarukhanyan, writing for Heqt Online, has an interesting piece up discussing Istanbul Armenians as the "Diaspora's Outsiders." An excerpt:

Sociologist [Arus] Yumul says that for the worldwide Armenian diaspora, the Istanbul-Armenian community is akin to a "lost lamb", an "outsider". She says that other Armenians have taken them to task for being non-active in Armenian affairs and for cow-towing to the government in Ankara. Yumul says she agrees with these assessments when it comes to the Ottoman period, but that after Turkish independence Armenians not only didn’t get involved in Armenian politics but also Turkish affairs. It was kind of a survival strategy she noted.

Yumul added that the community is slowly integrating into the larger Turkish society and that mixed marriages are paving the way.

"At one time Armenian parents resisted but this too has faded. The next generation will be more like a hybrid, free to chose whether they are Armenian, Turk..."

She was quick to add that this doesn’t mean that Armenians will disappear in Turkey.

However, the use of Armenian as a daily language of communication is also on the decline; the number of Armenians who can’t speak the mother tongue is growing. Parents send their kids to Armenian elementary schools but afterwards many go to private or foreign high schools so that they won’t have problems with the Turkish language in college.

The 1990s were a turning point for the community in many ways. Armenians, like the other minority communities, began to voice their concerns, speak about the discrimination they faced, and even raise the taboo subject of the 1915 Armenian Genocide

Twenty years ago, all this was unthinkable. What the next twenty will bring for the community remains a big question mark.

More evidence that Lausanne is outdated, and that its continued legal character is becoming more and more anachronistic as Turkey opens up . . .

On another note, Kadir Has University has announced plans to start teaching courses in Armenian. The classes are offered in the context of improving regional relations with Armenia.

For more on the Treaty of Lausanne's lasting impact in Turkish politics, see my post from 2008, "Article 301: An Anti-Imperialist Discourse." For the treaty's misused application in relation to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, see this past post. For more on Turkey's Armenian minority, click here.

United States Issues Religious Freedom Report

The United States Department has issued its annual International Religious Freedom Report. For DRL's report on Turkey, click here.

Though many accusations might be leveled at the United States for not taking a consistent position on democracy and human rights issues, a difficult task for any country, the State Department's reports on human rights and religious freedom are refreshingly objective.

Issued by the State Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the reports are issued independent of the State Department's other policy making arms. For a bit on how, why, and the history behind these reports, click here.

Holy Cross Church Opens Without a Cross

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

The first mass in 95 years was held at the Surp Hac (Holy Cross) Armenian church on Van's Akdamar Island yesterday despite a controversy this week about the cross that church officials wanted to place atop. The church was first opened as a museum two years ago following a Turkish government funded restoration, after which a Turkish flag was placed at its top. Culture Minister Ertegrul Gunay announced in April that the church would be open for prayer once a year.

In expectation of the first mass, the Turkish Armenian Patriachate built a 100-kilogram church, which it had planned to place atop the church with the help of for experts from Armenia. However, municipal authorities objected to the cross, arguing that church officials did not have proper permission from the Van Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Given that the church has been open for two years and that the government had plenty of time to address the issue, the cross controversy evinces the difficulties that remain in both Turkey's reconciliation with its Armenian minority, as well as its relations with Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.

All the same, Aris Nalci, an editor at the Armenian newspaper Agos, told journalist Yigal Schleifer that the cross controversy should not overshadow the significance of the mass. From Schleifer, writing for Eurasianet:

“This is a very important step for this city and the people living in the city,” said Nalci, who came early to Van to help publish a special edition newspaper in Armenian called “Van Time,” the first Armenian-language newspaper to be printed in the city since 1915.

“Five years ago, you couldn’t imagine that a newspaper in Armenian would be published in Van. Previously people here would tell me not to say that I’m Armenian. Now people here are proud to say they have an Armenian friend,” he recounted.

“This is a big opportunity. It’s a big step for the Van people,” Nalci added.

After heralding the open as a major accomplishment in Turkey-Armenia relations, why the Turkish government did not take a stronger position on the cross remains to be seen. High-ranking government officials did not attend the ceremony, though the government has said that the mass will not be the only one to be held at Akdamar.

Greek Orphanage Returns Minority Real Estates to Spotlight

The Greek Orthodox orphanage now in disrepair at Buyukada is Europe's iggest remaining wooden building. PHOTO by Hasan Altinisk / Hurriyet Daily News

A European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision ordering the Turkish government to return an abandoned orphanage and its grounds back to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate after it was seized in 1995 has again brought attention to the issue of real estate owned by religious minorities in Turkey. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The 112-year-old orphanage, Europe’s biggest remaining wooden building, was built in 1898 as a hotel and casino on the largest of Istanbul’s Princes’ Islands, then purchased by a prominent Greek family that donated it to the patriarchate for use as an orphanage.

“The orphanage was opened in 1903 by Sultan Abdülhamid and remained so for a long time,” Osman Doğru, a law professor at Marmara University, told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review. “Yet in 1964, it was emptied for security reasons and then left to its destiny.” For almost 30 years, the building simply rotted away. In 1995, Turkey’s General Directorate of Foundations took over ownership – and the court cases began.

“The decision to transfer the orphanage building’s ownership to the foundations directorate was based on the claim that the Greek Patriarchate didn’t do any maintenance work on it. However, it was the Turkish state that didn’t allow any restorations during that period,” said Kezban Hatemi, a lawyer for the patriarchate.

“Such a transfer is legally very problematic, and this case is not the only one,” Hatemi told the Daily News. “Since the 1960s, there have been many violations to the rights of properties owned by minority foundations.”

According to a 2009 report by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, or TESEV, there are approximately 1,000 “immovable properties,” essentially land parcels and buildings, in the country that originally belonged to Greek foundations but were confiscated by the Turkish state.

Foundations administered by other minority groups have been affected as well; some 30 properties belonging to Armenian foundations have likewise been seized, an issue that Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink tried to raise awareness about before his assassination in 2007.

“In 1936, the Turkish government asked all minority foundations to declare their properties. Yet, in 1975, the Supreme Court of Appeals decided that minority foundations do not have the right to hold any property and ordered all properties gained after 1936 to be returned,” Dink once said. “Yet these immovable properties weren’t returned to their [original] donators either, because they were already dead. So many of these properties were transferred to the General Directorate of Foundations.”

According to law professor Doğru, the case of the Büuükada Orphanage was complicated by the fact that the patriarchate claimed the building in 1936, when the government asked minority foundations to report their holdings. “However, the Supreme Court of Appeals found a very creative solution to the issue and said the building was actually claimed by the orphanage foundation, not the patriarchate itself, so they could transfer it to the General Directorate of Foundations,” he said.

After the building was confiscated in 1995, the Fener Greek Patriarchate applied to have the court decision cancelled. When this application was rejected, the patriarchate took the issue to the European Court of Human Rights.

“Minority foundations in Turkey did not have any property problems until the mid-1960s,” said patriarchate lawyer Hatemi. “But this situation completely changed when the Cyprus crisis started during that period. Only then were the declarations of 1936 remembered and minority foundations were used as a tool to gain power over Greece.”

The issue of minority foundations and the property they own is legally complicated and a bit too thorny to adequately get into in a blog post, but the 2009 TESEV report alluded here is an excellent source for further information. The report, "The Story of an Alien(ation): Real Estate Ownership Problems of Non-Muslim Communities and Foundations in Turkey," is authored by Dilek Kurban and Kezban Hatemi.

In spring 2008, the Turkish parliament passed major reforms of Turkey's Foundations Law, under which both the Greek and Armenian minorities are governed, though the reforms are largely argued to have not gone far enough in addressing such issues as real estate.

For more on how minority foundations are governed in Turkey, see also Today's Zaman columnist Orhan Kemal Cengiz's two-part op/ed series. In the first part, Cengiz lays out the history of minority foundations, while turning his attention in the second part to the 2008 reforms -- which the CHP, in one of its more overtly nationalist overtures, opposed -- and the current climate for further reform.

"Cage Plan" Hearings Get Under Way

PHOTO by Emrah Gürel/Hurriyet Daily News

With eyes focused on Turkey-Israel relations, Turkey's recent vote on Iranian sanctions, and increased PKK violence, the Ergenekon investigation continues onward, as do the trials it has brought in its wake. Among these are of the 33 suspects charged with participating the Cage Action Plan, the mysterious designs of which the Turkish daily Taraf revealed last November. The first hearing for the Cage suspects got underway in Istanbul yesterday.

According to Taraf and a susequent investigation, active and retired military staff plotted to commit mass acts of violence against Turkey's non-Muslim communities in a premeditated effort to cause enough chaos and discontent with the AKP government to force it out of power. These acts of violence allegedly included the assassination of Hrant Dink, as well as the murders of three Christian missionaries working at Zirve publishing house in Malatya and Catholic priest Andrea Santoro in Trabzon. The group is thought to have also been hatching further actions.

At yesterday's hearing, the 12th High Criminal Court in Istanbul granted the Turkish-Armenian Agos newspaper, of which Dink had been the editor, joint plaintiff status, allowing Dink lawyers to participate in the hearings. Fethiye Cetin, who has long advocated on behalf of the Dink family and the Hrant Dink Foundation to bring the shadowy operation surrounding Dink's murder to light, argued that the alleged conspirators had long waged a campaign of intimidation against the paper and was responsible for Dink's murder. Two separate trials involving Dink's murder ae currently ongoing, and have been plagued with problems and continued coverups.

The defendants denied the allegations, arguing the document laying out the plan is a hoax. They had requested to e tried in military court, stating that the civilian court in which the case is being tried had no jurisdiction. The court denied their request while granting that of Agos. For an account of the hearing, see this report from Bianet.

The Cage suspects face 7 to 15 years in prison for being memers of an armed terrorist organization.

For more on the Cage Action Plan, see Jan. 25 post.


UPDATE I (6/18) -- The second hearing took place yesterday at which alleged "Cage Plan" ring leader retired Vice Admiral Ahmet Feyyaz Ögütçü gave his defense, dismissing the charges against him as based on a series of fabrications and hoaxes that are part of a conspiracy designed to weaken the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). For an account of the hearing, see this report from Bianet. A third hearing is taking place today.

More Reason Why Neighborhood Pressure Matters

Bogazici University and the Open Society Institute have released a study assessing intolerant attitudes in Turkey toward ethnic and religious minorities and LGBT people. The survey, released in report form as "The Otherization and Discrimination in Turkey
(in Turkish)" ("'Biz'lik, 'Oteki'lik, ve Ayrimcilik: Kamuoyundaki Algilar ve Egilimler"), was conducted between Feb. 15 and April 25, in 18 provinces with the participation of 1,811 interviewees. Hurriyet Daily News summarizes the results:

The most striking result of the survey concerns the question on “who deserves a restriction on their rights?” The answers given by the respondents indicated that the discriminatory tendencies and the level of tolerance have changed little in the last five years.

An astonishing 53 percent of participants strongly believed that the right to freely express a different sexual orientation should be restricted. Similarly, 37 percent of the people sampled denounced the right of believing in no religion, with 59 percent standing against atheists flaunting their lack of religion. Moreover, 28 percent denounced the right of non-Muslims to be open about their religious identity.

The results showed that 72 percent of the sample supported the idea that “those who have a different sexual orientation, like homosexuality, should be open about their sexual identities.”

According to the 2005 results of the survey, 58 percent said non-heterosexuals should not be equally free. The percentage of those who say the rights of those who have a different native language other than Turkish should be restricted is 19 percent, the same figure as the 2005 survey.

Those who say that all ethnicities, religions and sects should be secured by the Constitution make up 74 percent.

Some 36 percent of the interviewees said their primary identity was “being a citizen of Turkey,” whereas a 29 percent thought “having a Turkish national identity” was most important.

Meanwhile, 66 percent said they have no other ethnic culture and they are rooted completely in Turkish culture, while 20 percent said their ethnic culture and language were secondary to Turkish language and culture. Some 8 percent said their language or culture came before Turkish culture while 2 percent said they had absolutely no connection to Turkish culture and language.

59% of respondents in the survey said they did not feel any sort of neighborhood pressure. And, the rest?

Such surveys should boost concern about the arguments of "strong democrats," those who continue to stress democracy with little reference to rights protections and difference. See my March 26 post on the need for Turkey, and the AKP as the government in power leading up constitutional efforts, to come to a sophisticated of rights-based democracy. Until the "democrats" start talking about protecting everyone's rights, promoting difference and diversity in Turkish society, and adopt an open, articulate discourse that encompasses all of Turkish society, many Turks are likely to fear rule by the majority -- and, if the respondents in this poll hasd their say, for good reason. Leadership requires taking risks and promoting new understandings, most especially in conservative societies where difference is seen as something Other. The AKP has taken some positive steps in this direction, but how genuine, far-reaching, and reflective of an overall attitude appreciative of diversity is still very much in doubt. When combined with a general societal ambivalence toward liberalism and a lack of tolerance, many Turks' fear of rule by majority should be taken seriusly. Turkey might not end up like Iran, but it could certainly end up a more closed, oppresive society should majoritarian democracy continue to take a stronger place without attention to rights. For more on neighborhood pressure, see also Feb. 10 post.

USCIRF Again Designates Turkey a "Country of Particular Concern"

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has released its 2010 annual report on the state of religious freedom in countries throughout the world and Turkey has again been named a "Country of Particular Concern." Since the file on the USCIRF website appears to be somehow damaged, below are excerpts of reportage from Today's Zaman:

Turkey remains on the watch list this year also. It was designated for close monitoring for the first time in 2009. The fact that very little has changed in terms of restrictions imposed on people has resulted in it retaining its status as a violator country in the view of the USCIRF.

In addition to these 13 countries, designated the worst violators of religious freedoms around the world, the 2010 watch list includes Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Laos, Russia, Somalia, Tajikistan and Venezuela as well as Turkey with respect to “the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments.” The panel’s report also criticized the current and former US administrations for doing little to make basic religious rights universal.

The commission was founded in 1998 by an act of Congress and has investigated conditions in what it calls “hot spots” where religious freedom is endangered.

Much of the USCIRF report will echo the U.S. Department of State's country report on international religious freedom in Turkey.

State, Society, and Diversity

Today's Zaman columnist Ali Bulac recently penned a column in which he wrote that there seem to be few minority problems when Turkey is viewed from a "horizontal," or societal, perspective. Here, Bulac points to 9,000 marriages between Turks of different ethnic, linguistic, and religous backgrounds (I am curious about this statistic, and where it came from), but wrote that problems areise when Turkey is viewed from a "vertical" perspective, whereby the state, and curiously, intellectuals, are seen to "intervene" and "disrupt" the "internal harmony of society." From Bulac:

The society tends to retain its own diversity and unless there are concrete/material data, everyone is aware that everyone is different. The state, on the other hand, does not allow even the awareness of diversity to strike roots among the society because it is fearful of the public emergence or visibility of diversities due to the principle of equality among its citizens.

This is well evidenced by the fact that since its establishment, the state has not permitted a survey that would realistically show the distribution of different ethnicities across the country. Political scientists advocate two main views in this regard. According to the first view, identities cannot be researched. The society is already as it should be; it has fused all identities -- religious, factional, ethnic, racial, class -- and in the final analysis, this is the main factor that makes a society. The society should be regarded as a mosaic, and studies that would bring differences to the forefront would lead to conflict. We can say that this is the view commonly advocated by scientists influenced by the French republican tradition. Since 1870, France has not conducted any census or survey to find out what religious or ethnic diversities exist in the country.

Scholars from the democratic tradition, on the other hand, suggest that such surveys are needed to obtain the correct information about the society and to determine more consistent economic and social policies. In the Republic of Turkey, the last census in which the people were inquired about their mother tongue took place in 1965. Since then, they have been asked no question about their religion, sect or mother tongue. The concern here is: Since there is no definition of an identity agreed upon by all groups and because a secular identity has been imposed on society in a top-down manner, a study that would expose diversities present would disrupt the official system.

When the European Union defined, though without exhaustive discussions, Kurds and Alevis as “minorities” in its 2004 progress report, this created a major problem. This was a very strange definition because we borrowed the concept of a minority from European legislation. Historically, Islam dealt with non-Muslims with reference to a “dhimmi” status, which was acquired as a result of wars. Therefore, dhimmis do not represent a minority in the sense that Europeans understand it. The Ottoman Empire based social groupings on religion and identity. There was a “nation of Islam” which included Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Georgians, Albanians, Bosnians, etc. Other than this, there was the “nation of miscellaneous elements” (millet-i saire). It should be noted that millet-i saire does not mean “other nations.” If these nations were defined as “millet-i aher” (other nations), then they would be “otherified.” Muslim states and the Ottoman Empire did not discriminate against non-Muslims but considered them within the category of miscellaneous nations. The work to draft a new and civilian constitution that Turkey needs should be encompassing.

I am a bit confused by what Bulac means here by "encompassing," and question his conclusion that there are not significant problems in Turkish society when it comes to minotirites. There is certainly plenty of antagonism and discrimination against minority groups that occurs independent of the state (though, it could perhaps be argued that most of this is largely a symtpom of state policies), as well as a good bit of what many have termed "neighborhood pressure" when it comes to accepting, embracing, and appreciating difference (see Feb. 10 post). Yet, the heart of what Bulac seems to be talking about when he draws a distinction between two schools of public thought, which he labels as republican and democratic, is important, and indeed one that Turkey, along with most other countries, have come to struggle with in recent years. Modern liberalism long relegated the importance of ethnic and religious differences among citizens, in doing "secularizing" citizenship to hold identities sepaarate from belonging to the state as irrelevant. However, importantly, citizenship in most states was not really ever "secular" in the sense that it was void of national, linguistic, or religious characteristics; rather, as in Turkey and France (the example Bulac gives), being a citizen often meant embracing a nationality, language, and religion not one's own, but that was tied to the nation-state identity in which one resided. Meanwhile, other identities in potential conflict with those promoted by the state were frequently repressed. This has certainly been the case in Turkey, as well as in most other nation-states.

I also sincerely question whether the European Union's use of the term "minority" is bizarre (and, to some, offensive) because it made little sense given the legacy of the Ottoman millet system. Rather, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and Turkey's transformation as a modern-state/nation-building exercises seem to be the key point of dissent here. Under Lausanne as recognized by Turkey, only Greek Orthodox Christians ("Rum"), Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews were described as minorities with special status and rights, though this actually, in many cases, resulted in them being perceived and treated as second-class citizens. [Other Christian minorities, such as the Syriacs, have been denied such recognition (perhaps, even under the terms of Lausanne, illegally), as were non-Muslim minorities.]

Lausanne is more the rule of the game when it comes to Turkey's policies toward minorities than the Ottoman millet system, and nation-states and empires, of course, would naturally have very different relationships toward minorities. While Ottomanism was largely premised on an Islamic identity, Turkey is founded on a Turkish national idenitity whereby religion is superceded in importance to nationality. I am unsure exactly how Bulac is suggesting that the Ottoman understanding of "minority" and "nation" should be applied to Turkey, but certainly would welcome further elucidation from Bulac on this point.

Contemporary international law on minorities have defined "minority" -- for instance, the United Nations' 1979 Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities, in which "minority" is defined as "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members -- being nationals of a State -- poseess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion, or language." Does Bulac think individuals belonging to minority groups' inter-mixing with other groups somehow invalidate ties that hold these individuals together in a minority identity? Do fluidity and inter-group relations somehow lessen the degree of protection these groups are due to receive under international law? Bulac's lack of reference to contemporary international law makes me wary to stay the least, but perhaps I am misunderstanding something here.


CORRECTION 4/12 -- Bulac writes there are "more than 9 million men and women from different ethnic groups are married to each other." Still, where does the statistic come from?

Making Friendly on the Turkish Armenian Front

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

The Culture and Tourism Ministry has announced plans to allow worship once a year at a key Armenian church close to the Armenian border. From Hurriyet Daly News:

The historical Surp Haç (Holy Cross) Church on Akdamar Island in the eastern district of Van was renovated and opened as a museum in 2007 by former Culture Minister Atilla Koç. Since then, debate has centered on whether the church would once again be opened for prayer. Buildings designated as museums are not allowed to host religious services under Turkish law.

In an interview with the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review in January, Culture Minister Ertuğrul Günay said the ministry was making the final legal arrangements to allow the church to open for prayer once a year.

Renovating the Armenian church helped begin the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia, but the church remained a topic of considerable debate especially around speculation surrounding whether a cross would be set atop the church. The decision on the cross is still pending.

The governor of Turkey’s eastern province of Van, Münir Karaloğlu, announced at the end of last year that the 10th century Armenian church located on Akdamar Island would be opened as a functioning church and museum by next September, inviting every Armenian Turk to the church when it opens for worship.

Gunay has also expressed intentions to open up other old Armenian churches for worhip if there is significant demand. According to Today's Zaman,

Günay said historic places of worship such as the Sümela Monastery in Trabzon, the Church of St. Paul in Tarsus and the Church of St. Nicholas in Antalya have special significance for Christians and are maintained as museums to be preserved for the generations to come. If there is sufficient demand, Günay said, his ministry would permit religious services to be held at those locations and open them to the public for a limited period of time without hampering tourism.
“We will try to do this at each venue,” Günay said while answering questions from reporters at a ceremony in Ankara to celebrate the 46th annual Turkish Library Week. He was asked if the ministry would allow religious services at sites other than the Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Cross on Akdamar Island in Lake Van.

“Developments regarding the Akdamar church are not new. We represent a democratic and secular understanding. That is what our Constitution requires. Respecting our belief systems is a natural attitude in our country,” he said. “We are only strengthened if our citizens and guests pray in different languages or different ways to the same Creator.”

On Tuesday, head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoglu, in support of the Armenian churches initiative, said that different religions should be allowed to worship according to their beliefs.

Lausanne and Beyond: The Council of Europe and Greeks in Turkey

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Earlier this month, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc met with religious leaders, including Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew, Chief Rabbi of Turkey Ishak Haleva, Armenian Archbishop Aram Ateşyan, Syrian Orthodox Archbishop Yusuf Çetin and Simon Zazadze, who represented the Catholic Georgian Church. At a press conference following the meeting, Arinc averred that the government will move to amend Turkey's laws to allow the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary at Heybeli Island to be re-opened. The seminary was opened in 1844, but closed in 1971. The Greek Orthodoz Patriarchate has long argued that its re-opening is essential to the preservation of the church (see Jan. 10 post), and this was not the first time that government officials have made promises to re-open the seminary (see June 30 post). However, Arinc's statement might be more than a bit premature. Soon after Arinc's remarks, Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesperson Cemil Cicek said, "The Turkish constitution and related regulations do not make the opening of private religious schools possible. If you are going to introduce new rules regarding human rights and freedoms, you need to do it for all groups equally."

In addition to opening up Halki, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate seeks recognition of its ecumenical status, which Turkey has long denied. For Turkey, the Patriarchate represents Turkey's now tiny Greek minority (estimated at between 2,000-4,000 people). The Constitutional Court has blocked past efforts to recognize the Patriarchate as the ecumenical representative of the entire Greek Orthodox Church, and a local court has recently held the same finding in a decision that the Venice Commission declared this month to be inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights, namely Article 9 pertaining to freedom of religion. The issue of Halki and recongizing the Patriarchate as ecumenical all comes down to the Lausanne Treaty, which set up relations between Turkey, Greece, and their minorities at Turkey's founding in 1923.

At the heart of any reform is Lausanne's status in both Turkish and Greek law. In a bold and diplomatic resolution passed this January, the Parliamentary Committee of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on both Greece and Turkey to eschew Lausanne and recognize the supremacy of the European Convention of Human Rights as the appropriate framework in which to make policies related to minorities and minority rights. Arguing Lausanne to be outdated, the resolution calls on Turkey and Greece to deal with minorities as citizens of equal status and to drop the constant rhetoric of reciprocity (in line with Lausanne) inherent in both countries' discourses. Minorities in both Turkey and Greece have long fallen victim to the 1923 treaty, legal arguments both states have make about reciprocity going something like this: Greece treats their Turkish minority in Thrace badly, and so Turkey must as well, and vice-versa.

Bianet does an excellent job of laying out Turkey's homework on minority rights as given to it by the PACE. Importantly, the inclusion of criticism of Greece strengthened the reception of PACE's report, making it both palpatable and welcome to some Turkish politicians, policymakers, and opinion leaders. (In contrast, see the European Parliament's one-way criticism of Turkey in regard to Cyprus, which Hurriyet Daily News reported side-by-side with the PACE resolution. See also Feb. 17 post.)

Also passed by the PACE in January was the report, “Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for Mon-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace [Eastern Greece]," of French parliamentarian Michel Hunault. The report follows a tour of Turkey some visitors of PACE made in June of last year. Soon after the report was released, Turkey's Ambassador to the European Union Volkan Bozkir headed a 12-member delegation comprised of members from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and local officials that met with Greek community leaders. Because of the continued importance of Lausanne, issues involving Turkey's Greek minority are handled by the Foreign Ministry, one of many recommendations the Venice Commission has said needs to be changed.

The most recent Council of Europe action -- the opinion by the Venice Commission -- follows January's PACE resolution and Hunault's report. Significantly, the report analyzes the legal dimensions of the Treaty of Lausanne and, though stating its subordinance to the European Convention on Human Rights, finds no legal basis in Lausanne by which Turkey can justify its refusal to recognize the Patriarchate as ecumenical. Whether the Commission's decision will help the government change current law and navigate around exisiting Turkish case law on the subject remains to be seen, but its unequivocal statement that Lausanne does not limit the Turkish government from recognizing Bartholomew's title will not ring weakly in the ears of those who are listening, however limited their number. From the Commission's opinion as relayed by Today's Zaman:

“The argument appears to be that the Patriarchate was only allowed to remain in Istanbul on the condition that it would shed its ecumenical status. This argument cannot be supported for several reasons,” it said, listing those reasons: “First, even assuming that there was a conflict between the ECHR and the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty the latter does not prevail over the first … Second, there is nothing on the ‘ecumenical’ nature of the Patriarchate in the provisions of the treaty itself, which do not mention the Patriarchate at all … Third, recourse to the preparatory work of the Lausanne Treaty or the circumstances of its conclusion as supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) do not lead to a different conclusion.” The commission concluded, “The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne therefore in no way limits the right of the Patriarchate to use the title ‘ecumenical’.”

The Venice Commission's "Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to use the Adjective 'Ecumenical,'" is not limited to the Patriarch, but the Greek minority in Turkey as a whole, and came at the behest of the PACE following the visit by the PACE delegation last June. For the full opinion, click here.

CORRECTION (3/22) -- Halki was shut down in 1971 following a Constitutional Court decision that annulled sections of the law governing private universites. All private universities were faced with either nationalization or closure . The Patriarchate chose not to nationalize and the seminary closed.


UPDATE I (3/25) -- Deputy Prime Minister Huseyin Celik discusses the persecution of Greeks and the status of the Patriarchate in an interview with Today's Zaman. He also questions the Greek Turks status as a minority under Lausanne.

Serious injustices were done to all these groups during the single-party era in Turkey; however, the injustices done to the non-Muslims were more severe. The wealth tax was a disgrace. The closure of the Greek seminary was a great shame. The Sept. 6-7 incidents were an inhumane conspiracy that humiliated Turkey in the eyes of the world. The alienated villagers were unable to enter Ankara’s city center until 1946. The violation of the rights of the humiliated Alevis, Kurds and the pious have continued until today.

. . . .

We have been having ‘ecumenical’ debates for a long time. Is Bartholomew ecumenical or not? It’s none of our business. Why do Muslims debate the world leader of the Orthodox community, why do they want to be decision-makers regarding this issue? Let the Orthodox community decide on this. If they see İstanbul Fener Patriarch Bartholomew as ecumenical, do we have any right to debate this as nnon-Orthodox people? Let the Orthodox people decide of their own free will.

. . . .

In my view, none of our 72 million citizens should be treated as a minority,” Çelik said. Indicating that believers of the three monotheistic religions along with many other religious communities lived in peace during the Ottoman Empire, Çelik said the state approached all religions and beliefs with tolerance back then. “The slogan that reflected this in the Ottoman Empire was ‘Diversity in unity,’ a slogan which is now promoted by the Council of Europe. The two cultures met at the same point centuries later.

I wonder if this interview would have run in Zaman (the Turkish edition) . . .

Caferi Organize Workshop

Recent intitiatives taken by the government to advance minority rights now include the Alevis, the Kurds, and the Roma. Another group, oft-overlooked, are the Caferis, whose number has been estimated at 3 million. Caferis are largely Azerbaijani Turks who hale from Igdir provicne, which was included in Turkey following the province's transfer from Russia to Turkey following World War I. Caferis, however, largely identify as Shi'a Muslims distinct from Alevis, and the largest concentration of the group is in Istanbul. The Caferis recently organized a workshop for their community leaders. Like ther religious minority groups, the Caferis demand autonomy from the Religius Affairs Directorate, including the right to freely administrate their mosques, religious education classes, and property. They are also seeking inclusion of information about their religion in textbooks designed for manatory religious education classes in public schools, as well as opportunities to talk about their religion on Turkish state television and radio.

TÜSEV's Cengiz Looks at Associations Law

Orhan Kemal Cengiz
PHOTO from Today's Zaman

The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV)'s Orhan Kemal Cengiz has authored a report on the continued difficulties faced by associations as a result of the Associations Law. Despite a drastic overhaul of the law in 2004 at the height of the EU-inspired reform process, significant hurdles continue to encumber the opening, operation, and efficacy of civil society organizations in Turkey. From Today's Zaman:

The report said the establishment has failed to understand that civil society has an autonomous structure completely independent of the public sector. The report said although the new laws made it clear that associations should exercise self-inspection mechanisms, the over-regulating and over-supervising attitude of the state still remains in place. It said this meant that essentially, the root of the problem remained embedded in the legislation, albeit in a much alleviated form: “Unfortunately the custom of taking back rights given by laws via ‘soft’ legal instruments such as regulations or decrees and/or the curbing of rights through such means is a continuing trend.” The report also said the application of the law changed considerably from field to field, saying human rights groups particularly complained about differences and the arbitrariness in the enforcement of the law.

The report also noted that Turkey’s counterterrorism laws were still a major obstruction in the way of the freedom to organize and form associations, as noted by the European Court of Human Rights in various verdicts. The report, in line with the European court’s rulings, said bureaucrats and security officers often abused the tremendous powers vested in their hands by the current Counterterrorism Law. It said some very general and ambiguous descriptions of terrorism in the law created major problems regarding freedom of expression.

Ethnic, religious, and other minority groups still frequently encounter "soft discriminaton" when applying for building permits, etc., and as noted here, the Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in 2006, has not helped, only greatly broadening the authority of bureacrats and security forces to restrict the operations of civil society groups that earn their displeasure.

From the most recent EU Progress Report:

Some legal provisions place an undue burden on the operations of associations. There are high fines or severe punishments for failing to comply with the Law on Associations23. The legal
obligation to notify authorities before receiving financial support from abroad places a burden on associations. Negative portrayal in certain media and at times disproportionate inspections of NGOs receiving funds from abroad, including EC funds, remain a further cause for concern.

Problems with registration of associations and foundations, in particular local representations of international NGOs, are still being reported. At least two other cases regarding major foreign NGOs (International Crisis Group and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute) have been pending for more than a year.

Overall, the legal framework on associations is broadly in line with European standards. However, considerable progress needs to be made as regards its implementation, as associations still face disproportionate scrutiny of their activities, which in some cases has led to judicial proceedings.

There is a growing awareness in public institutions and in the public at large about the crucial role played by civil society organisations, including in the accession process.

However, some difficulties encountered with the consultation procedures reflect the lack of trust between State institutions and civil society organisations. The legal framework for collection of donations and tax exemptions for NGOs needs to be strengthened, in line with EU good practice, to improve NGOs’ financial sustainability.

The Progress Report also cites the 3 month to one year sentence that may befall NGO executives who fail to keep proper records.

For an excellent look at the Turkish environment for NGO operations in light of the accession process, see Nigar Goksel and Rana Birden Gunes, "The Role of NGOs in the European Integration Process: The Turkish Experience," South European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 57-72.

Wrestling for Co-Patriarch

The wrestling in the Armenian Patriarchate continues as its Spiritual Board moves to appoint a co-patriarch to serve alongside the disabled Patriarch Mesrob Mutfayan. Mutfayan is suffering from dementia, and though unable to perform his duties as leader of the Armenian Church in Turkey, is likely to continue to serve in the position until the end of his life as dictated by Church law. In the meantime, Archbishop Aram Ateshyan, who is head of the Spiritual Board, is vying for the position and has received criticism within the Armenian community (for example, in the Turkish Armenian newspaper Agos) for using his position to maneuver so as to ensure the invevitability of his own candidacy against other candidates who are abroad at the moment. At the beginning of the ordeal, Ateshyan opposed an election at all, his critics surmising that without an election of a co-patriarch he was able to control the church through his role as head of the Spiritual Board. In an unprecedented move, Armenian community members organized to form an Election Initiative Committee, which has petitioned the Turkish government to elect a new patriarch while ignoring the disabled status of Mutfayan. It is still unclear what move the government will take, if any, and some observers (for example, this American Armenian weekly) have speculated it is in the Turkish government's interests to keep the community divided by taking no action. Ateshyan's competitors live in Armenia and Germany, where both are primates, and have both made recent visits to Turkey. They are eligible because they were born in Turkey, a requirement of the Turkish government and a rule that has been criticized among some members of the Armenian community as hindering the selection of a competent patriarch.

"The Rabbi of Jews in Turkey" and Combating Anti-Semitism

Rabbi Isak Haleva

From the JC.com:

The Turkish Chief Rabbi, Isak Haleva, has complained to the government after it stalled for months on authorising elections for a new holder of the office.

Rabbi Haleva's seven-year term of office expired last autumn, but elections could not be held because of a row between the Turkish authorities and the community over the official title of the post.

The authorities refused, for reasons that were never explained, to allow the next holder of the post to be called "Chief rabbi of Turkey", and insisted instead on simply "Chief rabbi".

A compromise was eventually reached in which the post-holder would be called "Chief rabbi of Turkish Jews", and a letter was sent allowing the Jewish community to go ahead with the election. A vote should take place shortly, with Rabbi Haleva widely expected to win a second term.

Liberal Turkish paper Milliyet reported that the row was part of a wider governmental strategy to stop non-Muslim communities appointing leaders and force all minority faiths to appoint one joint representative.

Rabbi Haleva made the complaint to the government during a meeting with the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis about the problems of non-Muslim communities in the country.

The meeting was also attended by Greek, Armenian and other religious leaders.

Other issues he raised include the legal ban on Jewish and other minority schools admitting students of foreign nationality.

The Jewish High School in Istanbul, like the Greek and Armenian schools, cannot admit students who hold foreign citizenship, including Israelis.

He also asked the government to consider including provisions in the penal code to justify legal action against antisemitic material in the press, a particular problem in some pro-Islamist publications.

The official view over complaints about antisemitic articles in the past has been that there is no legal basis for legal action.

Jews in Turkey are an officially recognized minority under the Lausanne Treaty, and the United States Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report estimates their number at 23,000. Anti-Semitism in Turkey has been rising since Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, and took a dramatic turn for the worse following Israel's invasion of Gaza in December 2008. Anti-Semitic comments, as the JC.com article notes, are common in Islamist newspapers and the political rhetoric of religiously conservative parties.

Turkish Jews Protest Anti-Defamation League on Armenia

From the Jerusalem Post:

Turkey's small Jewish community has come out against the Anti-Defamation League's new policy position that the massacre of Armenians during World War I was "tantamount to genocide." Silvio Ovadio, head of the Jewish community in the country, issued a statement saying, "We have difficulty in understanding" the ADL's new position on the matter, the Turkish media reported on Thursday. The ADL position only reflected the opinion of "related institutions of the American Jews," the statement emphasized. "We declare that we are supporting Turkey's belief that the issue should be discussed at the academic level by opening archives of all related parties and that parliaments are not the places for finding out historical facts via voting‚" the statement read. The Turkish press also published a letter from prominent Turkish Jewish businessman Jak Kamhi to Foxman on Thursday. In his letter, Kamhi said that "by accepting this false comparison between the uniquely indisputable genocide for which the term was coined - the Holocaust, and the events of 1915, the ADL has committed an act of the most inexplicable injustice against the memory of the victims of the Holocaust, as well as against the sensitivities and pride of the Turkish people, who deserve your praise for their centuries-long tradition of compassion and their culture of humanity and cohabitation that remains an example to the world." Kamhi took issue with Foxman's assertion that there was a consensus among historians that the massacre was tantamount to genocide, saying there was no such agreement.

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), under pressure from Turkey and Israel, has struggled with its position on 1915 for some time now. In 2007, the ADL moved to recognize 1915 as "genocide," only to reverse itself shortly later. ADL's most recent change in position has divided the organization, and sparked a firestorm in the United States at a time when the American Jewish community and the powers that be are equivocating on what before has been firm opposition to genocide recognition.

According to the U.S. Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report, there are approximately 23,000 Jews livining in Turkey. The population used to be larger, but several Jews left Turkey following the Second World War and the creation of Israel, as well as the Turkish Republic's infamous 1942 passage of the "Wealth Tax," which largely targeted the money of Jews and other minorities that had up to the time controlled a significant share of the wealth in the new Turkish Republic.

Ahead of the Curve?

Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertugrul Gunay in Van
PHOTO from Taraf

Hurriyet takes a look at recent initiatives by the Ministry of Culture, headed by Ertegrul Gunay. The story basically cites a litany of Ministry-led endeavors, ranging from restoring the citizenship of Nazim Hikmet to supporting the production of Kurdish-language plays. From Hurriyet:

Arguing the initiative process entails “the real institutionalization of Turkey’s democracy,” Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay said: “First of all, this includes freedom of thought and expression and the self-enunciation of various cultures. We are determined to behave in a way that will eliminate all discrimination, break taboos and dismantle prohibitions. The importance of these endeavors will be understood in time. I believe many people in Turkey appreciate this new and remarkable reconciliation process.”

. . . .

“We will also carry out some other cultural projects that will make people see that different cultures can live together in peace and we should get used to it. We will organize cultural activities to support tolerance and peace in society. I hope these cultural activities will pave the way for the democratic initiative.”

Also included in the litany are Gunay's efforts to publish the work of Kurdish poet Ahmed-i Hani, funding for a film featuring Kurdish language, "İki Dil Bir Bavul," and religious ceremonies at churches that have in some cases not had ceremonies in 100 plus years. Gunay said periodic services could be had at former Christian sites with the permssion of the governor ofthe province where the site is located. I am not sure how this fits into the Culture of Ministry's domain, or what the details are (or, if it amounts to much more than political showmanship), but would hope to learn more.

In June, Gunay addressed Kurds in Hakarri, putting himself at the front of the government's recent Kurdish intiative, declaring then DTP leader Ahmet Turk, now facing criminal charges and a ban from politics, to be the most important person for peace in Turkey.

Power and Discipline?: Religion and Identity Cards

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled that religion cannot be listed as a field on Turkish national identification cards, which all Turkish citizens are required by law to carry. In 2006, Turkey began allowing people the right to leave the field blank or change their religious designation by application, though the ECHR ruled that the new regulation did not go far enough. The ECHR decision also said it was not the duty of the state to collect religious information about its citizens, which the Turkish Statistical Institute collects all the same regardless of whether religion is left blank or entered on the ID card.

The case that resulted in the ECHR decision came from an Alevi man who claimed state authorities would not allow him to change the religion on his identifiation card from "Islam" to "Alevi," and that this violated Article 9 ("freedom of thought, conscience, and religion") of the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as the Turkish constitutional prohibition against anyone being coerced to disclose religious beliefs (Article 24).

At the moment, the Turkish government has only a limited number of categories citizen may declare on their identification cards: Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Christian, Jew, Hindu, Zoroastrian, Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, Religionless, Other, or Unknown. As the U.S. Department of State's report on religious freedom in Turkey observes, some religions, such as the Baha'i, have complained about not having their religion included in the listing. As the report also documents, several non-Muslim minorities have complained of exposure to harassment and discrimination as a result of the inclusion of their religion on their identification cards, and as is the case with the Alevi petitioner, others have complained of harassment by local authorities when seeking to change their religious designation. Additionally, some groups, like Protestants and Syriac Christians, have faced particular difficulty opting out of otherwise compulsory religion classes if their identification cards did not include a religion other than "Islam." The courses teach world religions, but minorities, including Alevis, have long complained about a Hanafi Sunni Muslim slant.

There is also the question, of course, of the sheer construction of such categories by the state, in particular the consideration of "Alevi" as apart from "Muslim," the lack of specific categories for Syriac Christians (who are not Greek Orthodox or Rumeli), and as aforementioned, the fact that some religions in Turkey are simply not represented in the choices available.

Also of interest are demands from women and gender groups to remove marital status and gender from religious identification cards, as well as to change the current law governing women's surnames. Divorce can result in discrimination and other difficulties fror women that men simply do not experience, and LGBT and other gender-conscious groups have long decried the blue and pink color of the cards in terms of LGBT rights.


UPDATE I (2/11) -- Ayse Karabat of Today's Zaman has written more about the demands from women's groups. The article expounds on the Bianet article linked above, and gives some more specific examples of discrimination. In regard to surnames, several women's groups are also demanding amendment of Article 187 of the Civil Code, which restricts women's surnames. A local court has petitioned for the Constitutional Court to consider the matter, implying that the article might violate the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). According to the Turkish Constitution, and thanks to the EU-inspired reform process, treaty law supercedes the Civil Code.

On Neighborhood Pressure

Professor Binnaz Toprak, Bahcesehir Universitesi PHOTO from The Balkans Project


In 2008, the Open Society Institute, in cooperation with Bogazici University, published "Being Different in Turkey: Alienation on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism." Professor Binnaz Toprak led the polemical study, which instantly garnered criticism throughout the conservative press. Conducting research in 12 Anatolian towns, Professor Toprak and her colleagues documented concrete incidents of "neighborhood pressure," a concept first discussed by Serif Mardin who coined the term to describe the pressure some people in Anatolia experience because they are different. They might be different because they are Alevi or some other religious minority, speak Kurdish, or because they drink alcohol and/or wear an earring and have long hair. The reaction to the report's arguments no doubt stems from their similarity to the argument some secularists/Kemalists make to justify the headscarf ban in universities -- that is, if women are allowed to wear the headscarf in universities, other women will feel pressure to do the same lest they be judged as less moral, religious, etc. However, despite the similarity, the report delved deeper, examining the toleration of difference in the 12 Anatolian towns it explores.

I allude to the study now because the debate has once again appeared -- this time on a new blog, Changing Turkey in a Changing World -- and because the exchange is just as relevant now as it was in December 2008. Professor Ahmet Kuru, who is currently at Columbia University's School of International Public Affairs (SIPA), posted a criticism of the report, to which Toprak responds by reiterating many of the arguments she made defending it when it was published a little over one year ago. Also worth reading is a recent interview Toprak conducted with John Feffer of Washington's Institute for Policy Studies' (IPS) Balkans Project. In the interview, Toprak discusses growing conservative attitudes and the headscarf issue.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- Efes Managing Director Tugrul Agribas complains of "neighborhood pressure." From Hurriyet:

Speaking to reporters in Şanlıurfa on Wednesday, Ağırbaş said the company aims to expand the beer market in Turkey, but the number of sales points has diminished to around 83,000 from nearly 100,000 four years ago.

“The per capita beer consumption in Turkey is around 12 to 13 liters,” he said. “The European average is 100 liters. What spurs consumption is restaurants, cafes and pubs. But in Turkey, each consumer pays a special consumption tax that is nine times more than the tax paid in Germany, for example.”

Beer sales points have problems in getting licenses or renewing them, Ağırbaş said. “Beer is a key source of revenue for corner stores and kiosks. Rakı, beer and cigarettes together constitute 70 percent of a grocer’s revenue. When you take out rakı and beer, the grocer starts having a hard time,” he said. “Those who wish to open sales points cannot find places to rent. Others face neighborhood pressure. Meanwhile, chain stores are destroying corner stores.”

Israeli Intelligence Charges Erdogan with Anti-Semitism

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan /
PHOTO by Alessandra Benededeti/Corbis

An intellegence report authored by the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Center for Political Research levels accusations that Prime Minister Erdogan is an anti-Semite, has turned a blind eye to rising anti-Semitism in Turkey despite evidence of its rising fervor, and often uses anti-Semitic remarks in his populist politics. The report alleges that despite Erdogan's public condemnations of anti-Semitism, the prime minister "incites and encourages" anti-Semitism by making low-brow remarks designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator of Turkish political society. From Hürriyet:

A government official said Tuesday the seven-page report accuses Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of inflaming Turkish public opinion against Israel with his repeated allegations that Israel committed war crimes during its Gaza offensive last winter, according to a report by The Associated Press. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the report is confidential.

He said the report also acknowledged Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon seriously offended Turkey's ambassador when he summoned the diplomat to protest a Turkish TV show that portrayed Israeli intelligence agents as cruel. Still, it said that the incident made clear that Turkey "reached the outer limits of the Israeli government's patience."

The report came as Turkey stated Tuesday that it would pursue its determination against anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia and discrimination with its belief in mutual understanding, tolerance, freedom, security and democracy.

. . . .

In Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Ayalon, both of Yisrael Beiteinu, are the leaders of the government's aggressive anti-Turkey faction, while Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Industry Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, both of Labor, head the conciliatory, pro-Turkey faction.

The report was written by the Center for Political Research, which performs the ministry's in-house intelligence analysis, and has already been distributed to Israeli embassies and consulates abroad. It was submitted to the key seven cabinet ministers a few days ago, Israel’s Haaretz reported.

Regarding Ayalon's humiliation of Ambassador Oğuz Çelikkol, the report said that while this seriously offended the Turks for many years to come, “at the same time, the manner in which senior Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, ended the crisis may indicate that Turkey recognizes that it entered the red-line zone and [reached] the outer limits of the Israeli government's patience, and that this was liable to lead to it losing Israel, which would damage Turkey's international legitimacy."

But most of the report focuses on the Turkish prime minister, who it considers the main source of the current friction. “In our estimate, ever since his party took power, Erdoğan has conducted an ongoing process of ... fashioning a negative view of Israel in Turkish public opinion,” via endless talk of Palestinian suffering, repeatedly accusing Israel of war crimes and even “anti-Semitic expressions and incitement,” it said.

Though in international forums Erdoğan always stresses that anti-Semitism is “a crime against humanity," the report continued, in reality, he “indirectly incites and encourages” anti-Semitism in Turkey. "For Erdoğan and some of those around him," it explained, "there is no distinction between 'Israeli' and 'Jewish,' and therefore, [their] anti-Israel fervor and criticism became anti-Jewish."

One result, according to the report, is articles in the Turkish press questioning whether Turkish Jews are loyal to their country – something that could endanger Turkey's Jewish community.

In some cases, it added, Erdoğan simply does not understand the anti-Semitic nature of his remarks – such as "Jews are good with money," which "he sees as a compliment."

While charges of anti-Semitism levelled by Israeli leaders against those critical of Israel are quite common, some of those made by the report have also been echoed in the Turkish liberal press and among intellectuals. While accusing Erdogan of anti-Semitism is quite bold, it does seem that the prime minister has a bizarre understanding of Judaism and Israel. Yigal Schleifer gives one illuminating example from last January when Erdogan alluded to an obscure Jewish saxophonist and anti-Semite named Gilad Atzmon. For more on the AKP response to the wave of anti-Semitism that struck Turkey following Israeli war crimes in Gaza, see Emrullah Uslu's analysis from last January. Also see post-Gaza post from last February, in addition to my post on some Washington neoconservatives' targeting of Turkey and some of the pieces of the puzzle its exponents conveniently leave out.


CLARIFICATION (1/27) -- The analysis from Emrullah Uslu that I linked here contains a factual error. Uslu cites Article 312 as a speech law in Turkey's penal code that has traditionally been used to punish hate speech. While this was the case prior to April 2005, in September 2004 Turkey adopted a new penal code. This penal code basically replaced Article 312 (offense and incitement to religious or racial hatred) with Article 216 (inciting hatred or hostility). I had missed this, and thanks to Bulent for pointing it out.

The Patriarchate and Ankara

PHOTO by Yigal Schleifer/Istanbul Calling

Just before Christmas, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew created an international furor when he gave an interview to American broadcasting network CBS's "60 Minutes" news program. In the interview, Bartholomew says he prefers to stay in Istanbul despite being sometimes crucified. When asked if he felt crucified, Bartholomew responded he sometimes did. (See Yigal Schleifer's Dec. 22 post). The AKP government quickly rushed to criticize the Patriarch for his remarks. Yet, plenty of Turks defended the Patriarch, citing continued government inaction to push for critical religious and minority rights reforms. (For example, see Mehmet Ali Birand's column in Hürriyet. For a defense of the AKP's criticism of Bartholemew and the slow rate of progress in terms of advancing rights for the Greek minority, see Orhan Kemal Cengiz's column in Today's Zaman.)

Minority rights reforms involving the Greek minority are critical to Turkey's EU accession process, especially if support from Greece and Cyprus is to be won. However, instead of pushing for reform, the government has instead made promises without providing timelines or showing serious intent of delivering, oftentimes simultaneously insisting that Greeks are equal citizens and/or pointing its fingers to Greece's abuse of its Turkish Muslim minority, as if two wrongs make a right. For an example of the former, see the remarks of the head of Turkey's Religious Affairs Directorate, or Diyanet, Ali Bardakoglu; for the latter, see Prime Minister Erdogan's comments this week. Unlike Turkey, Greece did not have to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria (developed in 1993) before its accession into the European Union in 1981. That said, minority rights reforms for the Greek community, a legally recognized minority vested with rights under the Treaty of Lausanne, are highly controversial. In March 2008, when the AKP passed modest reforms to Turkey's Law on Foundations, which governed many religious organizations, the reforms faced fierce nationalist opposition from both the CHP and the MHP. Little concrete work has been done since, and with the EU reform process stalled, the AKP government going as perhaps as far as it wants to go at the moment, it is unlikely much will change in the future. Continued problems with its Greek minority continue to get attention in the United states as well -- for example, see Senator Cardin's recent resolution on reopening Halki.

For more information on the Greek religious minority, including its legal standing under Lausanne, see the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom's 2009 annual report. From the report:

When Turkey was founded in 1923, there were approximately 200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians in the country. In 1955, by which time the number had fallen to 100,000, pogroms targeted the Greek Orthodox community, resulting in destruction of private and commercial properties, desecration of religious sites, and killings. As a result of these pogroms and other difficulties, the Greek Orthodox Christian community has fallen to its current low level, which the State Department reports to be no more than 3,000. Although the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey has been under Ottoman Turkish jurisdiction since 1453, the Turkish government today still does not recognize the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate as a legal entity. Moreover, the Turkish government also refuses to acknowledge the Patriarch's Ecumenical status, recognizing only his role as head of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey. Although Prime Minister Erdogan reportedly stated in parliament in January 2008 that the issue of Patriarch Bartholomew's title as "Ecumenical" is an "internal" one for the Patriarchate and that the state should not interfere, the Turkish government still does not officially recognize the Patriarch's Ecumenical status. The Turkish government also maintains that only Turkish citizens can be candidates for the position of Ecumenical Patriarch and for hierarchs in the Church's Holy Synod.

In 1971, the government's nationalization of institutions of higher education included the Orthodox Theological School of Halki on the island of Heybeli, thereby depriving the Greek Orthodox community of its only educational institution for its leadership in Turkey. Furthermore, in November 1998, the school's Board of Trustees was dismissed by the General Authority for Public Institutions. Due to the factors mentioned above and because of the continuing expropriation of income-generating properties from Greek Orthodox private citizens, the very survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey is at risk.

In the summer of 2008, the European Court of Human Rights ruled unanimously in a case brought by the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate that Turkey was in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case concerned an orphanage on the Turkish island of Buyukada owned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Turkish government has yet to implement the court's ruling.

See also the EU progress reports and human rights reports linked under the "Key Documents" section of this site.