Court Announces Reasoning Behind Closure Decision

A weid, and ultimately bizarre ruling from the Constitutional Court, which issued its reasoning for its decision in the AKP closure case last summer. From TDZ:

The Constitutional Court explained late Thursday in a reasoned opinion that it had fined the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) for undermining Turkey's secular principles instead of shutting it down because of the party's efforts to gain Turkey membership in the European Union and to improve women's rights.

The court imposed financial penalties on the party in July for eroding secularism but dismissed the state prosecutor's case to shut down the party and ban Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other leading party members from political activity for the next five years.

Nihat Ergün, chairman of the AK Party's parliamentary group, said Friday that the opinion confirmed the AK Party's success in pushing democratization and the EU process.

"The reasoned opinion has two aspects," Ergün said. "One emphasizes that secularism is important, and it's a warning to pay attention to sensitivities about secularism. The other aspect says the government is not aiming to erode secularism. It confirms that the government is democratizing Turkey. These two aspects should be evaluated together."

Ergün also noted that the Constitutional Court had dismissed 370 pieces of the evidence against the AK Party, highlighting that only 30 statements and acts by AK Party officials were found to be anti-secular. But he said his party attached importance to the court's finding that some words and actions were against secularism.

He stressed that the court had reviewed evidence in favor of the AK Party, establishing that the government had moved forward Turkey's EU membership process, carried out political and legal reform, removed obstacles to democracy and freedoms, introduced affirmative action for women, increased human rights standards and expanded press freedoms.

Of course, remember that the Constitutional Court has been anything but generally cooperative in terms of complying with decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, and that its finding in the türban case is a huge stumbling block to any serious reform of the consitution, causing some to question if the Court even thinks it is possible to legally draft a new constitution in peace time.

Of further interest will of course be the impact this has on the domestic politics of accession since it seems to imply a strong endorsement of the accession process by the Court, and will surely place pressure on AKP to push for more reforms so as to further prove its credentials.

For coverage from TDN, click here.

German Marshall Fund Initiates New Turkey Forum

Here are abstracts to three excellent articles brought to you thanks to a new initiative being taken by the German Marshall Fund.

Turkey After the Verdict: Back to Normal?
Written by Ian Lesser
July 31, 2008
The decision by Turkey's constitutional court to warn and sanction, but not close the Justice and Development Party (AKP), offers an opportunity to Turks and Turkey's international partners. After almost a year of distraction and disarray, Ankara may now be able to focus on the most pressing problems facing the country. Europe and the United States may now be able to treat Turkey as a "normal" country again. Much will depend on whether the court's decision ushers in a period of moderation or renewed polarization, and whether the AKP government uses its renewed freedom of action to think strategically about external policy.

After The Constitutional Court Ruling: Whither Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP?
Written by Amberin Zaman
July 31, 2008
As the dust begins to settle in the aftermath of the constitutional court's surprise decision not to ban the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the most pressing question in the Turkish capital, Ankara, is what impact it will have on the country's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The Court Blinks
Written by Soli Ozel
July 31, 2008
Turkey's Constitutional Court decision not to ban the AK Party, in spite of ten members being convinced that they were indeed guilty of some political wrongdoing, means that Turkey's political problems and its struggles for power will now have to be settled in the political realm, by the ballot box and not by extra-political means. In its own peculiar way, Turkey is clearing its own path toward becoming a better democracy and the thorny issue of Turkish secularism will need to be settled through political bargains and processes rather than judicial fiat.

Click here for the GMF site.

Can Salvation Bring Redemption?

ART WORK: Peter Schrank / The Economist

Although Constitutional Court chairman Haşim Kılıç sounded off that Tuesday night's close decision is a strong warning for AKP, it is yet to be seen that AKP will take the opportunity to mend fences and rebuild ties with reformers who have been critical of the ruling party's recent politics. It should be noted that Kılıç is the Court's only member to opt not to sanction AKP for allegedly anti-secular activities, but his announcement of the Court's decision was quite strong and the close verdict should not be taken lightly. While AKP can do little about those who are stubbornly set in their opinion that the party is nothing but a smarter reformation of Refah, the party does have a critical opportunity to prove itself a center-right party determined to expand economic opportunities and contribute to the development and institutionalization of a healthy set of democratic norms--namely, the protection and expansion of individual and press rights and attention to the EU's demands for human rights reform.

Although many point to the party's restrictions on alcohol, fewer in Turkey have paid attention to AKP's treatment of the country's religious and ethnic minorities, in particular its Director of Religious Affairs recalcitrant stance on Sunni Muslim education for the country's Alevi religious minority (and contrary to multiple decisions by the European Court on Human Rights) and the party's stubborn denial of Kurdish cultural rights (despite the fact that granting these rights was strongly advocated by Turgut Özal, who many AKP members deeply respect and see as a predecessor of their own style of political rule). To my mind, some of the party's more Islamist tendencies, while certainly contradicting the strict laicism that defines the state's treatment of religion, vary little from the advocacy of Christian parties and seem in many ways less threatening than reforms advocated by religious conservatives in Christian countries. (If one compares Erdoğan to the likes of Christian Coalition conservatives in the United States, the former is surely less threatening.) A center-left party that might more rationally oppose AKP's plans to expand the role of Islam in Turkish society is surely welcome, but the party can hardly be characterized as any more religionist than many other center-right religious parties.

However, in a country where civil liberties have yet to fully take root and where truly liberal reformers are desperate to expand traditionally denied freedoms of expression and political participation, AKP finds itself in a much different political context than other conservative political parties. It seems that in order to truly gain legitimacy as a center-right party, AKP must join with other, perhaps more liberally-minded reformers to fix the country's constitutional structure. While AKP is a coalition of religious conservatives and an odd assortment of liberals and pro-market reformers (think pre-Jacobin classical liberalism), it is the religious conservatism of the party that causes, and perhaps rightly so, the most concern among its detractors. When AKP shelved constitutional reform for a last-minute deal with MHP on the headscarf (see Jan. 20 post), the country's arch conservative political party with a quasi-fascist political history, it seriously undermined its self-espoused liberal credentials. Further, as the party has done little since 2005 to move boldly forward with EU-inspired reforms aimed to harmonize Turkish law with EU standards, these credentials are subject to further criticism. For those skeptical to affirm AKP's center-right identity, the party must move away from the intra-party authoritarianism that characterizes all of Turkey's political parties, open its eyes and ears to the complaints of liberal reformers, and renew its commitment to constitutional reform—change that seeks to expand personal liberties and redefine Turkish citizenship along lines much more agreeable to contemporary understandings of democratic pluralism. Additionally, the party must also answer for the absence of women in high-level political posts. There is only one woman in the entire AKP-formed cabinet, and she is charged, not surprisingly, with women's issues. If AKP can meet these demands, it might one day avoid such crushingly stupid indictments as the one that almost brought about its closure. Further, it will surely eschew oft-sounded harangues about it being an Islamist party hell-bent to bring theocracy to Turkey. Such arguments fail to realize the fundamental differences between AKP and Refah and the complexity of AKP as a political party capable of bringing about broad and positive change.
(Important to note is that AKP is currently the only political party capable of such doing).

Along these lines, more food for thought is an op/ed from Serg Truffaut in Quebec's LeDevoir via TruthOut.org:

By one vote and one vote alone, the ruling government party in Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP, has avoided a judicial ban. Although the Constitutional Court judges agreed not to outlaw this party in order to avoid a major political crisis, they did, on the other hand, deem the accusations leveled against the party to be well-founded. Thus is it written that the fierce struggle between Islamists and secularists will continue with renewed vigor.

. . . .

To return to the subject of the day - the court's decision - one must understand that the event that instigated it was not an isolated event. It was also not a primary event that previewed a chain of events, but an event that shines a light on the AKP's desire to broaden religious presence in spheres of activity it had not yet been involved in. One thinks, of course, about the wearing of headscarves in universities - which the AKP proposed and this same court moreover prohibited several months ago.

Before, well before, Erdogan attacked the university world through the interposition of the headscarf, he had applied himself meticulously to handing Turkey's crown jewels over to businessmen sharing his religious views. His first target? The media. He exploited all the holes observed in television legislation to "pass along" the Sabah-ATV conglomerate - the second-most-important in the country - to a pro-AKP financier. You won't be surprised to learn that the latter appointed Erdogan's son-in-law president of that company.

After the media, it was the banks' and big companies' turn. Every time Erdogan and the current president, Abdullah Gul, had the opportunity to place AKP intimates at the head of influential entities, they hastened to seize it. The same rule held true for the apparatus of the state as for the private sector: AKP militants were given preferential treatment. That program's distinguishing feature? The number of women occupying important positions has melted like snow in the sun. In passing, let it be said that among the ministers, assistant ministers, secretaries of state and undersecretaries of state, one finds one woman and one woman only. Of course, she is responsible for Women's Issues.

Strong from the hold they have over the country, Erdogan and his intimates have found nothing better than to brutally strike out at those who criticize them. Notably journalists, some of whom are today in prison. The victory, however narrow it may be, that the prime minister has just won on the legal front will certainly encourage him to continue down the road of Turkey's Islamicization, unless he should renounce the ideas that are at the heart of the AKP. Eventually, it's likely that Turkey will be more like Jordan - half-secular, half-religious - than like any democracy of the European Union that Turkey nonetheless still wants to join.

(A note: In a section of this article not excerpted, Truffaut mentions that the Turkey of the 1980s moved closer to religion in response to the PKK. This is not really explicative of the entire story, as the government's more tolerant stance toward Islam and religion in politics had much more to do with being distracted by the fear of communism (see "Where Have All the Leftists Gone?" Feb. 12 post.) Another critical note is Truffaut's reference to imprisoned journalists. While some journalists have been imprisoned under Turkey's harsh speech codes, I know of no case where a journalist has been imprisoned for criticizing AKP.)

I take objection with Truffaut's notion that AKP "attacked the university world through interposition of the headscarf" and the general tone that the party is highly-organized and is planning a slow, but sure Islamicization of Turkish society. Truffaut's suggestion that Erdoğan must renounce the founding idea of the AKP if further Islamicization is to be avoided oversimplifies what is actually going on here and takes it for granted that AKP has some sort of set, Islamic ideal. In fact, the party's public language and what might best be interpreted as an articulated political platform is not so much about Islam, but about democratic liberalism and an expanded space in which Turkish citizens might exercise fundamental freedoms (religious and otherwise). However, what the party stands accused of by more knowledgeable experts of Turkish politics is "creeping Islamicization" and this in spite of its repeated public assertions that it has no such Islamic agenda. AKP does not at all have to renounce its heart to save Turkey from Islamicization, but rather match rhetoric with action. Most importantly, the rhetoric itself must be more sophisticated, rising above platitudes about the virtues of liberal democracy and instead communicating a clearer idea of how it envisions resolving the eternal conflict between majoritarian democracy and rights-based liberalism—what Robert Bork famously called in American politics the "Madisonian dilemma" (see May 14 post). If AKP can come to a reasonable consensus in this regard, my mind, for one, would surely rest much easier and Truffaut could be dismissed with Rubin and other detractors.

AKP Saved by One Vote

PHOTO: Constitutional Court Chairman Haşim Kılıç, the only judge who ruled against any sanctioning of the party.

The Constitutional Court has just announced its decision regarding AKP's closure, which fell one vote shy of the seven judges required to close down a political party and consider banning the 71 politicians prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya accused of violating the Turkish Constitution's protection of secularism. The 11-judge panel instead issued a decision that denies some treasury funding to the party. The fact that the vote was so close testifies to the case's divisiveness and the high drama that accompanied it. With financial markets actually gaining the past few days on expectation that the Court would rule not to close the party, the Court's decision affirmed expectations and surprised many commentators and several AKP politicians who were predicting closure.

Six judges voted for closure, four for penalities to be imposed on its state funding, and the Court's Chairman, Haşim Kılıç, voted against any sanction.

Kılıç did say that despite AKP's eventual salvation, he believed the party will get the message and curb activities that might be considered anti-secular. He also criticized press coverage of the closure case, which he felt was unfair to the Constitutional Court, and blamed Turkish politicians for not making it more difficult to bring a party closure case to the Court.

For coverage from the Turkish Daily News.

For coverage from Today's Zaman.

What Will the EU Do In Case of Closure? Will Pragmatism Prevail?

The following brilliant analysis/speculation of the EU's response to AKP closure comes from Amanda Akcakoca in Sunday's Zaman.

Turkey's membership negotiations are already in trouble, and even without this closure case there would be very little good to put in the commission's 2008 Progress Report (due to be published in the autumn). There are serious question marks over Ankara's commitment to EU related reforms; major problems still remain on freedom of expression; very worrying signals that backsliding it taking place on issues of human rights and minority rights; increase in torture and maltreatment; and the military continues to play a completely unacceptable role in political life. In this light and given that in countries like France, Germany and Austria, opposition to full Turkish membership is strong, it would seem to be the easiest thing in the world for the EU to suspend the negotiations, making the whole problem of full Turkish membership disappear. This would be the end of Turkey's membership project, as it would be a near impossible task to ever get 27 member states to agree to reopen the talks. However, at the same time it would be delivering the ultimate gift to those who are opposed to Turkey's transformation in Ankara and elsewhere.This, of course, leaves the EU with a dilemma. As Commissioner Olli Rehn has stressed, it is unthinkable that the EU can continue with business as usual with Turkey if the AKP is banned. However at the same time it is very unlikely that the commission will recommend an "official" suspension of talks and it is also difficult to believe that there would be one-third of member states (nine) ready to go against the commission's recommendation and support a suspension of this nature. Turkey is already in a very precarious position and the EU should not act in a way that will add to the instability. Rather, the EU needs to put itself in a position where it can act as a tool to help Turkey through this difficult period -- given that there are many people in Turkey from many different walks of life who are counting on the EU to do just that.

Of course Turkey's relationship with the EU is going to pay a price for what has happened, but because it is also in the EU's own strategic interest to keep Turkey in its "orbit" and thereby able to maintain some leverage on Turkey, the suspension of talks may well take the form of an unofficial "rupture" that would give Turkey and the EU a timeout during which time Turkey will probably have early elections. This sort of break in talks would not require "unanimity" to get things moving again, but at the same time Turkey could be required to meet some "pre-conditions" such as a new constitution or significant judicial reform. Nevertheless, the risks are still high, as Turkey many never meet any of the preconditions and the negotiations could remain stalled for a very long time. But at least then the EU would have removed the ball from its own court and put it back in Turkey's. This response could hardly be described as "soft." This is not the first time the EU has had such a dilemma with Turkey. Another crisis situation at the end of 2006 came about when Turkey refused to extend its EU customs union to Greek Cyprus, something that it is legally obliged to do. At that point there was also much talk of suspending negotiations, but finally it was decided to instead freeze the eight negotiating chapters linked to the customs union. Turkey had three years to resolve the issue. To date there has been no change.

The EU is not in the habit of creating instability in its own neighborhood, and so sometimes acts in a way that is perceived as bending its own rules. The case of Serbia is a good example. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence and the catastrophe this caused in Belgrade, the EU knew it needed to keep Serbia from derailing by putting it on a strong EU track. They therefore offered Belgrade a new agreement, setting it on an EU path without Serbia having to comply with all the pre-conditions. There was objection from some member states, but at the end of day the long-term stability and prosperity of the country was at stake. Before the elections on May 11, EU foreign ministers set aside reservations about the failure of Serbia to arrest key war crimes suspects and signed the new agreement. It sent the message that Europe likes Serbia, which was a successful ploy. Instead of embracing nationalism and isolation, voters gave Boris Tadic's party the most seats in Parliament and there is now a pro-EU ruling coalition. But the EU had to bend its own rule to get the result. Turkey has already lost a lot over the last six months. According to State Minister for the Treasury Mehmet Şimşek at least $20 billion, as the markets have rollercoasted. Turkey's image has also been severely damaged in the outside world both by the closure case of the AKP and by the ongoing Ergenekon scandal. The issue now is how Turkey will overcome the possible outcomes of the case without democracy and stability in the country being further injured. As in Serbia, the EU needs to set aside differences between member states and put Turkey's stability and prosperity at the fore. This is why the EU will show Turkey "tough love" and act in a very pragmatic fashion -- don't expect the ultranationalists and Kemalists to like it, though!

For full article, click here.

Court to Deliberate on July 28

The Constitutional Court will meet to deliberate the AKP closure case on July 28. Seven of the 11 total judges on the panel must vote for closure if AKP is to meet its final demise. The general mood is not optimistic despite Court Rapporteur Osman Can's recommendation that the party not be closed for allegedly anti-secular activities.

Rapporteur Recommends Against Closure

Constitutional Court Rapporteur Osman Can has somewhat raised the prosects that AKP will not be closed by issuing a recommendation that the Court should not consider the party to have violated secular provisions in the Turkish constitution. However, Can also recommended that the Court not annul February's law lifting a prohibition against the headscarf at universities and reportedly recommended that the Court not accept the closure case from the beginning (see March 29 post).

From Today's Zaman:

Osman Can, the Constitutional Court's rapporteur, told the court on Wednesday afternoon not to ban Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) over charges of being a focal point of anti-secular activities because the government's moves were peaceful and aimed at expanding freedoms. Mithat Sancar, a professor of law at Ankara University, said the report is nonbinding and only serves to guide the members of the court as the rapporteur is allowed to make his own evaluations.

"The members [of the Constitutional Court] look at the report to get a better understanding, but in the end vote on the closure case using their own judgment. They do not necessarily vote as the rapporteur advises them to," he said in a phone interview with Today's Zaman.

The same rapporteur recommended to the court earlier this year that it allow the lifting of a ban on headscarves, but the court overwhelmingly -- 9 to 2 -- decided to leave the ban in place. The ruling has been interpreted by most as the judiciary's seizure of Parliament.

Can pointed out that it was Parliament that voted to lift the ban on headscarves on campus and that a previous decision by the top court annulling the lifting of the ban eliminated that threat, according to an unidentified source quoted by The Associated Press at the court on Wednesday.

Mustafa Şentop, an associate professor of law at Marmara University, said the court has a tendency to weigh precedent more heavily than the recommendations of its advisers -- especially on critical decisions such as the closure case and removing the headscarf ban at universities.

"When we look at the court's decisions, we see that the members are in line with the court advisor's recommendations in the majority of cases but are in conflict with the rapporteur on critical issues," he told Today's Zaman.

For the full analysis, click here.

Just When Will Closure Come?

From BIA-Net:

Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek and Deputy Chairperson of AKP’s Parliamentary Group Bekir Bozdağ presented to the members of the Constitutional Court the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) oral defense for the closure case.

The procedure started yesterday morning (July 3) and lasted until 18.00 with a lunch break in between. Commenting about the presentation at the end, Çiçek said, “We explained why this case should have not been filed at the first place through arguments based on the Constitution, the Turkish legal system and the international conventions.”

Çiçek declined to give information about the content of the defense, adding that they would wait for court’s decision.

Oral defense

Based on the newspaper reports, Çiçek stressed the following arguments in the oral defense: “There were confuted disclaimed news reports in the indictment”, “the indictment had false information” and “the indictment included baseless allegations.”

AKP’s defense made use of the Constitutional Court’s latest verdict in the closure case of the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR). The defense also stated that the Chief Prosecutor wanted a type of deputy who is completely subservient to everything.

The oral defense also gave a detailed account AKP’s accomplishments in its six year long rule in various areas from health to women’s rights. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is on trial for being the center of the activities against secularism.

Now the Constitutional Court rapporteur Osman Can will collect all the information and the documents about the case and write his report about the substance of the case. While these procedures are taking place, both the Chief Prosecutor and the AKP will be able to present additional evidence or written additional defense.

The report will be presented to the eleven members of the Constitutional Court, President of the Court Haşim Kılıç will determine a meeting day, on which the members will start discussing the matter of substance of the case.

The eleven member court will make the final decision. In case one of the members is missing or retired, the most senior of the four alternate members will replace the missing member.

According to the Constitution a qualified majority is needed to close a political party. Therefore 7 out of 11 members of the Constitutional Court must approve the closure. According to article 69 of the Constitution, the court may decide to cut the treasury aid to the AKP either partially or completely rather than closing the party permanently. (EÜ/NZ/TB)

Very few observers still think it is possible that the Court will dismiss the closure case or merely cut treasury aid. After Can's report is issued, a decision will be expected soon after and all of this could happen as early as August. As before said, the real question is not so much of AKP's closure, but how the court will treat the 71 politicians who are faced with political bans (see June 17 post).

More Trouble With Europe

Turkish relations with Europe have become further stressed and hope for its bid to eventually enter the EU further dimmed as a result of a special meeting held by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Turkey is a member of the Council and the party closure case has caused the Council to express serious concern for the democratic normalization of Turkey. The result of the meeting was a further condemnation of the closure case (AKP officials had requested last April for PACE to condemn closure—see April 19 post) and the threat of a renewed monitoring by the Council. Full-monitoring ceased in 2004 and paved the way for the European Commission's recommendation for the EU to initiate accession talks with Turkey. Since then, a special committee of PACE has continued to follow Turkish political development in a phrase of "post-monitoring," which committee member Luc Van den Brande pointedly stated has continued as a result of Turkey's unwillingness to adopt European political and human rights norms. PACE called the urgent meeting on May 29.

Although EU relations are already imperiled, the PACE consensus, coming from outside the EU, will strengthen European condemnation and the and the hand of EU politicians in the Sarkozy camp who are opposed to Turkish membership. The PACE report approved Thursday strongly warned Turkey of the political risks in closing AKP, recognized the utility of the Venice criteria for party closure and condemned the closure of political parties for violations of secularism, urged PACE to consider re-imposition of monitoring of Turkish democratic and human rights practices, and significantly, demanded Turkey to treat the recent political crisis as an opportunity to move forward with a civilian constitution.

As does the EU, PACE walks the difficult diplomatic line of not provoking too strong a retaliatory condemnation of PACE, which would rally public support for the Euroskeptics, while at the same time fulfilling its need to address the closure case as a serious concern that will imperil EU-Turkey relations. The PACE decision is likely to heighten tensions between Europhiles and Euroskeptics within Turkey and might well complicate AKP's relations with Europe. CHP and MHP officials have already condemned the PACE meeting as unwanted interference and Foreign Minister Ali Babacan was conspicuously absent. Bababcan cited his necessary attendance at the regular monthly meeting of the National Security Council, but Babacan's decision not to attend is likely motivated by AKP's attempts to distance itself from European criticism and risk being accused of fomenting outside criticism, a definite taboo.

Apart from the report, PACE also passed a report on Friday urging Turkey to better conditions on the Greek islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada, in so doing restoring Greek exiles' property rights and allowing for the construction of a school. PACE members also signed a motion for a resolution condemning the conviction of Ragıp Zarakolu and urging the Turkish government to undertake more comprehensive reform of Article 301. For some Turks, Friday's moves will add insult to injury.

The PACE decision reflects growing polarization between Europe and nationalist politicians in Turkey, and with reform stalled (see Jan. 19 post), it is unlikely that the rhetoric is to stop until the closure case has come to an end. In light of the PACE decision, Joost Lagendijk, Co-chair the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, reaffirmed the grave danger closing AKP will have on future accession negotiations. Still, the EU is unlikely to formally suspend accession talks—once suspended, talks are difficult to recommence—in the face of AKP's closure and thereby give up critical diplomatic leverage.

"Make Noise Against Coups"

PHOTO BY Johan Spanner/The New York Times
The sign pictured reads: "We Were Small in the 80s. Now You Are."

Mary Ann and Richard brought me my very own sign from the large demonstration leading up to Taksim Square on Saturday. Thousands of people attended the unsanctioned protest (there was no permit), but police did nothing to intervene save block access to Taksim. The signs being waved read, "Make Noise Against Coups," and the protests were indeed loud enough to warrant a story in Sunday's New York Times. The NYT article focuses on the class dimension of the current political struggle and the heightened anxiety of the "secular establishment."

From BIA-Net:

On Saturday (June 21) the “Stop the Coups” meeting was held in Istanbul, which was organized by the organization Say Stop To Racism And Nationalism”. Among the supporters were the Global Action Group (KEG), Young Civilians, Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUM-DER), Say Stop To Racism And Nationalism, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party (DSİP), the Foundation of Volunteer Organizations of Turkey (TGTV), the Socialist Democracy Party (SDP), the Socialist Party Initiative, The Peace Congress Activists, Lambdaİstanbul LGBTT Solidarity Association and the Political Horizon Movement.

“We can stop the coups”
Gathering in Istanbul’s historic Tünel neighborhood, the crowd of thousands of people, among whom were intellectuals like Adalet Ağaoğlu, Nazlı Ilıcak, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Lale Mansur, carried the banner that said “70 Million Steps Against The Coup”.

The meeting crowd, which chanted slogans such as “Say Stop, Say Stop, Say Stop To Coups”, “Free, Free, Freedom” and “We can stop the coups”, was interesting in showing that individuals from different backgrounds could get together for a common cause. Kurds, covered women, gays, socialists and many others walked together, making the same demand.

White glove, Turkish flag and police barricade
Among people who were wearing white gloves and blowing whistles against coups, there were those who were carrying Turkish flags as well.

Although the meeting crowd was planned to go all the way to Taksim square originally, it had to end with a press release in front of Galatasaray High School, midway between Tünel and Taksim square, once the crowd encountered the police barricade set for them.

“Today is the day to show the first reaction against the attempt to place democracy under the guardianship of military”
Zeynep Tanbay, who read the press release on behalf of the crowd, said, “Today is the day to raise our voice against coups, coup attempts of all sorts, the day to show the first reaction against the attempt to place democracy under the guardianship of military.”

“Are we experiencing a military coup? At first sight, it seems not possible to talk about such a coup. But, especially the developments after the April 27 manifesto by the military show that we are in a slow-motion coup process, that democracy is subjected to a sort of intervention.”

The concepts of freedom, justice and equality are thrown into the background
Reminding that there were closure cases against the political parties DTP and AKP and that the amendment that permitted the use of headscarf in the universities was annulled, Tanbay told the crowd that “We are facing a new stage in the intervention process that has been taking place for a while in Turkey. The demand by the forces on the side of democracy for a democratic constitution has been dropped from the agenda during this process and The concepts of freedom, justice and equality are thrown into the background.”

We will continue taking steps until we arrive at real democracy
Indicating that they want to disperse organizations such as Ergenekon, the Republican Work Groups and spoil the plans made behind the closed doors, Tanbay continued, “We will raise our voice against coups regardless if it is a summer day, an autumn night or a winter morning. Against coups, we will be on every street in Turkey .We will continue taking steps until we arrive at real democracy. (BÇ/EZÖ/TB)

The Overlooked Closure Case

Much overlooked by the AKP closure case, DTP is also facing closure and the ban of 221 party members, eight of which are deputies. However, in contrast to AKP, DTP's approach to closure has been to stall proceedings. The Constitutional Court yesterday granted the party's request to postpone its oral argument to the court to Sept. 16. The DTP filed its defense earlier this month and Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya has already made his oral argument. In its defense, DTP is citing the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' protection for free assembly and thought. The defense is interesting in that the party is not arguing that it is not connected to the PKK, but rather suggesting that there is nothing criminal in voicing support for the PKK. At the same time, DTP is claiming to reject violence and argue that negotiation with the PKK is the only means by which to reach a solution to the Kurdish problem. The argument is not at all likely to win favors and reflects the sentiments of hardliners who have recently come to control the party. A succinct summary of the party's fragmented leadership following its election last July appeared in the June 1 edition of Today's Zaman.

The decision-making process in the DTP works from bottom to top so, while the election of candidates came to the agenda, those with PKK sympathies had a determining effect. The DTP was hoping to have at least 30 deputies, but it emerged from elections with only 20, which is just enough to establish a parliamentary group. Although the DTP officials found excuses for the party's election results and accused the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of using governmental means, such as distributing coal or giving parents money for their children's' school fees, the moderate wing behind closed doors accused the radical wing of making some systematic mistakes. The radicals suggested that the decrease in votes took place because of the inadequate policies of the moderates.

Before the general elections Türk was the chairman of the party, but he resigned from the post in order to run as an independent candidate. After his resignation the party council elected Nurettin Demirtaş as the acting leader and left the search for a chairman until after the elections. Meanwhile when the DTP formed its parliamentary group, Türk became the chairman of the group. But the radicals were against the chairmanship of Türk, especially after the hand-shaking incident with Bahçeli.

Five months after the general elections the two groups finally agreed to elect a chairman from outside of Parliament. They reached a consensus on Diyarbakır Yenişehir Municipality Mayor Fırat Anlı. But Anlı at the last moment withdrew his candidacy, and in November 2007 Demirtaş was elected chairman, rather than mere acting chairman. However, soon after his election a court case was opened against him on the grounds that he had falsified documents in order to get out of military service; he was arrested and served a short term in prison, but was subsequently released and enlisted in the military. After these developments, the discussions on who would lead the DTP started up again, and now the decision has been left until the DTP's extraordinary congress in July.

But meanwhile, Türk, during a visit to northern Iraq, said in an interview the armed struggle of the PKK is harming the Kurds. This statement angered the radical segment of the party, and while he was still in northern Iraq the party council elected Emine Ayna as the acting leader of the party.

According to parliamentary bylaws the chairperson of a party must also be the chairperson of the party's parliamentary group. The law experts at the DTP warned the party that Ayna, even though she is merely the acting chairperson of the party, has to be the chairperson of the parliamentary group. Türk, in view of the situation, resigned from the acting chairmanship of the parliamentary group.

After this development Türk said his resignation had nothing to do with the internal struggle of the party. "We will continue our work with solidarity. We are a party with a mission and are working for solutions. Of course in politics there will always be debates and critics, but we will always be united," he said, adding that he had not decided whether to run as a candidate for the chairmanship of the party at the July 20 congress.

The party is hopeful to solidify its leadership at another party congress to be held July 20. The factional politics of DTP and the many debates within the party as how it should act in relation to the PKK, most of which never make it into the Turkish press, suggest just how complicated is the issue of PKK affiliation and reflect deep divides over and misgivings about the PKK's continued dominance of Kurdish politics. For more on the issue of negotiation with the PKK and the thorny business of Kurdish politics, see Feb. 4 post and May 16 post.

Closure A Foregone Conclusion

AKP filed its defense statement today and ahead of its deadline to do so. The action indicates that the party is adopting a strategy that treats its closure as a foregone conclusion. Arguing publicly that party officials do not want to drag the country through the political and economic turmoil of a hard-fought closure case, privately the party is planning for the creation of a new party. The party is unlikely to differ much from AKP save for a potential change in leadership. The real question starting to be paid attention to is just which AKP politicians are going to face five-year political bans and exactly how the party is preparing to organize new leadership. Erdoğan is, of course, "the big fish" to be caught and his ban is almost certain. However, more a matter of debate is just how and to what degree he will exercise power behind the scenes. Legal analysts have said that it is perfectly legal for the prime minister to seek elected office as an independent candidate since the political ban only applies to politicians who are members of political parties. However, just what the Constitutional Court and the Higher Election Board decide is subject to speculation, especially as a local election board prevented former RP prime minister Necmettin Erbakan from running in elections as an independent in 2002. Also of interest is discussion of center-right challengers to Erdoğan from both within and outside of AKP.

If AKP is banned, how exactly will events unfold? This question is difficult to answer and due to the variety of contingencies still very much being sorted out, Erdoğan has kept parliament working throughout the summer so as to keep deputies close at hand and parliament poised to initiate early elections should they be deemed necessary. Whether elections will come in the form of provisional elections (depending on the number of deputies the court bans in both the AKP and DTP closure cases) or early elections is also still very much subject to speculation. The prospect of early elections might fall on the same date as municipal elections, currently scheduled for March 29, and the ultimate decision rests with the Higher Election Board. In the event of a shutdown, AKP's preference is for the earliest elections possible.

The 98-page defense statement was itself quite simple and focused mainly on the very political nature of the case. Provocatively, the statement also declared that has confused the issue of secularism and that the Turkish model is out of date with a "universal understanding" of the concept. Rather than defining secularism as a "lifestyle," as the prosecutor has done, the statement argued that secularism should be understood as a separation of church and state. While such a model of secularism follows the American model, the Turkish model is much more similar to that practiced in France, a model that denies religion from having any influence in public affairs whatsoever (see April 13 post). Criticism was also made of Yalçınkaya's sloppy indictment (the Chief Prosecutor's love of Google) and fell along the same lines as the critique of the indictment submitted to the Court in AKP's preliminary defense statement. From the statement:

"All data in this case against us have been interpreted by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office at the expense of freedoms. However, the fundamental principle of universal human rights law is ‘interpretation in favor of freedoms.’ Let alone interpreting data in the favor of evidence, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office has literally used the method of ‘divination’ in assessing the AK Party’s alleged goals and has shown things not likely to happen as likely.”

As the Court's decision in regard to the türban amendments evidences, such a defense is not likely to be well-received. The Court's decision in the case could come as early as July, and rest assured, AKP will be prepared for the verdict.

Desperation Is Not A Good Thing

In recent days, two rather extraordinary proposals have been made by AK party officials, the most notable being Speaker Köksal Toptan's idea a senate be created so as to take on some of the responsibilities of the Constitutional Court and provide a further check on judicial power. A few days later, AKP deputy Ahmet İyimaya suggested that AKP draft a proposal that would allow the parliament to suspend verdicts issued by the Court. Both attempts are widely viewed as designed only as means by which AKP might save itself, and opposition parties have squarely rejected them while the party's top brass has been wise to keep its distance. These proposals will require that the parliament amend the constitution, a move that is unlikely now as it was before the court decided the türban case. Significant is that these very reactionary measures will likely weaken support for AKP by reinforcing the image that the party is only out to save itself. The idea that AKP is selfishly trying to save itself is similar to the idea of a significant number of former AKP party supporters who have come to view the party as only concerned with securing the rights of Sunni Muslims. The party should take heed of recent polls that reflect a growing disillusionment with AKP. Gareth Jenkins' analysis of a recent poll conducted by A & G research company and that ran in Milliyet this week echoes this cause for concern:

Worryingly for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the A & G survey reinforced the findings of other opinion polls, which had suggested that the government’s heavy-handed attempts to abolish the headscarf ban in Turkish universities (see EDM, February 11) and the subsequent case filed for the party’s closure (see EDM, April 1) have undermined its popular support. When asked how they would vote if a general election were to be held immediately, only 31.4 percent said that they would support the AKP, down from 46.6 percent in the last general election in July 2007. However, recent events appear to have shaken voters’ confidence in the AKP rather than persuaded them to switch their allegiance to another party. Of those questioned 24.7 percent either failed to reply or said that they were undecided.

. . . .

Although they have improved in recent years, opinion polls in Turkey have often proved unreliable. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the results of the A & G survey would appear to suggest that the AKP has been damaged by its attempts to lift the headscarf ban and the subsequent court case for its closure. Privately, some AKP officials have advocated bolstering its defense in the closure case by calling an early election, in the expectation that the party would be returned to power with an increased majority. However, although few doubt that the AKP would win any early election, the results of the latest A & G survey suggest that it could turn into a Pyrrhic victory and leave the party with a considerably reduced parliamentary majority (Milliyet, May 9-10, Vatan, May 11, A & G website, www.agarastirma.com.tr).

In terms of practical politics, it is wise for Erdoğan to reject these proposals and do a better job of keeping similar proposals out of public view. It also would seem necessary that the party reaffirm its commitment to work on behalf of securing greater rights and freedoms for all citizens instead of continuing to react to resistance againt the türban. The best way to protect the rights of Sunni Muslim women is to focus on bolstering the party's mandate so that it might have the political clout necessary to ecure passage of the constitution it was planning to introduce prior to the closure case.

Further, AKP should do a better job of listening to its detractors. The A & G poll suggests that there are numerous voters who have become disillusioned with AKP, but who are also not content with CHP or MHP and probably also uncomfortable with the judiciary's heavy hand. Not all AKP detractors are CHP-style staunch secularists out to deny Sunni Muslims' basic rights, but are deeply concerned with AKP political decision making and increasingly uneasy about the party's sincerity in expanding rights and freedoms to all citizens. They are skeptical that AKP sacrificed and continues to sacrifice so much political capital for the türban reform and I conjecture are made further uncomfortable with the party's seeming narrow focus on the issue and its desperate attempts to save itself from closure. Further, on a normative level, these concerns are not unjustified. Toptan' senate proposal and İyimaya's suspension idea rightfully draw criticism of AKP insomuch as constitutional reforms should be designed for the Turkish political systems' long-term benefit and not a response to a specific political exigency.

U.S. Shifts Line . . . Slightly

Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has spent the week meeting with various U.S. officials over a whole host of issues ranging from cooperation with the United States to develop nuclear power to Turkey's role in ongoing peace talks between Syria and Israel. Most important to my interests, however, is an apparent decision on Rice's part to declare the United States' support of AKP. Speaking at a joint press conference following here meeting with Babacan, Rice responded to a question about the closure case:

"Our view is that Turkey will, of course, resolve its issues through its democratic processes. But we are going to continue to work with this government with which we have found an excellent working relationship, with which we share common values and which increasingly, over the last year or so, we find ourselves working more cooperatively, more in unison to solve really hard problems than I think has been experienced in US-Turkish relations for some time."

Although her positive words do not constitute condemnation of the closure case, they do at least bolster support for AKP and send a clear message that the United States is in no way a proponent of AKP's closure nor will it "authorize" military involvement, as was the case when Refah was pushed out of power as a result of intense military pressure on the governing coalition at the time. I still contend that it is important for the United States to join the European Union in condemning the closure case, but the Bush Administration is obviously not willing to do so (see April 18 post).

In other news, the United States has appointed career foreign service officer James Jeffrey as its new ambassador to Turkey.

Constitutional Showdown

PHOTO FROM Der Spiegel

The Constitutional Court ruled 9-3 yesterday to annul amendments passed in February to lift a ban on the türban at universities. The appeal to annul these amendments was brought by CHP and DSP and is at the center of the current showdown between AKP and the Constitutional Court. Following a 6-hour emergency meeting, AKP declared that the ruling was in violation of the Constitution and some sympathetic legal experts have declared that the legislature can regard the ruling as non-existent and keep the amendments in place (see Mustafa Şentop's comments in Today's Zaman).

The ruling argued that the amendments violated the principles of secularism laid out in Article 2 of the constitution and found a basis to rule on the substance of the amendment in Article 4 of the constitution that assert the unalterability of the state's core values. The ruling is in contradiction with the non-binding recommendation's of the court's rapporteur, Osman Can (see May 18 post). In a report released prior to the court's verdict, Can argued that the court could only rule on the amendments as to their form, but not their substance. However, the court arrived at a different interpretation of Article 148's application to the appeal.

The court's annulment of the amendments on substantive grounds is a particularly bold statement in light of the fact that the court could have rejected the case without comment by asserting that it could not rule on the amendment's substance, but uphold the türban ban based on its obligation to adhere to prior rulings. The court rejected a similar attempt to lift the türban in universities in 1989, but the legislation was by statute and not amendment to the Constitution (see Jan. 20 post). In rejecting the amendments, the court went further than it did in 1989.

Protests occurred throughout the country today as many citizens declared that the Court had usurped the role of Parliament. The court's sweeping decision also has implications for the closure case pending against AKP in that the 9-3 ruling reveals strong secular sentiment felt by the court's judges. Eight of the twelve judges were appointed by President Sezer, a staunch secularist.

Joost Lagendijk, co-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, and the European Parliament's Turkey rapporteur, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, used the opportunity to push AKP to introduce the new constitution. The EU has long argued that Turkey's political problems are systemic and that a constitutional overhaul is in serious need.

It seemed until of late that AKP took these recommendations very seriously, but at the moment they seem to be falling on deaf ears. Although last April AKP found itself considering calling early elections and attempting to push through amendments that might save itself from closure, the party has since taken another route and is preparing itself for closure. This strategy is in many ways more cautious than the former, but opens the party up to criticism that it cares only about its own self-preservation. Since today's bold decision reveals a willingness to take strong action against the AKP and its alleged Islamization of politics, it is ever more likely that the party will face closure and most have already begun to accept this fate as a foregone conclusion.

An article in today's Der Spiegel suggests that despite calls for peace and calm in the face of a shutdown, come the Court's decision there will likely be large-scale protests throughout the country. I am not so sure of this, especially as AKP has avoided such confrontational means before and insofar as Erdoğan, by every indication, likes to keep politics at the elite level. AKP has also repeatedly told its constituents to remain calm in the face of closure and has publicly sworn not to provocate mass demonstrations that might further destablize the country. Mass demonstrations risk intervention by the military and basically provide the TSK with a justification to enact a full-scale coup. Past reports of a previous coup attempt planned by some forces within the TSK suggest there is at least some support within the General Staff for strong action. AKP will thus likely play it safe, pray that it will not be closed, and in the likely event that the party is forced to re-group, do so as best it can with as little damage as possible done to the larger moderate Islamist forces long-term political existence. Perhaps most troubling to AKP is that yesterday's strong ruling indicates that the court is prepared to enact bold sentences on the list of 71 politicians the Chief Prosecutor has asked be banned from politics.

Click here for an English translation of Turkey's 1982 constitution.

Battle Lines Drawn

Yesterday the Supreme Court of Appeals' Chamber Presidents Council sounded off against the AKP government. A statement released by the court accused AKP of attempting to undermine the judiciary and looking to Europe for its solutions. The report criticized the party's submission of planned judicial reform to EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn before it had consulted the Turkish judiciary and asserted that the party's government was trying to inappropriately pressure the Court. Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek struck back that the court was acting like an opposition political party and EU politicians responded similarly.

Ria Oomen-Ruijten, the European Parliament's rapporteur on Turkey, said that the closure case is not about the judiciary and that the Constitutional Court revealed its own impartiality by releasing the statement. The warning was harsh and accompanied with a statement by the rapporteur that nowhere else in Europe do prosecutors enjoy the kind of power they do in Turkey.

European Parliament Approves Turkey Progress Report, Criticizes Recent AKP Moves

The European Parliament approved two amendments to the Turkey progress report the EP's Foreign Affair Committee approved in April (see April 25 post) and voted to approve the final version of the report. Both amendments can be read as critical of recent actions taken by AKP. The first amendment was pushed by leftist parliamentarians and condemns the excessive force used by police during May Day celebrations (see May 8 post). The second amendment promulgates that much more is needed to be done to protect freedom of expression in Turkey, basically affirming what many EU politicians have already said was quite a lackluster reform that might change very little (see May 8 post and May 21 post).

As to the closure case, the report called on the Constitutional Court to respect the Venice criteria for party closure and affirmed its concern over its impact on Turkish democratization. European Parliament Rapporteur on Turkey Oomen-Ruitjen said that AKP might have avoided the case completely if it had moved ahead with the constitutional overhaul it was planning and remarked that suspension of constitutional reforms was regrettable. Oomen-Ruitjen's remarks speak to EU politicians' utter lack of faith in the judiciary of Turkey to eschew politics, and, yes, while it is sad that AKP did not push forward with the constitution instead of stopping along the way to make a deal that has cost them a great lot of political capital and put the party at risk, what can be done about it now?

AKP Suspends Plans for Amendments

On Monday night, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan told a group of reporters in Egypt that the party has suspended efforts to ush through the package of constitutional amendments expected to change the law relevant to party closures. Babacan told the reporters that AKP is prepared to accept the verdict of the Constitutional Court and that hopefully commonsense will prevail.

The news confirms a significant shift in strategy for AKP as rumors continue to fly that the party is already preparing for opening another party following its closure.

Tread Carefully Young Skywalker . . .

Prominent American neoconservative Michael Rubin's recent tirades (see his recent article in The American) against AKP and endorsement of its closure have affirmed that the Washington ideologue does indeed live in a world disconnected from reality. Unfortunately, Rubin's ideological wonderland is not altogether his own and the space of insanity he has carved for himself does not necessarily have walls. American policy toward Iraq and Iran provide ample reason to be concerned that Rubin's land of make believe might actually leak into the thinking of Washington policy makers, and as with American policy toward Iraq and Iran, infect policy makers' capacity for reasoned judgement in light of the facts before them. One of the most terrifying quotes of the last decade appears in Ron Suskind's account of former Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neill's short-lived career in the Bush White House. Quoting O'Neill:

The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."

The "reality" created led to the disaster in Iraq and a similar construction is being applied to American policy toward Iran. With Foreign Minister Ali Babacan expected to make a trip to Washington at the end of the month, it does not seem a bad idea to keep track of people like Rubin, lest they weave others into their fanciful creations. In this regard, Şaban Kardaş' gripping column in Today's Zaman provides ample food for thought. Kardaş is responding both to Rubin's piece in the ultra-conservative publications The American (linked above) and his earlier published piece in the National Review Online (see April 18 post). For more on neoconservative antics, simply search the label "Neoconservatives" at the end of this blog post.

RUBIN FIGHTS THE 'DARK SIDE'IN HIS 'WONDERLAND': BAD ADVICE FOR THE US ADMINISTRATION—Şaban Kardaş (excerpt):

Rubin's world

These two stark pictures of Turkey also instruct the outside perceptions of the positions and identities of the parties in Turkish domestic politics. Of particular relevance is how to ascertain the true pro-democracy forces, hence the allies of the West in Turkey. Michael Rubin presents a very grim picture of Turkey. In an essay for National Review Online, Rubin compares Turkey to Iran prior to the Islamic revolution. Having underlined the threat posed by Islamic parties in general and the AK Party in particular, he advises the Bush administration not to "abandon its ideological compatriots for the ephemeral promises of parties that use religion to subvert democracy and seek mob rather than constitutional rule." For Rubin, "Turkey is nearing the cliff" and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should "not push it over the edge" by expressing support for the AK Party. In his contribution to a debate hosted by The American, Rubin responds to the question whether it is the ruling AK Party itself or the lawsuit brought against the AK Party that poses the greatest threat to Turkey's secular and democratic institutions. Rubin views the legal case as an affirmation of democracy and constitutional rule. He finds Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's party in grave violation of the wall of separation between religion and politics, disregard for rule of law, suppression of dissent and a policy of placing his own followers in influential bureaucratic positions. Having noted that "both AKP supporters and Western officials unfamiliar with the AKP's record paint the Court's actions as undemocratic," Rubin assumes a self-declared mission to reveal "the dark side," hence his advice to the Bush administration to reassess its true counterparts in Turkey.

Rubin in 'Wonderland'?

This picture of Turkey, however, differs from the one most analysts and Western politicians believe, as Rubin himself admits. Rubin depicts the actors that are perceived as the pro-democracy forces and most likely allies of the West in Turkey by most international and Turkish observers as the dark side seeking to take country down a dark road. For instance, Mustafa Akyol, another participant of the same The American debate, believes that the closure case amounts to a threat to Turkish democracy. For Akyol, the tension is between the reformed Islamists representing democratic forces in favor of Turkey's cooperation with the West and increasingly inward-looking secularist groups supporting anti-Americanism. Akyol is not alone in this analysis, and many liberal and democratic voices in Turkey share similar views.

This reading of Turkey's balance of forces, diametrically opposed to that of Rubin, is shared by outsiders, too. Given that the whole EU machinery has served as the watchdog over Turkish democracy for years, who is better positioned to comment on the AK Party's democratic credentials than the European Union? EU representatives have thrown their weight behind the AK Party. Olli Rehn, European commissioner for enlargement, maintained that "Turkey's tension is between extreme secularists and Muslim democrats." Rehn elsewhere also underlined his belief that there is no smoking gun indicating any hidden agenda pursued by the AK Party. Joost Lagendijk, co-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, attacked Turkey's secularist social democratic opposition, the Republican People's Party (CHP), for its failure to act as a true socialist and democrat party. Similarly, in a recent Washington Post report, Claire Berlinski captures how the underlying power struggle is concealed by appeals to ideological threats to the constitutional order. Having noted how "the secularists here are if anything more hostile to the West than the AKP" she concludes, "Don't make the mistake of thinking that 'secular' here means 'liberal, democratic and friendly to the West.' That, it decidedly does not."

A world gone wild?

Is everybody but Rubin under an illusion? Are the secular "ideological compatriots" of the West true allies of the United States? Just a reality check on the "plot" and evil forces that Rubin paints makes us cautious of his assessment of the forces of the dark side. Differences of interpretation between Rubin and others aside, the factual information he cites is false at worst and unsubstantiated at best. A few examples are in order. First, whereas no sane person would believe that the AK Party sees democracy as a "one time deal," Rubin maintains that for Erdoğan democracy is "One man, one vote, once." Second, the hit man who "gunned down a justice" was not a follower of Erdoğan, as Rubin claims, but an operative of ultranationalist circles, which are, by the way, anti-American. Only recently, a photo of the perpetrator, Alparslan Aslan, with Veli Küçük, a leading figure of the neo-nationalist gang seeking to destabilize the country, was published in Turkish media. Third, nor did the AK Party undertake the kind of purge of the judiciary Rubin claims it did. Fourth, for Rubin the military's declaration of support for the Constitution in a written statement is not a coup. It might be permissible under normal conditions, but what he ignores is that if it is meant to influence a pending court case, it might very well amount to a coup.

Fifth, Rubin also criticizes Erdoğan's "harassment" of Nihat Genç, Serdar Akınan and Tuncay Özkan, leading neo-nationalist figures. Let alone substantiating his claim, he does not stop to ask if the constant accusations of those figures may fall under "hate crime." What is more worrisome, however, he completely misses the point that these figures foster a paranoid nationalism which is by all means anti-American. Indeed, one of the reasons these people are so much against the AK Party is their belief that the AK Party betrayed the country's interests by submitting to the US yoke. If one is looking for traces of anti-Americanism or "Islamofascism" in Turkey, it will be enough to read one of Akınan's columns in Akşam -- for instance Feb. 27, 2008. Interestingly such arguments escape Rubin's radar despite his self-declared mission to reveal hotbeds of anti-Americanism and Islamofascism.

Rubin misrepresents the position of Turkish actors; commits grave factual mistakes about self-declared ultranationalists and anti-Americans, and then warns the Bush administration against anti-American forces and "false information," by pretending to represent the higher ground of an expert of Turkish politics. Can all this be true?

Rubin against the 'dark side'?

There is ground to question the basic thrust of Rubin's argument. One is left wondering: Who are the evil forces, if there are any? And where is Rubin placed in this game, anyway? Let's draw some analogy from the "Star Wars" trilogies, which may help explain those strange bedfellows. In the original trilogy, Luke Skywalker trains to become a Jedi fighter and joins the struggle against the evil, totalitarian empire. The return of the Jedi and the heroic struggle of the rebels eventually bring down the empire. If this is the setting of Turkish politics, and Rubin is with the Force, we would welcome him as either the Master Yoda or the Young Skywalker who fight for freedom.

An alternative story is presented in the prequel trilogy, though: Darth Sidious, on his way to establishing the authority of the dark side of the Force and emerging as the emperor, skillfully manipulates the republic, and most importantly young Anakin Skywalker, whom he lures to become his next apprentice. Darth Sidious, presenting himself as the upholder of peace and stability, uses his secret separatist army of clones to create turmoil, which serves as the pretext for the suspension of republic. Again, if Rubin is one of the noble members of the Jedi, such as Obi-Wan Kenobi, seeking to uncover the plot and prevent the young Anakin from being lured by Sidious, his quest to save democracy is more than welcome. What if Rubin is one of the characters on the dark side, though? The question then might very well be whether he is the master or the apprentice.

Rubin: master or apprentice?

Either Rubin's remarks are reflective of ignorance and naïveté at best -- Rubin the apprentice -- or a deliberate attempt to misinform and manipulate at worst -- Rubin the master. If it is the former, he either lives in a wonderland which does not correspond to the Turkey most reasonable people know of, or he is being taken for a ride by his Turkish informers. The best one could hope is that someone informs the young Rubin about the dangerous path he is taking. If it is the latter, those neo-nationalists who contemplate rallying behind Rubin better be careful lest they are reduced to his clone army. Clones are destroyed, too, when their date of expiry arrives and a new apprentice emerges.

Science fiction aside, the point I am trying to make here is that in any case, Rubin's claim that he is the one familiar with real Turkey needs to be approached carefully. His credibility to serve as the guru for Washington is questionable. If the current, or for that matter the forthcoming administrations, see Turkey as an important ally and are committed to the survival of Turkey's democracy, they will have to choose carefully their domestic allies in Turkish politics. If American administrations are going to be consulted by self-declared experts such as these and their ideological dogmatism and distorted analyses, the best one could say is "may the Force be with them," lest they fall victim to the spiel of the dark side.

Erdoğan Can Run As An Independent?

From Today's Zaman:

If the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is unsuccessful in defending itself against a closure case at the Constitutional Court, its members can still run in general elections as independent deputies, according to a report in yesterday's Star daily.

Columnist Şamil Tayyar reported the claim yesterday on the basis of a conversation he had with the head of the Supreme Election Board (YSK).
The AK Party, re-elected to power with a solid mandate of 47 percent on July 22 of last year, is facing a closure case filed by a state prosecutor who claims that the party has become a "focal point for anti-secular activity." The prosecutor is also demanding that 70 AK Party members and former AK Party member President Abdullah Gül be banned from holding political party membership for the next five years.

In his column Tayyar wrote that YSK President Muammer Aydın had told him there were no legal obstacles to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or any other party member running in the next general election as an independent candidate. Underlining that Article 69 of the Constitution, which regulates political party closures, clearly states that no actual political ban is imposed on party members whose parties are shut down, Aydın noted that a ban only forbade such individuals from holding membership in political parties.

Caught in the clutches of the closure case, AKP is most certainly moving in the direction of accepting closure, regrouping, and running for elections in a slightly modified party bearing a new name. In the likely events that Erdoğan and other members are banned from politics, which in many ways is the key objective of the party's opponents, the suggestion that these politicans can run again as independents becomes very significant. The legal technicalities of this are still unclear to me, but I am sure there will be plenty to come as AKP moves to accept closure as a foregone conclusion.

More as it happens . . .