Leaving the Past Behind: Re-setting Greek-Turkish Relations?

AFP Photo from The Guardian

Before Prime Minister Erdogan's arrival in Greece on Friday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called the prime minister's visit a "revolution" in Turkish-Greek relations. No doubt eager to use the visit as a means to demonstrate its "zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy, the Turkish government hyped the visit for weeks before with talk of disarming the Aegean and ensuring a new era of cooperation in which tension between the two neighbors would become a thing of the past.

Last month, Turkey and Greece signed five "confidence-building measures," including one that assured regular joint parliamentary meetings between them, the first of which resulted in 21 bilateral cooperation agreements signed Friday.

Coupled with Turkey's EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis' call in March for both countries to reduce arms procurements, Erdogan's visit and April's confidence-building measures do indeed signal a will by some politicians in both countries for mutual cooperation between the two countries, but the fundamental problem of territorial disputes and continued aerial confrontations between the two countries' air forces, as well as different approaches to reconciliating Cyprus, will continue. For further explanation of these, see Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mehmet Ali Birand's column in which Birand excerpts snippets from an interview he conducted with Greek Prime Minister Georges Paprendreou.

In Athens, Erdogan reiterated Bagis' earlier call for arms reduction, as well as proposed that both countries file flight plans with NATO and with each other in effort to avoid dogfights over disputed airspace over the Aegean wherein Greek planes continue to fly with full payload, another issue Erdogan broached.

However, such moves seem difficult in Greece, where some Greek nationalist politicians have warned that Greece should not be duped into falling victim to what are sometimes characterized as Turkish tricks just because Greece's economy is in dire straights (in fair part, due to military spending efforts to keep up with Turkey -- see April 27 post).

It is also not clear whether there is such will on the Turkish side. On the morning of Erdogan's visit, the Turkish miitary flew six F-16s into disputed air space, resulting in mock dog fights with the Greek pilots. Bagis had told Greek television before the meeting that the continued dog fights were also a problem for the Turkish government, hinting that the military and the government are not necessarily on the same page.

The cooperation agreements signed pertained to areas ranging from immigration to tourism to technology and trade. One of the more important deals brokered pertains to Turkey's facilitation of the return of illegal immigrants who have re-located from Turkey to Greece, an issue that has long annoyed Greece. All in all, 10 Turkish cabinet ministers travelled with Erdogan to Athens to participate in the joint meeting, haled as a "high-level cooperation council."

Also along for the ride were an approximate 100 Turkish business people, key to Ankara and Athens stated goal of expanding bilateral trade and investment opportunities, likely to be the hardest immediate concrete result of the meeting.


UPDATE I (5/22) -- Greece has rejected Erdogan's proposal that Greek planes fly without payload when on patrol in the Aegean. Greek deputy Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas told Greek newspaper Imerissia, "Greek warplanes are armed because they are scrambled to face an unknown threat, because the Turkish side does not file flight plans to enter the Athens Flight Information Region."

Old Problems and New Possibilities

In preparation of Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Greece, Turkish Foreign Ministry undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu is in Athens this week working out just how much progress can be made in bilateral relations between the two countries. Both NATO members, Greece and Turkey have for years spent huge sums of money on weapons, most of it going to Western weapons contractors. The sums are particularly burdensome for Greece, which has a small population and a GDP far below that of Turkey, prompting Greek citizens to pay a considerably larger amount in defense spending per capita than Turks. The financial crisis has presented an opportunity to reach a new stage in relations, and hopefully, scale back this spending. However, domestic problems and old prejudices in both countries and Turkey's lagging accession process play a spoiling role -- much to the benefit of weapons contractors. From Today's Zaman:

Greece, the country with the highest military expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in Europe, has in a sense become a victim of its arms race with Turkey. In 2000 Turkey devoted $16.4 billion to its military spending, while that figure was $8.7 billion for Greece in the same year. In 2003 Turkey's military spending stood at $13.4 billion, compared to $8.5 million in Greece. Per capita defense spending in Turkey was around $164 on average in the 2000s, while this number never went below $709 in Greece.

Turkey's military spending gradually declined and fell to $11.6 billion in 2008, while Greece's military expenditures consistently increased, reaching $9.7 billion in the same year. Speaking about Greece's military spending and its connection to the financial crisis, International Crisis Group (ICG) Turkey analyst Hugh Pope said reports of large German sales of armaments to both Turkey and Greece illustrate a phenomenon -- which he says is most likely just coincidental -- that the German policy of excluding Turkey from the EU has contributed to tensions between Turkey and Greece, from which the German arms industry has then profited.

“Although the January trip to Turkey by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has done much to improve the climate, past statements by German politicians have left the impression that Germany opposes Turkey's EU membership, which frustrates Turkey and feeds tensions between Turkey and Greece,” Pope stressed.

An additional paradox is that Germany is also doing its best to help Greece emerge from the financial crisis as its partner in the EU, while one of the contributing reasons for that crisis is the fact that Greece's per capita military spending is higher than the average of NATO member countries. According to Pope, fear of Turkey is one of the main reasons why Greece spends large amounts on its military.

According to the Deutschlandfunk radio station, Greece buys 31 percent of its arms from Germany. This is a high figure considering that Greece ranks fifth among arms buyers in the world.

Continued Rapprochement with Greece

On Thursday, Turkey and Greece agreed to five "confidence building measures" (CBMs) designed to assuage fears concerning the two countries' military intentions (for the AP story, click here). The hope is that the CBMs will allow both countries to reduce their arms spending vis-á-vis one another, a move that has wide support in recession-struck Greece where military spending has long been criticized by a vibrant and quite vocal civil society. In meetings held in Ankara, Greek Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsos and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu agreed that 10 key ministers, including those in charge of foreign and European Union affairs as well as energy and economy would meet at least twice a year, and laid out plans for joint military training and other cooperative endeavors within the framework of the CBMs.

Turkey's Minister for European Affairs and EU Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis made headines in Greece last month when he announced that Turkey would reciprocate should a reduction or freeze of Greek military procurement come about. The remarks followed criticisms Bagis made of German and French arms sales to Greece despite the austerity measures Greece will have to endure in coming years. Greece spends a greater percentage of its GDP on military spending than any other EU country, largely driven by its fear of Turkey.

The new CBMs are in addition to the 24 already adopted, and will only further solidify the rapprochement that has taken place between Greece and Turkey in recent years despite the lack of progress on Cyprus. In 1999, following devastating earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey and a wave of public support, the Greek government moved to support Turkish membership in the EU as a means of reducing a future military threat from Turkey, an idea long-heralded by former Prime Minister Kostas Simitis.

On Saturday, Turkish Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug said Turkey had no interest in engaging in a conflict over the Aegean, where Greece and Turkey have some territorial disputes and conflict over the administation of flight information regions, both of which routinely lead to mock dog fights between the the air forces of both countries. (For a brief look at these disputes, click here.)

Prime Minister Erdogan is expected to visit Greece in May.

Lausanne and Beyond: The Council of Europe and Greeks in Turkey

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Earlier this month, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc met with religious leaders, including Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew, Chief Rabbi of Turkey Ishak Haleva, Armenian Archbishop Aram Ateşyan, Syrian Orthodox Archbishop Yusuf Çetin and Simon Zazadze, who represented the Catholic Georgian Church. At a press conference following the meeting, Arinc averred that the government will move to amend Turkey's laws to allow the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary at Heybeli Island to be re-opened. The seminary was opened in 1844, but closed in 1971. The Greek Orthodoz Patriarchate has long argued that its re-opening is essential to the preservation of the church (see Jan. 10 post), and this was not the first time that government officials have made promises to re-open the seminary (see June 30 post). However, Arinc's statement might be more than a bit premature. Soon after Arinc's remarks, Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesperson Cemil Cicek said, "The Turkish constitution and related regulations do not make the opening of private religious schools possible. If you are going to introduce new rules regarding human rights and freedoms, you need to do it for all groups equally."

In addition to opening up Halki, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate seeks recognition of its ecumenical status, which Turkey has long denied. For Turkey, the Patriarchate represents Turkey's now tiny Greek minority (estimated at between 2,000-4,000 people). The Constitutional Court has blocked past efforts to recognize the Patriarchate as the ecumenical representative of the entire Greek Orthodox Church, and a local court has recently held the same finding in a decision that the Venice Commission declared this month to be inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights, namely Article 9 pertaining to freedom of religion. The issue of Halki and recongizing the Patriarchate as ecumenical all comes down to the Lausanne Treaty, which set up relations between Turkey, Greece, and their minorities at Turkey's founding in 1923.

At the heart of any reform is Lausanne's status in both Turkish and Greek law. In a bold and diplomatic resolution passed this January, the Parliamentary Committee of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on both Greece and Turkey to eschew Lausanne and recognize the supremacy of the European Convention of Human Rights as the appropriate framework in which to make policies related to minorities and minority rights. Arguing Lausanne to be outdated, the resolution calls on Turkey and Greece to deal with minorities as citizens of equal status and to drop the constant rhetoric of reciprocity (in line with Lausanne) inherent in both countries' discourses. Minorities in both Turkey and Greece have long fallen victim to the 1923 treaty, legal arguments both states have make about reciprocity going something like this: Greece treats their Turkish minority in Thrace badly, and so Turkey must as well, and vice-versa.

Bianet does an excellent job of laying out Turkey's homework on minority rights as given to it by the PACE. Importantly, the inclusion of criticism of Greece strengthened the reception of PACE's report, making it both palpatable and welcome to some Turkish politicians, policymakers, and opinion leaders. (In contrast, see the European Parliament's one-way criticism of Turkey in regard to Cyprus, which Hurriyet Daily News reported side-by-side with the PACE resolution. See also Feb. 17 post.)

Also passed by the PACE in January was the report, “Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for Mon-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace [Eastern Greece]," of French parliamentarian Michel Hunault. The report follows a tour of Turkey some visitors of PACE made in June of last year. Soon after the report was released, Turkey's Ambassador to the European Union Volkan Bozkir headed a 12-member delegation comprised of members from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and local officials that met with Greek community leaders. Because of the continued importance of Lausanne, issues involving Turkey's Greek minority are handled by the Foreign Ministry, one of many recommendations the Venice Commission has said needs to be changed.

The most recent Council of Europe action -- the opinion by the Venice Commission -- follows January's PACE resolution and Hunault's report. Significantly, the report analyzes the legal dimensions of the Treaty of Lausanne and, though stating its subordinance to the European Convention on Human Rights, finds no legal basis in Lausanne by which Turkey can justify its refusal to recognize the Patriarchate as ecumenical. Whether the Commission's decision will help the government change current law and navigate around exisiting Turkish case law on the subject remains to be seen, but its unequivocal statement that Lausanne does not limit the Turkish government from recognizing Bartholomew's title will not ring weakly in the ears of those who are listening, however limited their number. From the Commission's opinion as relayed by Today's Zaman:

“The argument appears to be that the Patriarchate was only allowed to remain in Istanbul on the condition that it would shed its ecumenical status. This argument cannot be supported for several reasons,” it said, listing those reasons: “First, even assuming that there was a conflict between the ECHR and the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty the latter does not prevail over the first … Second, there is nothing on the ‘ecumenical’ nature of the Patriarchate in the provisions of the treaty itself, which do not mention the Patriarchate at all … Third, recourse to the preparatory work of the Lausanne Treaty or the circumstances of its conclusion as supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) do not lead to a different conclusion.” The commission concluded, “The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne therefore in no way limits the right of the Patriarchate to use the title ‘ecumenical’.”

The Venice Commission's "Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to use the Adjective 'Ecumenical,'" is not limited to the Patriarch, but the Greek minority in Turkey as a whole, and came at the behest of the PACE following the visit by the PACE delegation last June. For the full opinion, click here.

CORRECTION (3/22) -- Halki was shut down in 1971 following a Constitutional Court decision that annulled sections of the law governing private universites. All private universities were faced with either nationalization or closure . The Patriarchate chose not to nationalize and the seminary closed.


UPDATE I (3/25) -- Deputy Prime Minister Huseyin Celik discusses the persecution of Greeks and the status of the Patriarchate in an interview with Today's Zaman. He also questions the Greek Turks status as a minority under Lausanne.

Serious injustices were done to all these groups during the single-party era in Turkey; however, the injustices done to the non-Muslims were more severe. The wealth tax was a disgrace. The closure of the Greek seminary was a great shame. The Sept. 6-7 incidents were an inhumane conspiracy that humiliated Turkey in the eyes of the world. The alienated villagers were unable to enter Ankara’s city center until 1946. The violation of the rights of the humiliated Alevis, Kurds and the pious have continued until today.

. . . .

We have been having ‘ecumenical’ debates for a long time. Is Bartholomew ecumenical or not? It’s none of our business. Why do Muslims debate the world leader of the Orthodox community, why do they want to be decision-makers regarding this issue? Let the Orthodox community decide on this. If they see İstanbul Fener Patriarch Bartholomew as ecumenical, do we have any right to debate this as nnon-Orthodox people? Let the Orthodox people decide of their own free will.

. . . .

In my view, none of our 72 million citizens should be treated as a minority,” Çelik said. Indicating that believers of the three monotheistic religions along with many other religious communities lived in peace during the Ottoman Empire, Çelik said the state approached all religions and beliefs with tolerance back then. “The slogan that reflected this in the Ottoman Empire was ‘Diversity in unity,’ a slogan which is now promoted by the Council of Europe. The two cultures met at the same point centuries later.

I wonder if this interview would have run in Zaman (the Turkish edition) . . .

The Patriarchate and Ankara

PHOTO by Yigal Schleifer/Istanbul Calling

Just before Christmas, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew created an international furor when he gave an interview to American broadcasting network CBS's "60 Minutes" news program. In the interview, Bartholomew says he prefers to stay in Istanbul despite being sometimes crucified. When asked if he felt crucified, Bartholomew responded he sometimes did. (See Yigal Schleifer's Dec. 22 post). The AKP government quickly rushed to criticize the Patriarch for his remarks. Yet, plenty of Turks defended the Patriarch, citing continued government inaction to push for critical religious and minority rights reforms. (For example, see Mehmet Ali Birand's column in Hürriyet. For a defense of the AKP's criticism of Bartholemew and the slow rate of progress in terms of advancing rights for the Greek minority, see Orhan Kemal Cengiz's column in Today's Zaman.)

Minority rights reforms involving the Greek minority are critical to Turkey's EU accession process, especially if support from Greece and Cyprus is to be won. However, instead of pushing for reform, the government has instead made promises without providing timelines or showing serious intent of delivering, oftentimes simultaneously insisting that Greeks are equal citizens and/or pointing its fingers to Greece's abuse of its Turkish Muslim minority, as if two wrongs make a right. For an example of the former, see the remarks of the head of Turkey's Religious Affairs Directorate, or Diyanet, Ali Bardakoglu; for the latter, see Prime Minister Erdogan's comments this week. Unlike Turkey, Greece did not have to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria (developed in 1993) before its accession into the European Union in 1981. That said, minority rights reforms for the Greek community, a legally recognized minority vested with rights under the Treaty of Lausanne, are highly controversial. In March 2008, when the AKP passed modest reforms to Turkey's Law on Foundations, which governed many religious organizations, the reforms faced fierce nationalist opposition from both the CHP and the MHP. Little concrete work has been done since, and with the EU reform process stalled, the AKP government going as perhaps as far as it wants to go at the moment, it is unlikely much will change in the future. Continued problems with its Greek minority continue to get attention in the United states as well -- for example, see Senator Cardin's recent resolution on reopening Halki.

For more information on the Greek religious minority, including its legal standing under Lausanne, see the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom's 2009 annual report. From the report:

When Turkey was founded in 1923, there were approximately 200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians in the country. In 1955, by which time the number had fallen to 100,000, pogroms targeted the Greek Orthodox community, resulting in destruction of private and commercial properties, desecration of religious sites, and killings. As a result of these pogroms and other difficulties, the Greek Orthodox Christian community has fallen to its current low level, which the State Department reports to be no more than 3,000. Although the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey has been under Ottoman Turkish jurisdiction since 1453, the Turkish government today still does not recognize the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate as a legal entity. Moreover, the Turkish government also refuses to acknowledge the Patriarch's Ecumenical status, recognizing only his role as head of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey. Although Prime Minister Erdogan reportedly stated in parliament in January 2008 that the issue of Patriarch Bartholomew's title as "Ecumenical" is an "internal" one for the Patriarchate and that the state should not interfere, the Turkish government still does not officially recognize the Patriarch's Ecumenical status. The Turkish government also maintains that only Turkish citizens can be candidates for the position of Ecumenical Patriarch and for hierarchs in the Church's Holy Synod.

In 1971, the government's nationalization of institutions of higher education included the Orthodox Theological School of Halki on the island of Heybeli, thereby depriving the Greek Orthodox community of its only educational institution for its leadership in Turkey. Furthermore, in November 1998, the school's Board of Trustees was dismissed by the General Authority for Public Institutions. Due to the factors mentioned above and because of the continuing expropriation of income-generating properties from Greek Orthodox private citizens, the very survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey is at risk.

In the summer of 2008, the European Court of Human Rights ruled unanimously in a case brought by the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate that Turkey was in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case concerned an orphanage on the Turkish island of Buyukada owned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Turkish government has yet to implement the court's ruling.

See also the EU progress reports and human rights reports linked under the "Key Documents" section of this site.

Halki Seminary Could Be Reopened Soon

(updated below)

From Hürriyet:

The Halki seminary on the island of Heybeliada is to be reopened, Culture Minister Ertuğrul Günay said, adding that they are searching for a formula to integrate the Orthodox theological school into Turkey’s university system. "Although we have not finalized a decision in the Cabinet, my personal impression is that we are going to open the seminary," said Günay, speaking on Kanal 24 television over the weekend.

Recalling that the functioning of the Halki seminary is not compatible with the Turkish university system, Günay maintained that work is underway to find a formula for its status. He explained that the question is whether the seminary would function like a university, which then has to be integrated into the Turkish university system, or if it would function like an autonomous private high school.

One of the latest proposals was for the seminary to become a private university under the auspices of a foundation, such as how Koç University was established under the auspices of the Vehbi Koç Foundation. The Heybeliada University would be set up under the Ayatriada Foundation with the patriarch chairing the latter and people with Turkish citizenship making up the rest of the board. However, the patriarch has rejected the idea.

The expectation of the reopening of Halki Seminary, which has been closed since 1971, has been long spelt out by the European Union in the course of entry talks and was lately expressed by U.S. President Barack Obama during his visit to Turkey in April.

State Minister and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış said that reopening Halki Seminary was a domestic issue for Turkey, in an interview with the Greek daily Kathimerini, reported the Anatolia News Agency on Sunday.

"Turkey needs to address the religious needs of the Orthodox community as well as Greece needs to address the needs of the Turkish community in Western Thrace. These are domestic matters for both countries," said Bağış. Although the reciprocity principle is not a must, both countries must tackle the problems simultaneously Bağış underlined.

Reciprocity on minority rights issues in relation to the Greek community has long been seen as an international issue dependent on Greece lessening restrictions it imposes on Turkish minorities. CHP and MHP opposed amendments to the Foundations Law last year on these grounds. For more on the history of the seminary, click here.

UPDATE 7/21 -- In a six-day visit to Turkey, Thomas Hammarberg, the human rights commissioner of the Council of Europe, met with Justice Minister Egemen Bağış and EU negotiator Egemen Bağış. Halki was brought up in the meetings. From TDZ:

In a six-day visit to Turkey, during which Hammarberg was received by President Abdullah Gül and met with Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin and chief EU negotiator Egemen Bağış, the human rights commissioner also raised the controversial issue of reopening the Halki Seminary. Asked whether he had the impression that the school would be opened soon, Hammarberg said: “Yes, clearly. There is no firm decision taken yet, but the way we discussed this matter clearly indicated that there is openness now. Hopefully the majority of the population will accept this to be the right way to go ahead. It will be decided before Istanbul assumes the title of Cultural Capital of Europe in 2010. My guess would be before the end of 2009 […].”

Constructing the Nation-State

From Bianet:

The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUMDER), filed a criminal complaint against Ministry of Defense Vecdi Gönül, accusing him of discrimination.

In the complaint, the association said Gönül justified the discrimination between ethnic groups and praised the discrimination witnessed at the period of the founding of the Turkish Republic by stating in his speech that “If there would be Greeks in the Aegean region and Armenians in many regions in Turkey today, then could there be today’s national state?”

MAZLUMDER claimed that Gönül violated the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) as well as the international conventions that Turkey is also a member, praising “the crime and the criminal.”

The Association to Research and Face the Social Events sends out an invitation for a “maturation” meeting
Cafer Olgun of the Association to Research and Face the Social Events has invited Gönül to a meeting of facing the past events held in the organization.

In the text handed out to the public, Olgun says “they do not want to hide their feelings of regret”, asking the following questions.

“Did you think how much you offended our Armenian and Greek citizens who live in this country and everyone with a good sense, when you emphasized that the “state” and the “nation” came into existence through forced migration, disciplining and forced exchange of populations? What have you understood from the critics and reactions? Have you thought of apologizing and resigning?”

While wishing that Gönül should see this meeting as an opportunity to develop himself democratically, he said that he should realize that the position he occupies should also come with the responsibility of rendering account of his deeds to the civil society.” (TK/TB)

For a very polemical article on the construction of the Turkish nation-state, see Uğur Ümit Üngör "Seeing Like a Nation-State: Young Turk Social Engineering 1913-1950."

More Trouble With Europe

Turkish relations with Europe have become further stressed and hope for its bid to eventually enter the EU further dimmed as a result of a special meeting held by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Turkey is a member of the Council and the party closure case has caused the Council to express serious concern for the democratic normalization of Turkey. The result of the meeting was a further condemnation of the closure case (AKP officials had requested last April for PACE to condemn closure—see April 19 post) and the threat of a renewed monitoring by the Council. Full-monitoring ceased in 2004 and paved the way for the European Commission's recommendation for the EU to initiate accession talks with Turkey. Since then, a special committee of PACE has continued to follow Turkish political development in a phrase of "post-monitoring," which committee member Luc Van den Brande pointedly stated has continued as a result of Turkey's unwillingness to adopt European political and human rights norms. PACE called the urgent meeting on May 29.

Although EU relations are already imperiled, the PACE consensus, coming from outside the EU, will strengthen European condemnation and the and the hand of EU politicians in the Sarkozy camp who are opposed to Turkish membership. The PACE report approved Thursday strongly warned Turkey of the political risks in closing AKP, recognized the utility of the Venice criteria for party closure and condemned the closure of political parties for violations of secularism, urged PACE to consider re-imposition of monitoring of Turkish democratic and human rights practices, and significantly, demanded Turkey to treat the recent political crisis as an opportunity to move forward with a civilian constitution.

As does the EU, PACE walks the difficult diplomatic line of not provoking too strong a retaliatory condemnation of PACE, which would rally public support for the Euroskeptics, while at the same time fulfilling its need to address the closure case as a serious concern that will imperil EU-Turkey relations. The PACE decision is likely to heighten tensions between Europhiles and Euroskeptics within Turkey and might well complicate AKP's relations with Europe. CHP and MHP officials have already condemned the PACE meeting as unwanted interference and Foreign Minister Ali Babacan was conspicuously absent. Bababcan cited his necessary attendance at the regular monthly meeting of the National Security Council, but Babacan's decision not to attend is likely motivated by AKP's attempts to distance itself from European criticism and risk being accused of fomenting outside criticism, a definite taboo.

Apart from the report, PACE also passed a report on Friday urging Turkey to better conditions on the Greek islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada, in so doing restoring Greek exiles' property rights and allowing for the construction of a school. PACE members also signed a motion for a resolution condemning the conviction of Ragıp Zarakolu and urging the Turkish government to undertake more comprehensive reform of Article 301. For some Turks, Friday's moves will add insult to injury.

The PACE decision reflects growing polarization between Europe and nationalist politicians in Turkey, and with reform stalled (see Jan. 19 post), it is unlikely that the rhetoric is to stop until the closure case has come to an end. In light of the PACE decision, Joost Lagendijk, Co-chair the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, reaffirmed the grave danger closing AKP will have on future accession negotiations. Still, the EU is unlikely to formally suspend accession talks—once suspended, talks are difficult to recommence—in the face of AKP's closure and thereby give up critical diplomatic leverage.

Foundations Law Clears Parliament, AKP Does Not Back Down

AKP has further enhanced its liberal credentials following a major overhaul of the 1935 Foundations Law, hich addresses the establishment of religious foundations. Since religions, including Islam, do not enjoy recognized legal status, the state governs religious organizations through bodies of law that recognize the legal status of their foundation or association. Religious minorities have long claimed that these laws are discriminatory and now that their arguments are bulwarked by criticism from the EU, there has been in recent years an impetus to eliminate the most discriminatory aspects of the law.

One of the principal issues at stake in the Foundations Law surrounds deeds owned by religious foundations, in particular Christian minorities whose properties have been seized by the state and sold non-transparently. Since Turkey assented to the ECHR, Europe has become involved in settling many of Turkey's historical disputes over confiscated property, especially following a 1974 decision in the Court of Cassation that facilitated state seizure of a number of religious properties acquired after 1936.

AKP attempted to reform the Foundation Law in 2006 and a similar major overhaul passed the parliament only to be vetoed by President Sezer on a series of very technical grounds. As is the case now, support for the new law from religious minorities is mixed. Some see it as providing non-Muslim minorities with more rights than they currently possess, while others fear the law as creating a distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim foundations that could actually harm minority rights. This latter opinion is shared by the much-respected Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV). According to TESEV program officer Dilek Kurban,

“It does not do away with injustices but, on the contrary, paves the way for similar injustices to continue in the future,” she said, citing the clause under the new law that allows the management and properties of non-active foundations to be taken over by the General Management of Foundations. “This was the aspect about the foundations law that we most criticized,” she said, adding that this was applied mostly to the Greek community.

“One of the difficulties arising from the bureaucracy was that these foundations could not elect their directorial board. This was an unlawful application. But this new law ensures the continuity of this application,” said Kurban

The legislation grants non-Muslim foundations rights to receive donations from and collect donations to be sent to foreign countries, engage in international activities, send representatives abroad, and be members of foreign institutions within the framework of the institutions' charters.

Earlier this week it seemed as if AKP might further dilute the bill by making significant concessions to MHP concerning non-Muslim minorities, which has referred to it as the "traitor bill." However, AKP proceeded with the legislation as drawn up last January and used its majority to push the bill through Parliament. MHP's specific concerns largely involve claims that the rights the new law grants are not reciprocally granted to Turkish minorities in other countries (in particular, Greece). Religious minorities find this argument offensive and contend that they are citizens of Turkey and that their rights should not rest of how other countries treat their minority populations. Officials from AKP cited that while Greece does not afford Turkish foundations the same rights provided by the new law, it is time for Turkey to set the bar higher. CHP and the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti—DSP) also opposed the new law.

The measure has long been demanded by European Union officials, but has been mired in controversy because many politicians see it as cow-tailing to demands of Western countries and jeopardizing Turkey's international security. In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stepped into a dispute involving the seizure of a Greek school and has affirmed that sections of the 1935 law are indeed a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Passage did not include Article 68 of the omnibus law. Article 68 returns confiscated property to non-Muslim foundations and will be debated next week.