Calling Places

PHOTO from Milliyet

One of my favorite political/rhetorical theorists, Kenneth Burke, reckons rhetoric -- and, more specifically, the politics it facilitates -- as akin to theater. According to Burke, life and politics are theater, and we all, as political actors, are on a stage. Though accusing someone of making political theater is pejorative, for Burke, we all make theater. Think Arendt and her Greek-influenced notion of politics as action -- as individuals appearing to each other in public fora whereby they put forward their thought and ideas, and wherein those thoughts and ideas, though sometimes agonistically incommensurable, are negotiated in communication with others.

For Burke and Arendt, while we may all be actors on a stage or in a public forum, no one has the right to call places. In a liberal democracy, politicians, civil society activists, and citizens all have a right to express themselves in the public sphere -- to partake in politics on any range of issues without being bounded. Tracing the development of civil society's relation to the state, this sort of boundlessness is key to civil society's ability to challenge the state -- to have and take advantage of the space necessary to enact truly democratic politics capable of holding the state accountable to those it governs.

Yet, for many politicians in the AKP, this idea is strange -- and, for too many, anathema. See, for instance, the recent comments of AKP parliamentarian Nurettin Canikli in response to the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists' Association (TUSIAD)'s criticisms of the government's plans for 4+4+4 education reform. TUSIAD is one of the most important NGOs for Turkey, and has proven a tremendous force for the country's European Union accession process and the democratic reform/EU harmonization packages that have so changed Turkey (and, which, contrary to so much of the coverage one sees in Western media, commenced in 1999, more than two years before the ruling AKP came to power).

According to Canikli, TUSIAD, as a business association, has the right only to speak on matters of business and economic policy -- not education. For Canikli, it is no matter that the quality of education is indubitably connected to both, as the boundaries he would place on the organization are quite strict. But that said, why might TUSIAD not also be able to speak on other important political issues, including human rights, the Kurdish conflict, freedom of the press, and a host of other issues on which it has in the past, should, and hopefully will continue to voice its opinion? For Canikli, if this happens, the association "should not only throw punches, but be ready to get punched."

Canikli, in stronger terms, is echoing remarks Prime Minister Erdogan delivered last Tuesday at his party's parliamentary group meeting. Though Erdogan laid off the issue during yesterday's party meeting, the prime minister stirred a series of heated exchanges between the AKP and TUSIAD when Erdogan lashed into the organization, accusing it of being a supporter of the Feb. 28 process (Turkey's 1997 postmodern coup) and telling it to "mind its own business." TUSIAD responded with a calmly generic explanation of the important role civil society plays in a democracy, and rhetorical clashes between the organization and the AKP continued throughout the week. (Here, and to his credit, note that on Saturday President Gul defended TUSIAD's role to engage in the education debate.)

Though there is nothing necessarily improper about a civil exchange of views between the government and civil society organizations, there is something quite wrong about the government circumscribing the activities of organizations, a frequent action taken by authoritarian governments around the world to restrict civil society and the freedoms it enjoys under international law. Here, it should be noted that associations law in Turkey has undergone a series of meaningful reforms under AKP rule, including a major overhaul in 2004 to the Associations Law. The AKP should be lauded for these changes, but rhetoric such as that coming from Erdogan and Canikli is threatening.

In stirring defense of liberalism and the role of civil society, Milliyet columnist Mehmet Tezkan digs into the implication of Canikli's comments: that civil society organizations might only speak on issues related to their particular focus. According to Canikli, this would mean labor unions speak on workers' rights, bar associations speak only about matters of the judiciary, and doctors' associations speak only about medical issues. Such narrowly consigned responsibilities not only restricts the space in which civil society may act, but to some extent, also neutralizes them. Canikli seems to be saying that if civil society organizations get involved in politics, there will be consequences. Doing so not only sends a signal that civil society organizations should be apolitical, but that there might indeed be costs for being political.

If politicians in the government wish to criticize TUSIAD and other organizations within the public sphere, they should, of course, be free to do so. Yet, if these "punches" involve restrictive measures such as libel suits, criminal charges, and troubles registering and operating, there is a problem. Given Prime Minister Erdogan and others' understanding of the role of the press, there is little reason to think that the government's approach to civil society is much different -- and, indeed, leaders of numerous civil society organizations, at least in regard to the Kurdish problem, have been rounded up alongside journalists. Taking on an organization with the kind of international clout of TUSIAD is a different matter, though Erdogan and Canikli's statements in regard to the organization are revealing of the AKP's liberal democratic deficit (not that many political parties have proved much better upon coming to power).

This is the first clash this year between the AKP and TUSIAD, and the vitriol of Erdogan's rhetoric has raised serious eyebrows given that TUSIAD is a mainline pro-reform/pro-Europe organization that has in the past loaned support to the AKP's reform initiatives. In 2010, before the country's constitutional referendum in September, Prime Minister Erdogan demanded that TUSIAD take a stand for or against the constitution, arguing that those who stayed neutral would be "eliminated." EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis followed up, declaring that he would challenge "the mental health and patriotism of anyone who intended to vote against" the referendum.

TUSIAD's position at the time was that Turkey needed a brand new constitution -- not simply a series of amendments designed to benefit the AKP. It should be remembered here that the amendments in 2010 were largely aimed to break the old establishment's hand on the judiciary, and in many ways, have since allowed the government to exert increased control of the organization. I know several Turks who opted to boycott or vote no against the referendum given these remarks and others like them. The latest set of exchanges is but a continuation of what has become prime minister's increasingly hostile stance toward the organization. More evidence of a rift between the AKP and TUSIAD emerged this week when news broke that a joint panel the two were planning to hold this month in Mardin had been cancelled.

And so what of the rhetoric of elimination? It is curious that Erdogan used this word when it also is the main accusation launched by Kurdish nationalists against the government -- they claim the government is trying to eliminate them, too. If the AKP respects these views, why the rhetoric? Is it mere populism against organizations like TUSIAD that are perceived by some AKP supporters as "elite"? Is it the prime minister's well-known tendency for rhetorical lavishes, and what many consider to be his quick temper? The government is clearly not intent to eliminate TUSIAD, but will it respect the organization and value its opinions? Most are not holding their breath.

The new film Fetih: 1453, which depicts the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, has been used in the past two weeks as political capital against what Erdogan's critics receive is his sultan-like attitude toward politics. In the past couple weeks, videos have been circulating on YouTube and elsewhere of the film's caricature of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the great Ottoman conqueror, juxtaposed with Erdogan (like this one). And while sultanism is in no way unique to Turkey or to the AKP in Turkey (the country's history of political leadership is a great testament to the truth of Lord Acton's famous axiom), the sheer number and intensity of these criticism and others like them represent a shift in how those fifty percent whom Erdogan and the AKP do not represent (see my election analysis) are increasingly alienated and wary at the prospect of the AKP's seeming strict majoritarian conception of democracy.

Some AKP politicians, including Erdogan, often seem baffled by this. Are they not democratizing the country? Have they not led the country's economy to be one of the strongest in Europe and the Middle East? Is Turkey not a great success story to be modeled elsewhere in the world? One might expect these party officials to bow down in gratitude to Erdogan as Orthodox Greeks do to Fatih Sultan Mehmet in 1453.

Such disbelief is not altogether uncommon for politicians who, often well-intentioned, place ends over means, and arrogantly, if not condescendingly, approach politics as if they know what is best for the direction of the country they govern and the citizens therein. But there is no such ijtihad. The prime minister and other AKP officials, not to mention those in opposition parties (which have their own democratic deficits and sultanist legacies!), represent the people -- they are not elected to tell the people what is best for them, or so says many of the criticisms launched against the party.

Yet the AKP and its dominant narrative of conquest and victimage (see past post) continues. Too often not only Prime Minister Erdogan, but all Turkish politicians, seem like great figures on a stage, players in some great drama that ordinary Turks simply sit back and watch. But real democratic politics, while perhaps dramatic as Burke argues, involve the citizens, too -- the citizens are players, too (not mere spectators), there is no director, and most importantly, no one gets to call places. No one can simply be eliminated.


(Note: An incomplete, draft version of this post appeared earlier today when I accidentally hit "Publish" instead of "Save Draft." Hopefully this complete version reads better, and makes a bit more sense.)


UPDATE I (3/8) -- Hurriyet Daily News columnist Gila Benmayor offers a bit more perspective on the recent clash between TUSIAD and the government, as well as criticism of the government's rushed attempt at this bill. As Benmayor argues, this is once again another example of the government pushing through massive reform packages with little consultation of civil society, especially civil society groups with whom it disagrees. The education package has now also lost the support of the Education Reform Initiative (ERG), which again, is not a Kemalist organization diametrically opposed to the AKP, but a moderate/reformist group that adopts a practical and non-ideological approach to the potential harms of the proposed legislation.

Weakening Minority Rights in Parliament

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

At a time when Turkey is gearing up to craft a new constitution, its parliament is currently drafting changes to its rules that would significantly shorten the period of debate, extend sessions into the weekend if necessary, and limit proposals to draft laws.

The ruling AKP is claiming the rules are intended to streamline debate and increase parliamentary efficiency while opposition parties are claiming the new regulations are intended to silence opposition voices (for specific changes, click here). The debate reached a climax yesterday when the CHP, the largest opposition party, stormed the rostrum after Speaker Cemil Cicek closed debate after a five hour standoff wherein CHP and BDP lawmakers shouted slogans against the speaker, forcing Cicek to call numerous recesses.

The eventual result was a fistfight after Cicek closed the session. Fistfights are not altogether uncommon in the parliament, and in 2001, a similar debate over rules left one parliamentarian dead of a heart attack after a fight broke out. Cicek has been trying for the past week to reach a compromise between the AKP and opposition parties, though his efforts have clearly failed.

All three opposition parties are united against the rules changes, and claim the AKP is attempting to fix the rules ahead of the constitutional draft being submitted to the general assembly in order to easily force the document out of parliament and submit it to referendum, as the party did the 2010 amendment package. Though the AKP is three votes shy of the 330 votes (3/5 majority) it needs to pass the new constitution in parliament and take it to referendum (as it did in 2010), the opposition fears that the AKP could well cobble together this majority rather than engage all parties in a more consensual process.

Clearly such an endeavor would hurt the legitimacy of a new constitution and certainly contradict the ruling party's stated objective of achieving the widest degree of consensus possible -- but, here again, the operative word is "possible," and efforts to build consensus will depend on just how the AKP interprets this mission, and how committed it will remain to it. A party operating with a solid 3/5 majority since its entrance to parliament in 2002, consensus-building has not exactly been the party's forté, nor has it, in all fairness, to any Turkish political party. For more on this point, see E. Fuat Keyman and Meltem Muftuler-Bac's recent article in the January issue of the Journal of Democracy.

The appropriateness of fist-fighting aside, the move to change the rules has led opposition parties to boycott the constitutional reconciliattion commission charged with framing a new civilian constitution, and has, in general, detracted from the commission's task-at-hand. The commission is comprised of  12 members (three from every party) and is designed to garner consensus among political parties and civil society.

At this phase of the re-drafting process, the commission is currently seeking proposals from politicians and civil society groups, which up until recently, could be viewed publicly on this website parliament setup in October. Yet at the beginning of February the commission decided to hide the substance of proposals being submitted in order to protect the names of individuals and groups submitting them since some were quite controversial. At the moment, only the names of individuals and groups submitting proposals are left on the site. For more, see this front-page article from the Jan. 27 edition of Milliyet.

Erdogan: President in 2014

PHOTO from Milliyet

This week the parliament's constitutional commission reached consensus to hold the country's first presidential elections in 2014. The decision allows Prime Minister Erdogan, who under the AKP's by-laws cannot continue to serve as leader of his party after 2015, to run for president. This would allow Erdogan to stay at the top of the political scene and work to realize his plans for Turkey's centennial in 2023.

This calculus is likely behind Erodgan's desire for a strong presidential system modeled on the United States and/or France, a move that would require a drastic reworking of Turkey's parliamentary system but might well be up for debate as parliament continue to work on provisions for a new constitution to replace the 1982 constitution drafted under military tutelage.

Yet enacting a presidential system will not be easy given that the AKP is shy of the two-thirds majority required to unilaterally pass amendments to the constitution, as well as the three-fifths majority needed to pass amendments and then take them to referendum. Amendments passed in this way require only a simple majority, which the AKP, as it did in September 2010, would likely have little difficult attaining. That said, the party is just three votes shy of the three-fifths needed (it currently has 327 seats of 330) to bring amendments to referendum.

So why is this week's decision so important? When Turkey amended its constitution in 2007 to hold popular presidential elections (before presidents were elected by parliament), the law was also changed to allow two consecutive five-year terms rather than one seven-year term. The question that is now near decided (parliament still needs to vote on the measure) is whether the new law applies to President Gul. Would Gul serve one seven-year term? Or, would he serve one five-year term and then be allowed to run for re-election, a move that would frustrate Erdogan's ambitions and remove him from the top of Turkish politics after 2014?

Though the delay deciding the issue essentially de facto scheduled elections for 2014 since there was little possibility of holding elections this year, the matter is now more decided. Now the question is more what will happen to the AKP after Erdogan becomes president. Will President Gul take the post or will it go to someone more junior over whom Erdogan can exert control (or, to a candidate like Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc, who recently sided with Gul over Erdogan when the two were divided over  a law reducing the penalty for match-fixing and over whom it might be more difficult for Erdogan to assert control)? If the latter is to happen, parliamentary elections will have to be moved from 2015, for when they are currently scheduled, to a year before, meaning that Turkey would hold presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in the same year. And, just as important, will Erdogan be able to enact his constitutional vision and expand his power after 2014?

The Radikal story linked to above has the details about the new law.


UPDATE I (1/26/12) --  President Gul has approved the new law fixing his term to seven years, and so setting Turkey's next presidential elections for 2014. The new law was passed quickly by parliament on Jan. 19 despite opposition from the CHP, which is still deciding whether it will challenge the legislation at the Constitutional Court. Prime Minister Erdogan is thus cleared to run for president in 2014, becoming the first popularly elected president. Erdogan will be allowed to serve two five-year terms, and if he wins a second, he could well be president when Turkey celebrates its centennial in 2023.

Ozel Regrets "Terrorist" Label

PHOTO from Milliyet

Milliyet's Fikret Bila has run an interview with Chief of General Staff Necdet Ozel in which the head of the Turkish Armed Forces says he would not like to call PKK fighters "terrorists" since they, too, are citizens of Turkey.

According to Ozel, many PKK fighters have been deceived, a fact which the top general laments at the same time he gives casualty figures of how many terrorists have been killed in the past six months. Turkish forces in Turkey's near 18-year conflict with the PKK. That number is at 165, according to Ozel, while 112 have surrendered and another 50 have been captured.

Ozel's intimation that PKK fighters should not be labeled as "terrorists" has infuriated many Turks, and nationalist-minded bloggers are clamoring to criticize Ozel as ineffective, and many not simply vis-á-vis the Kurdish question, but in regard to the treatment of army generals who have been arrested in the ongoing Ergenekon investigations.

In the interview, Ozel also dismissed reports that the PKK has adopted a truce, arguing that the opposite is in fact true and that PKK operations have continued throughout the winter. He also said unequivocally that the Turkish Armed Forces were in no way involved in the negotiations between MIT and the PKK that seem to have ended at the end of 2009 or beginning of 2010. Ozel further states that he is against recognizing Kurdish as an official language or integrating it into school education and using it to administer public services.

The general goes on to state that the United States has provided assistance from northern Iraq, though the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has done little to assist with the situation. Iraqi officials have told Ankara that there is little they can do (see an account of TRT's interview, in Turkish, with Iraq Vice President Tariq Hashimi on Oct. 30). Meanwhile Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani and KRG president Massoud Barzani, much to the likely frustration of Turkish officials, continue to dialogue with the BDP, urging the party, albeit without much visible success, toward peace.

A Pyrhhic Victory?

I recently wrote a short entry on the elections for Democracy Digest, a project of the National Endowment for Democracy. An excerpt:

Increasingly, Turkey is polarized between those who support the AKP and those who do not. The AKP’s critics include not only the secular elite, but also liberals, Kurds and other minority groups, and others who fear the intolerance with which the party deals with difference and dissent.

However, the new parliament presents fresh opportunities for compromise and reconciliation. All parties agree that Turkey should adopt a new constitution, and given the CHP’s progressive turn, the country now has a genuine opportunity to pass a liberal democratic constitution that will respect and affirm the rights of all citizens.

Nevertheless, and despite Prime Minister Erdogan’s acceptance speech yesterday in which he vowed to seek compromise on a new constitution, it is possible, even likely, that the AKP will promote its agenda with minimal compromise and consultation (as it has in the past). Such a unilateral approach increases the likelihood of the new constitution entrenching the illiberal practices evident in the AKP’s current exercise of power, including the targeting of journalists, libel suits, increased reliance on executive and administrative orders, enhanced cabinet powers at the expense of parliament, limited minority rights, and restrictions on freedom of association and civil society.

Turkish civil society is crucial to ensuring that Erdogan seeks compromise with the other three political parties that have entered parliament. In this context, civil society will prove just as key to saving Turkish democracy as it did during the optimistic years after the EU accepted Turkey’s application for membership in 1999 and major reforms started coming down the pipe. Support for strengthening political parties and institution building has been enormously successful, but further progress is unlikely without funding and empowering civil society to hold the government and political parties in check and goad them to respond to democratic demands.

A democratic regression in Turkey will not only mark the end of a regional success story but also set back Islamist/conservative democrats in other Muslim states who view the AKP as an exemplar. As recent survey research attests, 66% of Arabs view Turkey as a democratic model.

Turkish democracy is neither a mission accomplished nor a lost cause. Authoritarian trends can be reversed and the AKP government may yet return to the more liberal politics of its inception. However, this will take serious work and dedication from the government, opposition political parties, and civil society. These elections and upcoming plans to draft a new constitution provide at once a strong impetus for reform and a new starting point.

For the full entry, click here. The blog is a good way to monitor political development throughout the world.

Election Night . . .

From Radikal

Election results started to come out at six o'clock in the evening Turkey time, and it became evident early on that the AKP had a commanding lead of the popular vote. However, despite capturing a near 50% of voters, the largest percentage the party has captured since it first came to power in 2002, the party fell four seats shy of the 330 seats it needs in parliament (a 3/5 majority) to push through a constitution unilaterally. For an electoral map complete with official results, click here.

This means that for the first time in a long time the AKP will have to engage in political bargaining (see yesterday's post). Last year the AKP successfully pushed through a series of constitutional amendments using its previous 3/5 majority before successfully submitting the amendments to referendum. Meanwhile, the ultra-nationalist MHP managed to comfortably surpass the 10% threshold required for political parties to enter parliament, winning 13% of the popular vote. Though the party went from 69 to 54 seats, coming in above then 10% threshold made it difficult for the AKP to meet the 3/5 marker.

The AKP's chances at gaining a 3/5 majority were further damaged by the historical success of the Kurdish nationalist party, the BDP. The BDP managed to pick up a whopping 36 seats (up from 20), no doubt a result in part to growing disenchantment with -- and, in many cases, outright hostility toward -- the party in Turkey's mostly Kurdish southeast. Running as independents so as to escape the 10% threshold, the BDP captured 6% of the vote.

The AKP's nationalist turn, presumably an effort to win voters away from the MHP, had the predictable effect of alienating Kurdish voters. Ironically, as the only other political party competitive in the region, it also contributed greatly to its failure to win 3/5 of parliamenatary seats since the BDP fared so well. AKP's efforts to defeat the MHP were a gamble, losing Kurdish votes for ultra-nationalist votes (while at the same time empowering the BDP), and the party paid the price.

In addition to MHP votes, the party did pick up a significant number of votes from the SP (Felicity Party), a legacy of Erbakan's National Outlook movement, consolidating its control over the Islamist vote. It also picked up votes from the center-right Democrat Party, which also harkens back to an earlier era. I would venture to say these are the blocs that explain the party's ability to increase its share of the popular vote.

Meanwhile, the CHP, which took enormous risks this election cycle, performed under expectations. The CHP captured 26% of the popular vote to gain 38 seats (from 97 to 135), but some expected the party to poll over 30%. During the campaign, the CHP became by far the most progressive mainline party, taking positions more pro-European, pro-peace, and pro-liberal than the AKP (again, see yesterday's post). However, the party's controversial positions, especially on the Kurdish issue, may have alienated some in its formerly nationalist base -- votes that would have gone to the AKP or the MHP. However, nonetheless, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and ""the new CHP" managed to gain almost 3.5 million new voters and pick up seats. Whether the CHP will continue to steer Kilicdaroglu's chart or be so frustrated with the results that it changes course once more remains to be seen.

In his acceptance speech, Prime Minister Erdogan vowed to build consensus on a new constitution and reiterated that he represented all Turkish citizens, not just those who voted for him. Prime Minister Erdogans aid the consensus would be built among political parties and civil society groups, all of which would be consulted during the process. However, the prime minister made the same promise last year and fell short.

All parties support drafting of a whole new document to replace the country's 1982 constitution drafted under military tutelage, but just what will happen in the coming months is very much up in the air. The AKP is far from weak, and could well gain the 3/5 majority it needs without too much maneuvering.


UPDATE I (6/13) -- For a truly wonderful electoral map complete with candidate names according to the provinces from which they were elected, click here. The AKP won more provinces along Turkey's more secular Western coast than it has in the past, but this should not be read as a significant setback for the CHP. Though the CHP no doubt lost votes in some of these Kemalist/nationalist strongholds, including majorities, it seems to have widened its support throughout the country, picking up votes in provinces where before it was not at all competitive.

What Will Happen Tomorrow (And After)?

Reuters Photo from VOA Kurdish

I gave a radio interview this morning to Voice of America's Kurdish service in which I was asked what would be the impact of tomorrow's elections on the AKP-led government's plans to introduce a new constitution.  Though the interview mostly focused on the Kurdish issue, of particular interest was just how successful the AKP could be in bringing forward plans to introduce a new constitution.

If the AKP wins at least 330 seats in the parliament (it now has 336), it will be able to introduce constitutional amendments without the need for much consensus before taking them to referendum -- an approach the AKP took last year and with great success. If the party manages to surpass 367 votes, it will have a 2/3 super majority that will allow it to unilaterally overhaul the constitution without the need for referendum. While the latter is unlikely and the former in doubt, the larger issue is just how sincere the party is in its reiterations that it will seek consensus as it moves forward. At the moment, all four parties with a chance of entering parliament have pledged to adopt a new constitution.

Last year, the party showed little concern as it pushed amendments rapidly forward. Neither civil society nor opposition political parties were given much voice in the process and the result was a referendum that basically polarized the Turkish public. The Kurdish nationalist BDP boycotted the referendum while the CHP and the MHP campaigned hard against the amendments. Though the official result was 58%, the actual number of Turkish citizens who approved the changes was lower given that a large number of Kurds who did boycott.

If the referendum is taken as a measure of the support for the AKP, it can be said that roughly over one-half of Turkish citizens approve of the party and the direction in which it is taking the country. This matches more or less with what a recent Pew poll found. According to the poll, 48 percent of Turkish citizens are satisfied with the direction the country is taking; however, 49 percent responded they are dissatisfied. The satisfied voters, more or less, can be assumed to be likely to vote for the AKP, but of more interest are those who are not. How many of these voters are simply typical Turkish cynics and how many are disenchanted with the party? The rising number of potentially disenchanted is cause for concern (and that is more than an understatement).

One of the most pressing problems in Turkish politics today is the amount of polarization in Turkish political society. Some of this can be explained by the increasing illiberal attitudes and policies of the AKP (see Tuesday's post), which, of course, is made all the more problematic by the AKP's seeming lack of willingness to engage opposition parties and craft serious political compromises when it comes to making government policy. Without an entrenched rights-based liberal democracy, the lack of compromise becomes all the more disturbing. A unilaterally-drawn up constitution will only serve to further polarize the Turkish public while continuing to fail at any real resolution of the classic dilemma posed by democracy and difference.

However, should the AKP fall short of 330 seats tomorrow, the party will be more inclined to compromise. Just exactly what this process of compromise would look like and what parties it would include remains to be seen, but perhaps for the first time in a long time the AKP will be forced to work with other parties to carve out a political agenda.

At stake are Erdogan's ambitions to institute a presidential system that would facilitate his ascendancy to the presidency. If Erdogan wins comfortably tomorrow, he will be more confident in these efforts. Even should the AKP fall short of gaining 3/5 of the seats in parliament, an increase in the popular vote for the AKP will embolden the already emboldened leader to move forward in his quest.

Meanwhile, just as interestingly, the CHP, which has drastically changed its leadership and party platform, will discover whether its new position in Turkish politics will be rewarded. The CHP is expected to pick up seats and increase its vote either way, but will likely have a difficult time gaining the 30% of the vote for which the party is striving. The CHP, which has billed itself as "the new CHP,"  has taken enormous risks this election cycle, presenting itself as pro-Europe, pro-liberal, pro-peace, and importantly, anti-nationalist and anti-coup. With Kilicdaroglu's victory over the party stalwart and former party secretary-general Onder Sav last year, the party has turned 180-degrees in many of its policies, especially in regard to the Kurds and its former pro-military/pro-coup attitude. Defeating Sav, Kilicdaroglu remarked, "The empire of fear is over in the CHP. Now it is time to end the empire of fear in Turkey."

The MHP will also face a serious test tomorrow. A little less than a month ago, there was serious question as to whether the ultra-nationalist party would be able to surpass the 10% threshold required to enter parliament. However, polls conducted at the end of June put the party safely over the threshold. That said, just how well the party does tomorrow will have an impact on the number of seats allocated to the AKP and CHP. The AKP has been competing for its nationalist voter base while the CHP's recent positions, especially in regard to the Kurds, might have alienated some in its former nationalist base to vote for the MHP.

And, finally, not without its own test will be the Kurdish nationalist BDP. The BDP currently has 20 seats in parliament, just enough to form a parliamentary group and be represented. However, there is little doubt that the BDP will surpass this number and could pick up well over 30 seats. Though the BDP candidates are running as independents since there in no chance they could meet the 10 percent threshold, the rising force of the party in the southeast and in Western cities populated by a large number of Kurdish migrants will indubitably be one of the most important stories of this election cycle. As its main challenger, the AKP's increased nationalist rhetoric is likely to work in favor of the party.

We'll see what tomorrow brings.

Why Turkey and Turkish Civil Society Matter

Far too many Western political leaders, thinkers, and donors, especially here in Washington, have come to think of Turkish democracy as a “mission accomplished,” or at least, a project "near complete.” The sad state of affairs is indeed the opposite, and mostly sadly, it is this premature attitude that could turn Turkey back toward its authoritarian past rather than build on the democratic successes it has achieved in the past 15 years.

As American think-tanks bandy about a “Turkish model” as some ideal path for the newly emerging Arab democracies to follow, the real state of Turkish political affairs remains a mystery to all too many. In fact, Turkey now has more journalists in prison than any other country in the world, including China. And, like China, a new Internet regulation that goes into effect Aug. 22 will set up an online filtering and surveillance system by which every Turkish citizen will be followed by the government using an online profile. These developments are all the more disturbing given the ongoing Ergenekon investigation, which while supposed to bring down the infamous Turkish “deep state,” instead has been used as a political tool to go after the ruling AKP government’s political enemies.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish conflict, which the government’s “Kurdish opening” was to finally bring to a close by granting Turkey’s Kurdish population of 15 million plus people cultural and minority rights, has ground to a halt. Prime Minister Erdogan just over a year ago recognized the “Kurdish problem” as a democracy problem, but has since denied its existence. Last summer saw the largest escalation of the conflict since the 1990s, and given the government’s recent nationalist posturing, it is highly unlikely that the problem will be resolved.

Most important of all is Turkey’s stalled European Union accession process, the primary fuel behind the rapid-pace reforms that constitute Turkey’s democratic successes at the turn of the millennium. However, more than four years have passed since Turkey began accession negotiations, wherein the country has made little progress in fully meeting the EU’s Copenhagen criteria for democracy and human rights. Indeed, as Dilek Kurban notes in yesterday’s post, progress has actually become regression. Turkey now has a repressive Anti-Terrorism Law in place that has landed thousands in prison without adequate legal redress and torture, illegal detention, and impunity remain problems just as daunting as they were before the AKP entered power in 2002.

The main problem, more than any other, is a ruling party that has distanced itself from the liberal democracy it once embraced to in its place champion a majoritarian conception of rule by the people where minorities, opposition figures, and political dissenters are becoming less secure in their rights by the day. Democracy, as the AKP understands it, is rule by the majority—it is electoral authoritarianism dressed up to look nice for Western audiences keen to fondly fixate on the notion of an Islamist party that has somehow come to champion a long oppressed majority while adopting liberal values. However, the AKP is not liberal. While there is plenty of truth that the majority of conservative Muslim Anatolia has been repressed throughout the history of the country’s history, now it is the majority who is comfortable to reign over the minority.

There is no resolving the Madisonian dilemma—the inherent conflict between majority rule and individual liberties—for the ruling AKP government. There is only a will to power—a will evinced by Prime Minister Erdogan’s designs to create a presidential system. As The Economist noted in its controversial editorial endorsing the CHP and which now has the prime minister fuming about Zionist-driven conspiracies, if the AKP is to unilaterally push through a new constitution, it could end up being worse than the greatly amended one currently in place.

Ironically, if the United States and Europe do not move fast to realize what is happening inside Turkey, the world will lose a country that really could serve as a democratic example to the Arab Middle East. The AKP government made tremendous progress when it first came to power in 2002, and it could be said that the party’s first years in office provided the best government in the history of the Turkish Republic. However, a lot has happened since and the model is at risk. If Turkey’s democratic progress is ultimately lost, then there will not only be the lack of a democratic success story in the region but a failure that could set back Islamist/conservative democrats in other Muslim countries who otherwise have good chances of making democracy work. And, as recent survey research attests, Arabs are paying attention. (66% of Arabs surveyed at the end of last summer said they viewed Turkey as a democratic model.)

What is to be done?

Now is the time for action. The EU accession engine that powered the AKP’s early reform efforts is imperiled by the Greek Cypriot presidency, which will commence in just a little more than a year from now.  This means the Turkish government, which will still be led by the AKP whether the party gains a super majority or not, must make serious progress toward accession. The country is in a race against time. And, no matter what happens in June elections, movement toward a new constitution, or at least major constitutional reform, will be on the plate.

In this context, Turkish civil society will prove key to saving Turkish democracy just as it did during the optimistic years after the EU accepted Turkey’s application for membership in 1999 and major reforms started coming down the pipe. The authoritarian tendencies of Turkish political parties, not exclusive to the current party in power, need to be countered by civil society.

When the AKP tried to make adultery illegal in 2004 and ignore legislative proposals that would reduce the sentences for honor killings and rape in certain instances, it was a highly mobilized network of women’s groups that pushed the party to do the right thing. Many of these groups had become empowered thanks to donor money and expertise, and they fought the good fight, and well, won.

Though Turkey is now confronting a different set of challenges, support for civil society is just as critical now as it was then to support these groups. And, what kind of support exactly? What is needed are not requests for proposals that nearly prompt groups to apply for money, but rather funds for genuine projects grown out of grassroots understandings of political expediency. Turkish civil society groups should be encouraged to do more to work together, as women’s groups did in 2004, and even more importantly, engage political parties, the government, and the state (listed here in an ascending order of difficulty).

Support for strengthening political parties and institution-building has been enormously successful in Turkey, and to some extent, has resulted in the recent democratic turn by CHP we have seen of late, but without funding civil society to keep political parties in check and goad them to respond to democratic demands, little will get done.

And, the impact?

The AKP has accomplished tremendous feats in its time in power, but the party has grown too strong while civil society has lagged behind. Now confident that it is the voice of the majority, without an active, challenging, forward-looking civil society to remind it of its earlier liberal promises, the party will be doomed to failure—and, with it, Turkish democracy. It is no coincidence that civil society and liberalism emerged together in the history of other countries’ political development, and the two go together in Turkey as well.

If Turkish civil society, adequately funded and attended to, can take the mass protest movements we have seen in response to the government’s plans to pass draconian restrictions on Internet usage and round-up journalists and actually organize this anomic political mobilization into smart, organic political engagement with politicians, the result would prove not only beneficial to the longevity of Turkish democracy but also serve as an example to the Arab world.

Everyone is a Turkish Citizen

PHOTO from Taraf

The CHP has declared its support to amend the constitution in favor of a non-ethnic understanding of Turkish citizenship. Under the country's current constitution (drafted under military tutelage) all citizens of Turkey are members of the Turkish nation (click here, in Turkish). Further, according to Article 66, every Turkish citizen is considered to be a Turk. This is the first time that any major Turkish political party in the entire history of the Turkish republic has offered such a non-ethnic understanding of citizenship.

The change is proposed as part of a wide series of concrete constitutional reforms the CHP has endeavored to put forward. The proposed reforms were drafted by CHP vice-president Suheyl Batum with a team of 35 academics. Though some have speculated that the CHP is too diverse a coalition to generate concrete proposals (Batum himself hales from the center-right), the constitutional proposals are more solid in substantive than the rhetoric coming out of the AKP.

The CHP has also expressed its support for education in mother tongue, which requires amending Article 42, which stipulates that no Turkish citizen can receive education in any mother tongue language other than Turkish. Article 42 specifically targets languages native to Anatolia, such as Kurdish, while allowing for education in English, French, and other foreign languages.

Kilicdaroglu addressing a campaign rally in Hakkari. PHOTO from Milliyet


Meanwhile, for the first time in nine years, the CHP held an election rally in Diyarbakir a day ahead of the rally AKP is expecting to hold tomorrow. Though turnout was somewhat disappointing for the party (only ~2,000 people showed up), it is clear the CHP is performing a series of firsts that could find itself winning voters in the southeast and currying favor with liberal reformers who have since become disenchanted by the AKP.

For an accounting and history, as well as some more context, of the proposals the CHP is putting forward on the Kurdish issue, see this post from a few weeks ago.

Prime Minister Erdogan will hold a rally in Diyarbakir today.

Trust Not the People

Aengus Collins wrote an excellent piece last fall on the democratic flaws inherent in Turkey's current system of closed-list proportional representation. As Collins notes, though the 10% threshold required of parties to enter parliament gets most of the attention (including recent mention in a 2010 Council of Europe report), considerable less attention is paid to the actual method by which parties and voters choose candidates. From Collins:

There are problems at every stage of Turkey’s electoral process. As I highlighted in my most recent post, parliament’s 550 seats are badly misallocated among the country’s 81 provinces. Next, the processes used to translate individual votes into seats for parties are deeply skewed. The 10 per cent threshold that parties need to clear before they can enter parliament deservedly gets the most attention, but it’s not the only issue here. Once the threshold has been passed, the d’Hondt method is used to distribute seats among the remaining parties. Of the many variants of proportional representation, d’Hondt is the least proportional, systematically favouring larger parties.*

We reach a further set of problems when it comes to filling the seats that have been allocated to the various parties. Turkey uses a closed-list proportional representation system. This means that voters vote for the party of their choice, but there is no mechanism for them to express a preference for one or more of the party’s individual candidates. Instead, a list of candidates for each province is drawn up by the party leadership and any seats won in that province are automatically assigned to the names on the list, starting from the top.

It’s not the list per se that causes the problems here. List-based proportional representation is an extremely widely used electoral approach. But in most cases an open list is used, which allows voters to influence the rank-order of the names on the list, and therefore the order in which seats will be allocated to party candidates. Turkey’s closed-list variant is less common. It has tended to feature in countries where democracy is relatively novel and/or shallow. The reasons for this should be clear. Closed lists produce an authoritarianism-friendly form of democracy, keeping power and control in the hands of party elites rather than individual voters.

Consider some of the negative effects that flow from the use of closed lists. First, as noted above, voters have no way of influencing the identity of the person who will represent them. Accordingly, the link between citizen and representative is weak at best. Second, parliamentarians are particularly strongly incentivised to bend to the will of their party leadership rather than to act in the electorate’s interest. Third, the calibre of party candidates is likely to be weaker than it could be, because leaders are free to promote weaker candidates on their lists in an effort to prevent rivals from emerging. Fourth, voters are left with no easy way to hold an individual politician to account by voting them out of office

Electoral systems are not the sexiest of business, but do not get enough attention. One of Turkey's chronic problems is the sheer strength that political parties wield over the system. Political leaders in Turkey are famed for staying around forever: once you are at the top of your party, there is little going away. This is, of course, also a problem of internal party democracy, but once leaders ascend to the position of party leader, they can virtually choose who will and will not be elected. Of course, this creates plenty of incentive for corruption, weak candidates with little popular appeal (think Deniz Baykal), and most importantly, a low level of democratic responsiveness to the people. The whole piece is worth a thorough read, and kudos to Aengus for writing it.

Prime Minister Erdogan has announced plans to draft a new constitution after the June 12 election, including a move to a presidential system. Why not an open-party list in addition?

Aengus also gives attention to parliamentary immunity, referencing Simon Wigley's equally cogent 2009 HRQ article on the topic. That one is also well worth the read.

Erdogan Defensive on Threshold Issue

The question of Turkey's high 10% electoral threshold came up again on Wednesday when Prime Minister Erdogan spoke at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). The Council of Europe recommended in January 2010 that Council members adopt a 3-5% threshold. When a PACE parliamentarian asked the prime minister why Turkey had such a high percentage, Erdogan became pointedly defensive. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The question brought a stinging response from the Turkish leader, who said the 10 percent election threshold was determined by the Turkish people’s will, rather than the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP.

“The 10 percent threshold is not determined by my party, we also came [to power] with this threshold. We established our party and managed to come to power 16 months later,” he said, impyling that the threshold was no barrier to becoming elected.

Lowering the 10 percent threshold is not a matter of democracy, according to Erdoğan.

“We will lower the threshold when the time comes, but we will do this by asking our people, not you,” Erdoğan said.

Russia, at 7 percent, is the only other European country approaching Turkey’s 10 percent threshold.

Germany and Belgium have thresholds of 5 percent each; Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia all have thresholds of 4 percent; Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden have 3 percent; Spain, Greece, Romania and Ukraine have 2 percent; Denmark has 0.67 percent, while the Netherlands merely requires parties to win 1/150 of the votes cast to enter parliament.

Although the practices varied widely, the report said the general application was around 4 to 5 percent.

Studying Turkey, the report analyzed 2002 general election data and noted that only two political parties succeeded in passing the 10 percent threshold. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, gained 66.9 percent of the seats even though it won only 34.2 percent of the votes, while the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, gained 33.1 percent of the seats with 19.5 percent of the votes.

As such, 46.3 of the votes were not represented in Parliament in the wake of the 2002 elections, the report said.

“More than half the electorate was deprived of representation and those parties that were elected had a percentage of seats twice that of their percentage of votes, [meaning] that a proportional system became a majority one,” the report said.

For the Council's full report and recommendations, click here. While the CHP and BDP have supported lifting the threshold, the AKP has resisted. Whether to raise or lift the threshold is, of course, a matter of politics. Lifting the threshold would cost the AKP the super-majority it hopes to land in the parliament in June elections while the BDP and AKP would stand to benefit from the AKP's loss. One would expect the MHP to also get on board the threshold issue given that it stands to lose the most should it not reach the the threshold in June. The BDP subverts the threshold by running independent candidates, and then forming a parliamentary group after their election.


UPDATE I (4/18) -- State Minister and EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis defended the threshold yesterday using Israel as a counter-example while speaking on a TV program. “In Israel, they have a foreign minister who flushes the toilet as he speaks on radio . . . . The guy in his youth was a nightclub bodyguard in Moldova. He still thinks of himself as one and cannot pass on to being a statesman. Israel’s foreign policy has been entrusted to this man because they don’t have an election threshold.”

Making Way for President Erdogan? . . .

The parliament's constitutional commission has given the greenlight to a bill that would allow a sitting prime minister to run for president without resigning her or his position in parliament. As Prime Minister Erdogan has expressed interest in running for the post at the end of President Gul's term, the law is widely regarded asn effort to secure the prime minister's position as a potential candidate.

In 2007, following the political crisis that ensured in relation to the election of Gul, the constitution was amended to faciliate the popular election of the president. Before, the president had been elected in parliament. Under the current constitution, the president is elected for a five-year term (though it took some time to sort out whether the term would e four or five years) with the right to serve two consecutive terms. President Gul's term will end in 2012.

In April, Erdogan caused further alarm in some circles when he discussed the virtues of installing a presidential system in Turkey along the lines of the American system. The prime minister said that a presidential system might better resolve ongoing conflicts about the separation of powers in Turkey's constitutional system, but skeptics quickly jumped on the statement as evidence of Erdogan's intentions to consolidate his own power once elected president.

Constitutional Court to Hear CHP Petition

Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya / PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

The Constitutional Court announced today that it will hear the CHP's petition to annul the constitutional amendments passed last month. It is still not clear whether the Court will examine whether the articles are in line with the first three un-amendable articles of Turkey's 1982 military constitution. There is a legal debate as to whether such an examination is substantive or procedural, and thus whether it falls within the purview of the Court. In 2008, the Constitutional Court annulled a constitutional amendment on the headscarf on the grounds that it violated the first three unchangeable articles of Turkey's 1982 constitution (see June 7, 2008 post).

Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said the Court's power of review extended only to procedural questions, taking the narrower view of what "procedural" means in this instance. Further, Arinc said the Court cannot meet to discuss the amendments until after the referendum on Sept. 12. However, Constitutional Court President Hasim Kilic said earlier that in the event the Constitutional Court decides to hear the appeal, a decision would be prior to Sept. 12.

Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, who brought the closure case against the AKP in 2008 and is thought to be preparing another, also weighed into the debate. According to Yalcinkaya, the amendments violate Article 2, and in doing, should be struck down. Yalcinkaya said the amendments were designed to undermine the judiciary and were a threat to separation of powers.

Constitutional Court to Decide on CHP Petition

Constitutional Court President Hasim Kilic announced that the Constitutional Court will meet next Thursday to decide whether to hear the CHP's petition to annul the constitutional amendment package passed earlier this month. In the event the Constitutional Court decides to hear the appeal, Kilic said the a decision would be reached prior to the scheduled Sept. 12 referendum date. The CHP is appealing the amendments on both procedural and substantive grounds. In 2008, the Constitutional Court annulled a constitutional amendment on the headscarf on the grounds that it violated the first three unchangeable articles of Turkey's 1982 military constitution (see June 7, 2008 post).

CHP Files for Annulment

The CHP has filed its petition with the Constitutional Court to annul the constitutional amendments passed in parliament last week. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The Republican People’s Party, or CHP, applied to the Constitutional Court with 111 votes. Along with 97 CHP deputies, six Democratic Left Party, or DSP, deputies, seven independent deputies and former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz of the Democrat Party signed the CHP’s application.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, meanwhile, criticized the CHP on Friday for repeatedly applying to the top court to resolve the country’s political problems.

Speaking to the media after the application, CHP deputy Süha Hakkı Okay said the party’s objection to the package was both procedural and in terms of its essence.

In the petition, the party said the package was submitted to Parliament with procedural mistakes and that articles regarding the judiciary were contrary to the Constitution.

The petition listed the procedural and methodological mistakes first, saying the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP’s, proposal was actually a draft bill, not a parliamentary proposal. The party cited Erdoğan’s constant references to the word “draft bill” in its court application.

The CHP also said the AKP submitted the proposal to Parliament twice, thereby constituting a methodological mistake.

The AKP first submitted its package proposal with “stock signatures” the party had collected from all its deputies when they were first elected to Parliament in 2007. Because of the CHP’s objections, the AKP had to resubmit the proposal to Parliament by having all its deputies physically re-sign the new proposal in person.

Claiming further that the AKP had failed to obey the rule of secret voting in Parliament, the CHP attached alleged visual evidence of this procedural violation in its petition.

The opposition party further objected to the essence of the reform package, saying the articles, which envision a reorganization of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, or HSYK, and the Constitutional Court was against the Constitution and a threat to judicial independence.

The Supreme Election Board (YSK) has scheduled the referendum for Sept. 12. The date is controversial because the party had planned to use the day to re-open the Armenian church on Akdamar Island in Van for religious services for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, a move initially showcased to symbolize rapprochement with Armenia.

The BDP in Washington

The BDP has opened an office in Washington, a decision no doubt sparked by the United States' continued cooperation and backing of the AKP in relation to Turkey's Kurdish problem. Since 2007, the United States has loaned its support to Turkish efforts to eliminate the PKK inside northern Iraq through various air raids, offering up intelligence to support the Turkish military in such missions and helping to ease tensions between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) that arise during such operations. Pressured to some extent by increased diplomatic and trade ties between the Turkish government and the KRG, the BDP is likely hoping the office will at least give it a presence in Washington. On Tuesday, BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas and Ahmet Turk participated in a panel sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (moderated by Henri Barkey). Click here for Carnegie's briefing of the event, during which politicians explained the BDP's opposition to the constitutional package and Turk outlined three demands (an inclusive constitutional re-structuring of Turkish citizenship, cultural rights for all, and more administrative control for predominantly Kurdish municipalities). For more coverage of the office and the BDP delegation in Washington, see Hurriyet Daily News columnist Ilhan Tanir's comments.

One Step Closer to Referendum

The constitutional amendment package cleared the second round of voting parliament yesterday, though it took a serious hit on Tuesday when the article pertaining to party closures failed to garner the necessary votes needed to take it to a referendum (for more on the article, click here). At least eight AKP deputies did not vote for the closure amendment, a move Prime Minister Erdogan claimed afterward as a victory for intra-party democracy (for a skeptical report on this claim and more on the closure vote, see Goksel Bozkurt's report in Hurriyet Daily News). Despite the AKP leadership's failure to pass the amendment on party closures, the other two controversial amendments -- pertaining to a restructuring of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) -- passed on Wednesday. The amendment package is now in President Gul's hands, who is expected to approve the package rather than send it back to parliament. Once the package is published in the Official Gazette, it is automatically submitted to referendum. The referendum can take place 60 days following publication in the Official Gazette, though the CHP is expected to challenge the legality of the referendum and the amendments themselves at the Constitutional Court, a move that could well change the timeline.

Separating and Limiting Powers

Picking up on some of the concerns I expressed earlier about the government's failure to outline limits on its own power (see March 28 post), thereby striking a balance between majoritarian and liberalism, see constitutional theorist Andrew Arato's interview with Milliyet's Devrim Sevimay (in Turkish, and in two parts -- for Part I, click here; for Part II, click here). The interview has only strengthened a vigorous debate in the Turkish press, and whether people agree or disagree, will hopefully help bring the need to strike this balance into better frame. My hope is that it will also strengthen the discourse of the oppostion, which has largely focused its arguments in narratives of the AKP/government's plans to take control of all society. Rather than arguing ad hominem and with use of various conspiracy theories, a more valuable discourse will center on the need to consign limits to governmental power, a requirement of liberal democracy and an exigency that Prime Minister Erdogan has been remiss to adequately address. (For a two-part response to Arato from Ankara University law professor Mithat Sancar, click here (Part I) and here (Part II); for an earlier article by Arato that came amidst the AKP closure case and the Constitutional Court's decision to annul the headscarf amendments in 2008, click here.)

Discussed briefly by Arato and Sincar is Erdogan's declaration of a week ago that he is warm to the idea of a presidential system similar to that of the United States. The prime minister said that a presidential system might better facilitate a separation of powers and resolve current consitition-centered tensions. The AKP has made statements that it plans to based its 2011 election bid on a new constitution, and Erdogan has said that he would be interested in the presidency if the public seemed to demand it. The CHP firmly denounced Erdogan's statements, using them as evidence that the party is bent on ensuring its own hegemony.


UPDATE 5/8 -- From prominent, self-identified "liberal" Atilla Yayla, who is currently Vice-Chiarman of the Liberal Thought Association:

If your primary goal is to make Turkey a more liberal country, then you have to struggle within the current system. The AK Party is neither the founder of this system nor its primary protector, though it has adopted and protected some of its characteristics and practices. Of course, the AK Party should be criticized, and some of its activities should be opposed. However, this alone does not a liberal position make. Indeed, Kemalists and (neo)nationalists oppose the AK Party, but this does not make them liberals. If you base your opposition to the AK Party on the current system, and not your liberal principles, then you will become just another obscure and weak copy of the CHP or the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). But if you oppose it from a liberal perspective, then this will both make sure that your own position becomes more liberal and force it to undertake more liberal acts. The choice is yours.

Another Missed Opportunity?: A Look Back at the 'Kurdish Opening'

Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir
DHA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

I am re-posting the timeline I originally posted on April 20 with updates. I will continue to update the timeline, but will not re-post it. The updated timeline can be easily accessed from the link under "Kurdish Timeline" on the right-hand sidebar.

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With many opinion leaders and observers of Turkish politics considering the 'Kurdish Opening' "closed," the government has fallen relatvely silent in recent months as it has moved to focus on constitutional reform. The Ergenekon investigation and revelations about a potential closure case against the AKP seem to have put the government's Kurdish initiative on the shelf for a while longer yet. Following harsh attacks by the opposition since the initiative's announcement, much strengthened by the botched Oct. 19 crossover of 34 Kurds from Iraq, eight of them former PKK militants, the government had already shown signs of watering down previous plans. Writing for the Middle East Information Research Project's Middle East Report Online after the Oct. 19 public relations disaster, Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden summed up the 'Kurdish opening' this way:

The AKP, assuming it intends to create momentum for peace anew, will find this task difficult. Even though the governing party enjoys considerable EU support, it will again encounter resistance from the parliamentary opposition, as well as the armed forces, who have accused the AKP of surrendering to “the terrorists.” What is more, a large part of the AKP’s constituency comes from the nationalist mainstream and is unsupportive of expansive overtures to the Kurds. The party leadership, beginning to look ahead to the 2011 elections, is already loath to rock the boat.

In 2009, the phrase of the moment was “road map” -- whether in the TESEV report [click here] or Öcalan’s shelved opus. Deniz Baykal invoked the phrase sardonically to distance his party from the Kurdish opening, bidding the AKP, “Bon voyage!” The problem, though, is that the Turkish government appears to have been without a road map. Its journey has accordingly seemed meandering, its leaders driving blind. A slightly different metaphor, however, of peace as a process, does seem to describe events as they have transpired. Erdoğan might still be prevaricating when he claims the “democratic opening” is a seven-year work in progress with short-, medium- and long-term objectives. But this concept does offer some hope, a glass with something in it, even if it is far from half-full. And Erdoğan is not wrong to emphasize how much progress has been made.

The politics of pushing throuh the initiative, especially an amnesty for former PKK militants, is no easy task, and especially at a time when the AKP is embattled in efforts to amend the constitution. Understandably, with the CHP now red-hot over judicial reform, the AKP does not want to offend nationalist voters and gain the wrath of the MHP, a party with which the AKP heavily competes for votes in conservative Anatolia.

Yet, the AKP has plenty of room to save itself and re-ignite the process. If the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Part (BDP) can be properly engaged and the process yield results in terms of decreasing terrorist attacks and reinvigorating enthusiasm lost in October, the popular enthusiasm for the government's initiative recorded in polls last summer might also be rejuvenated. The road is not easy. The Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA)'s Hatem Ete, back in August, wrote that the AKP's task at hand involves the government involving all parties in the initiative, from the ultra-nationalist MHP to the BDP, and that as daunting a feat as this is, that should the AKP be able to get state institutions involved, most importantly the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the initiative might just yield results. While Ete rejects any form of mediated talks with the PKK, he does acknowledge an important role for Kurdish nationalist politicans to play. With the looming threat of increased violence and yet indications from imprisoned PKK former leader Abdullah Ocalan that he is willing to allow for more distance between the PKK and the BDP, engagement is indeed possible at this time and will prove essential to successful reform efforts in the future. Ongoing operations against suspected members of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan - KCK), a group functioning as go-between for the PKK and the BDP, have badly damaged relations and, as Huseyin Yayman explains, only served to consolidate support for the PKK by leding creedence to their rhetoric of "elimination." Bridges burnt between the AKP and the BDP in recent months can be rebuilt, but only with diligent, sustained effort and willignness on the part of the AKP to engage in dialogue to begin with -- something the party did not seem keen to do even at the earliest stages of the initiative.

The AKP's initiative is not the first significant gesture a Turkish government has made in regard to the Kurdish problem, but it could be the first to succeed. In 1991, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel boldly declared, "Turkey has recongized the Kurdish problem," and before then, President Turgut Ozal had been holding secret negotiations with the PKK throgh indirect contacts. In 1993, despite the ocnflcit's later escalation, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller spoke of the Kurdish conflcit as parallel to Spain's conflict with the Basques, suggesting that a limited autonomy solution might be possible. (In November 2008, the same was suggested by then Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission co-chairman Joost Lagendijk.) And, in 1999, after the Helsinki Summit, Mesut Yilmaz instructed, "The road to the European Union passes through Diyarbakir." The ending of the unilateral PKK ceasefire in 2004 and rising Turkish nationalism has since complicated the journey, but it is not too late to forge onward.

However, as Lagendijk informed at the end of his tenure, the path taken must first be chosen by Turkey. Erosion of support for the EU accession process and skepticism about the wave of trips the EU paid to the southeast in the first years of the accession have soured the efficacy of the EU in the process while the United States' role is beleaguered by its role in Iraq and widespread accusations of its having imperial designs. (Notably, in recent months, Ocalan has sent signals that he is now more willing to deal positively with the EU.) And, there is drive in Turkey t do, however dissipated it might be in this moment. In a recent op/ed response to an argument that the BDP has not changed while the government has, Radikal columnist Oral Calislar writes that Kurdish nationalism is a fact that must be dealt with, and that, in fact, both Kurdish nationalists and the government have changed. This, indeed, is a product of the peace process, and it leaves much hope to be had. Several Turks realize that the formation of the Kurdish Regional Govoernment (KRG) changes the name of the game, and that the continued polarization and relative deprivation of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey could have profound effects in the future if the issue is not solved in the soon to near future (for examples in English, see these op/eds by Omer Taspinar and Cengiz Aktar; for a taste of recent nationalist rhetoric, see AFP's interview with BDP deputy chairwoman Meral Danis Bestas).

Recognizing the Kurdish problem to be his problem, Prime Minister Erdogan made a bold first step when he addressed an audience in Diyarbakir in 2005, and recognizing"Kurdish nationalism" will be another big step yet. But, this is what a peace process is all about. The government was never going to solve the Kurdish problem in one fell swoop, but the initiative was, and should it be re-energized, a step in the right direction.

Below is a timeline I have assembled documenting developments in the 'Kurdish opening' from February 2009 to last week's attack on Ahmet Turk. I would more than appreciate any additions of important events/details I have left out. For events before February 2008, see my post, "Beyond Bananas: Hopes for the Kurdish Minority in 2009," Jan. 8, 2009, in addition to this article by the European Stability Initative's Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere that appeared in Turkish Policy Quarterly.


A TIMELINE

February 2009

2/15 -- Protestors marking the tenth anniversary of Abdullah Ocalan's capture clash with police throughout the southeast.

2/22 -- Prime Minister Erdogan visits Diyarbakir to launch TRT-6 under threats from the PKK. Despite the government's efforts to seell the station in the southeast, the new channel is largely seen as an election ploy. The DTP does not support the channel, largely seeing it as a superficial attempt by the AKP to undermine its clout before elections.

2/24 -- DTP leader Ahmet Turk, observing UNESCO World Language Week, illegally speaks Kurdish in parliament to the outrage of nationalist politicians. Turkish national television immediately cuts off feed.

2/27 -- Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug expresses support for limited cultural rights.

March 2009

The PKK declares a unilateral ceasefire.

3/9 -- Iraq President Jalal Talabani calls on the PKK to lay down its arms following a bilateral meeting in Anakra with President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan. Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). President Massoud Barzani supported Talabani's call much to the betrayal of some Kuridish nationalists in Turkey.

3/10 -- President Gul, talking to reporters in Tehran, sends the first signal of what would become known as the 'Kurdish Opening,' declaring, "There are already good things happening. We are resolving our own internal problems."

3/23 -- Prime Minister Erdogan visits the KRG to urge cross-border cooperation in stopping PKK attacks incursions into Turkey. It was the first time a Turkish leader had visited the region in more than 30 years.

Newroz celebrations result in few incidents of violence and the expected calls for the state to negotiate with the imprisoned Ocalan and the PKK. Ocalan calls on followers to resist KRG-led resolution efforts, harshly criticizing KRG President Massoud Barzani and telling followrs to stay away from a planned summit Barzani was reported to be planning in Arbil. The Arbil summit never came to fruition. Leyla Zana denounces the calls of KRG politicians for the PKK to lay down arms, echoing Ocalan's call to stay away from the planned summit in Arbil. United States involvement is also denounced.

3/25 -- Diyarbakır AKP deputy İhsan Arslan said that those “who want to solve the Kurdish problem cannot disregard the DTP, the PKK or Abdullah Öcalan.”

3/29 -- In municipal elections, the DTP wins landslide victories across the southeast, losing many districts in which the AKP had done well in 2004. Academic and member of Turkey's PEace Assembly told Bianet before the election that "it's a referendum on if the PKK-DTP line should be regarded as the main address for a dialogue to solve the Kurdish issue or not. . . . The state and the government are trying to avoid that and hope to render conservative Kurds as their counterpart. I believe that DTP, which claims to be the main actor, will gain strength in the elections."

April 2009

4/20 -- Over 120 suspected members of Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan - KCK), a group functioning as go-between for the PKK and the DTP, are detained, including senior members of the DTP. The arrests are widely seen by Kurdish nationalists as a response to the DTP's March electoral victories. The detentions and arrests that follow will be the first in a series of operations against the KCK. These are still underway.

4/27 -- An extensive police operation in Istanbul against a leftist organization linked to the PKK results in a five-hour shootout in which three police officers are killed. The militant on the other end of the gunfight, Orhan Yilmazkaya, turns out to be 0ne of the top three leaders of the Revolutionary Headquarters.

4/29 -- 10 soldiers are killed in Diyarbakir and Hakkari provinces in violation of the PKK's unilateral ceasefire.

May 2009

5/13 -- Ocalan announces plans to release a roadmap for peace, later issuing a statement through his attorneys that the roadmap would be relased on Aug. 15. Though the roadmap was never released, stories about its would-be content continue to be published in Turkish newspapers through the summer, including in a much talked about government-sanctioned interview with Ocalan conducted by Hurriyet journalist Ertegrul Ozkok. Details included a wiseman commission to mediate an amnesty between the Turkish state and the PKK. Ocalan informs that any mediation should be done without participation from the United States or European Union. Ocalan's roadmap, as it was part and parcel revealed, also resembled the vague four-point plan the DTP would later float around. PKK Commander Murat Karayilan, in an April interview with Milliyet's Hasan Cemal, laid out similar plans (see also Jenny White's post, including a link to the interview in Turkish).

5/18 -- President Gul says Turkey has a "historic opportunity" to solve the Kurdish question.

5/22 -- In a speech in Duzce, Prime Minister Erdogan argues that Turkey should begin fairly dealing with its minorites. From the speech: "Over many years, suspicions toward foreigners existed in this country. This mindset has seemingly not changed. They have chased members of various ethnic groups out of this country. Have we won? We should think about this. Actually, this was a result of a fascist mentality."

5/26 -- A mine explodes in Diyarbakir province killing six Turkish soldiers in violation of a unilateral PKK ceasefire in effect since March.

5/31 -- The PKK extends its ceasefire to July 15 in anticipation of Ocalan's roadmap.

June 2009

6/13 -- A Turkish soldier and a PKK militant are killed in a firefight exchanged at the Turkish border.

July 2009

7/15 -- The PKK extends its unilateral ceasefire to Sept. 1.

7/22 -- Prime Minister Erdogan announces that the government is preparing its own comprehensive plan for peace. Soon after, AKP deputies appear for the first time in six years on Roj-TV and state that “all political actors [including Ocalan] should be considered if they positively contribute to the peace process." Interior Minister Besir Atalay gives a televised press conferece. From the conference: "We have the intention to take determined, patient and courageous steps." MHP leader Devlet Bahceli and other ultranationalist leaders vociferously denounce the plan while some PKK opinion leaders welcome it, hoping that it might lead to dialogue between the government and the PKK.

7/29 -- Leaders from Turkey, Iraq, and the United States meet in Ankara to discuss how to deal with the PKK in the context of a tripartite mechanism setup between the countries to arrange for cooperation between them on the issue.

August 2009

8/1 -- CHP Deputy Chairman Yılmaz Ates joins a show on pro-PKK Roj-TV, stating that “we need to have self-criticism about what happened that we [Turks and Kurds] have become foes.” Divisions seem to emerge within the CHP as to how to approach the government's intiative.

8/3 -- The Turkish National Police Academy hosts Interior Minister Besir Atalay and a group of opinion leaders to discuss the Kurdish question. The workshop, titled “The Solution to the Kurdish Question: Toward the Turkish Model,” was attended by 15 participants, all warm to the government's plans.

8/12 -- Prime Minister Erdogan delivers an emotive speech to his party's parliamentary group. Referring to the "Kurdish Opening" as a "democratic project." Erdogan asks, “If Turkey had not spent its energy, budget, peace and its young people on [fighting] terrorism, if Turkey had not spent its last 25 years in conflict, where would we be today?”

"The DTP's Deputy-Chairman Selehattin Demirtas, list[s] four demands as the basis for any peace settlement including: forming a new constitution that fully supports democracy; amending article 66 of the constitution, which defines a Turkish citizen as anyone 'bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk, in order to emphasize the non-ethnic qualification for citizenship; removing the ban on using the Kurdish language in education and media and empowering the local municipalities'" (Emrullah Uslu, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Aug. 14, 2009).

8/20 -- Ocalan delivers his 160-page handwritten roadmap to his attorneys whereupon it is confiscated by prison officials at Imrali.

8/25 -- The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) General Staff express support for the government's plan to grant limited cultural rights and improve economic development in the southeast. However, the TSK drew red lines on negotiating with the PKK, undermining the unitary structure of the Turkish state, or making Kurdish an official language.

The end of August proved to be a turning point. First, harsh criticism of the AKP poured forth from the parliamentary opposition, replete with dire warnings of the impending downfall of the republic. This invective was followed by a message from the chief of general staff, İlker Başbuğ, posted on the army’s website, which reiterated the military’s commitment to the “unitary” Turkish state and the struggle against terrorism. The top general rebuffed the DTP call upon the government to negotiate with Öcalan, saying, “There should be a good look at who is responsible for the bloodshed. You cannot put martyrs who sacrificed their souls for their country and terrorists in the same corner.” In response to the push for political and cultural autonomy for Kurds, Başbuğ continued, “The state of Turkey, the country and the nation, is an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009).

September 2009

9/2 -- Prime Minister Erdoğan, attending an iftar meal (to break the daily Ramadan fast) with police at a Special Operations Department branch, declare[s], “I say this very clearly and openly: Neither the state nor the government of the Republic of Turkey will sit down with terrorists or treat a terrorist organization as a party to negotiations. This can never, ever be a subject for discussion” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009).

9/5 -- Prominent AKP MPs turn[] a discussion of the Kurdish opening into a recitation of old slogans, denouncing the PKK as “baby killers” and exalting Turkey as “one nation with one flag.” (Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009.)

9/10 -- The Higher Education Council (YOK) gives Artkulu University in Mardin the permission to teach Kurdish language education courses. The language was offered alongside Farsi, Arabic and Syriac at a new "Living Languages in Turkey" institute. YOK Chair Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, announced that language courses would train academics to teach minority languages. A similar initiative at Dicle University in Diyarbakir for teaching courses only in Kurdish under the heaidng of a "Kurdish" faculty was rejected.

9/14 -- The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) apply to the parliament to prolong its mandate to conduct military operations in northern Iraq.

9/23 -- Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug once again expresses cautious, but heavily guarded support for the government's intiiative. For coverage from Bianet, click here.

9/23 -- The PKK issues a press statement criticizing the "Kuridsh opening" for not recognizing Ocalan as a negotiating figure and not suspending anti-PKK military and police operations. DTP members argue the government's initiative presents old policies in a new package.

October 2009

10/8 -- After refusing to meet with Interior Minister Besir Atalay, CHP leader Deniz Baykal sends a letter to Prime Minister Erdogan agreeing to meet with the prime minister. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said the government might be forced to hold a referendum on some elements in the "Kurdish Opening," of which the details had still not been disclosed.

10/19 -- At the request of Ocalan, 26 refugees from the Makhmour UN refugee camp in northern Iraq and eight former PKK members cross into Turkey at the Habur Gate as a "peace group." Though the eight former PKK members were detained at the border, they were released within 24 hours. The next day, prosecutors brought charges against five of the former guerillas, but the important thing is that they were not detained, the government citing that they had not committed crimes during their times with the organization.

Interor Minister Besir Atalay, who helped coordinate the crossover, said returning group was considered the beginning of the laying down of arms by the PKK, but later the process ceased after scenes of celebration interpreted to be pro-PKK flooded Turkish television screens. Opposition political parties harshly criticized the AKP, raising public ire over the incident and accusing the government of cooperating with terrorists. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli denounced AKP's actions as treason, and a number of anti-PKK rallies took places throughout the country. Prime Minister Erdogan held the DTP responsible for the celebrations, deeming them to be provocative. Significantly, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), for its part, criticized the celebratory nature of the return, but said nothing of the return in itself being wrong (Interview with Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere, The Balkans Project, Nov. 16, 1009)

The DTP most definitely used the rallies to their advantage, but after the first day, Ahmet Turk ordered participants not to wear PKK regalia and tried to minimize the gatherings being perceived as pro-PKK. Another group from Europe was expected to turn themselves in, but their arrival was cancelled after the Turkish embassy in Brussels withheld their entry visas. [See Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton and Joost Jongerden, “'Road Maps' and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast," MERIP, Oct. 30, 2009.]

10/28 -- Fifteen NGOs in Diyarbakir issue a press statement criticizing the DTP for not playing a more constructive role in the "Kurdish opening."

November 2009

11/12 -- Interior Minister Besir Atalay announces a six-point action plan. An amnesty is not included in the plan.

11/13 -- The AKP introduces part of its "Kurdish Opening" in parliament. The legislation includes the easing of restrictions on private Kurdish-language television stations and Kurdish language faculties in universities, as well allowing towns and villages to use their original Kurdish names once again.

11/21 -- The AKP meets to discuss opposition to the "Kurdish opening" and designates certain party members to discuss the initiative. There is talk about removing Atalay as the main voice of the initiative. From Today's Zaman:

The party leadership decided on individuals who will have the authority to make statements for the party and the government in the initiative process. These individuals are Prime Minister Erdoğan, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek, Chief EU negotiator Egemen Bağış, deputy chairmen of the AK Party Hüseyin Çelik, Salih Kapusuz and Ömer Çelik; and deputy chairmen of the AK Party’s parliamentary group Bekir Bozdağ and Suat Kılıç. According to the new strategy, nobody except these individuals has the authority to make statements on the initiative.

AK Party deputies were again given the red lines that are never to be crossed when implementing reforms to actualize the democratic initiatives. Every move has to comply with the first three articles of the Constitution. According to this, Turkey’s unitary structure, flag and official language will not be changed.

11/22 -- A DTP-organized convoy touring Izmir is attacked by Turkish nationalist youth. Protests broke out in Hakarri after the attack.

11/25 -- Ocalan complains to his attorneys after he is moved to new prison facilities and his isolation ended. However, Ocalan sends messages through his attoneys that the new prison facilities are worse than before. The government had invited the the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) to tour the new facilities and meet with Ocalan and other inmates. A protest in Diyarbakir draws five thousand people, all answering the DTP’s call to protest Ocalan’s prison conditions.

11/26 -- In Bamaric, in Canakkale province, a clash between Kurdish and Turkish youth incites widespread violence against Bamaric's Kurdish minority. Three Kurdish teenagers are jailed, and a lynch mob of thousands gathers outside where they are being held.

11/29 -- A group of PKK supporters in Diyarbakir launches Molotov cocktails at the offices of Sura-Der, a pro-Hizbullah association. In response, a thousand Hizbullah supporters assemble to protest the PKK.

11/29 -- The KCK issues a statement saying the “attacks” against Ocalan show that the intention of the Turkish government is to eliminate the PKK leader. “This is a war project against Ocalan and our organization and the Kurdish people. If Ocalan is not released from the ‘death cell’ where he was put, our organization is not responsible for further developments.”

11/30 -- The "peace group" that returned in October issue a statement on Ocalan's prison conditions in a press release made by the Diyarbakir Branch of the Human Rights Association (IHD). The statement is now being used in a case against them being pursued by prosecutors in Diyarbakir. For more on the case, see Bianet.

December 2009

12/6-7 -- Weekend protests of Ocalan's prisons conditions draw thousands, and include more violent clashes with police. A 23-year-old university student is killed by a bullet in the back.

12/7 -- A PKK attack in Tokat kills seven Turkish soldiers. Three soldiers are wonded in a separate attack on a military vehicle.

12/7 -- The DTP's Emine Ayna gives a controversial interview (in Turkish) to Radikal in which she says the PKK gave the DTP the political space to do politics. She further goes onto say that no one should expect the DTP to deny or back away from this fact, adding that Kurds can always "go to the mountains," a metaphor for joining the PKK. Unsurprisingly, there is now a lawsuit being pursued in relation to the interview. Ayna has used the interview for her own political gain and remains in parliament while DTP doves Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk are banned from politics.

12/8 -- The Constitutional Court begins to hear arguments in the DTP closure case.

12/11 -- The Constitutional court announces its decision to close the DTP and ban 38 DTP politicians from politics for a period of five years, including chairmen Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk. Dramatic protests and clashes with police follow. See Dec. 20 post.

12/15 -- Shop owner Turan Bilen, whose store was attacked and car set on fire during protests of DTP's closure in Bulanik (Mus province) , opens fire on demonstrators, killing two and injuring seven.

12/23-24 -- To purportedly end allegedly KCK-organized street violence, police raid various addresses and arrest approximately 100 alleged KCK members, including human rights activists, politicians, students and ten mayors. For a list of some of those detained, including Diyarbakir Human Rights Association Chairman Muharrem Erbey, click here. For more on Erbey and a bit of insight into the operations, see this brief from Human Rights Watch. A petition followed the arrests. The so-called 'KCK operations' started in April following the DTP's sweeping election victories, prompting charges that the state/government are using the operations to target the party.

The National Security Council (MGK) announces full support of the government's Kurdish initiative and announces plans to publish a roadmap of its own in 2010. The roadmap has not yet been published. Rumors persist that Interior Minister Besir Atalay will be removed from his charge of coordinating the initiative.

12/28 -- An additional 24 alleged KCK affiliates are detained in Batman and Van.

12/30 -- Ahmet Turk's granddaughter, Ruken Turk, is sentenced to 10 years in prison for attending a pro-PKK demonstration.

12/31 -- DTP's closure and the 5-year political bans of DTP parliamentarians Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk go into effect upon publication in the Official Gazette. Turk and Tugluk's parliamentary immunity is terminated. Without Turk and Tugluk, and following a call from Ocalan, the remaining representatives of the DTP have decided to stay in parliament, joining the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which was strategically formed shortly after the closure case was opened against DTP in November 2007 as a fallback should the DTP be closed. Independent deputy Ufak Uras had agreed to also join the party, giving the party the 20 required members it needs to form a parliamentary group and be represented in parliament.

January 2010

1/10 -- Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu makes a tour of Mardin in support of the Kurdish opening.

1/10-11 -- Police detain two of the PKK returnees who crossed into Turkey as part of the Oct. 19 "peace group."

1/15 -- Atalay holds a press conference in attempt to reignite enthusiasm for the Kurdish opening.

1/15 -- Radio Ses in Mersin begins broadcasting in Kurmanci, Zaza, and Arabic. According to Bianet, "Radio Ses ('Voice') airs four programs in the Kurdish Kırmançi dialect, one in the Zaza language spoken by the Zaza people in eastern Anatolia and one broadcast in Arabic per week.

1/19 -- Former DTP member Hasip Kaplan announces that he has applied to the Europpean Court of Human Rights (ECHR) , arguing the Constitutional Court's decision to close the DTP violates the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


1/22 -- Gendarmerie forces detain approximately 60 alleged KCK members, including Igdir mayor Mehmet Nuri Gunes. Protests in Igdir are to follow.

1/24 -- Approximately 60 people are detained in another KCK sweep. 400 people are involved in clashes with police during a demonstration in Dogubeyazit.

1/24 -- The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistan -- TAK) issues a new declaration, in which TAK threatens to hit economic targets and civilians who play critical roles in maintaining the existing political system. TAK further warns tourists not to come to Turkey, and criticizes the PKK for being too passive in its struggle against the state.

1/25 -- Conflict erupts in Igdır between pro-Kurdish demonstrators and police following a DTP demonstration. Shops mostly belonging to ethnic Azeris are stoned during the course of events, provoking violent reactions from Turkish ultranationalists.

1/26 -- A delegation from the CPT visits Ocalan's facilities at Imrali and interview him and other prisonmates. Click here for coverage from Bianet.

February 2010

2/1 -- The BDP elects leaders Selahattin Demirtas and Gultan Kisanak as its co-chairs at its first party congress.

2/2 -- The day following the BDP's first party congress, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in Ankara opens an investigation of the party. The investigation is launched on alleged crimes of “turning people against the military,” “contradicting the Political Parties Act” and “praising crime and criminals,” according to the Anatolia News Agency.

2/3 -- PKK Commander Murat Karayilan releases his own roadmap for a future peace agreement between the state and the PKK.

2/3 -- U.S. general Ray Odierno, top commander in Iraq, meets with Turkish government officials as part of tripartite mechanism setup between the United States, Turkey, and Iraq. Discussed are details of how to evacuate the Makhmour U.N. refugee camp, where 10,000 Turkish Kurd refugees have been residing since 1993. Makhmour is a major source of recruitment for the PKK and its closure will be an important part of any peace settlement. (Click here for coverage from Hurriyet Daily News. For U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarks on the meeting, click here.)

2/3 -- Police detain 16 former DTP members.

2/3-4 -- The EU-Turkey Civil Commission (EUTCC) hosts its sixth international conference on the Kurdish question.

2/6 -- Following Ocalan’s advice, BDP leader Selehattin Demirtas declares, “The PKK and the BDP are two separate organizations. If the PKK want to say something they have the right to say so. We will not be their voice.” In an interview a few days later, Demirtas thanks Ocalan for allowing the BDP to develop its own political program as an independent party from the PKK. According to Emrullah Uslu,

With the BDP, Öcalan seems be at a point where he wishes to cooperate with the EU, so he has ordered the BDP to distance itself from the PKK. In parallel with Öcalan’s demand, BDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş outlined his party’s relations with the PKK, saying, We will not be the voice of the PKK.” During
another interview, Demirtaş thanked Öcalan for letting his party develop its own policies separate from the PKK. Based on this information, one can assume that the pro-Öcalan Kurds are pursuing a double-sided strategy. The BDP, of course, under the direction of Öcalan, is pursuing policies more independent of the PKK.

The PKK, on the other hand, plans to pursue its own policies through a more violent terror campaign. In an interview, Cemil Bayık revealed the PKK’s 2010 strategy to remove the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the Kurdish region. According to Bayık, the Turkish state thinks the AKP is the last resort for it to establish relations with Kurdish communities. If the PKK removes the AKP from the region, Bayık thinks, the Turkish state will have no choice but to sit down with the PKK and negotiate peace.

Unlike its traditional strategy, the PKK this time will use proxies to terrorize society. The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), an offshoot PKK organization that terrorized the country, especially tourist destinations and metropolises, in 2006 and 2007, will be the proxy organization for the PKK in 2010. The reason why I underline the TAK’s role is because this mysterious organization has recently issued a declaration threatening to resume its intense terror campaign in 2010.

2/6 -- Today's Zaman reports on Interior Ministry plans to restructure the village guard system in line with a report prepared by the parliament's human rights commission issued following the Bilge massacre. However, to date, no concrete measure has been taken. The Council of Europe has long called for the system's abolishment.

2/8 -- Unidentified individuals in an automobile open fire on BDP headquarters in Ankara. Interior Minister Besir Atalay calls BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, describing the act as a "provocation" and conveying the AKP's concern over the incident.

2/9 -- Rojda, Turkey's most popular Kurdish female singer, is arrested on charges of "spreading propaganda for an illegal organization." More than one month later, Rojda is convicted and sentenced to one year and eight months in prison after she had been invited to attend a meeting of artists Prime Minister Erdogan had assembled to discuss the Kurdish opening.

2/9 -- More than 90 civil society organizations, including business associations, chambers, professional unions, human rights activists and women's organizations, launch the “two minutes of darkness” protest, which will run through the month.

2/11 -- The first hearing in Ankara occurs in a case involving two off-duty police officers who shot to death a Kurdish man following a confrontation in a bar triggered by the man singing songs in Kurdish.

2/13 -- Police detain another 69 people in an effort purported to assuage expected demonstrations marking the eleventh anniversary of Ocalan's capture. More detentions and arrests occur the next day. According to Bianet, more than 100 people are arrested over the weekend, mostly members of the BDP.

2/15 -- Demonstrations marking the eleventh anniverary of Ocalan's capture draw clashes with police. From Bianet: "According to Fırat News Agency, 25 people got injured in the demonstrations, 21 people were taken into detention, 17 of them children. Overall, 110 demonstrators were arrested including 35 children."

2/19 -- A trial of 61 alleged members of the KCK gets underway in Diyarbakir.

2/20 -- Prime Minister Erdogan hosts popular artists to discuss the Kurdish opening in an effort to garner popular support.

2/22 -- In one of the many cases brought against her, Aysel Tugluk is acquitted of charges of "spreading propaganda for a terror organization." Tugluk was tried together with two of Ocalan's lawyers, Irfan Dundar and Fırat Aydinkaya, who received sentences of 10 months each.

2/23 -- At an event organized by the Civil Society Development Center (STGM), Kurdish civil society leaders expressed frustration at not having their voices adequately heard by the governmnet. Today's Zaman quotes Levent Korkut: “It will be difficult for the democratization process to move on if dialogue and cooperation between civil society and the state is not ensured."

2/24 -- Mehmet Ali Aydin, head of Diyarbakir's BDP branch, is formally arrested after showing up for a morning court proceeding.

2/26 -- Van BDP deputy Fatma Kurtulan submits a motion to parliament to open an investigation into the death of former president Turgut Ozal.

2/26 -- Italy arrests 11 suspected PKK members. Dutch authorities apprehend the PKK's lead operator in the Netherlands. And, on the same day, a German court lifts the gag on Roj-TV, which had been in pace since 2008.

March 2010

3/2 -- France arrests nine Turkish citizens suspected of recruiting for the PKK.

3/4 -- Belgium detains 30 people for suspected links to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, after conducting raids on 25 locations, including a studio of Roj-TV. Nine were arrested, including Kongra-Gel (PKK) Chairman Remzi Kartal and executive Zübeyir Aydar.

3/7 -- CHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu hints that the CHP would support a general amnesty, only to back away from his comments the following week under presumed pressure from his party. The remarks triggered a strong reaction in the Turkish press.

3/7 -- Commemorating International Women's Day, in a speech delivered in Urfa Prime Minister Erdogan called on all women to contribute to the government’s efforts to end the terror problem.

3/12 -- Siirt BDP deputy Osman Ozcelik submits a motion to parliament calling for an investigation into a recent wave of suicides among former members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The motion read: “The opinion that the TSK is covering up certain incidents is gaining ground among the public. The fact that most of the military personnel who are reported to have killed themselves are of Kurdish origin, and statements from families of alleged suicide victims that they do not find the TSK statements on the alleged suicides convincing give way to suspicions that there is ethnic discrimination in the military and even cases where executions are covered up as suicides.”

3/15 -- Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan regional administration in northern Iraq, met with Aydın Selcen, Turkey’s first consul general in Arbil, the de facto capital of the semi-autonomous region.

3/15 -- Turkish Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug defends the village guard system as essential to Turkey's "fight against terrorism."

3/15 -- BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas meets with Interior Minister Besir Atalay to discuss the safety of Newroz observances.

3/17 -- 14 people are detained in Siirt in another KCK-sweep, including Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) provincial head Sıdık Taş, the Human Rights Association’s (İHD) Siirt branch head, Vetha Aydın, provincial council member Belkıza Epözdemir, Tüm Bel-Sen branch head Ferit Epözdemir, and several administrators from various unions and associations.

3/18 -- Newroz celebrations begin in Hakkari under tight security. Celebrations continued throughout the week with few disturbances, accompanied by the usual Kurdish nationalist fanfare. Celebrations in Istanbul were confined to Kazlicesme in Zeytinburnu. For more in-depth coverage of festivities, including excerpts from message a from Ocalan delivered by BDP members, click here.

3/19 -- Siirt Mayor Sidik Tas is formally arrested.

3/20 -- Prime Minister Erdogan hosts another meeting with Turkish artists.

3/21 -- The PKK leadership's People's Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) Executive Council Presidency announced a "new phase" in the organization's struggle. Karayılan said in an interview with Ayla Jean Yackley from Reuters News Agency that a political solution has grown increasingly difficult to be reached, pointing to the DTP's closure. "We can end the ceasefire and resume the armed struggle," Karayılan warned.

3/22 -- The Public Prosecutor's Office in Diyarbakır launches cases against Turk and Tugluk for various speeches made by the politicians. Another case against both politicians is being pursued in Ankara.

3/25 -- Demirtas tells Today's Zaman that the BDP will support the government's constitutional package if all restrictions on campaigning in Turkish are lifted (not just the oral use of the language, but also written and broadcast materials), Treasury money is fairly disbursed between parties, and the election threshold is lowered. The following week, BDP co-Chairwoman Gultan Kisanak echoed Demirtas in her party's group meeting, iterating that the BDP's support of the package is conditional on the government's "extensive acceptance" of its recommendations. For more on the BDP's position, including analysis from former Chairman of the Diyarbakir Bar association Sezgin Tanrikulu, see this article from Today's Zaman's Ayse Karabat. Ocalan has said that Kurds should not support the constitutional reform package until the Anti-Terrorism Law (TMK) is lifted.

April 2010

4/6 -- Prosecutors in Diyarbakir begin to pursue a case against members of the October "peace group." From Today's Zaman: "At the time of the Kandil-Makhmour returnees, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was critical of the jubilatory nature of the group’s reception and had said: “Is the attitude seen at Habur correct? Is it a unifying attitude? Is it an attitude that makes people uneasy? Is there freedom and peace in the attitude?”' See also this report from Bianet.

4/8 -- Former MP of the closed Democracy Party (DP) Leyla Zana is sentenced to three years' imprisonment under charges of "propaganda for a terror organization" on the grounds of calling PKK leader Öcalan the "Leader of the Kurdish People". See also coverage from Today's Zaman.

4/12 -- A man attacks Ahmet Turk outside the Bilen trial in Samsun. Turk is hospitalized, and questions emerge about the security with which the former DTP leader was provided. Protests and highly questionable clashes with police breakout throughout the country (see also reportage from Bianet). Shops are closed in Hakkari, Yüksekova, Şemdinli, Van, Başkale and some areas of Mersin in protest of the attack. Emerging from the hospital, Turk urges calm. From Today's Zaman: Later, Interior Minister Besir Atalay, "speaking to a TV program, said Turk is known for being courteous and moderate and urged people to remain calm in the wake of his attack and look to his example as a model of a reasoned and measured response to injustice. He added that they will not tolerate attempts at provocation, and he cautioned security forces to take better measures to prevent such attacks in the future." For reactions from the Turkish press, click here.

4/13 -- Demirtas gives a sharply critical speech at his party's group at a podium blazoned with a banner reading "1,483 BDP members still detained." At the meeting, Demirtas declares, "we have seen nothing else but cruelty from AKP during the past eight years. Not one single area of freedom created by AKP was for the benefit of the people". Bianet gives a summary of the "KCK operations," which commenced in April 2009 following DTP victories in the southeast.

4/15 -- Hurriyet columnist Yılmaz Ozdil writes, "The person who punched Ahmet Türk on his nose was an interpreter of the feelings of many people in this country." Lawyers from the Diyarbakir Bar Association file a lawsuit against Ozdil for "inciting hatred and hostility amongst the public and humiliation of the public."

4/19 -- A gymnastics teacher attacks Energy Minister Taner Yildiz in Kayseri, yelling, " “This is the fist of the Turkish people. Here is [a Kurdish] initiative.” Yildiz was attending the funeral of a soldier killed in a PKK attack.

May 2010

5/7 -- Two more Turkish soldiers were killed in two separate incidents of PKK-placed landmine explosions in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces.

5/8 -- BDP Istanbul Provincial Chairman Mustafa Avci describeds the KCK operations as "political genocide," characterizing them as retaliation won for the electoral victories the DTP won in March 2009's local elections.

5/9 -- For Mother's Day, the southeastern NGO Peace Mothers staged a sit-in in Ankara. More than 100 protestors called for an end to the Turkish military's operations against the PKK.

5/11 -- Riots between students at Dokuz Eylul University in Mugla result in a police officer shooting a Kurdish student. The riots are later said to have had an ethnic dimension.

5/13 -- Former DTP leader Aysel Tugluk is acquitted in two of the multiple cases that have been brought against her since her parliamentary immunity was removed following DTP's closure.

5/16 -- Milliyet runs a statement by Ocalan, issued through his lawyers, that he will no play an active role in settling the conflict if officials do not meet with him by May 31. He warns of attacks and broad rebellions in Turkish cities.

5/16 -- To protest continued operations against the PKK, a group of BDP deputies and a large crowd form a human shield in an effort to block military operations in Lice (Diyarbakir).

5/17 -- The BDP announces that it will begin taking the cases of those arrested in the KCK operations to the European Court of Human Rights.

5/20 - 5/24 -- An additional 120 people alleged to members of the KCK are detained.

5/20 -- The Turkish military carries out air strikes against PKK positions inside northern Iraq. The military later reports it killed 19 PKK fighters.

5/21 -- Six people are arrested for insighting the attack on Ahmet Turk in Samsun. Proescutors are demanding four years for Turk's attacker.

Manouchehr Zonoozi, a former director of Roj-TV in Denmark, recently gave an interview to a Danish newspaper in which he spoke of the close links between Roj-TV and the PKK.

5/26 -- The Turkish military reports to have killed four PKK fighters in clashes in Tunceli. Early the next morning, one Turkish soldier and four others are wounded in continued clashes.

5/27 -- A PKK attack in Siirt on a military vehicle kills one Turkish gendarme.

5/31 -- A PKK attack on a naval base in Iskenderun (Hatay) leaves six Turkish soldiers dead. It was the first attack on a Turkish naval base in the history of the Turkish Republic, and a sign that the PKK is intent on expanding the conflict. Some government officials, opposition leaders, and public opinion leaders begin speculating that the attack is linked to Israel's raid on the Mavi Marmara.

June 2010

6/1 -- An additional six people are arrested in Van in the course of the KCK operations. Seven more people are arrested there on Friday (6/4).

Three Turkish soldiers are injured in an attack in Cukurca (Hakkari).

Six PKK members surrender at the Habur Gate in Silopi province, and another in Adiyaman province.

6/2 -- A security summit is held in response to increased violence in the southeast. The professionalization of the military is discussed, as well as increasing the response to unrest in the southeast. Interior Minister Besir Atalay expressed the government's commitment to the political and economic solutions laid out in the announcement of the Kurdish opening last summer, but again, failed to give any specifics.

6/3 -- KRG President Massoud Barzani meets with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The two discuss trade between the KRG and Turkey, as well as the deteriorating security situation in the southeast. Barzani reiterates his opposition to the PKK's decision to end the ceasefire, and meets with DP leaders following his meeting with Davutoglu.

Violence continues in Cukurca with an attack on an armed police vehicle that injures three Turkish police officers. The local police department and police housing facilities fell under attack the night before. Another two police officers are injured in another attack on Friday.

6/7 -- An indictment is finally issued for the over 1,500 people who have been detained in the ongoing KCK operations. The indictment includes 15 BDP-elected Kurdish mayors.

6/8 -- A bombing in Istanbul's Kucucekmece district injures 15 military officers and two civilian bystanders. Five suspects are arrested after the bombing.

6/9 -- Ten people are arrested in KCK operations in Hakkari, including Hakkari BDP provincial head Sıddık Akış, BDP deputy co-chairperson Berivan Akboğa, former provincial head of the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP) Huvzullah Kansu, Dicle News Agency reporter Hamdiye Çiftçi and party members Baki Özboğanlu and İzzet Belge. Protests in Hakkari's city center following the arrests draw clashes with police.

6/11 -- A bomb placed beside a road linking Tunceli and Elzig injures 13 Turkish soldiers, some of whom were conscripts who had just been discharged after completing their mandatory military service. Police report to have foiled an attempted bombing in Izmir.

6/15 -- At the AKP's parliametary group meeting, Prime Minister Erdogan denounces the BDP, accusing the party of supporting the PKK: "Saying peace won’t bring peace. Those who are in direct or indirect contact with the PKK are accomplices to murder." Erdogan's remarks draw a strong response from BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, who accuses the prime minister for essentially calling for the closing of the BDP.

A PKK-planted landmine in Sirnak kills one Turkish soldier and injures another three.

6/16 -- A PKK attack on a military border post in Sirnak kills one Turkish soldier. The Turkish military responds by sending three commando divisions and a specialized battalion to chase the attackers into northern Iraq.

6/17 -- Ten members of the group of eight PKK memers and 26 residents of the Makhmour refugee camp who crossed at Habur in October are arrested at the first trial against them.

6/18 --


July 2010

August 2010