Closure A Foregone Conclusion

AKP filed its defense statement today and ahead of its deadline to do so. The action indicates that the party is adopting a strategy that treats its closure as a foregone conclusion. Arguing publicly that party officials do not want to drag the country through the political and economic turmoil of a hard-fought closure case, privately the party is planning for the creation of a new party. The party is unlikely to differ much from AKP save for a potential change in leadership. The real question starting to be paid attention to is just which AKP politicians are going to face five-year political bans and exactly how the party is preparing to organize new leadership. Erdoğan is, of course, "the big fish" to be caught and his ban is almost certain. However, more a matter of debate is just how and to what degree he will exercise power behind the scenes. Legal analysts have said that it is perfectly legal for the prime minister to seek elected office as an independent candidate since the political ban only applies to politicians who are members of political parties. However, just what the Constitutional Court and the Higher Election Board decide is subject to speculation, especially as a local election board prevented former RP prime minister Necmettin Erbakan from running in elections as an independent in 2002. Also of interest is discussion of center-right challengers to Erdoğan from both within and outside of AKP.

If AKP is banned, how exactly will events unfold? This question is difficult to answer and due to the variety of contingencies still very much being sorted out, Erdoğan has kept parliament working throughout the summer so as to keep deputies close at hand and parliament poised to initiate early elections should they be deemed necessary. Whether elections will come in the form of provisional elections (depending on the number of deputies the court bans in both the AKP and DTP closure cases) or early elections is also still very much subject to speculation. The prospect of early elections might fall on the same date as municipal elections, currently scheduled for March 29, and the ultimate decision rests with the Higher Election Board. In the event of a shutdown, AKP's preference is for the earliest elections possible.

The 98-page defense statement was itself quite simple and focused mainly on the very political nature of the case. Provocatively, the statement also declared that has confused the issue of secularism and that the Turkish model is out of date with a "universal understanding" of the concept. Rather than defining secularism as a "lifestyle," as the prosecutor has done, the statement argued that secularism should be understood as a separation of church and state. While such a model of secularism follows the American model, the Turkish model is much more similar to that practiced in France, a model that denies religion from having any influence in public affairs whatsoever (see April 13 post). Criticism was also made of Yalçınkaya's sloppy indictment (the Chief Prosecutor's love of Google) and fell along the same lines as the critique of the indictment submitted to the Court in AKP's preliminary defense statement. From the statement:

"All data in this case against us have been interpreted by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office at the expense of freedoms. However, the fundamental principle of universal human rights law is ‘interpretation in favor of freedoms.’ Let alone interpreting data in the favor of evidence, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office has literally used the method of ‘divination’ in assessing the AK Party’s alleged goals and has shown things not likely to happen as likely.”

As the Court's decision in regard to the türban amendments evidences, such a defense is not likely to be well-received. The Court's decision in the case could come as early as July, and rest assured, AKP will be prepared for the verdict.

More Reason for 301 Reform

I almost missed this, but Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya warned Wednesday that his office is intent to file charges against journalists and academics who go beyond criticism of the AKP closure case and instead insult the authorities currently prosecuting the case. (Yalçınkaya's office?) As we have seen, what is determined to be criticism and what is found to be an insult is highly unpredictable and usually politically-motivated. This is all the more reason why amendment to Article 301 and other legal restrictions on free speech must be rapidly removed. Actions such as Yalçınkaya's turn the political process into a trading of insults exchanged between various political elites—a spectacle that addresses not the needs of the people, but the egos of the politicians. As before argued, it also renders impossible the possibility of an open marketplace of ideas.

Criticism of Yalçınkaya will likely continue to build as revelations continue to make their way into the papers that many of the charges the Chief Prosecutor included in his 162-page indictment of AKP were copy-and-pasted from CHP circulars. Not only does such information show the tenuous nature of the allegations in the indictment as intimated by the Constitutional Court's rapporteur Osman Can, but more importantly, a possible political link between Yalçınkaya and CHP officials. As former chair of my university's honor council, is there a law in Turkey against plagiarism?

A Comprehensive Solution?

Today's Zaman reports that AKP is planning to include amendments regarding party closure in a larger package of constitutional amendments that will address an array of issues in the Turkish political system and hopefully bring the country in greater harmony with EU law. The package is speculated to not just address party closures, but also immunity for government officials, the office of an ombudsman by which complaints against the state may be solved, and even revision to Article 301.

Amendments to Article 68 and 69 of the Constitution had been discussed before the Constitutional Court accepted the AKP closure case on Monday, but seemed to have reached a deadlock. It is hardly likely that AKP will be able to push forward the new constitution it had planned to adopt this year in time to save itself from closure. Although AKP had designated a commission of legal experts and academics to draft the Constitution under the direction of Professor Ergun Özbudun following its July victory (see previous posts), the new mini-amendment package seems the logical consequence of how the democratization encompassed in that draft will be executed until the AK closure case is resolved. Most importantly, a larger package of democratic reforms might also provide more ground under which opposition parties might unite to solve the party closure issue. It seems also that AKP might also be motivated to include the party closure reforms as part of a larger package to save face so that any such amendment package will not seem a specific attempt to save itself, but rather be directed toward the larger aim of strengthening democratic institutions in the long-term.

CONTEMPLATING PARTY CLOSURES

Although the details of the new package will likely change as AKP seeks to negotiate the details with opposition parties (most principally MHP), it is likely that the party closure amendments will include a revision of the circumstances under which political parties may be legally closed. MHP has insisted that provisions be kept in place so as to allow for the closure of DTP. The Kurdish DTP is alleged by MHP to be linked to the PKK and to harbor separatist aims. No matter how incorrect this assessment of DTP, it is unlikely that MHP will come to any sort of agreement with AKP unless strong measures are put in place to allow the Chief Prosecutor to move against DTP (which MHP is hell-bent on closing). Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya's indictment of DTP last November accused the party of being involved in terrorist activities and of having links to the PKK.

Key to changing the criteria for closure is its embrace of the so-called 'Venice criteria' that require parties can only be closed if they “advocate the use of violence or use it as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution.”

Other possible reforms include requiring that the Chief Prosecutor attain approval by the Parliament or another institution in the government before filing a closure case with the Constitutional Court. There is much to debate as to what institution the Chief Prosecutor should be required to seek consent and the matter will be left to negotiations.

Further, an idea has also been proposed to change the number of judges required to consent to a party closure. Currently, at least seven judges must agree to close a party and it is possible that the amendment package might raise this number and therefore make it more difficult for the Constitutional Court to close AKP. Earlier proposals to change the law had included provisions that might even require unanimous consent of the Court to ban a political party, but these now seem to be off the table. They had also included talk of a provisional article that would might be tacked onto the Constitution outlawing party closures altogether and/or cancelling cases currently standing before the Court (see March 21 post). It seems the primary thought for casting aside these ideas was that it was thought this was asking too much of MHP and would hinder an agreement between the two parties. However, amending the Constitution to increase the number of judges needed to close a party by one or two might still appease MHP in that the solution might save AKP while damning DTP, extracting a minimum amount of reform all the while saving AKP and allowing MHP to use their assistance as a bargaining chip so as to gain concessions from AKP in relation to other issues.

The earlier constitutional draft prepared by AKP's academic committee and which has long since fallen to the wayside only proposed a slight amendment on party closures. The measure required that the Chief Prosecutor first warn the party before it files its case with the Constitutional Court. As Mithat Sancar, a constitutional law professor from Ankara University, told Today's Zaman, such a change will have little effect. What is needed is a drastic revision to the way in which the Turkish state deals with party closures and such a change should happen quickly. If AKP is to save itself by this means, it is necessary that the party either come to a compromise with MHP (as CHP and DSP express no desire to work with CHP on the issue) or to take the amendments to referendum. This would likely happen in June or July after AKP tries to push through the package on its own sometime in May. However, the significance of including the party closure amendments in a large package suggest that AKP is reluctant to do this and that it will try over the next few weeks to reach a comprehensive solution with other parties in Parliament.

POLITICAL BANS AND THE IMMUNITY ISSUE

The major sticking point in the discussions between AKP and MHP is how to deal with the immunity of parliamentary members. MHP is seeking that amendments include eliminating immunity currently granted to parliamentary members under Article 83. AKP has expressed willingness to compromise on the issue, but argues that immunity should also be lifted for members of the judiciary and bureaucracy.

The parliamentary immunity issue is associated with the long-lived practice of banning politicians from politics. AKP's hope is that amendments might re-work such political bans. This practice is interesting in that even when politicians are banned, they are still often working behind the scenes. This was the case when Erdoğan was banned following 1997's 'post-modern' coup. Although he was not publicly visible, he was very much involved in the creation of the Virtue Party. The same is true of Gül who was banned from politics up until the time AKP came into office in 2002 and he was appointed foreign minister by Erdoğan. AKP had suggested the rather confused practice be revised so as to prevent politicians from running in the next elections rather than being banned from politics and disallowed to participate in the formation of new parties.

MHP has a different approach. The party contends that bans for politicians should remain a part of Turkish political life, but that they should occur apart from the procedures currently in place. According to MHP, parliamentary deputies should be punished for illegal actions and such penalties might include banning the deputy from politics. Under current law, parliamentary immunity can only be lifted if the deputy's party is closed by the Constitutional Court. In this case, the Court can then ban the deputy from politics. MHP argues that parliamentary immunity should be completely removed and that deputies should be held responsible for any illegal acts their party might have committed. This would shift accountability toward individual deputies rather than the party. It would also likely mean that deputies might be banned from politics independent of a closure case.

Intent to change the law so as to save "the list of 71" drawn up by Yalçınkaya, it has not been foreseeable that AKP will give into this command. Saving its members from political bans is in many ways more important to AKP than saving the party itself. AKP is reportedly content work around this concern and compromise on the issue. Any such compromise would need to address what will happen in regard to the political bans the Chief Prosecutor is currently seeking the Constitutional Court to issue against "the list of 71." In recent days, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli has continued to emphasize the party's opinion that it is important that parliamentary members be held to account for actions taken when participating in government duties. This is no doubt connected to the DTP and Bahçeli's desire to see DTP deputies prosecuted once stripped of parliamentary immunity. Lifting parliamentary immunity is not a new issue in Turkish politics and MHP has before advocated similar moves. Lifting immunity has also been raised as a solution by which to address political corruption and is included in AKP's previous promises of reform.

AN OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

Also part of the mini-reform package is the re-introduction of the ombudsman issue. The creation of an office of ombudsman by which individuals might address complaints against state institutions was passed by Parliament in 2006, but vetoed as unconstitutional by President Sezer. AKP has proposed amending the Constitution so as to reference such an office and assure that future law might construct such an office. This is an important step for EU membership and a measure for which EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehen has long called.

ARTICLE 301—FINALLY?

According to the article in Today's Zaman, AKP is also considering the inclusion of amendments to Article 301 (part of the penal code, not the Constitution—see previous posts) as part of the mini-reform package. Such a move will most likely alienate MHP, but the fact that AKP has brought the issue up is laudable. It is more likely that AKP will pursue 301 reform as an effort apart from any such comprehensive reform package. This is probably for the best in that it will be difficult to pass meaningful reform of the bill under so many other pressures. If Article 301 is discussed as part of the package, it would be sad indeed if a watered-down amendment to the law is made in concession to MHP for cooperation on the more immediate party closure issue—that is if MHP will even allow any reform to be made.

Closure Case Accepted

Yesterday morning the Constitutional Court voted unanimously 11-0 to accept the AKP closure case. A decision to consider banning President Gül from politics was accepted by a vote of 7-4 as some judges apparently had concerns about the Court's ability to take a sitting president to task for any other act other than treason (as designated by the constitution). There has been much question as to whether actions the President took prior to assuming the Presidency can be used against him in the closure case.

The Court voted unanimously to consider banning the 70 other members of Chief Prosecutor Yalçınkaya's list, including Erdoğan and 37 other deputies. The Court needed only a simply majority of judges to agree to accept the case. If AKP is to be closed, a total of seven judges must find it to be in violation of the Constitution and order it closed.

Now that the case has officially been accepted by the Court, AKP might well move quickly to push forward constitutional amendments to change law pertaining to party closures. Unlikely to strike a compromise with MHP, it is possible that AKP will seek to take these amendments to a popular national referendum and/or hold early elections to bolster its majority. Such a move will heighten tensions between the party and Turkey's ruling political establishment—most significantly, the military. The question of early elections is further complicated by the fact that should AKP be closed, the party will inevitably lose its seats in the new parliament. If AKP is serious in its plans to pass amendments, it will need to act quickly. Meanwhile, the party is expected to prepare its preliminary defense in the next month. It is also likely that Yalçınkaya will submit more evidence against AKP following last week's conclusion by the Court's rapporteur, Osman Can, that evidence against AKP needs to be concrete if the party is to be legally closed.

Rapporteur Releases Report on AK Indictment

Constitutional Court Rapporteur Osman Can released his report Thursday evening as to whether the Court should accept the closure case currently pending against AKP. Can recommended that the Court should hear the closure case, but apparently stressed concerns about the evidence collected by Chief Prosector Yalçınkaya. Although the report is not public, it was leaked that Can stressed the fact that under Article 174 of Turkey's Code on Criminal Procedure (CMK) it is required that the indictment provide concrete evidence. The significance of this is that it indicates the report was concerned with a lack of solid evidence against AKP. Also significant to the report is the political ban facing President Gül and whether he might be banned from politics based on acts in which he engaged prior to his presidency.

A decision by the Constitutional Court to accept the case is expected as early as Monday and will require a majority of the Court's 11 judges. If the case is accepted, at least seven judges must decide to rule against AKP if the party is to be closed.

Secular Jihadis?

In a column in today's Wall Street Journal, Mustafa Akyol (who regularly writes for the Turkish Daily News) compares AKP and the rise of "Muslim bourgeoisie" to Islamic groups in other countries while maintaining that there are many similarities between so-called 'Islamic fundamentalism' and the "secular fundamentalists" that are currently in favor of closing AKP á la "secular jihad."

Akyol calls on the United States to stand by Turkey's elected government.

SECULAR JIHAD—A JUDICIAL ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY—Mustafa Akyol

Who would you expect to be zealous enemies of "moderate Islam"? Islamic fundamentalists? You bet. From Osama bin Laden & Co. to less violent but equally fanatic groups, Islamist militants abhor their co-religionists who reject tyranny and violence in the name of God. But they are not alone. In this part of the world, there is another group that holds a totally opposite worldview but shares a similar hatred of moderate Islam: Turkey's secular fundamentalists.

This secular hatred comes, most recently, in the form of a stunning attempt by judicial means to shut down the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and ban its top 71 members, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from politics for five years. Even President Abdullah Gül, a former AKP minister, is on the to-ban list of the country's chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, who submitted his indictment to the Constitutional Court in Ankara on March 14. The court is expected to decide this week whether to take up the case.

It is, needless to say, the first time that a ruling party, which won 47% of the vote less than a year ago, is threatened with judicial extermination. In the past, pro-Kurdish parties have been closed down due to their links with the outlawed PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). Yet the AKP is under threat simply because of its political views. It's a judicial version of the military coup d'etats that Turkey has experienced four times in the past half century.

Yet what are those political views of the AKP which, according to the chief prosecutor, require its banning? The 53,000-word indictment gives a clear answer: The AKP folks are too religious, they speak about God and religion in the public square, and they want more religious freedom.

The major "crime" of the AKP that is emphasized in the indictment, and which provoked the whole process, is the recent constitutional amendment that opened the way for female students to wear Islamic head scarves in Turkish universities. This ban was enacted in 1989 by a Constitutional Court decision. Since then thousands of young girls have been forced to choose between their beliefs and a university education. Some have gone to European or American colleges. Others have tried to wear wigs on top of their scarves in order to enter Turkish campuses.

The indictment also presents lengthy quotes from Prime Minister Erdoğan that demonstrate his "antisecular views and activities." These include his remarks in June 2005 to CNN's Wolf Blitzer: "My daughters can go to American universities with their head scarf. There is religious freedom in your country, and we want to bring the same thing to Turkey." In another "criminal" statement, made in London in September 2005, Mr. Erdoğan said, "my dream is a Turkey in which veiled and unveiled girls will go to the campus hand in hand." During a February 2005 interview with Germany's Welt am Sonntag, his "crime" was to note, "We Turks prefer the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of secularism to the French one" -- for the former grants more religious freedom to its citizens. For the chief prosecutor, these all prove that Mr. Erdoğan and his party aim to dilute and then overthrow secularism.

Actually there is some truth to this claim, because Turkey's official secularism is fiercely illiberal and shows limited respect for religious freedom. Any religious expression or symbol in the public square is considered an infringement of secular principles. For Ankara's old guard, the public square should be dominated by what former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer proudly defined as "the state ideology."

According to Princeton historian Sükrü Hanioglu, this ideology is rooted in the "vulgar materialism" of late 19th-century Germany, which heralded a postreligious age of "science and reason." This philosophy, which was emulated by some of the Young Turks and inherited by most of their Kemalist successors, has been openly endorsed by the Constitutional Court. "The secularism principle," Turkey's top judicial body argued in a 1989 decision, "requires that the society should be kept away from thoughts and judgments that are not based on science and reason."

A similar secular fundamentalism is propagated in the West by popular thinkers such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens -- but there it is one of many competing ideas. In Turkey secular fundamentalism is the official ideology, and it is eager to crush any alternative.

Besides their ideology, Turkish secularists also use a seemingly realist argument. If religion is given even a little bit of space in public, they argue, it will soon dominate the whole system. This doctrine of pre-emptive intolerance guides, and misleads, Ankara's establishment on virtually every issue. If we allow the Kurds to speak in their mother tongue, the establishment has argued for seven decades, we will have a Kurdish problem. But today they have a much bigger problem precisely because they have suppressed the Kurdish language and culture. Despite their presumptions, it is repression, not freedom, that feeds political radicalism.

Turkish secularists also portray the AKP as part of the radical Islamist movement. For them, there is no difference between the Gucci-wearing, head-scarved woman in Istanbul who wants to study business and the chador-wearing woman in Tehran who cries, "Death to capitalism!"

But the Muslim-democrat AKP is quite different from the Islamists of the Middle East. That's simply because Turkish Islam is a unique interpretation of the global faith. Since the Ottoman reforms of the 19th century, Turkey's observant Muslims have been widely favorable toward democracy. And since the 1980s, thanks to their engagement in globalization and capitalism, they have become much more Western-oriented than much of the secular elite. That's why the secularists constantly accuse the AKP and the supporting "Muslim bourgeoisie" of serving "American imperialism" and "Zionism." The same paranoia is reflected in the chief prosecutor's indictment. In it he notes, apparently in all seriousness, that Colin Powell and other U.S. officials have praised "moderate Islam," and he connects Prime Minister Erdoğan to "the American Broader Middle East Project which aims at ruling countries via moderate Islamic regimes."

The U.S. should indeed encourage Turkey not to enact a "moderate Islamic regime" -- a project that exists only in the fantasies of Turkish secularists -- but to achieve a real democracy in which the sovereignty of the people overrides the ideology of its bureaucrats and army officers. What the latter threatens these days is not only the most popular and successful political party of Turkey, but also this country's democracy.

Evidence Links Closure Case to Ergenekon Investigation

The daily Taraf reported yesterday that a copy of Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya's indictment was found on the computer of one of the fourteen people detained in a series of arrests that took place in the wee hours of the morning Friday. The copy of the indictment is apparently dated two days before it was filed with the Constitutional Court and indicates that the current closure case with which AKP is faced might indeed be linked to the government's ongoing investigation into Ergenekon.

The arrests took place in conjunction with the ongoing Ergenekon investigation and the individuals arrested were mostly leftist journalists and members of the Workers' Party (İP). They include 83-year old Cumhuriyet columnist İlhan Selçuk and İP leader Doğu Perinçek.

Due to the lack of government disclosure, AKP has been subject to criticism in recent days that the investigation is turning into a witchhunt aimed at its political enemies.

More About the AKP Indictment

To post more about the indictment/petition to close AKP, see two perspectives of the allegations against AKP. The first appears in Today's Zaman and the second in the Turkish Daily News.

The Constitutional Court has announced that it will decide whether or not to accept the case in the next ten days.

In other news, in an emergency AKP parliamentary group meeting, Erdoğan continued to urge party members to refrain from provocative comments and remain calm. He is also said to have questioned any potential links between the closure case and the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. The Turkish Bar Association and TÜSIAD have denounced the petition as inappropriate and a threat to political stability. In recent days, Turkey's currency has lost value against the Euro and the American Dollar. For a financial analysis of the situation, see Andrew Finkel's column in Today's Zaman.

The Crimes of the AKP

The below column by Mustafa Akyol appears in today's Turkish Daily News.

THE ATTEMPT FOR A JUDICIARY COUP D'ETAT

I have been telling you that these people are crazy. And now they proved it beyond any doubt.

You must have heard what I am speaking about. Turkey’s chief prosecutor has just filed a case against the incumbent AKP (Justice and Development Party). He asks for the closure of the party and the banning of Prime Minister Erdoğan and his 70 top colleagues from politics. A political party which has just gained the votes of the 47 percent of the Turkish people is now under threat. Even President Abdullah Gül is on the list of the would-be banned politicians. Unbelievable but true!

For long we have feared military coup d'état’s in Turkey. That type of assault on democracy happened four times and left behind an executed prime minister, hundreds of imprisoned politicians, and thousands of tortured intellectuals and activists. But although the Leviathan that organized those military coups is very orthodox in its authoritarian ideology, it is not totally mindless. It, as Donald Rumsfeld once said in a different context, “has a brain – is continuously changing and adapting tactics.”

The Empire Goes Mad

The 21st century tactic is to stage coups via not the military but the judiciary. As I noted in my piece dated Jan. 24 and titled “The Empire Strikes Back (Via Juristocracy),” now the bureaucratic empire in Ankara attacks the representatives of the people with legal decisions, not armed battalions.

If you talk to them, they will proudly tell you that they are saving Turkey from Islamic fundamentalism. You have to be a secular fundamentalist – or hopelessly uninformed – to believe that. The AKP has proved to be a party committed to the democratization and liberalization of Turkey, a process which, naturally, includes the broadening of religious freedom. But that democratization and liberalization is the very thing that the empire fears from.

If you look at the “evidence” that the chief prosecutor presented to the Constitutional Court to blame the AKP, you will see how fake all this “Islamic fundamentalism” rhetoric is. The anti-secular “crimes” of AKP include:

- Making a constitutional amendment in order to allow university students to wear the headscarf. (Maddeningly enough, this bill was accepted in Parliament with the votes of not just the AKP’s deputies but also those of the Nationalist Movement Party [MHP], and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society party.)

- Supplying free bus services for the student of the religious “imam-hatip” schools, which are nothing but state-sponsored modern high schools that teach some Islamic classes in addition to the standard secular education.

- Naming a park in Ankara after the deceased leader of a Sufi order.

- Not allowing the public display of a bikini advertisement.

- Employing headscarved doctors in public hospitals.

- Allowing one of the local administrators to issue a paper which has the criminal sentence, “May God have mercy on the souls of our colleagues who have passed away.” (The simple fact that he dared to mention God [“Allah” in Arabic and Turkish] in an official setting was considered as a crime.)

Yes, this is absolutely crazy. It is like defining the Republican Party in the United States as an “anti-secular threat” and asking for its closure based on facts such as that it has pro-life (anti-abortion) tendencies and that President Bush publicly said that his favorite philosopher is Jesus Christ.

The heart of the matter is that Turkey’s self-styled secularism is a fiercely anti-religious ideology akin to that of Marxist-Leninist tyrannies. And the AKP has been trying to turn Turkey into a democracy. That’s the party’s real “crime.”

A Shipwrecked Turkey?

Now what?.. We will see… The chief prosecutor’s file will be evaluated by the Constitutional Court, which is notoriously dominated by the ultra-secularists appointed by the previous president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Recently the same court cancelled a law which allowed foreign companies to buy real estate in Turkey. (Yes, the empire is against not just religion but also capitalism.) In that real estate decision, the ratio of the judges was 6 to 5, which was enough to cancel a law. But to close a party you need 7 votes (3/5th of the 11 members). And if 6 is the number of illiberal judges sitting there, that might not be enough to make an extremely illiberal decision such as closing down the AKP.

But what if the AKP really gets executed? To be sure, a party with a similar program will be formed soon and it will win the next elections. Meanwhile, though, the economy will be ruined, the EU process will be wrecked, and the hopes and dreams of millions of Turkish citizens will be crushed. That’s really the worst thing about tyrannies: You ultimately win your struggle against them. But, in the meantime, they give you hell.

Post-Modern Coup—Take Two?

Last night an amazing thing happened: A case was filed in the Constitutional Court to close down AKP for allegedly anti-secular activities. Under Turkey's 1982 Constitution, parties may be closed by the Constitutional Court. Although some European states have similar provisions for party closure, the provisions in Turkey have long-been used as a political weapon against parties who step too far outside of the establishments' comfort zone. In total, 18 political parties have been closed down under the 1982 Constitution. AKP now joins DTP in facing potential closure.

Significant to the closure case is a list of 71 politicians that now face being banned from politics for a 5-year period. The list includes Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül and the bans could have a more serious impact on AKP politics than actual closure of the party. As before noted, AKP is in fact the reformulation of two other previosuly closed parties and its top leaders have experience in handling party closures. Banning Gül proves particularly interesting in that the president is theoretically positioned to be "above politics" and it will be interesting to see how the Court handles his name being on Yalçınkaya's list.

The closure case will change the entire pace of Turkish politics. With a popular mandate of a near 47 percent of the vote received last July, it seemed that AKP had stood up to the old guard (namely the military) and survived. However, as AKP has expressed strong intentions to pursue the Ergenekon gang's investigations and politically weakened itself by pushing so hard to lift the headscarf ban, it seems that the old institutional structures are now pushing back.

See reportage of the story in Today's Zaman.

The Headscarf Debate: AKP and MHP Agree to Work Together

The past week has once again put the issue of headscarves at the forefront of Turkey's political agenda. Before midnight this last Thursday, it was announced that AKP and MHP had come to an agreement to work together so as to assure that parliamentary action would soon be taken to lift the ban. Details as to how this will happen are still developing, but needless to say, the move signifies an important development in Turkish politics and one that is likely to antagonize the political establishment to which AKP is seen opposed.

Watching the story break, it was hard not to be caught by the enthusiasm of the Turkish pundits offering commentary. In Turkey, women are forbidden to wear the headscarf while on a public university campus. Since two-thirds of women in Turkey wear the garment, the rule has effectively denied education to a large number of women who aspire to a university education. Some headscarved women do enter university, but are forced to stuff their scarves in their purses before entering university gates and oftentimes don a cap or wig in substitution of the disallowed scarf. The issue is one that promises a great amount of vitriol to be spewed from both sides of the dialogue—in particular from those who will inevitably come to see the state's secular values as under direct attack from AKP. For them, this will surely mean that the Islamic agenda they suspected all along has finally revealed itself.

For those who are outside the issue, the headscarf polemic is difficult to get a grasp on. In the United States, for example, it is hard to comprehend how the government can prohibit women from wearing articles of clothing they might feel compelled to wear for personal, religious, or cultural reasons. Few people think twice about a Muslim woman donning a headscarf in a public place and no serious move of which I am aware has ever been made to prohibit this right in the public arena. It is basically a non-issue. This said, it should be noted that the issue is by no means exceptional to Turkish politics, but has rather been important in other countries as well: France bans the headscarf in public schools (and all other "overtly religious" clothing and/or symbols) and even conservative Kuwait struggled with the issue of allowing women to wear the niqab in science classrooms (for safety reasons). In Turkey, the headscarf is of particular importance insomuch as it has come to be seen by many as a political symbol of Islam. Those who wear it are often seen as agents of Islam who are challenging the state's secular value scheme as laid out at its founding by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. More than anything else, it is this symbolic attachment that some people place on the headscarf that makes it such an explosive issue.

The headscarf issue is interesting in that its very presence in Turkish politics nicely illustrates the dynamic between Turkey's strict secular establishment and its more religiously conservative silent majority. A poll published last June in the Turkish left-wing daily Radikal found a majority of Turkey's populace to be in favor of lifting the headscarf ban. In many ways, Turkey's politics since its transition to multi-party democracy have been the story of opposition parties attempting to represent what might be called this silent majority or trying to curry favor with it.

To begin to understand the origins of the secular establishment to which I have been alluding, it is useful to turn to the Turkish state's origins. Founded in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Turkish state moved quickly to establish itself as a modernizing force. Atatürk, very much influenced by the Young Turk ideology the formation of which he was a part, believed secularism to be a crucial pillar to any such movement forward. The first years of Turkey's political history brought a great number of Western reforms, including revision of the Turkish language from an Arab script to a Roman one, sartorial reform that included the elimination of the fez that was viewed as a symbol of the Ottoman Empire's Islamic past, the suppression of Muslim brotherhoods/dervish orders (tarikats), and most importantly, the enshrinement of secular politics following the elimination of the old Ottoman Caliphate. A secular, republican state intent to pursue political development along Western lines and in strict accordance with the nation-state model, Turkey's political heritage is very much rooted in these early days of the Republic. A single-party state until 1945 (CHP is in name an inheritor of this first party), Turkey's troubled transition to democracy and the military's constant interventions in the name of preserving its "secular democratic politics" is very much a story of Turkey's secular established elite (often self-identified as Kemalists) and various conflicts emerging within and outside of this elite. The most significant element from outside the elite are parties—some which have been identified as Islamist—that claim to represent the majority of Turks' more religiously conservative attitudes. As there are a great deal of significant divides and past conflicts within those who identify themselves as Kemalists and as the tale of Turkish politics is about much more than a clash between secular and religious values, this account is necessarily over-simplified for purposes of introduction. However, it is important to grasp before coming to terms with the history of the headscarf.

The history of the headscarf issue is a long and complicated one, but its root lies in the confrontation that came to fruition during what has come to be known as the 'post-modern coup' of 1997. Soon after RP was disbanded, Turkey's Constitutional Court, a long-time stalwart institution of the Kemalist secular guard, ruled that the headscarf was illegal. The Court's statement appeared in its ruling to disband RP as a political party. The judges reasoned that insomuch as the headscarf had been determined to be illegal under previous decisions of the Constitutional Court (although there has never been any specific law banning he headscarf and despite the fact that these decisions were never enforced) and insofar as RP encouraged women to wear the headscarf in universities, they had encouraged illegal activity. Although this was not the only reason to disband the RP, it did figure into the Court's decision and reinforced the link in the minds of the Turkish public that the headscarf was connected to political Islam. Soon after the decision, the military proclaimed that a formal ban should be established and university rectors duly issued a formal proclamation banning the headscarf in all public universities.

To give some brief background of the context in which the issue emerged in 1997, it is necessary to understand what was happening inside Turkey in the 1980s. As mentioned in yesterday's introduction, the primary concern of the military following the 1980 coup was to dissolve leftist opposition. Paying little attention to what the establishment would later see as a Kemalist threat, the military largely left observant Muslims alone. As economic prosperity brought more and more conservative Muslims to the populated coastal cities of the West and as many of these more conservative Muslims began to make their way into the middle class, they soon found themselves as neighbors to, working beside, and attending university with members of Turkey's established Kemalist class. The headscarf was frequently worn by more observant women when they went off to university and amidst insecurity about its legal status, attempts started to be made to assure its legality.

Despite lacking the fanfare the polemic receives today, there were restrictions the military put in place following the coup that forbade female primary and lise (high school) students to cover their heads. Passed in a series of comprehensive orders that regulated all sorts of things in the first years following the coup, the restrictions were paid little heed. Although the headscarf had traditionally been viewed as forbidden, there was no firm law on the matter and, again, the issue was never vested with the amount of importance it is today. The issue of wearing the headscarf in university appeared after 1982 as students were trying to distinguish the türban from the headscarf. Türban is a French word that came into vogue as some female university students were trying to distinguish the two fashions. Although the headscarf had traditionally been viewed as forbidden, there was no firm law on the matter and it was soon argued that the türban was different than its predecessor and should be treated as such. In 1984, the Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu—YÖK) ruled that the türban was allowed in universities, but that the traditional headscarf was banned. What is considered a türban, or at least as I am coming to understand it and by today's standards, is a garment worn tighter than the traditional headscarf. The garment covers the neck much more than the loosely-fitting traditional headscarf, but the woman's face remains uncovered. The türban is often worn with a tight band that holds down the woman's hair (almost like a skullcap). There must be a name for this piece of apparel in Turkish, but I have not asked about it and cannot find it online. At any rate, the türban seems much more fashionable than its more traditional counterpart and I am constantly amazed at the various and sundry styles in which it may be worn.

Ironically, the reason asserted was that the türban was more modern and therefore less of a political challenge. The opposite is the case today. Young women donning the türban are seen by their more 'secular' counterparts as particularly pious and often political whereas older women who wear the more traditional headscarf are said to do so for traditional or, it has even been told to me, more purely religious reasons. One of the dynamics that is most fascinating—if not, most disturbing—about these arguments is that they often call the religious sincerity of another into question. I have been told on more than five occasions now that many "covered women" do so for political reasons—they want to make a political point and are not at all motivated by their religion. This argument bothers me on a number of counts, but most significantly by the way that it presumes to make a judgments about anothers' intention without ever engaging that person in dialogue. To make the matter more egregious, it seems to pre-empt dialogue by declaring the other person a nuisance, a "trouble maker" to whom it is not worth talking. I am not quite sure if these statements meant to be as strong as they at times across, but this will no doubt be one of the thing I keep in mind as I continue to follow this issue.

Returning to the history of the headscarf, following the passage of a national law in 1988 to formally legalize the türban, the Constitutional Court made the decision in 1989 to declare the law unconstitutional. The Court interpreted the provisions of secularism in the 1982 Constitution to determine that any law motivated by religious reasons is unconstitutional. Under this strict definition of a secular state, the United States and several other countries would no doubt be theocracies. Although other attempts were made to legalize the türban, none ever successfully challenged the 1989 decision. Notably, a 1990 law legalizing the scarf made its way to the Court, but the case was refused for reasons that the Court had already come to a decision. Throughout the 1990s and up until the military coup, women continued to wear the headscarf, or türban as it had become known, to university.

When AKP was elected in 2002, many pundits proclaimed that the state would be in for another showdown on the headscarf issue. However, AKP focused instead persisted in shoring up its political support and moving forward with much needed economic and EU-inspired political reforms. In 2005, a case made its way to the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR), and much to the disappointment of conservative Muslims who had come to support Europe as a check on state control, the ECHR effectively ruled that the türban ban did not constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights' Article 9 guarantee to "freedom of thought, conscious, and religion." Some conservative Muslims began demanding a state-led renegotiation of secularism that would address the issue once and for all. While AKP has continued to talk of the headscarf as a matter of discrimination against Muslims who observe the practice and a matter of women's rights, little has been done until now to put the matter in front of the Parliament. Much to the disenchantment of some AKP supporters outside of the party's conservative Sunni Muslim base, the wrath of secular Kemalists, and some women's groups who might be constituencies of either of the latter two groups, the AKP constitutional draft released last fall included the right of women to headscarves in university.

Many have thought that AKP would sit on the issue until a full constitutional draft is once again submitted and finally presented to the Parliament for consideration. The proposed alliance with MHP on the issue puts this into question as MHP is known to be very much opposed to many of the other provisions any such future draft is likely to contain (e.g., the document's revision of the strict secularist paradigm ingrained in multiple articles within the 1982 Constitution and free speech measures that would nullify Turkey's Article 301). It seems now that AKP might be content to move forward with a set of amendments to the current constitution instead of waiting to include it in a larger debate of its new constitutional draft. Today's Zaman quotes Salih Kapisuz,former deputy chairman of AKP's parliamentary committee, as saying that MHP's cooperation on the headscarf issue will make it easier to

"to implement the constitutional amendments. There were several critical issues that have been tangling up the drafting process. The headscarf issue was one of them. All political parties may eventually arrive at an agreement over other amendments to the constitution."

MHP is likely eager to see the headscarf issue dealt with now rather than risk it being used as political capital for AKP once debate on the new constitution commences. It also seeks to gain political capital from those voters who support lifting the ban. Also quoted in Today's Zaman is MHP deputy chairman Tunca Toskay: “It is our intention that the headscarf issue be solved before the drafting of the new constitution. We will not allow them to stir public opinion by mixing the headscarf issue with the new constitution.”

In order to work with MHP and consider what steps might be taken next, AKP has put together a joint commission with members of MHP in which possible amendments to the Constitution might be further studied. MHP proposes that the issue can be solved by amending Article 10 of the constitution to equally guarantee the rights of all citizens to state services. AKP is skeptical that such an amendment will be sufficient to affirm any right of covered women to attend university and have suggested that an amendment to Article 10 might be coupled with an amendment to Article 42 pertaining to rights to education. If an amendment is to be made to the constitution, it will be necessary for AKP to procure MHP's support. With only 340 members in the Parliament, it will need 367 to amend the constitution.

To recap on the events of the week that have catapulted the headscarf into the thrust of today's political discourse and deal-making, news started being made after Prime Minister Erdoğan addressed a UN forum in Madrid on January 15. Before the commencement of a set of talks on dealing with cultural differences at the Alliance of Civilizations meeting, Erdoğan talked of the state's headscarf ban as a limit on freedom of expression and a contradiction of Turkey's liberal democratic values. Most significantly, he stated that even if the türban was worn as a political symbol, this still does not mollify the injustice inherent in the ban. Quoted in Zaman, Erdoğan argued, "Even if it is worn as a political symbol, can you consider wearing it as a political symbol a crime? Can you bring in a ban on symbols?"

The response was almost immediate. CHP leader Deniz Baykal moved to denounce Erdoğan's words as irresponsible and re-asserted that Turkey has no problem with the headscarf, but only with it being worn as political symbol. The logic of this argument is explained somewhat above and is, of course, very particular to the Turkish case and the political mind of rigid secularists like Baykal. After the announcement, Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, responded that the headscarf was against the "secular and unitary structure of Turkey," a warning that AKP will not take lightly as it draws up plans to move forward. To follow up Yalçınkaya, the Council of State issued another somber warning on Friday via its website declaring that the ban was necessary to Turkey's secular political heritage and that its lifting would create instability and possibly erode into other areas of public space. Again, this sort of slippery slope argument is quite common among members of the secular establishment who fear Islam's extension into the public realm.

This Saturday, the issue appeared in the New York Times.