Financial Support to Libyan Opposition

Speaking on the sidelines of the third Libya contract group, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Aduvtoglu has pledged $100 million to fund the Libyan Transitional Council. From Hurriyet Daily News: 

"There is a real need for humanitarian access as well as for the natural needs of Libya like schools, hospitals and all those facilities," Davutoğlu said, according to a report by Reuters.

Davutoğlu was speaking to reporters at a summit of Western and Arab countries backing Libya's rebels and planned to prepare for a political structure after the departure of leader Moammar Gadhafi from power, Reuters reported on its website.

The statements came at the third meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. Davutoğlu was among participants at the meeting along with his counterparts from 21 countries. The participants also included U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The Contact Group, including the United States, European powers, allies from the Middle East and international bodies, was established during an international conference in London in March to lead international efforts to map out Libya's future. The group held its first meeting in Qatar, the second in Italy. The fourth meeting of the Libya Contact Group will be held in Turkey (click here for more).

Yesterday United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized Turkey alongside four other NATO member states for not doing enough to support NATO's ongoing military operations. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States have vowed not to quit the strikes until Gadhafi is removed from power. At the third Libyan contact group meeting, Turkey argued the Tripoli regime consisted of more personalities than just Gadhafi.

Pushing Western Alliances

EU Chief Negotiatior Egeman Bagis called on NATO to help end what he characterized as an illegal the Israeli imposed blockade of Gaza, even suggesting that it send a fleet of ships to protect the safety of Palestians and Israelis. Though Turkey has not made such a request in the formal framework of NATO, the call, combined with Bagis' characteriation of EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton's response to the flotilla incident as a "joke," is unlikely to win Turkey many friends in NATO or the European Union.

In other flotilla-related news, see Ha'aretz's report on the work of Medi Nahmyaz and Nathalie Alyon, two Israeli citizens of Turkish descent who were called to translate for Turkish citizens detained by Israel during the flotilla affair. According to the two translators, the majority of Turkish citizens on board the flotilla were unaware of the military blockade. The women reported that most were uneducated, came from pious backgrounds, and most significantly, thought that everything had been arranged for their safe arrival in Gaza. from the report:

Many passengers spoke of coming "to help children in Gaza, orphans, hungry children," or "to bring humanitarian assistance." Alyon and Nahmyaz got the impression that many of them believed before they left Turkey that everything had been arranged and they would reach Gaza. They also did not seem to have broad political knowledge or a distinct ideology.

The medical team was very nice, say the interpreters, and people almost apologized for feeling unwell or saying it was hard to breathe. "That's very Turkish," says Alyon. "The doctor is such a big and important man, who am I to bother him?" The activists from Western Europe were blatantly different. They spoke loudly, demanded their rights and refused to talk until their representatives arrived.

Also relevant

More Trouble with Israel

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
AP Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Batsheva Simon, reporting for the LA Times, writes:

The latest episode in the ongoing drama of Israeli-Turkish relations could be a partial arms embargo, according to Turkish media, quoting Jane's Defence Weekly. Now, say reports, SIBAT -- the body that handles foreign defense assistance and export procurement and contracts for Israel's defense ministry -- will review Turkish requests for buying defense systems case by case; Turkey has expressed interest in a number of systems, including guided anti-tank weapons and heavy infantry fighting vehicles, as well as electronic-warfare systems.

This further weakens the practical part of the alliance's strategic component, which already took a number of blows when Turkey dis-invited Israel from the joint military exercise Anatolian Eagle last year and also refused to allow the Israeli air force to deploy fighter jets in Turkey or use its airspace. Now, the press reports, Israel is looking for new long-range training options.

But they're still working to save the other aspects of bilateral relations. In the eighth Israel-Turkey Bilateral Economic Dialogue on Thursday, both sides expressed their strong support to further enhance bilateral trade and economic relations and called the business communities to "engage in active cooperation."

Meanwhile, many Israelis don't quite know what to make of the up-one-day, down-the-next ties with Turkey. Outraged over repeatedly harsh words for Israel from Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, many decided to boycott Turkey -- a tough principle to stick to, as Turkish clubs and resorts are a favorite for a close, affordable indulgence. Last month, Turkey launched a $2-million campaign to bring Israeli tourists back. Many did. But some workplaces didn't want to buy packages for Passover vacations. How would it look if we sold our patriotism for $99, they asked.

And Anastassia Tal has her own embargo. The 16-year-old model from Israel turned down a job offer from a Turkish jewelry company, saying (in Hebrew) that under no circumstances would she "be the 'face' of a Turkish company so long as their prime minister lashes out at Israel and its leaders in such a unilateral, humiliating manner." Tal said she was a proud Israeli and that money wasn't everything.

For the Today's Zaman story quoting Jane's Defence weekly, click here. In other Israel news, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu once more brought the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons to the table in an address to foreign ministers of NATO countries on Thursday. Davutoglu argues that NATO should consider disarmament alongside nuclear deterrence.

Old Problems and New Possibilities

In preparation of Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Greece, Turkish Foreign Ministry undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu is in Athens this week working out just how much progress can be made in bilateral relations between the two countries. Both NATO members, Greece and Turkey have for years spent huge sums of money on weapons, most of it going to Western weapons contractors. The sums are particularly burdensome for Greece, which has a small population and a GDP far below that of Turkey, prompting Greek citizens to pay a considerably larger amount in defense spending per capita than Turks. The financial crisis has presented an opportunity to reach a new stage in relations, and hopefully, scale back this spending. However, domestic problems and old prejudices in both countries and Turkey's lagging accession process play a spoiling role -- much to the benefit of weapons contractors. From Today's Zaman:

Greece, the country with the highest military expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in Europe, has in a sense become a victim of its arms race with Turkey. In 2000 Turkey devoted $16.4 billion to its military spending, while that figure was $8.7 billion for Greece in the same year. In 2003 Turkey's military spending stood at $13.4 billion, compared to $8.5 million in Greece. Per capita defense spending in Turkey was around $164 on average in the 2000s, while this number never went below $709 in Greece.

Turkey's military spending gradually declined and fell to $11.6 billion in 2008, while Greece's military expenditures consistently increased, reaching $9.7 billion in the same year. Speaking about Greece's military spending and its connection to the financial crisis, International Crisis Group (ICG) Turkey analyst Hugh Pope said reports of large German sales of armaments to both Turkey and Greece illustrate a phenomenon -- which he says is most likely just coincidental -- that the German policy of excluding Turkey from the EU has contributed to tensions between Turkey and Greece, from which the German arms industry has then profited.

“Although the January trip to Turkey by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has done much to improve the climate, past statements by German politicians have left the impression that Germany opposes Turkey's EU membership, which frustrates Turkey and feeds tensions between Turkey and Greece,” Pope stressed.

An additional paradox is that Germany is also doing its best to help Greece emerge from the financial crisis as its partner in the EU, while one of the contributing reasons for that crisis is the fact that Greece's per capita military spending is higher than the average of NATO member countries. According to Pope, fear of Turkey is one of the main reasons why Greece spends large amounts on its military.

According to the Deutschlandfunk radio station, Greece buys 31 percent of its arms from Germany. This is a high figure considering that Greece ranks fifth among arms buyers in the world.

Rasmussen: A Friend to Turkey After All?

NATO Chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen is calling for the European Union to allow Turkey administrative arrangements with the European Defense Agency (EDA), a move that would greatly strengthen cooperation between NATO and the EU. Since Cyprus, a non-NATO member, was admitted to the EU in 2004, tensions between the EU and Turkey within NATO have run high as Cyprus has sought to block Turkish membership in European security institutions, among them the EDA. Turkey has long aspired for an EU-Turkey Security Agreement, as well as administrative arrangements in the EDA, both of which Cyprus has said it will oppose until a settlement on Cyprus is reached. From Hurriyet Daily News:

"Why doesn't the EU grant such an arrangement to Turkey?" said Rasmussen, in a pointed demand for Ankara, which provides NATO with one its biggest armed forces, to join the European Defense Agency, or EDA, a mainly research and development arm.

His call, delivered to top policymakers attending a transatlantic security conference in Brussels, was directed squarely at listening EU parliament head Jerzy Buzek.

The former Danish premier, who sparked outrage in the Muslim world over his defence of controversial cartoons lampooning Islam, has actively courted Ankara since before it dropped opposition to his appointment last year at the last minute.

Rasmussen said that Brussels should also conclude a security partnership with Ankara, and involve non-EU countries in decisions affecting its mission to Bosnia.

"Turkey is the second-largest contributor to the EU operation in Bosnia ... but the EU does not provide non-EU contributors with the opportunity to contribute" to policy and decision-making, he said, adding that it was "essential" it does

In 2003, Ankara consented to the Berlin-Plus agreements, which effectively created a framework for the EU to have access to NATO assets in exchange for non-EU members to involve themselves in the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), now headed up by EU Foreign and Security Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton. Yet, Cyprus' admission to the EU in 2004 and the EU's subsequent inclusion of Cyprus in ESDP planning complicated matters. An especially sore point for Ankara is its lack of say in ESDP planning in ESDP-related missions to which it contributes more resources than some EU member states.

Turkey, al-Qa'ida, and Afghanistan

A video recently released by al-Qa'ida criticizes the Turkish government's participation in NATO operations in Afghanistan. CNN reports the video features the voice of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's second in command. From CNN:

"Let every free Turkish Muslim who is keen on protecting Islam and his fellow Muslims know that the Turkish forces will serve the Crusader campaign in Afghanistan, which is burning the villages, destroying the houses and killing the women and the children, occupying the lands of the Muslims, fighting the Sharia and spreading lewdness, debauchery and corruption," the speaker says.

"The Turkish troops will carry out the same operations in Afghanistan that the Jews are carrying out in Palestine, so how would the pious, free Turkish Muslim people accept such a crime against Islam and the Muslims?" the speaker asks.

The video also features the appearance of a purportedly Turkish suicide bomber.

Turkey has played an important role in NATO's mission, contributing 1,755 troops to International Security Assistance Force, which contributes to training Afghan security forces and reconstructing urban areas. Turkey does not paricipate in combat operations. However, as the Brookings Institution's Omer Taspinar observes in his column in Today's Zaman, more important than Turkey's troop contribution is its soft power over Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Washington understands that success in Afghanistan will be determined in the southern Pashtun belt on the border with Pakistan and that NATO forces desperately need the cooperation of Pakistan’s army to achieve that. Without Pakistan’s help, it would be impossible to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda effectively. This is also perhaps why Turkey’s contribution to the war effort is analyzed by criteria other than a mere contribution of troops.

To be sure, Washington would welcome more Turkish troops in Afghanistan. But what makes a Turkish contribution more valuable is its “soft power” in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is something that secularist hard-liners do not like to hear, but such power is essentially rooted in Turkey’s Muslim identity and particularly the Islamic roots of the current government in Turkey. For instance, the Financial Times reported last week that “NATO officials also often talk of a fuller engagement with Pakistan by using member Turkey, a Muslim majority state, and its diplomats as facilitators in Islamabad.”

Turkey is probably the best envoy the West can find to talk to Pakistan about the need to change its old habits of using Islamist ideology and loyalty to militant group such as the Taliban in order to exert influence over Afghanistan. No doubt, this is easier said than done. But there are some signs that Islamabad is slowly realizing that the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and militant groups sponsored and abetted to strike at arch-rival India (such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was behind last year’s Mumbai terrorist attacks) are all part of the same threat. Further evidence that the strategy is working is the capture on Pakistani soil of Mollah Baradar. After decades of supporting Islamist groups in neighboring India and Afghanistan, this is the first major sign that there may be a change of heart in Pakistan. After all, the Taliban was in some measure a creation of Pakistan as it sought to expand its influence into Afghanistan at the end of the Cold War.

. . . .

At the end of the day, what both Afghanistan and Pakistan need is better governance. This requires not only security and stability but also some modicum of economic development with jobs and services. This is another area where Turkey’s soft power comes into play. Most analysts agree that Turkish companies and construction firms are the first to take serious risks in the region in order to improve infrastructure projects.

Obama Reigns in Era of New Opportunity in U.S.-Turkey Relations

PHOTO from the New York Times

President Obama's inauguration on Tuesday excited millions around the world hopeful that a new American administration -- led by a seemingly very different man -- might translate into real and meaningful change. Like elsewhere across the globe, Obama's message of change, perceived moderation, and calls for transparent government are well received by Turks. Upon Obama's election, 44 sheep were slaughtered in the eastern city of Van to commemorate Obama's election as the 44th president of the United States. A recent BBC poll (taken before the Gaza crisis) revealed that 51 percent of Turks believe Obama will strengthen American relations with the rest of the world, a number up from 11 percent just six months ago when most Turks seemed despairingly indifferent to the results of the U.S. election. Not only is the increase significant, but also the sheer number of hopeful people: Turks are one of the most anti-American populations in the world, and conspiracy theories about U.S. support for the PKK and Middle East designs abound (see "I Am Not in the CIA," June 11 post, for more background). With such political capital at his disposal, President Obama has a real opportunity to transform U.S.-Turkey relations for the better. The U.S. and Turkey have plenty of national interests in common and foreign policy areas ripe for mutual cooperation are many.

As I laid out in Foreign Policy in Focus in November, Turkey is teetering between East and West in its foreign policy orientation. Although Turkey has historically linked itself to the West, largely anchored by its European vocation and NATO membership, a growing number of Turks have begun to advocate that Turkey should strengthen relations with Eastern powers, especially Russia, and/or adopt a more isolationist posture. Essential to determining Turkey's future relations with the West will be the outcome of its accession to the European Union, as well as good relations with the United States. In order to assure both, the United States should do all it can to facilitate Turkish accession and come to terms with a Turkey more independent in its thinking, and with foreign policy aspirations more its own than at any time during the Cold War. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is in transition, and Cold War understandings of Turkey are anachronistic. Russia is now Turkey's largest trading partner, and Ankara is seeking better relations with Muslim capitals throughout the Middle East. The more complex relationship between Europe and the United States also plays a hand. Europe and America are not always on the same page, and Turkey should not be expected to choose between the two -- for an example, look no further than European opposition to the invasion of the Iraq. The ambitious foreign policy of Turkey's AKP-led government seeks to expand Turkey's soft power and restore relations with countries that were once provinces over which the Ottomans were suzerain (see Mustafa Akyol, Newsweek, Dec. 6). As Turkey endeavors to meet its foreign policy objectives -- and, discover their implications in so doing -- the United States should look for areas of overlapping interest, meanwhile doing all it can to anchor Turkey firmly to the West.

The United States should build multilateral ties with Turkish NGOs, businesses, and cultural/educational institutions. By way of this new multilateral approach (Cf. Mary Kaldor, Boston Review, Feb./March 2005), President Obama will not only bolster support for inter-state diplomacy, but build the kinds of deep, inter-penetrating social ties that will not only counter anti-Americanism inside Turkey, but provide the cement for friendly future relations. Obama would also do well to promote Turkey within NATO, praising the productive role it is playing in Afghanistan and the potential it has in brokering peace in the Middle East. In terms of NATO, Obama would do well to encourage Turkey to assent to the Berlin Plus Agreement, uniting Turkey with the rest of Europe in support of a mechanism important to the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy. President Obama would also be well-advised to encourage a diplomatic solution to Cyprus, taking advantage of the election of moderates on both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot sides so that a UN-sponsored bicommunal solution again becomes a viable option.

The Obama Administration should do everything in its power to support human rights and democracy in Turkey, strengthening governing institutions by standing firmly behind pro-reform/accession forces inside Turkey and the European Union. President Bush was rather lackadaisical in his support of the EU process, and criticism of human rights/support for democratic institutions in Turkey has been lacking in the past eight years. When sinister forces threatened to topple the AKP-elected government last year and sought to undermine the election of President Gül the year before that, the United States did little to voice its disapproval, leaving Europe largely alone in its vehement opposition to these anti-democratic posturings. While AKP survived the closure case, its leaders have not forgotten the lack of support(see Henri Barkey, Washington Post, Aug. 23). President Obama should address this lacuna quickly and steadfastly by expressing solidarity with Turkish democratization efforts, including the salvation of AKP at the Constitutional Court last July -- though, disappointingly, AKP was found guilty of the trumped up charges it faced, just barely escaping closure.

Concomitantly, President Obama will do well to ignore the falsehoods and propaganda coming from neoconservative think-tanks and journals like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Middle East Quarterly (see my posts of Nov. 24 and April 18; also, Avni Dogru, Foreign Policy In Focus, July 24). Turkish press have a tendency to fixate and generate conspiracy theories based on the publications and public statements of figures like Michael Rubin, and Obama would do the U.S.' relationship well if it makes clear from the beginning that these people have no influence in policy making.

And, finally, one last thing the United States might do to bulwark democratization is demonstrate its support for the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. Although the United States is well-advised to stay far removed from the volatile domestic politics in which the investigation is inextricably entangled, President Obama could further strengthen relations if he were to make a public statement expressing support for the opportunity the investigation offers to extirpate lingering elements of Turkey's historic 'deep state,' the shadowy, obfuscate network of anti-democratic forces hidden beneath state structures. In doing, the President should also call for government transparency during the investigation. The impact of such a position would bolster support for the United States within AKP and its political constituency, but might also -- depending on how it is made -- curry favor with secular leftist Turks, many of whom still remember the 1980 military coup in which deep state elements were indubitably involved. To add weight to this second point, it is appropriate to note the significant amount of conjecture about U.S. involvement in the anti-leftist coup ('Operation Gladio,' see 25/1/08 post), resentment around which is still a part of Turkish historical memory.

Obama foreign policy toward Turkey is not without its usual pitfalls and opportunities, though Ankara's neo-Ottoman foreign policy has perhaps made things a bit easier. The Armenian 'genocide' question still persists, as does the United States' role in Iraq, namely the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the use of northern Iraq as a safe haven for the PKK. However, thanks to Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia and the KRG, both situations, respectively, might be improved. More difficult will be the United States' support for Israel, which given the size and intensity of Turkish protests against Israel's recent invasion of Gaza, poses the risk of infecting good relations by the sheer potential preponderance of the issue. Ankara's new interest in the conflict, not to mention the demonstrated willingness of the Israelis to inflict mass civilian casualties, make the situation in the Palestine Occupied Territories even more explosive in terms of U.S.-Turkey relations.

Turkey's expanding foreign policy might well prove of mutual benefit to both states. There is hope that Turkey's symbiotic relationship with Iran places Turkey in a useful position to mediate between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Shortly after Obama's victory, identifying Iran as the United States' most vexing challenge, Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed Turkey's willingness to help the United States negotiate a solution. Further, Turkey's efforts to achieve an alliance between Caucasus states are critical to the security of Central Asia, a potentially effective way to protect the sovereignty of these newly-independent states.

And, as a hopeful aside, in December, Obama transition aides mentioned the President is considering a major speech debunking Huntington's infamous "Clash of Civilizations" thesis to be delivered in a Muslim capital -- might it be İstanbul?

(For a wonderfully concise analysis and fairly dead-on take on the U.S.-Turkey relationship and what Obama might do to improve it, see Spencer P. Boyer and Brian Katulis, "The Neglected Alliance Restoring U.S.–Turkish Relations to Meet 21st Century Challenges," Center for American Progress, December 2008.)

Gül Hosts Trilateral Meeting with Karzai and Zadari

From TDZ:

Amid rising tension between New Delhi and Islamabad in the aftermath of last week’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, President Abdullah Gül yesterday hosted a trilateral meeting with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan in İstanbul for talks aimed at boosting cooperation between the neighbors.

. . . .

In the spring of 2007 Turkey arranged a meeting between Karzai and his then-Pakistani counterpart, Pervez Musharraf, after Kabul accused Islamabad of not doing enough to stop militants from entering Afghanistan from Pakistan.

During the landmark trilateral summit in Ankara in late April of last year, Karzai and Musharraf issued a joint statement called the “Ankara Declaration,” which stresses mutual commitment to fighting terrorism.

That was the first meeting between Karzai and Musharraf since September 2007, when they were brought together by US President George W. Bush to try to ease tensions.

Yesterday's trilateral meeting in İstanbul came in the midst of a recent row between New Delhi and Islamabad as India made allegations of Pakistani elements being involved in the terror attack on the Indian city of Mumbai.

For full article, click here.For more of the below analysis of the meeting from EDM, proceed here.

This is the second such trilateral summit that Turkey has arranged. The presidents of Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan met for the first time on April 29 and 30, 2007, in Ankara. At that time the Pakistani and Afghan leaders issued the so-called Ankara Declaration, which underlined their intention to take concrete steps toward regional development and the fight against terrorism. Following the meeting, the parties agreed to form a joint working group to follow up on the conclusions of the summit and maintain the trilateral process (Stratejik Analiz, June 2007; www.asam.org.tr).

Gul extended his invitation for a new meeting to his counterparts during the UN General Assembly in September 2008, and they accepted. After deliberations over the scheduling, the three heads of state finally decided to meet in Istanbul. The main items on the summit agenda are cooperation in security and the economy. The joint working group composed of senior-level officials met the day before to discuss the specific areas set in the first trilateral meeting. Given Turkey’s experience, the parties are expected to reach an agreement to train Afghan and Pakistani officers in Turkey’s anti-drug trafficking and anti-terrorism educational centers. The joint declaration prepared by the working group will be approved by the leaders and made public. Moreover, representatives of the business sector met within the framework of the Istanbul Forum founded by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) with it’s the equivalent bodies from Afghanistan and Pakistan (www.cankaya.gov.tr, December 3; www.cnnturk.com, December 5).

The inclusion of the private sector and economic issues as a separate group reflects Turkey’s recent foreign policy philosophy that a comprehensive solution to political problems can be built on the foundations of strong economic cooperation.

Spooky

From Emrullah Uslu at EDM:

The leader of the IP, Dogu Perincek, now an Ergenekon suspect, is a former Maoist, who advocates “Eurasianism” as opposed to Turkish membership in the EU and NATO. Despite having only marginal public support, he has become an important figure dominating public debates in recent years.

In one of his interviews Tuncay Guney claims that Dogu Perincek was the author of Ergenekon’s program. Guney says that the purpose of the Ergenekon program was to promote Turkey membership in the Shanghai Five (Bugun, September 11). The Shanghai Five, which consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, emerged from demilitarization talks that the four former Soviet republics held with China in 1996 to counter U.S influence in Asia (Newsweek Korea, May 4, 2001).

Zekeriya Ozturk, another Ergenekon suspect who once worked for the IP’s TV network, also accused Perincek of being an agent working for the Russian and Chinese intelligence services; but Perincek denied the allegations (Radikal, March 30). Perincek’s close associate Adnan Akfirat, another Ergenekon suspect, is the chairman of the Turkish-Chinese business association (www.chinaembassy.org.tr, June 6, 2006). It should also be noted that Perincek was an early proponent of Turkish-China-Russia relations. His daughter is a journalist working for Chinese Public Radio’s Turkish Program (Yeni Safak, April 26); and his son, Mehmet Bora Perincek, is a researcher in Moscow and is establishing connections between the Turkish Worker’s Party and the Russian Eurasia party. In a meeting between the two parties it was declared:



The United States has always tried to beleaguer our particularly continental civilizations. Today this process is being continued under the patronage of American secret centers [promoting] the concept of pan-Turkism in Turkey and national chauvinism in Russia toward the Turkic nations. “The Eurasia” and “The Worker’s Party” representatives came to an understanding about the concerted consultations, conferences, and colloquiums in the sphere of Russian-Turkish geopolitical rapprochement. “The Worker’s Party” leadership has been interested in the unique means of solving interethnic conflicts developed by the experts for the Center of Geopolitical Examinations and “The Eurasia” party on the basis of the concept of “nations’ rights.” They proposed that “The Eurasia” take part in a conference of groups working on the solution of the Turkish-Greek conflict in Cyprus on the grounds of the geopolitical Eurasian methodology. “The Worker’s Party” responded willingly to the proposal of taking part in organizing the international Eurasian movement. These exciting ideas have been lined up by its intellectuals for a long time. We are also willing to begin a number of concerted projects in the sphere of TV broadcasting, publishing activities, [and] economic collaboration (http://www.evrazia.org, November 11, 2003).


As the meeting notes show, the Worker’s Party suddenly started advocating Turkish nationalist policies. Veli Kucuk, a retired general and a leading Ergenekon suspect, brought the younger Perincek, who participated in the 2003 meeting in Russia, together with Levent Temiz, another Ergenekon suspect, who was then the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)’s youth leader. In 2003 the two formed a youth alliance between the Maoists and Turkish Nationalists, who were once fiercely opposed to each other (Zaman, January 15, 2004).

As was planned at the meeting in Moscow, the Workers’ Party issued an invitation to Alexander Dugin to attend the International Eurasia conference in Ankara. Dugin, the leader of the Eurasian movement, was introduced as an adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel; former Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas; the Iranian and Chinese ambassadors; former chairman of the National Security Council General Tuncer Kilinc, Ret.; former commander of the Gendarmes Sener Eruygur, now an Ergenekon suspect; and the leaders of the Workers Party attended the conference to discuss Turkey’s role in Eurasia (Ulusal Kanal, December 6, 2004).

In a live TV broadcast, Guney further accused Dogu Perincek as playing a vital role in bringing Turkey closer to Russia and China. Guney stated, “Dogu Perincek should reveal why Putin’s people provided economic and ideological support to the Eurasia Conference” (Taraf, November 2).

Given Tuncay Guney’s affiliation with the MIT, it seems very likely that the intelligence service used Guney to penetrate the Ergenekon network in order to detect activities aimed at shifting Turkey’s direction from the West to Eurasia.