Something Wicked This Way Comes?

In a back hall of parliament, CHP leader Deniz Baykal caused a firestorm of criticism when he was took a question from a reporter during the first round of voting on the headscarf amendments.

When asked by a reporter whether or not an entirely new constitution can be drafted, Baykal said: “Of course it can: You chase away the enemies and found the country from scratch. You erect your flag. It has already been done. … You can stage a revolution, risk being hanged. And after that the entire constitution can be changed.”

“We have been elected to implement the constitution, not to draft it. It would be wrong if we attempted to cancel the current one and make a new constitution,” he said, reiterating that his party will appeal to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of the amendments that lift the headscarf ban.

AKP politicians have already denounced the remark as terrifyingly irresponsbile, but it raises an important question as to just how far AKP can go without the political establishment intervening á la the military. After last April's stern warning to AKP delivered via email, 'coup' by memorandum some say, AKP should feel itself treading on delicate political ground. General Yaşar Büyükanıt, chief of the Turkish Armed Services, shares Baykal's scorn toward the new constitution and although keeping quiet following Gül's election and, so far, throughout the opening days of the türban legislation, military intervention cannot be dismissed.

In a wonderful article that came out two months before I came in the New York Review of Books, Christopher de Bellaigue warns of three potential dangers that could destabilize AKP. The first of these is an increase in PKK activity that could rally nationalist support in Turkey. The second is a disproportionate response by the Turkish military that would rally Kurds toward the PKK and endanger European Union membership. The third is that the AKP will do something feckless like lift the türban ban at university. Of the third possibility, Bellaigue writes "there will be another crisis. It would be a mistake for the AKP to assume brazenly that the age of coups is over. " It seems the third has come to fruition and could possibly be complicated by the first two. As things heat up in the east with renewed engagements between the PKK and the military, the potential of an antagonistic Europe should the conflict enlarge is a grave threat. In the face of the much hated PKK, European denunciation of Turkish military and police actions would no doubt weaken the lure of EU membership and its influence on Turkish politics. As this influence might prove pivotal to keeping AKP in power and avoiding another coup, be it post-modern or traditional, we should all be paying attention to what is going on in the east.

Is Turkey headed for a crisis? The angst is already being felt as scores of protestors take to the streets to protest the türban legislation. Recent unrest recalls a column a melancholic Elif Şafak authored during the crisis last July. Şafak asks if Turks are always to live in the shadows of unrest, always anxious about what political development the next month will bring.

It is not easy to be a Turk in a world that is becoming more and more polarized. A world where the number of people who believe in a “Clash of Civilizations” escalates each day. A world in which more and more hardliners claim that Islam and Western democracy cannot coexist. At first glance, Islamic fundamentalists and Western Islamophobics might seem to be poles apart. But they are not. They share the same prejudice and narrow-mindedness toward the Other and the same desire to exclude everyone who doesn't echo their views. Hardliners in one country produce more hardliners elsewhere.

“East” and “West” are relational categories, and yet, they are often used as if they were mutually exclusive. The world we are living in regards gray areas with suspicion as if life is solely composed of two colors: Black and white. Today, there is a considerable degree of fear of Islam in the West and a considerable degree of dislike of the West in the Muslim world. Biases are produced mutually, and they keep breeding one another.

Headscarf Amendments Pass, Number of Headscarves Decline

Both amendments passed the second and final round of voting in Parliament today. The first amendment to Article 10 was passed with a final vote of 403-107 and the second amendment to Article 42 was passed with a final vote of 403-108. President Gül observes the right to call a referendum on the amendments, but such a move is not expected.

Additionally, one additional tidbit of information I have recently gleaned is that the proportion of women who wear some sort of head covering (türban or otherwise) has actually declined in recent years. According to a study released in November 2006 by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), a very well-respected think-tank, the percentage of Turkish women wearing no head covering increased from 27 percent in 1996 to 37 percent in 2006. This is contradictory to the oft-made claim that a rising Islamist tide has been responsible for more women covering themselves in recent years.

To move outside Turkey for a bit, NYU law professor and CFR fellow Noah Feldman wrote in Friday's New York Times that if Erdoğan continues to move forward with other progressive reforms, the vote has the potential to set a positive example of the potential co-mingling between Islam and democracy. More reaction to follow. . .

Headscarf Amendments Clear First Round of Voting

Both amendments cleared the first round of voting yesterday without any major problem. The second round of voting will take place on Saturday. Debate was vigorous and it was interesting to read the reportage in both Today's Zaman and the Turkish Daily News.

Interesting also is the current animosity between MHP and CHP. MHP continues to contend that it is not trying to win political advantages by joining in a coalition with AKP while CHP has seized on the opportunity to portray MHP as a traitor to Kemalism. The latter is best observed in Turkish Daily News writer Mehmet Ali Birand's most recent column.

Recent Strikes Incite Kurdish Tensions

I feel like I should I have knocked on wood following my Feb. 4 post concerning reasons to be skeptical about the relative peace enjoyed at the moment in the Kurdish southeast. The recent air strikes in northern Iraq have prompted Kurds to join in numerous rallies throughout Turkey. An article in Today's Zaman chronicles the journey of a convoy of DTP supporters in İstanbul who planning to converge in Diyarbakır to demonstrate against the raids and raise awareness about the Kurdish problem. The convoy was subject to numerous stops by security services, including here in Kocaeli. The Turkish city with the largest Kurdish population is İstanbul, not Diyarbakır, and the article goes to prove that Kurdish unrest affects the whole country, not just the southeast region. Motivated by a search for jobs and a better life, many Kurds have moved in recent years to large cities in the west, driven by the lack of opportunities characteristic of the southeast's underdeveloped economy.

Headscarf Vote Due Tomorrow as Protests Mount

I witnessed my first protest in İzmit today in opposition to the recent legislative moves to lift the headscarf ban. I did not have my camera and am thus unable to post photographs, but the demonstration basically consisted of 40-50 some odd protestors. Most seemed to be university students from Kocaeli University. I was able to ask one young türban-wearing woman who if this changes her hopes to attend university. She just graduated from her lise and is taking the year to improve her English. She responded that she would simply wait and see. Her excitement was evident, but there also seemed an underlying skepticism as to whether the amendments will actually pass and survive being challenged at the Constitutional Court and all this sans military interference.

As to news about the legislation, the first round of voting is due tomorrow after which a second vote will be held on Saturday. If the amendments are approved, the provision to the Higher Education Board (YÖK) Law will be introduced in Parliament. The commission leading the legislation commenced on Friday.

Renewed Air Strikes in Northern Iraq

Per yesterday's post, reports flooded newspapers today about another tound of Turkish air strikes inside northern Iraq. The air raids had ceased by the beginning of January, but yesterday's renewal speaks to the Turkish military's intentions to route the PKK out of northern Iraq before it has an opportunity to launch a spring offensive. Here is the article from today's New York Times.

No Country For Young Men

PHOTO FROM Today's Zaman
Pvt. Ramazan Yüce with his mother following his release.

Following an attack in Dağlıca in Hakkari province last October, eight Turkish privates were captured by the PKK and later released in what was a carefully orchestrated public relations move by the PKK. DTP members had visited northern Iraq to secure their release, but upon the soldiers' release, the soldiers' release was used to evidence DTP collaboration with the PKK and the eight soldiers were accused of treason. To further complicate matters, the Turkish General Staff released a press statement denouncing press accusations that the men are being charged not for misconduct, but because they embarrassed the military.

From Today's Zaman:

Van military prosecutor Hakan İleri has asked for permission from the General Staff to investigate whether Lt. Col. Onur Dirik had any responsibility in the attack by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in October of last year, during which eight soldiers were taken hostage.

The eight Turkish soldiers were released earlier this month pending trial on charges of disobeying orders, including main suspect Pvt. Ramazan Yüce, whose lawyer filed charges against Dirik for breaching security at the time of the incident. The Van prosecutor was acting on the complaint filed by Yüce’s lawyer.

The charges in the file on Dirik, who was in charge of the Dağlıca battalion at the time of the incident, include causing the killing of more than one person and the kidnapping and injury of many others by reason of negligence and failing to take measures to prevent the attack.

If the military authorities allow it, a criminal investigation will be launched into Dirik.

The charges brought against the Dağlıca commanders include the following: Although an attack was imminent according to the depositions of 13 eyewitnesses, radio communications and thermal camera records, the commanders failed to take the necessary security measures. The military staff that was responsible for seeing to the safety of the Dağlıca battalion only included privates. No soldiers were deployed in the neighboring hills to protect the battalion. Two posts for artillery and a grenade launcher were vacant at the time of the attack since no soldiers were commissioned to use them. Dirik did not approve a request to bring a Cobra helicopter from a nearby military headquarters to protect the battalion. The PKK’s ability at the time to use heavy artillery to carry out this attack over such difficult terrain stemmed from a lack of sufficient intelligence and security measures.

The claims from Yüce and his lawyer filed against the lieutenant colonel were not the first suggestions that it might be necessary to further investigate the responsibility of higher-ranking officers in the incident. Reports and documents on the case acquired by some Turkish newspapers have also suggested that some very strategic mistakes were caused by the negligence of higher-ranking army officers.

For additional background on the hostility the privates face, see Doğu Ergil's column in Today's Zaman:

The first response, which shook us all, was a statement by the justice minister, who said that he was not happy the kidnapped, captive soldiers were still alive. He was not alone in his sentiment: Rather than being taken captive by a terrorist organization, they should all die. By staying alive they have damaged our national pride!

Later, the soldiers were released as part of a propagandistic gesture by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Few of us were happy at their freedom because we were embarrassed at being humbled by a terrorist organization. After all, we were the mighty Turkish nation, and our army is the second-biggest and strongest in the NATO alliance. Yet in this confused state of mind we did not ask why and how a battalion that was battle-ready and on the frontline could be ambushed by a peasant organization, lose 13 soldiers and allow eight of their own to be dragged tens of kilometers away without any punitive pursuit.

Those responsible for this scandal have not yet answered to the people they serve or their representative organ, Parliament. No official statement has been released regarding the dismissal of the commanders who faltered so badly. Yet the military prosecutor has sentenced all the freed soldiers to several years of imprisonment and one of them to life in prison on grounds of treason.

The so-called "traitor," Ramazan Yüce, is of Kurdish origin. The military failure has been blamed on him by labeling him as a PKK mole. Yet until the moment of the ambush he was entrusted as a wireless operator and thermal camera watchman. Yüce defends himself by saying, "If I was a PKK member, how could I be trusted with these critical duties?" He is also on record as stating that he heard the approaching PKK on the wireless and located them coming with loaded mules on the thermal camera -- and informed his superiors. No one can answer why proper counter-measures were not taken.

Yüce is also accused of not firing on the enemy. He said he did so until the nozzle of his rifle swelled and became inoperative. The prosecutor does not believe him, but the weapon is missing because it was taken away together with the soldier by the PKK.

The prosecutor also claims that the soldiers surrendered immediately. But military statements that appeared in the press revealed that the battle dragged on for 36 hours. The soldiers in the ambushed outpost were a part of a battalion. Why did neither the battalion nor other relief forces come to their rescue?

These questions may be increased and ridiculous accusations like "leaving the post of duty to go to a foreign country (sic) without official permission" may be mocked. But this does not change the seriousness of the melodrama the prosecuted soldiers are suffering through. They are dishonored, their families are embarrassed and they are punished for a war that is the making of years of neglect on the part of old men who demand that they sacrifice their lives.

Would they ever think of coming back from captivity if they knew they would be so brutally denigrated by their countrymen and superiors alike? These young man are facing long prison terms, and one of them life imprisonment, only to satisfy the wounded ego of their nation and its ruling elders. No, no one has the right to ridicule the country's youth from whom so much sacrifice is demanded with so little in return.

The Future of the Southeast: Reason for Skepticism

In contrast to the hopeful vision presented yesterday, much has happened in the past three years to warrant a skeptical view toward Turkey's settling of its problems in the Kurdish southeast. There are two chief and interconnected reasons for this skepticism and they once again relate to poles in Turkish politics that have become more extreme in recent years.

The first reason (or pole) is the rising Turkish nationalism that has taken hold in recent years. With Euro-skepticism struggling to gain the upper hand, the Turkish state has become increasingly intransigent to calls for greater Kurdish autonomy and more cultural freedoms. Despite the EU's continued recommendations to grant greater cultural freedom to the Kurds and devolve power to the local level, recent actions by the Turkish state reflect a move in the opposite direction. Not only is the situation at a standstill, but it is getting worse.

The second reason (pole), which of course influences the first and vice versa, is the continued militarism of the PKK. Although largely divided on matters of tactics and its general strategy of pursuing greater Kurdish autonomy, a fact that Turkish policy makers and citizens largely fail to recognize, the PKK is a central force against a peaceable resolution of the conflict. A more militant faction, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, has carried out a series of very violent terrorist attacks on Turkish civilians and foreign tourists. However, the dominant position in the PKK is to restrict its attacks to the Turkish military. In the latter case, the method is still highly-confrontational and very brutal. Turkey has a conscripted army and fears of young Turkish conscripts being ambushed and savagely murdered by PKK members only heightens the wrath of the Turkish citizenry, reinforcing Turkish recalcitrance to come to a peace accord with the terrorist group. Further, the PKK has prevented more moderate voices from rising in Kurdish politics and its affiliation with DTP is akin to that between the IRA and Sin Feinn in Northern Ireland or ETA and Harri Batasuna in the Basque country. Most Kurds point to the ties between DTP and the PKK and affirm the former to be nothing but the political wing of the terrorist group that has murdered its sons and daughters. While the relationship is no doubt more complicated than this characterization paints it, it prevents the DTP from being a real agent of change. DTP deputies are often elected with the tacit support of the PKK and at the very least by a constituency still very much sympathetic to the fight the PKK is waging in the name of Kurdish freedom. As violence increases between the PKK and the military, so will the resentment of the Kurdish and Turkish populations.

When the PKK assumed a dominant position in Kurdish politics in the 1980s, it was the first time that a Kurdish revolutionary movement had attracted so broad a base of support, especially among the mostly uneducated Kurdish populace. Blending Marxist socialism with Kurdish nationalism, the movement was cohered by a powerful ideological amalgam that simultaneously spoke to Kurdish poverty and the yearning for greater freedom, the right to express an identity that is uniquely Kurdish. Despite its inhuman tactics, in particular the 1993 campaign that targeted Turkish teachers assigned to the southeast and Kurds selling Turkish-language newspapers and a campaign in 1987 in which it killed large numbers of Kurds who lived in villages that were suspected of being 'pro-Turkish,' Öcalan and the PKK remain the driving political force in Kurdish politics. Philip Robins lays out the principal reasons for how the PKK garnered so much support:

"the increasing growth of a self-conscious Kurdish nationalism inside Turkey; the material disdain for the southeast on the part of the Turkish state, which provided few resources for economic development or social services; structural economic factors, which have helped accelerate the sharply growing relative poverty in Turkey; and the coercive nature of the Turkish state, both in terms of forced assimilation to the values and ideology of Kemalism and in terms of the increasingly extensive activities of the security services. The very receptivity of Kurds in Turkey to the PKK is evidence of the conditions inside the country" (Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 184).

Robin's latter observation still holds true, a vicious cycle between the actions of the Turkish state and the PKK that perpetuates itself today.

Much changed upon Öcalan's capture in 1999. In a highly-publicized trial, Öcalan confessed his violent past and pled guilty to the charges of the court. Although the verdict was virtually predetermined, Öcalan expressed his desire to see Kurds live within the boundary of a Kurdish state. Although the PKK had begun to change its position as early the 1990s as Turgut Özal began to make gestures toward the group that indicated a desire to come to sort of negotiated settlement, the 1999 trial was surprising for many observers in that Öcalan went so far as to speak of his hope that one day Kurds might live in harmony with the Turkish devlet, a move Stephen Kinzer describes as "truly astonishing, almost incomprehensible." The concept of devlet is ingrained in the Turkish national mentality as a force that coheres the Turkish nation, a meaning that Kinzer elucidates as connoting "something bigger than the judicial system, bigger than the Turkish government, bigger than the people. He was offering to collaborate with that incorporeal but holy entity that is at the center of Turkey's consciousness" (Kinzer, The Crescent and the Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2001), 127). Despite Öcalan's conviction and most Turks' opinion that the statement was insincere, the PKK announced a ceasefire in 2000. The reason for the ceasefire is not linked to Öcalan alone, but also found reason in hopes that Turkey's aspirations to join the European Union might bring about the greater freedom and autonomy for which the Kurdish yearn. However, the ceasefire broke down in 2003 and ended completely in 2004. With the resumption of hostilities, the PKK became ever more hated by most Turks and all of the Turks with whom I have brought up the subject mark continued hostilities as evidence of the lack of PKK sincerity to pursue any real solution.

The lack of promise for peaceful resolution leaves the future of the southeast very much uncertain and as AKP seems to be losing grip on its reform agenda, a solution is becoming less and less likely. Indeed, the AKP finds itself hard-pressed to take actions that can be portrayed as 'pro-Kurdish.' Kurds continue to be prosecuted under restrictive speech codes as torture and detention of suspected PKK-members is on the increase. Further, AKP is less likely to offer its support to local efforts that promote Kurdish culture or education. Although the EU still has a very important role to play in implementing law that legalizes rights for Kurds to hold cultural gatherings and conduct Kurdish language education, AKP support for such undertakings has been half-hearted. In particular, the AKP government acted very badly in its failure to prosecute persons responsible for a terrorist attack on a Kurdish bookseller in Şemdinli when it learned that they had connections to the TSK. In its response to riots that broke out in Diyarbakır following the funerals of four PKK fighters in March 2006, AKP also showed itself less amenable to building bridges. Following riots that resulted in the deaths of 13 people, AKP removed Diyarbakır mayor Osman Baydemir and made no effort to intervene in the massive waves of prosecutions and detentions that followed, including prosecutions of local DTP politicians. In June 2007, the party removed Diyarbakır's district mayor and council after attempting to offer multilingual government services.

Although AKP's support for Kurdish cultural rights seems to have waned, it is still quite keen to offer more social services and distribute monies to the southeast. As a result, a large number of DTP parliamentary candidates running as independents last summer lost votes to AKP, perhaps seen as promising, but only in the instance that this support is not threatened by an increase in violence that brings attention to AKP's unwillingness to grant cultural rights and support Kurdish overtures that might be regarded as separatist by nationalist forces. In this way, the AKP and those Kurds who are not comfortable relinquishing their cultural rights are very much in the midst of the two large polls—the PKK and ultra-nationalist elements of the Turkish state. The impact is that recent AKP actions very much put into doubt its ability to act as the mediator of any peaceful resolution between the state and Kurdish nationalists. Instead, AKP seems more likely to equate Kurdish cultural aspirations with separatism. Such a position feeds directly into the hands of the PKK and jeopardizes inroads the party has made with Kurdish voters who might well decide to remove its support of AKP if cultural restrictions continue. The latter is especially exacerbated by the increasing violence between the PKK and Turkish security forces, the ongoing closure case against DTP, and rising inflation that is very much blamed on AKP economic policy.

It seems that if any peaceful solution is to be reached, it must take into account the PKK. This position has been argued by Turkish Daily News columnist Yusuf Kanlı and is not uncommonly acknowledged. AKP passed a law in 2003 that granted a limited amnesty to PKK fighters, but it was extremely limited and in no way comprehensive enough to end in any sort of accord. Meanwhile, tensions continue to mount between Turkey and Northern Iraq, a Turkish military invasion of which seems increasingly likely.

Below is an interview with Kurdish intellectual Ümit Firat that appeared in Today's Zaman in October. It is well worth the read.

INTERVIEW IN TDZ 29/10/07
Kurdish intellectual Ümit Fırat believes Turkey should abandon its policy of rejecting the Iraqi Kurdish administration and start implementing immediate social and political reforms immediately instead of resorting to military options to end the terrorism of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

“Turkey should abandon its policy of rejecting an entity that emerged under Iraqi law and its constitution and should instead recognize it under international legal instruments as generated through the internal developments of Iraq. It should view the northern Iraqi autonomous Kurdish administration as a friend. This is the way to end the current tension,” said Fırat, a writer for the Kurdish political magazine Serbestî, published in İstanbul in Turkish.

In addition to carrying the risks of confrontation with the United States and the peshmergas, a cross-border operation would increase tension and make the problem chronic, he said adding, “Northern Iraq needs peace, and a strong and stable northwestern border.”

On Sept. 29, 12 people -- seven of whom were village guards -- were massacred in the Beytüşşebap district of the southeastern province of Şırnak, and then on Oct. 21 at least 12 soldiers were killed in near the village of Dağlıca in Hakkari, stretching Turkey’s patience to its limit. Parliament passed a motion authorizing a cross-border operation into northern Iraq to hit the PKK bases there if diplomatic efforts fail. For Monday Talk, Ümit Fırat told us how the developments can be seen from the Kurds’ perspective.

What would happen if Turkey entered Iraq?

Turkey will have to deal with two actors if it enters Iraq: the autonomous Kurdish administration formed under the Iraqi constitution and the peshmerga units subordinate to this administration. The peshmergas are considered part of the Iraqi army; therefore conflict with them will automatically mean opening war with Iraq, and this inevitably carries with it the possibility of confrontation with the United States. This will all eventually lead to abandonment of Turkey’s six-decade-long international policy.

But isn’t the region home to the PKK?

The actual sphere of influence of the PKK is in Turkey, and if a solution were sought, measures should be implemented inside the country. Those who are settled on Kandil Mountain in northern Iraq got there through Turkey and return to the same territory. Turkey would not be able to resolve anything in Iraq through a military intervention.

The PKK would fulfill its goal of dragging Turkey into northern Iraq if Turkey launches a military operation. It will not be easy to present a cross-border operation as part of a comprehensive combat against terrorism. Above all, there is a general assumption that combat against terrorism is executed by special forces -- not by regular army units. Besides, for such an operation against terrorism [to be successful], the consent of the country where the operation will be carried out is required. Otherwise, Turkey will be considered an invader.

And even though the military and the government seek to present a cross-border operation as a matter of internal security, this action is declaration of war under international law. In that case, it will not be possible for you to call your opponent a terrorist organization as they become the other party of the war. In a possible conflict, international organizations will refer to the terrorist organization as warring party. In that case, calls for cease-fires and calls for implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions might come into consideration.

Don’t you think that an army operation would have a role in preventing further PKK attacks?

The only benefit of the operation would be proof of military superiority -- which Turkey already has. Besides, it is obvious that no social problem can be resolved through military methods. Attempting to test whether this is the case once more would be too expensive and risky. I want to emphasize that a climate of killing and ending lives has emerged in the region, and attempts should be made to change that and ensure normalization.

Furthermore, a military incursion by Turkey into northern Iraq would possibly de-align the Kurds in the region from the PKK, whereas it would strengthen Barzani’s KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party]. Turkey should be determined to resolve the Kurdish question if it really seeks to eliminate the PKK terrorism. A Turkey committed to resolving the Kurdish question will have the chance to overcome the obstacles in time.

What was the difference between the Beytüşşebap and Dağlıca incidents?

There is no similarity between the two. In Beytüşşebap, the victims were working on the construction of a canal to transport water to their village. They were killed on their way home for iftar [fast-breaking meal during Ramadan]. I cannot help but remember a very similar massacre that was committed in Şırnak-Güçlükonak in 1996. In that massacre, 11 villagers, including some village guards, were forced to get off the minibus and were killed at the scene. The terrorists burned the bodies. Despite this, the identification cards were found in good condition. The authorities took journalists to the site, but they were not allowed to talk to the local people, who disagreed with the security forces on who had committed the murders. They thought that the massacre was committed by some state units.

Are you convinced that Beytüşşebap massacre was committed by some clandestine powers in the state?

We know through our experience that we have no reason to believe the official statements, considering past explanations that followed many similar incidents. It may come as no surprise to see the “good guys” who were behind the Semdinli incidents two months ago. Actually, the conclusion I want to draw here is not to single out who the perpetrators of the incident were -- that’s not something I can tackle at any rate. But why aren’t these events being illuminated through official investigations? Why are the people who question these events warned or threatened? Why does Turkey insist on this policy?

Who do you think are the “good guys”?

The powers organized by the “good guys” might include former PKK informants and village guards who became stronger and then turned into gangs that threatened society. It’s possible to get an idea about this through documents submitted to the courts and the memoirs and interviews with retired military men. In the current environment of violence and conflict, nobody would question why this country has one of the largest armies in the world. While some make calculations to increase the influence of the army in politics considering the consequences of the prevalent environment of violence, others seek an opportunity to establish absolute authority by the PKK in the region through the same environment. An organization whose purpose of existence is war and armed conflict may preserve its political survival through the existence of an environment compatible with its goal.

And what would you say about the Dağlıca incident?

The military unit attacked in Oremar [Dağlıca] was there for a military operation; the PKK militants, acting based on the intelligence on the presence of the military unit at the site, carried out the assault. The Turkish troops would have done the same if they had similar intelligence. That is, if there is a conflict, it is inevitable for one of the parties to suffer substantial losses. For instance, a few days before the Beytüşşebap incident, nine PKK militants were killed in a conflict. I want to emphasize again that a climate of killing rules, and moves are needed to change that.

What should be done?

The post-Saddam developments following the US occupation in 2003 seriously damaged the “stability” policies of Turkey to preserve the status quo in the region. The new situation in Iraq was perceived by the status quo actors of Turkey as a threat. These actors never accepted the new state of affairs. Turkey should abandon its policy of rejecting an entity that emerged under Iraqi law and its constitution and instead recognize it under international legal instruments as something generated through the internal developments of Iraq. It should view the northern Iraqi autonomous Kurdish administration as a friend. This is the way to end the current tension -- a friendly state would not support hostilities. Increasing the tension will not resolve the problem; quite the contrary, it will make it chronic. Effective measures should be taken immediately before further Beytüşşebap-like incidents are committed. Northern Iraq needs peace, and a strong and stable northwestern border.

But the discourse promoted by Barzani and Talabani does not imply peaceful actions from Turkey’s perspective.

In such delicate times, even ordinary actions may fall outside reason and rationale. Considering that the editor-in-chief of a major daily newspaper in Turkey provokes the nation to exhibit a strong reaction and that Barzani makes provocative statements, it’s only normal if the regular citizens of the country act in accordance with their basic instincts rather than reason. History tells us that such statements are of no use. These remarks and statements usually speak to the excessive sentiments of the masses, and they do not transform into permanent policy. Fortunately the initial outrage is gradually being replaced by reasonable action and words, anyway.

What would you say about the role of the DTP [Democratic Society Party] deputies on some vital issues, particularly on the release of the soldiers held captive by the PKK?

There is nothing they can do on their own initiative. If the PKK agrees to make a gesture by handing over the eight hostages to DTP deputies, at that time they may be involved in the process. It does not seem possible for them to assume a role at present to determine the PKK’s actions.

What would happen if the DTP deputies recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization?

Nothing. Let’s say they did. Would the PKK’s strength decrease? No, on the contrary DTP deputies’ power would decrease because these deputies were elected by those who have an affinity or allegiance with the PKK. The DTP deputies have to consider their demands and political views. The deputies have to be influential within the party in order for them to detach from the PKK. However, they are aware how they have been nominated. It now seems impossible that they will have a proper position to attract the moderates, particularly given the latest developments.

So you’re saying that the DTP deputies cannot have an independent sphere?

Following the 2004 election, Abdullah Öcalan [the imprisoned leader of the PKK] gave a start for the formation of a new party because he was threatened by the autonomous policies of DEHAP [the Democratic People’s Party] and gave orders for the establishment of the new party, naming it the DTP. I don’t think the DTP could be an address -- apart from the PKK -- in solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey. And I don’t think the Turkish government needs such an address to solve the Kurdish problem as long as it says this is a problem of Turkey.


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[ÜMİT FIRAT]

Author and editorial board member for the Kurdish political magazine Serbestî, published in Turkish in İstanbul, he also writes for the Turkish dailies Zaman and Radikal as well as the Bianet Internet news site. Originally from Bingöl, he had a bookstore in Ankara between 1973 and 1979 until he was sent to jail for four years by the repressive regime of the Sept.12, 1982 military coup. An İstanbul resident since 1989, he has been active in the formation of many Kurdish initiatives, including the Helsinki Citizens Association and Kurdish Intellectuals Initiative, which organized a sizable conference that was allowed by Turkey to have “Kurdish” in its name for the first time -- “The Necessities of Recognizing the Kurdish Reality.” In the early ‘90s, he worked actively in Cem Boyner’s widely respected New Democracy Movement (YDH), which later became a political party. He was also active in 2004 promoting a signature campaign in Turkey for the text “What Do the Kurds Want in Turkey?” published by the International Herald Tribune, Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspapers.

For a context as to DTP's closure, see the Turkish Daily News article breaking the news in November. AKP has so far maintained the position that the parliamentary immunity of DTP deputies should not be lifted.

The EU and the Kurds

As mentioned in my two weeks ago, the European Union has served as a linchpin for securing the relative peace and stability that now exists in the Kurdish southeast (see Jan. 19 post). The Kurds have a long and complicated history both inside and outside of the Kurdish state structure. While many in the state tried to force their assimilation into Turkish culture, the Kurds have resisted. This resistance is evident in the long history of Kurdish revolts that have taken place since Atatürk secured Turkish independence at Lausanne in 1923. The "Kurdish problem" in Turkey—I put this in quotations since a significant number of Turks, especially among the ruling elite, do not recognize the Kurdish situation as a "problem"—dates back to Lausanne and the treaty's declaration that there are no "non-religious minorities" in Turkey.

Under Lausanne and Turkey's successive series of constitutions, Kurds are not recognized as a distinct people with their own language, history, and cultural heritage. As Kurds represent one-fifth of Turkey's population of 70 million and are the predominant population of the southeast, the denial of Kurdish identity is thus at the heart of Kurdish unrest.

Although the Turkish state has traditionally pursued a stubborn and failed policy of assimilation, this position has started to change under pressure from the European Union. As Turkey's fight against the PKK picked up in the early 1990s, many European politicians and human rights groups began to pay increasing attention to Turkey's policies toward the Kurds and criticism mounted to the point of threatening the 1995 customs union that was signed between Turkey and the European Union.

However, a political opening emerged in 1999 thanks to two key events. The first of these was the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and his subsequent calling for a peaceful solution, a move that helped bring about a PKK ceasefire in 2001. Second, and just as important, was the Helsinki summit and the promise of EU membership. As Turkey moved to pursue accession into the EU, the Turkish posture toward the southeast began to change. Under intense EU pressure, the state lifted the state of emergency rule that had come to define Kurdish existence in the southeast and that rendered Kurds de facto second-class citizens. The state also began to recognize Kurdish cultural identity, and though still quite nervous about referring to reforms as granting "minority rights," became more comfortable with the idea of Kurdish "cultural rights." Although enormous restrictions still exist as to Kurds' ability to publish, broadcast, and educate in Kurdish (some legal and some practical, e.g. Kurdish schools are expensive), the reforms were a remarked turnabout. Evidence of the magnitude of the language reforms is revealed when held in contrast with the 1983 military decree that made it illegal to publicly use Kurdish.

As a result of EU-inspired legislation and the increased diplomatic influence that came with the conditionality of EU accession, space has begun to emerge in which Kurds could begin to lead normal lives. Although much still needs to be done to secure the rights of Kurds and to integrate the Kurdish community into Turkish society, the EU provides reason for hope. However, as the EU has become an increasingly distant dream in recent years and as reform has come to a virtual standstill, there is much reason to fear that the Kurdish southeast will once again slip into a cycle of violence. I will examine this dimmer outlook in tomorrow night's post, but for the time being would like to direct attention to an article Stephen Kinzer authored in the New York Review of Books in January 2006. The article provides a nice summary of the pivotal role played by the EU and gives a nice summary of what is undeniably a very serious problem—for Turks and Kurds alike.

KURDS IN TURKEY: THE BIG CHANGE—Stephen Kinzer (The New York Review of Books)

Diyarbakir, in southeastern Turkey, has for centuries been the center of Kurdish political and cultural life. For much of the 1990s it was under a harsh form of military rule. Turkish soldiers and police officers, many in plain clothes, were everywhere. Armored personnel carriers crawled along main streets, manned by soldiers with automatic rifles who kept constant watch over sullen crowds. People who supported the idea of Kurdish nationalism lived in constant fear. Several hundred were murdered on the streets or abducted and tortured to death.
This autumn, I spent a week traveling through the region where guerrilla war was fought for years. My first walk through Diyarbakir made it instantly clear how much has changed. There are no soldiers or armored vehicles on the street anymore. Police officers keep out of sight. Most important, people now say whatever they please.

A book fair was underway while I was in Diyarbakir. At the first stand I visited, wedged between Turkish translations of War and Peace and For Whom the Bell Tolls, I found a selection of books with titles like History of Kurdistan and Turkey's Kurdish Problem. No such books could possibly have been sold here during the 1990s, when the very word "Kurdistan" was taboo and the term "Kurdish problem" was taken to refer to an illegal form of separatism.

"Before, we were afraid to speak out," a Kurdish writer named Lutfi Baski told me at the fair. "The government was insisting that there were no Kurds, that there was no Kurdish language or culture. They arrested us and closed our organizations. Now, so much has changed, especially in the last few months. Our problems haven't been solved, not at all, but at least we can talk about them honestly. It's a huge difference."

Later that day, I walked past city hall and saw a large banner advertising a conference that was being held inside. Its subject was "The European Union Accession Process and the Kurdish Problem." When I walked into the packed hall, a local politician was delivering a passionate harangue.

"For so many years, the Turkish state called us criminals, saying that it was not possible to have dialogue with us and that we had to be crushed," he told the rapt crowd. "This is the repeated tragedy that created the Kurdish problem. The only reason Kurds were forced to begin armed struggle was the way the Turkish state has treated Kurds at every stage in the history of this country."

These would have been highly dangerous words a couple of years ago. Even now, police agents monitor and videotape conferences like this one. Their presence, however, did nothing to intimidate the speakers in Diyarbakir. "They watch us just like before, but they can't do anything to us anymore," one man told me. "This is a democracy now. We're becoming European. The state can't touch us."

The next morning, I visited the mayor of Diyarbakir, thirty-four-year-old Os- man Baydemir, who since his election last year has become a leading spokesman for the rising generation of Kurds in Turkey. He told me that although the emergence of a quasi-independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq has thrilled most people here, they are not eager to join it. Instead, he said, they want to remain citizens of Turkey—assuming that Turkey changes its attitude toward them.

Nearly all of the Kurds I met told me the same thing. The prospect of remaining part of a large country that is associated with Europe, and has Istanbul among its many attractions, appeals to them more than the abstract satisfaction of living under a Kurdish flag in an isolated, landlocked Mesopo- tamian "entity."

"Revolutionary steps are now being taken within the framework of democracy," Mayor Baydemir said. "But in a country where change comes slowly, we need an outside influence to push us along. The prospect of getting into the EU gives us that external pressure. It's why more has changed for us in the last few years than in the entire period since the founding of the Turkish Republic. It's also our main hope for the future. This problem can only be solved peacefully, but who can make Turks and Kurds realize that? Only the EU."

On October 3, after a frantic series of last-minute maneuvers, leaders of the twenty-five European Union countries agreed to begin formal membership negotiations with Turkey. These talks could last for a decade or more, and the final outcome is far from guaranteed. Some European leaders, including Angela Merkel, the new German chancellor, and the French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, oppose Turk- ish membership. A host of issues, from terrorism in Europe to the status of Cyprus, could erupt to block Turkey. Yet in the Kurdish region, people are behaving as if they are already under Europe's protection.

. . . .

The European Union has been one of the most effective peacemaking institutions of the modern era. It eased transitions from dictatorship to democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. More recently, it helped manage the peaceable breakup of the Soviet empire. Now, although torn by internal problems, the EU is the main factor drawing Turkey toward democracy, and perhaps even toward resolving the seemingly intractable Kurdish problem.

Kerim Yildiz, executive director of the London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project, writes in a new book, The Kurds in Turkey, that the EU accession process "opens unprecedented political space to press for human rights and to draw attention to the need for political dialogue between Turkey and the Kurds." If this process actually leads Turkey into the EU, Yildiz predicts, Kurds will greatly benefit: "Full EU membership will impose checks on the behaviour of the Turkish state, and could ultimately provide the Kurds with some of the tools necessary to protect their political and legal status within Turkey."

. . . .

Over the last few years, pressed by the EU, the Turkish state has granted Kurds rights that it long denied them. It has done so, however, with little enthusiasm. The much-awaited legalization of Kurdish-language television broadcasting has led only to a single half-hour program per week. Private schools are now allowed to offer classes in Kurdish, but since most Kurds in the southeast cannot afford private schools, only a few such classes exist. Europeans expect these freedoms to be considerably broadened. If they are, the Europeans may press Turkey to go further by licensing all-Kurdish TV stations or allowing the free use of Kurdish in public schools and universities. Today, many Turks would consider those proposals radical. As Turkey moves closer to EU membership, however, they may come to seem reasonable and perhaps even obligatory.

The poorest of Turkey's eighty-one provinces is Hakkari, deep in the almost entirely Kurdish southeast. During the war years, it was a battleground. I tried several times to visit there, but was always turned back at military checkpoints. Once I was arrested, accused of spying for the PKK, and made to spend the night in a prison cell. This time, I was only stopped at one checkpoint. A young soldier checked my passport and then sent me on my way with the words "Gule gule"—go with a smile.
Many of Hakkari's residents consider themselves Kurds first, then Turks. In this they are different from millions of their fellow Kurds who have moved westward and established themselves in big cities like Istanbul and Izmir. Many of those who left are by now well assimilated into Turkish society. More than a few have risen to high positions in business, entertainment, government, and the army. In Hakkari, however, people cling to their Kurdish identity.

The bravest person I met in the provincial capital, also called Hakkari, is a thirty-four-year-old lawyer named Rojbin Tugan. She attended law school in Istanbul, and after graduating was hired by an established firm there. Less than a year later, anguished by reports of the violence that was spreading in the Kurdish region, she returned. For nearly a decade she has been one of the few human rights lawyers in this part of Turkey, doggedly representing clients who claim that soldiers or police have abused them.

One evening, Ms. Tugan invited me for dinner at the apartment she shares with her parents. For most of the evening, we talked about the physical and spiritual devastation that overwhelmed this region during the 1990s. Ms. Tugan has dealt with many horrific cases, and she strongly identifies with the Kurdish cause. Her brother is serving a prison term after being convicted of membership in the PKK. Yet as I was leaving, she surprised me with a burst of optimism.

"I am very hopeful for Turkey's future," she said. "These last few years have been like paradise. I can travel on the roads and not have to worry about being back before dark. When the doorbell rings, we answer it without being afraid. When someone in my family goes out shopping and isn't home in an hour, I'm not terrified. We used to be without hope, but there have been so many changes."

Besides occasional firefights in remote areas, there are also violent attacks on Kurds that recall the terror of the 1990s. Soon after I passed through Hakkari, a car bomb exploded in an outlying town, the second such attack there in a week. It was staged to look like the work of the PKK, but bystanders chased and caught the fleeing bombers, and they turned out to be men tied to government security forces.
These events set off violent protests in both Hakkari and Diyarbakir, with thousands of people shouting pro-PKK slogans. Their intensity showed how angry many Kurds are at what has happened to them, but it also showed how free they are to express their anger. I found more evidence of this in the town of Sirnak, a provincial capital with a population of about 60,000. When I talked to a group of men in a barber shop, I heard graphic accounts of what people described as a four-day military sweep through the town that began on August 18, 1992, and ended with scores dead and much of the town burned.

"Who are the real terrorists?" one of the barbers indignantly asked me. "Our organization [the PKK] or the security forces that burn and torture and kill? Why do Europe and the United States call our PKK fighters terrorists?"

"What do you call them?" I asked.

"Kurds," he replied simply.

The men in this barber shop were so outspoken that even my Kurdish traveling companion, who lives in Diyarbakir, was amazed. He told me that as recently as a year ago, a conversation like this in a public place would have been unthinkable. I asked the barber what had changed, and he answered immediately.
"We're becoming part of Europe," he said. "If we're European, we can say whatever we want."

The anger of the men in the barber shop became most bitter and intense when they talked of the Turkish general, now retired, whom they blame for the 1992 military sweep. The ferocity with which they cursed his name suggests another trauma that may lie ahead for Turkey. People will inevitably want to know the full truth about the Kurdish war, and either an official "truth commission" or a private one will probably attempt to conduct a serious investigation. One way or another, Turks are going to be forced to face ugly truths about how this war was fought.

European leaders have pressed Turkey to repeal laws that limit open discussion of delicate topics like this. In June, responding to their pressure, the Turkish parliament adopted a new and somewhat more tolerant penal code. People who challenge accepted dogma on issues related to the Kurds, however, still face indictment. An Istanbul publisher, Fatih Tas, has recently been charged with distributing a Turkish translation of a 1997 book called Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade. A prosecutor seeks to suppress this book because it asserts what nearly everyone in southeastern Turkey knows: that during the 1990s, Turkish soldiers abused Kurds, burned their homes, and forced them to leave their villages.

This case recalls one brought against the journalist Nadire Mater in 1999. The charge against her—she was eventually acquitted—was publishing a poignant compilation of recollections by former soldiers who fought in the Kurdish war. An English translation, called Voices from the Front, has just been published. In it, Turkish army recruits tell of the crimes they saw and committed, from beating civilians to trafficking in heroin. One recalls his emotions upon finding the bodies of several fallen comrades:

The PKK slaughtered all of them.... They not only cut their throats, but they sliced their ears, pierced their eyes out, cut their penises and thrust them into their mouths. But we did worse things. Ask four to five martyrs' families if they opened the coffins of their sons and looked at their faces...ask if the families have been shown their sons' faces. They don't let them see because there is nothing left to see. I beg your pardon for crying. I had no idea it would hurt this much.

In many parts of southeastern Turkey today, roads are being widened and schools are being built. This region, however, needs psychic as well as physical reconstruction.
"We have an exercise at the women's center where I work," Nurcan Baysal, a social worker in Diyarbakir, told me at dinner one evening. "We put a group of women together, and ask them to close their eyes for three minutes and think of things that have happened to them because they are women. By the end of three minutes, every woman is crying. Then come the stories: my village was burned, my husband was tortured, my son was killed. This war devastated our society. Even now, there is no work for people here. The girls become prostitutes. The boys are thieves. They're proud of it. They come to me and say, 'I'm happy because I was able to steal some money today and bring it to my family.' Our people are suffering. We have deep and painful wounds that will take a very long time to heal."

In August, Prime Minister Erdogan, the first modern Turkish leader who does not come from the political establishment, flew to Diyarbakir to deliver a speech that was almost shocking in its candor. He promised to "resolve every issue with more democracy":

A great and powerful nation must have the confidence to face itself, recognize the mistakes and sins of the past, and march confidently into the future. The Kurdish issue does not belong to a part of our nation, but to us all. It is also my problem.... We accept it as real and are ready to face it.... We are ready to listen to anyone who has something to say, and ready to consult anyone who has a sense of justice.... Turkey will not retreat from the point we have reached. We will not step back from our process of democratization.

Erdogan's speech provoked loud protests from Turkish nationalists, but many Kurds were impressed. Some hope the next step will be an offer of amnesty to PKK fighters. No one knows how many fighters there are, but most informed guesses place the number at five thousand or more, with about two thirds encamped across the border in northern Iraq. The idea that they might return to enter civilian life without paying for their crimes is abhorrent to many Turks. For any form of amnesty to work, these Turks would have to change their minds. The PKK would also have to change.

"It is objectively impossible to deny the power of the PKK in this region," one thoughtful Kurd, Dagistan Toprak, a businessman and former deputy mayor of Diyarbakir, told me at a café overlooking the majestic city wall. "If we're going to have real peace here, though, the PKK needs to adjust itself to the new world situation. The Turkish state is becoming more democratic. The PKK needs to do the same. It should give up the idea of armed struggle, and open respectful dialogue with Kurds who think differently. It also needs to renovate its leadership. This organization was formed with a cold war mentality. It needs to evolve."

Some PKK leaders say they want to negotiate with the Turkish state. In July the PKK military commander, Murat Karayilan, told an AP reporter that the group has given up "extreme socialist ideas" and now seeks only to assure that Kurds can live "in a democratic way." In view of other statements, and recent PKK attacks, that claim is dubious, and in any case the army maintains a firm policy of rejecting all overtures from the PKK. A Turkish general recently asserted that "no one in his right mind" would urge the army to halt offensive operations in the southeast.

Many Kurds in this region dream that one day, PKK militants might return to their homes, under protection of an amnesty, and resume civilian life. It is by no means clear that the PKK is ready to accept this prospect. Certainly the Turkish state is not. Neither are most Turks. The EU, having classified the PKK as a terrorist organization, can hardly pressure Turkey to negotiate with it.

Despite all of this, however, Kurds in southeastern Turkey have a boundless, almost childlike hope that the EU will lead them out of their situation. Even Selahattin Demirtas, chairman of the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakir, whose office is decorated with portraits of assassinated comrades, fervently believes in the transforming power of the EU.

"If our own government were the only hope for accomplishing all this, I don't think it would be possible," he told me. "But there is a powerful external dynamic in this process now, the European Union. That gives us great hope."

Today, this dream is the central fact of life for many Kurds in southeastern Turkey. Like millions of people across their country, they are convinced that Turkey's entry into Europe, of which many Europeans are wary, will resolve their deepest political, social, economic, and cultural problems. The mere prospect of joining the EU has already changed Turkey. What actual membership could do—and whether it will ever materialize—remains tantalizingly uncertain.

HRW Releases Human Rights Report

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has released its annual report on the status of human rights throughout the world and its assessment of human rights in Turkey is quite grim. From the report:

Recent trends in human rights protection in Turkey have been retrograde. 2007 saw an intensification of speech-related prosecutions and convictions, controversial rulings by the judiciary in defiance of international human rights law, harassment of pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) officials and deputies, and a rise in reports of police brutality. The state authorities’ intolerance of difference or dissenting opinion has created an environment in which there have been instances of violence against minority groups. In January 2007 Turkish-Armenian journalist and human rights defender Hrant Dink was murdered. Armed clashes between the military and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rose in the lead-up to elections in July and intensified yet further in the second half of the year, with heavy loss of life; some attacks—such as a suspected PKK bombing in Ankara in May—have targeted civilians.

Although the report notes the success of Turkish citizens in staving off a military coup last July, Kenneth Roth notes in the broader report's introduction that the effort was owed much more to the actions taken by Turkish citizens than to denuniciation by the EU. HRW joins many others in expressing concern that the leverage the EU once had in protecting human rights in Turkey is waning thanks to the rhetoric of some EU politicians who have made the Turkish public much more skeptical about the eventuality of ever being accepted as a full member.

The report cites the significant increase in speech code prosecutions, including their possible use to reduce the political power of DTP in the face of upcoming elections; the continuing occurrence of police brutality and extrajudicial killings, including concern about the new "stop and search" law; the impunity of security forces, in particular in the Şemdinli case, the acquittal of four police officers accused of murdering two people in Kızıltepe in 2004, the killing of 10 protesters in Diyarbakır in 2006; and the continued harrassment of civil society organizations, such as the gay rights organization, Lambdaistanbul.

Norman Corwin Could Not Have Said It Better

From an op/ed in Today's Zaman:

HOW IS THE STATE INSULTED?—Faik Akçay

Identities and institutions like Turkishness, the Turkish nation, the state, legislative organs, judicial institutions, security units and the republic cannot be insulted, degraded or belittled through constructive criticism and discussions on their actions or their deficiencies.

Quite the contrary, criticism and discussion may help them revitalize and become stronger institutions. Insulting Turkishness may be done by killing Hrant Dink or slaughtering Father Andrea Santoro; it may also be done by murdering people in Malatya simply because they print Bibles. Turkey's image is undermined by intimidating Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk and ensuring his departure from the country. Insulting the state's security forces, military or police may be done by welcoming murderers who killed the thinkers of this country as if they are heroes and by taking photos with them. The image and prestige of the Turkish military establishment was eroded when it staged the military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. Its image was further damaged when the equipment and materials of the Nokta news magazine were confiscated because it revealed a military coup plotted by a retired military officer.

Denigration of Turkishness all over the world is possible through attempts to keep the Susurluk, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum incidents unresolved. You may insult Turkishness by avoiding confrontation of the past. The republic may be denigrated by taking steps inconsistent with contemporary administrative approaches. Denigration of Turkishness is made possible by penalizing thought and sentencing a number of writers, artists and thinkers like Atilla Yayla. Denigration of Turkishness is possible via attempts to eliminate the differences and diversity by relying on legal instruments like the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). You may insult Turkishness by resisting a democratic system. Insulting the judiciary is possible by releasing the police officer who almost killed a young person who kept running from him despite an initial warning. Respect for the judicial institutions may be seriously undermined when the relevant institutions take a timid approach in dealing with the actual perpetrators of Dink's murder. Insulting state institutions may be done by strong attachment to cumbersome and non-operational state structures and resistance to contemporary approaches.

Praising the crime and the offender is possible by remaining indifferent to the actual perpetrators and instead keeping the hit men in prisons. The Turkish identity may be praised and promoted by making every effort to ensure apprehension of the criminals. Insulting Turkishness is possible by remaining indifferent to all ethnic, religious and linguistic identities. Insulting the state is done by making state institutions unaccountable or by suing journalists because they did not report the slogans chanted at the rallies they were covering. The state image is undermined by not taking any effective action to deal with the suspicious deaths of the country's president and a high level military commander in an aircraft crash. Undermining the image and prestige of the security forces is possible by incarcerating an innocent person based on weak accusations, by exonerating a police officer who killed a young person, by shooting a person who argues with the police or by beating an individual to death in the park.

We may protect this country, our nation, our institutions, our values and our constitution by honorable actions, not by promulgating laws. Before making new laws, we must go through a transformation to embrace the contemporary civil and humane standards. Making contemporary laws requires a certain level of perception. We have to take the necessary steps to attain this level of perception, instead of resorting to legal mechanisms like Article 301. This is the reality that this age presents to us.

Professor Yayla and Turkey's Modern Project

Still distacted by the snow, it is time to post about Mohamed Yayla's conviction this past Monday. Yayla was sentenced to three months in jail, although his sentence was suspended for two years under the conditions that he not commit the same offense during this probationary period. Professor of political science at Gazi University and head of the Association for Liberal Thinking, Yayla was charged under a 1951 statute that made it illegal to insult Atatürk. The charge followed a speech he gave in İzmir in 2006.

The speech was given at an AKP-sponsored youth conference and included remarks about the period following Turkey's full transition to a multi-party system in 1950 being more democratic than its formative years as a one-party state. Yayla continues to maintain that he was not insulting Atatürk, but questioning the idea that Atatürk's reforms were as purely progressive as some Kemalists maintain. He also questioned Atatürk's legacy as it has been applied by Kemalists following his death. Yayla is appealing the court's finding.

In an interview with the New York Times, prosecutor Huseyin Durdu was quoted as saying Yayla's speech “had no basis in science.” As Times correspondent Sabrina Tavernise noted in her article, this is a particularly difficult claim in that Yayla's speech was so academic that the only specific "insult" the prosecutor could find was Yayla's one-time reference to Atatürk as "this man." Largely respected for his amazing feat in building a Turkish state following the chaos of World War I and European imperial designs for carving up Turkish territory, Atatürk's tremendous role in history should not be denied. However, it seems particularly difficult to claim that Yayla was insulting this heritage by simply questioning that the first year's of the Turkish Republic were not completely progressive. No state has ever been completely progressive and to further claim that Yayla's remarks were not based in science when his speech drew careful attention to Enlightenment thinking is more than a bit odd.

A similar conclusion was reached by Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee Co-chairman Dutch Green deputy Joost Lagendijk who was quoted in Wednesday's Today's Zaman: "What he said is a part of the debate in Turkey. Confusing his arguments with insulting Atatürk is completely wrong. He insulted no one. I hope he will be acquitted in the upper echelons of the judicial procedures."

Although a proposal has been submitted to amend Article 301 (see Saturday's post), the changes are unlikely to prevent similar prosecutions. There are plenty of statutes in and outside of the Turkish penal code that allow for such prosecutions and Yayla's case is a demonstration of just how they can be put to use against people with whom prosecutors disagree. If Turkey sincerely desires to gain entry into the European Union, criticisms such as Lagendijk's should be taken seriously. As the article quoting Lagendijk observes, EU diplomats are at a loss as to why AKP was not more aggressive with the proposal. With a huge electoral mandate, this level of disbelief is likely to continue to draw criticism of the party. While I do not yet feel knowledgeable enough about Turkey's internal political situation to comment as to what AKP should have done, if it is truly the case that little more could be done to press the establishment on lifting the article, it is a sad situation for Turkey indeed. However, this said, a vote to amend Turkey's penal code needs only a simple majority in Parliament and unless there is a serious risk of de-stabilizing the country, it seems have been completely appropriate for AKP to draft a more progressive amendment.

As Yayla's presecution attests, Turkey's lack of a serious political dialogue about its own past, present, and future will continue to haunt the country. To me, what seems most admirable about Atatürk was his ability to take risks and reign in a modern age against all odds. It is this sort of progressivism to which laws designed to protect free speech are instrumental in designing. One of the lasting legacies of the Englightenment is a free marketplace of ideas into which women and men can enter into meaningful and sustained dialogue with one another in hope that in so doing a greater truth might be produced. I think the most telling statement from this whole event comes from Yayla's declaration in the New York Times: "I need thoughts to counter my ideas." This sort of willingness to be challenged is the very basis of the modern project.

Sadly, Yayla is one of the lucky ones. As he told The Guardian, "I'm protected in some way because I'm more well known and recognised in Turkey and have international friends who will put pressure on the government. For those not known it is really difficult to speak out." One of the things that the number of freedom of expression cases wrought by statistics carefully composed by human rights groups will notably never tell us is how many people are quelled into silence by these laws. This chilling effect is likely profound and something the EU rightly took note of in its November progress report.

To close today's post, I would like to direct readers to a column Orhan Kemal Cengiz wrote in last Saturday's Turkish Daily News about the dangers in squelching discussion of Atatürk.

A Period of "Mutual Adjustment"

Bülent Aliriza, Turkey Program Director at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, discusses a period of "mutual adjustment" in which Turkey-U.S. relations are currently suspended. The report is a useful summary of the bilateral relationship, which dates back to the Truman Doctrine and is shadowed by the Cold War. Aliriza discusses four main obstacles for the relationship: first, and foremost, Turkey's need to suppress PKK activities, especially in light of renewed violence in October; second, pursuit of a so-called 'genocide resolution' such as the one that passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee last October, only to be tabled before it reached a vote in the House; third, Turkey's burgeoning relationship with Iran; fourth, Turkey's pursuit of an independent foreign policy in relation to the Middle East as exampled by its recognition of the Hamas government in the occupied territory of Gaza and the cordial relationship it enjoys with Syria.

Aliriza writes that the Turkey-U.S. bilateral relationship is much approved from where it stood in October following the U.S. Congress' treatment of the 'genocide resolution' and what Turks' saw as Washington indifference to PKK attacks (and, not mentioned by Aliriza, even tacit support for the PKK). Since the tabling of the genocide resolution and U.S. sharing of intelligence that has facilitated Turkish air attacks on the PKK inside Northern Iraq, the relationship has much improved, although both countries are most likely destined to remain, as Boğazici University Professor Kemal Kirişçi has written, "ambivalent allies."

Kirişçi's work in addition to Philip Robin's book, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (2003), are great sources to which to turn for more information about Turkey-U.S. diplomacy.

Snow

On a lighter note than the Ergenekon investigation and headscarf legislation that has been dominating the news, a snow storm has hit Turkey. In the past six hours, I have seen more snow than I have ever seen before in my life. I am told that schools and public buildings have been shut down and just venturing to the grocery store, I saw shoveled piles of snow as high as seven feet. For a Texan, truly amazing.

More Ergenekon Weirdness

At the same time as the parliament here is moving forth with a proposal to establish a special parliamentary commission to investigate Ergenekon and its links to the state, the Turkish public is learning more and more about the gang's activities. While CHP is drafting the proposal and AKP has said it is in support of their work, MHP is more ambivalent and has expressed fears that any such move might label nationalists as gang members. One would think that if you were a member of a self-identified nationalist party and wanted to distance the ideology of your party from the apparently heinous crimes of an illegal gang you would be among the first to call for an extensive investigation. However, this sentiment is apparently not felt by MHP's leadership.

As the story gets weirder and weirder, this Wednesday the so-called head of the "Turkish Orthodox Church," Paşa Ümit Erenerol, was detained by police for questioning. The "Turkish Orthodox Church" is recognized only by its members and its "patriarchate" dates back to the final days of World War I. Also affiliated with the organization is Sevgi Erenerol, one of the first arrested and the sister of the "patriarch." Erenerol is suspected of being one of the chief ring leaders of the group and gained a reputation for her vitriol in discussing supposed Christian missionary activities and Kurds. Mustafa Aykol's column today in the Turkish Daily News tells an interesting narrative of the church.