Ergenekon: Difficult Ground Indeed

The Ergenekon indictment is expected to be released tomorrow and stories are still flying about the nature of the organization, its criminal activities, and most importantly, its links to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). As noted in my July 9 post, the investigation poses a difficult test for Turkish democracy and coming amidst the AKP closure case, risks a significant destabilization of Turkish politics. The following from Saban Kardaş appeared on July 9 in the Eurasia Daily Monitor:

To establish a credible case for this charge before the courts, the prosecutors have to connect the perpetrators to “actual plotters” in the military. This seems to be the Achilles’ heel of the entire case: proving Ergenekon’s intent and its capability to overthrow the government requires the conviction of a good many shadowy figures; but as the prosecution pursues influential people, it gets engulfed in the muddy waters of Turkish politics. Civilian investigations into past coups and alleged coup attempts, let alone bringing those involved to trial, is a venture into uncharted territory for Turkish politics.

. . . .

Prosecutor Zekeriya Oz assumed a Herculean task by deciding to expand the scope of the Ergenekon investigation. In this already politicized case, the prosecution will have to prove that what is on trial is not the neo-nationalist political program opposing the AKP but a group that poses an imminent threat to legal order. Hence, the Ergenekon investigation ironically coalesces with the closure case in an odd way. If the prosecution cannot furnish a strong case, it will be charged with seeking to prosecute advocates of an idea rather than the wrongdoings of a terrorist organization, paralleling the charges that the Constitutional Court closes political parties for harboring ideas without looking into hard evidence.

The task is indeed Herculean, and time will simply tell exactly what happens. Recent leaks of the investigation have included linking the assassination plans of Alparslan Aslan to Ergenekon. According to media sources close to the government, Aslan is said to have received assistance from Ergenekon to assassinate judges at the Council of State and also in his 2006 hand grenade attack on Cumhuriyet's İstanbul office.

In other news, more dirty laundry is being aired. Former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. Hilmi Özkök has neither confirmed nor denied that some members of the General Staff had pursued plans for a coup as early as 2003, one of which is rumored to have called for Özkök's own assassination. Some have linked these coup attempts to Ergenekon, but if more or less true, they could exist as a phenomenon altogether separate or perhaps only slightly connected and defined by very different driving forces. Revelations of plans for Özkök's assassination were first reported by the newsweekly Yeni Aktüel (click here for the story in Today's Zaman).

We will see what tomorrow brings in terms of an actual indictment. The indictment will not include the suspects detained on July 1, allegations against whom will be formalized in a later appendage to the larger indictment. There will no doubt be plenty of leaks in the interim.

Al-Qa'ida in Turkey?

From Today's Zaman:

One of the three policemen killed in an attack on the US Consulate died at the hospital of wounds sustained during the attack. İstanbul Police Chief Celalettin Cerrah inspected the scene.
Three policemen and three gunmen were killed in an armed attack yesterday on the US Consulate General in İstanbul that sent shockwaves across Turkey at an already troubled time.

Both Turkey and the United States described the attack as a terrorist act, and US Ambassador to Turkey Ross Wilson said the US and Turkey would "stand together and confront this, as we have in the past."

The attack coincides with political tensions in Turkey. The police are probing a shadowy far-right group suspected of plotting a military coup against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which is in a legal fight to avert closure over charges of anti-secular activities.

The consulate occupies a citadel-like structure on a hill in İstinye, a densely populated residential neighborhood along the Bosporus on the European side of İstanbul. Turkish police guard the street, while US personnel are in charge of security inside the consulate compound. During the attack US security personnel stayed inside the compound, as they are not authorized to engage in armed action on Turkish soil.

The assailants came in a car and three of them later got out, opening fire on policemen at an entrance gate of the consulate at around 11 a.m. yesterday. Three police officers -- Nedim Çalık, Mehmet Önder Saçmalıoğlu and Erdal Öztaş -- were killed in the shooting and three assailants were shot dead, reportedly all by the same policeman, identified as Osman Dağlı, in the resulting shootout. News reports said the fleeing car was loaded with explosives.

Sources said some bystanders who had been waiting for US visas were also injured in the attack. The wounded were rushed to nearby hospitals for medical attention.

There was no immediate information on who was behind the attack, although there were unconfirmed reports that al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-trained elements were involved. İstanbul Governor Muammer Güler said all three assailants killed in the clash were Turkish citizens, denying earlier speculation that they had Syrian passports.

"It is, of course, inappropriate now to speculate on who may have done this or why. It is an obvious act of terrorism," Ambassador Wilson told a press conference.

Police launched an operation to capture the fourth assailant, who fled the scene in the automobile, and private CNN-Türk reported that two suspects, one of whom was identified as Atilla Çınar, were soon taken into custody. Sources identified the assailants as Erkan Kargın, Rauf Topçıl and Bülent Çınar and news reports said they had been trained in Afghanistan.

"At first sight, the attack appears to be pointing to al-Qaeda," said Sedat Laçiner, the head of the Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO/USAK), adding that it might be a symbolic assault on both the United States and the Turkish police protecting the consulate building. "If you look at other similar attacks in the Middle East, you will see that they are directed more at the local forces protecting the Western interests than the West itself. Attackers may believe that they inflicted harm on the Turkish police who protect the US," he told Today's Zaman.

Mahir Kaynak, a former intelligence chief, expressed doubt that the attack could be related to the ongoing investigation into the Ergenekon network, which has so far resulted in the arrests of dozens of people, including two retired generals. "The attack was primarily directed against the US Consulate. The target would have been something else if the attack was related to domestic developments," he said.

Wilson also said he didn't believe the attack had any links to the Ergenekon terrorist organization, saying in response to a question that there was no evidence pointing to such a link at the moment.

Güler told reporters that one of the slain police officers worked at the consulate and that the other two were traffic policemen. "One of the police officers died at the scene of the incident during what police said was a two-minute gunfight. Two died of their wounds at a hospital. Two other policemen were injured in the attack. Their conditions are not life-threatening. One of them was injured in the shoulder and the other in the elbow. They were rushed to nearby hospitals," he said.

"Weapons and shotguns have been found at the scene of attack. We have launched an investigation into the incident. We will examine it in all its aspects. It is said the assailants arrived at the scene in a vehicle. I cannot say which group or terrorist organization the attackers belonged to at the moment. We are very sorry for our martyred police officers. May their souls rejoice. I extend my condolences to their families," he said.

A US Embassy spokeswoman said there were no reports of casualties among consulate employees. "We are cooperating with the police and taking the appropriate measures," she said.

One eyewitness said: "They came in a white car. They had hand grenades, pistols and weapons in their hands. Three of them got out of the vehicle and fired at police officers waiting in front of the consulate. Policemen started shooting in return, but three of them were martyred. I saw them dead, lying on the ground."

Another eyewitness, Ulus Durgut, said the attackers were bearded men with long hair.

Interior Minister Beşir Atalay expressed his sorrow for the martyred policemen. "A comprehensive investigation has been launched into the incident. Three police officers were killed in the attack. Our pain is great. We will make a broad statement when the shroud of mist around the shooting dissipates," he said.

Security increased around US missions

İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Aykut Cengiz Engin told reporters that the evidence so far pointed to a terrorist attack.

"According to preliminary reports, the assailants were between the ages of 25and 30 and had guns and shotguns. They have not yet been identified. The fourth attacker managed to flee from the scene. The modus operandi, nature and characteristics of the attack show that it was a terrorist act," he said.

Wilson thanked the Turkish police for the courage they showed in the attack. "The staff at the US Embassy is in good condition. We are grateful to the Turkish police for the bravery they displayed," he said. "It is enough to say that they are terrorists who carried out a dastardly and cowardly attack. The attack was perpetrated against both Turkey and the US. Our countries stand together in the fight against international terrorism. Such attacks will not be able to distort the friendly relations between Turkey and the US," he added.

Wilson said security around US diplomatic missions in Turkey had been increased after yesterday's attack. "We asked for increased security presence, and the police responded effectively and quickly," he said.

A Fight for Press Freedom?: Taraf Faces Off with TSK

From BIA-Net:

The newspaper “Taraf” is in trouble with the General Staff about the Dağlıca story it made a few days ago, in which it had claimed that the military already knew about PKK’s Dağlıca ambush where twelve soldiers were killed. In this story, Taraf had published some secret documents about the incident.

Reacting to this story, the General Staff told Taraf to return all these secret documents it used in its story. Otherwise they would get them through a law-enforcement action.

Bianet talked to the heads of the media institutions about the matter.

“They are trying to cover up Dağlıca” Ahmet Abakay, head of Contemporary Journalists Association (ÇGD), told bianet that Dağlıca was a very important matter and they were trying to cover it up. He also added that Taraf ran a serious story, but this also involved a risk, since some circles obviously did not want these kinds of stories. Abakay said that they realized that Taraf was under pressure because of this story and that they were protesting this.

Accusations should be not to the newspaper, but to those who did not do their job
Abakay stated that what mattered was not whether or not a document was published, but whether or not it was authentic. He claimed that as long as the document was authentic, it was the responsibility of the media organization that public was informed about it and this was protected by the freedom of press and the laws.

Journalism is like being a ropewalker
Abakay thinks that journalism under these conditions is like being a ropewalker. According to him, journalism in Turkey is a very risky business. He said, “Sometimes things that are not illegal are presented as if they are criminal acts. This is the biggest problem.”

Erinç: Journalism is one of the most difficult jobs
Orhan Erinç, head of the Turkish Journalists Association (TGC), indicated that there was an article in the press law that stated the journalists could not be pressured into turning their sources and documents.

He added that the same thing had happened in “Nokta” incident when the weekly Nokta was pressured into shutting itself down because of its story about some generals planning a military coup; different laws were used to bypass the press law. Therefore, he said, that journalism was one of the most difficult jobs in Turkey.

The Taraf readers and various non-governmental organizations visited Taraf’s main building in Kadıköy, İstanbul to show their support. (BÇ/EZÖ/TB)

Germans Kidnapped by PKK

From Today's Zaman:

Members of the outlawed Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) on Tuesday kidnapped three German mountaineers as they were climbing Mt. Ağrı (Ararat), the governor of the eastern Anatolian province of Ağrı announced yesterday.

The three Germans were nabbed from a group of 13 mountaineers by five PKK terrorists, who raided their camp at an altitude of 3,200 meters on Mt. Ağrı, Governor Mehmet Çetin told the Anatolia news agency yesterday.

The group of German mountaineers, headed by a guide, obtained a legal permit to climb Ağrı by applying to the Ağrı Governor's Office through the Foreign Ministry in Ankara and arrived in the province three days ago, Çetin said. He emphasized that teams from the provincial gendarmerie have launched a wide-scale search operation in the region and that the rest of the mountaineers' group was brought to the province's town of Doğubeyazıt.

"The terrorists said they carried out this action because of the German government's recent moves against PKK associations and sympathizers," Anatolia quoted the governor as saying, in an apparent reference to the fact that the Denmark-based Roj TV station, one of the main propaganda tools of the PKK, was recently banned in Germany because of its support for the PKK's terrorist activities against Turkey.

Yet in Ankara, officials from the Foreign Ministry, while acknowledging that the three mountaineers were captured around 11 p.m. on Tuesday night, were not yet able to confirm that the mountaineers were kidnapped by the PKK.

"There is no confirmed information yet. The German Embassy in Ankara, our ministry and the Interior Ministry as well as the Ağrı Governor's Office have been involved in the issue since last night [Tuesday night]," the Foreign Ministry officials, who requested anonymity, told Today's Zaman yesterday.

Kidnapping tourists is a rare tactic for the PKK, whose activities are mainly focused on attacking military targets in southeastern Turkey. German Embassy officials could not be reached as of yesterday afternoon. In Berlin, a spokesperson for the German Foreign Ministry yesterday issued a statement with similar comments to those of the Turkish Foreign Ministry officials to Today's Zaman.

Tanktops at Galata: Protesting Patriarchy and Double Standards

From Nicole Pope in Today's Zaman:

Recently, while on my way to Tarabya, I was stuck in one of the perennial traffic jams that have become a feature of Istanbul summers. Next to the road where vehicles painfully inched forward swimmers were noisily frolicking in the Bosporus, obviously having a wonderful time. All of the 15 to 20 bathers were male -- teenage boys and men. Some of them had stripped down to their Y-fronts to enjoy a refreshing dip and were sunning themselves on the pavement.

Contrast their careless enjoyment of summer fun with the story of 28-year-old Gülcan, who went fishing on the Galata Bridge wearing leggings and a light blouse. She did not strip down to her underwear or harass anyone, but her summery attire was deemed "immodest" by the men standing nearby. Soon the police got involved and a court case followed. The verdict was recently handed down: Gülcan was sentenced to six months in prison, later reduced to five months and suspended for good behavior during the trial.

The ruling prompted a loose coalition of women's rights activists to gather on the bridge on Saturday, some of them in tank tops and shorts, to protest against state interference with women's dress code and behavior. Stating that "our bodies are ours," they demanded the abolition of Article 225, which carries prison terms of six months to a year for "indecent exposure."

What constitutes "indecent exposure" is of course in the eye of the beholder. There have been countless examples of judgments reflecting the traditional notion that women should dress modestly and stay at home if they want to avoid trouble. Unlike in Gülcan's case, the uncouth troublemakers who were filmed harassing foreign female revelers during the New Year celebration at Taksim Square were only fined YTL 57.

Turkey is of course preoccupied with weightier judicial matters at the moment, but highlighting these legal double standards is far from frivolous. Interpreting the law through such a narrow lens has serious implications, especially when dozens of women are still killed every year in the name of honor.

In October 2007 for example, a court in Adana reduced the sentence of a man who had killed his 17-year-old wife because she was "wearing white leggings and a white T-shirt." He saw it as proof that she was having an affair, and the court accepted that he had been provoked by her behavior. In İzmir the following month, another tribunal rendered a similar judgment. This time, the killer's excuse was that his wife, normally covered, had worn jeans against his wishes and had been "flirtatious" when she asked the time from a group of men in a shopping center. "She was constantly hurting my male pride," her husband argued, successfully avoiding a life sentence.

Women, under pressure from all sides, are restricted to a narrow band of socially acceptable behavior. If they wear a headscarf, the law prevents them from studying at university or holding a public job but, on the other hand, traditional social mores still put them at risk if they wear short dresses or sleeveless tops beyond Bebek or Nişantaşı.

Although the "turban" remains a divisive issue among women's groups, the gathering on Galata Bridge included activists wearing headscarves as well as secular feminists. The women were all defending their right to make their own choices.

There seems to be a growing awareness among democrats in Turkey -- be they male or female -- that the powers-that-be should not be allowed to drive a wedge between them. This is creating new opportunities for people to work together to challenge the status quo, bypassing the usual secular/religious divide. In these troubled times, this is a welcome development.

Although the AKP-led revision of the Turkish Penal Code undertaken in 2004 was a huge step in the push for gender equality, the positive end-result is largely a result of the coming together of women's groups to protest an attempt by Erdoğan to re-criminalize adultery. The proposed law against adultery had been removed in 1996 for men and 1998 for women, but some AKP politicians argued that the law was necessary to protect social values and also to protect women. Many women's groups vehemently disagreed and pointed to the patriarchy inherent in the idea of "protection," further arguing that the laws would in practice be applied to women and only further contribute to discrimination. As a result of pressure from women's groups, the Turkish Penal Code provided for tougher sentences for those convicted of honor killings and increased the penalties for rape, including marital rape. Additionally, significant reforms were made to Turkish family law that declared women and men equal partners in marriage, made the legal age of marriage the same for both sexes, and did away with the legal concept of "illegitimate children" while assuring women the right to take custody of children born outside of marriage. Most significantly, sexual crimes were treated as crimes against individuals rather than social norms or mores. (For a summary of the revisions, click here.) However, as Ms. Gülcan's case attests, there are still a number of laws on the books that facilitate discrimination against women.

Luckily, the repression of women has not been without dissent. As Pope argues, it is a very good thing indeed that women are mobilizing to respond to this discrimination and exert pressure on the state through dissent and raising consciousness about the plight of Ms. Gülcan. Additional evidence of women's ability to effectively mobilize and influence politics came about last fall. Proving to be an integral part of civil society, last fall women's groups came together to protest the new draft of the constitution. The constitutional draft removed a clause pertaining to the government's obligation to assure the equality of all Turkish citizens and replaced it with language that describes women as a vulnerable social group in need of protection.

An added dimension to the struggle for women's rights in Turkey is the hope for European membership and just as other traditionally repressed social groups risk being further alienated by the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations, namely the diminishing diplomatic leverage of Europe, women are no exception. For more on the influence of the EU on the mobilization of women's groups and the advancement of the status of women during the drafting process of the Turkish penal code, click here.

Also, see reportage from BIA-Net.

Ergenekon Proves New Test for Democracy

Just as political as the AKP closure case, the Ergenekon investigation has come to rock Turkish politics in the past week and has prompted many to conjecture that what is happening in Turkey at the moment is more a struggle for power than a test for democracy (see Gareth Jenkins’ July 7 commentary from the Eurasia Daily Monitor). While it does indeed seem that Turkish politics is coming to be ever more defined as a struggle for power between two divergent groups—the rising Islamic middle class represented in power by the broad coalition AKP has managed to strengthen in recent years and the so-called ‘Kemalist’ secular establishment—intent to maintain and expand their political power, both the closure case and the Ergenekon investigation are, at heart, tests for Turkish democracy. If we view one of the most important aspects of democratic governance as the establishment of legitimate procedures by which political groups vie for power viz. their contestation of key political issues within the public sphere, then the crucial test with which Turkey is currently faced is whether both the closure case and the Ergenekon investigation will follow the rule of law and become truly transparent, public political phenomena in which democratic norms will ultimately prevail.

I have been without Internet for more than a week now, but one positive to this frustration is that I am now able to look back on what has been an incredibly confusing week of events. In the early morning of July 1, police detained 24 suspects alleged to be involved in the deep state network Ergenekon. The suspects included some very “big fish,” as the headlines of the liberal daily Radikal hailed on July 3. Among those detained included retired General Şener Eruygur, former military head of the Gendarmerie and current president of the Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD), retired General Hurşit Tolan, former head of the First Army Force (İlk Ordu), and Sinan Aygün, well-known Kemalist politician and current president of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ATD). Mustafa Balbay, Cumhuriyet Ankara correspondent, was also arrested, bringing similar charges of government-led attempts to intimidate journalists who have been particularly critical of AKP. The arrests were also accompanied by raids on Cumhuriyet’s Ankara bureau and the ADD in İstanbul. As before noted, Cumhuriyet is at the forefront of the neo-nationalist press and is well-known for its seething attacks on the government and the ADD is strongly opposed to AKP as a threat to secular governance. The ADD was one of several organizations involved in the large rallies against the election of Abdullah Gül during the presidential crisis in spring 2007. The early morning detentions and raids raised accusations that the Ergenekon investigation has turned into little more than a witch-hunt aimed to discredit AKP detractors. With the arrests coming just hours before the first hearing of the closure case, some have even decried the events as political revenge and even the most fervent of AKP supporters with whom I have talked have had difficulty dismissing the claim that the arrests were not 'somewhat' politically-motivated.

The Ergenekon investigation commenced on 13 June 2007 when hand grenades and a small amount of explosives were discovered in a house in İstanbul. At the time, ten were arrested, but the investigation soon seemed to quiet and was lost among news of the presidential crisis. It was not until this January that the investigation really picked up strength following the high-profile arrests of retired General Veli Küçük and twelve associates (see Jan. 25 post). The January arrests led to the renewal of intense scrutiny of what some have referred to as Turkey’s “deep state” (derin devlet). Since that time, accusations have been made that the shadowy-network now well-known as Ergenekon participated in plans to bring about numerous military coups and may have been behind such violent events as the Malatya murders, the Alevi-Kurd riots in the Gazi district of İstanbul, and the murder of Hrant Dink. It has also been alleged that the group had plans to assassinate Nobel Prize laureate Orhan Pamuk. As general of the gendarmerie, Küçük was among those entrusted in the early 1990s by Tansu Çiller to use any means at their disposal to eliminate the PKK. The result was a series of grave human rights violations and chaos in the southeast that while weakening the PKK, also undermined the legitimacy of the Turkish state in the international community and made it virtually impossible to reach the sort of peaceable, diplomatic solution to the Kurdish problem that had been sought by Turgut Özal. Upon retiring in 2000 and with Öcalan arrested, Küçük is said to have turned his attention to the Islamist threat he perceived as coming from AKP. Some in the press have speculated that Ergenekon is not led by Küçük, but instead has a much longer history and that the former general is only a member of a much broader and powerful organization with substantial links to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). However, others have been much more skeptical to regard Ergenekon with such far-reaching power, and have instead regarded the network as a weak, disorganized association of has-beens and wannabes with no link whatsoever to the TSK.

Throughout the investigation, the TSK has made no move to prevent the government from performing what has been a very wide-reaching and politically sensitive investigation. Indeed, the July 1 arrests of Eruygur and Tolon occurred at a military retirement facility and were executed by members of the TSK at the request of the prosecutor. This cooperation seems to suggest that any connections Ergenekon has to the military are weak and that the top brass of the TSK are not tainted by links to the network. However, the press has made much of Ergenekon's alleged connections to the military, implying that the TSK has had significant knowledge of the organization and even cooperated with it. On July 3, the Islamist daily Sabah ran a story in which the paper implied that the TSK had given a green light to Ergenekon to pursue plans for a military coup that would take place this summer. However, lacking in evidence, the story points only to hand-written documents that were found in the July 1 raid of Ereygur’s home. The documents are said to have laid out an operation plan by which the network was set to carry out a number of attacks on the judiciary and then to organize a number of protests geared to urge the state to protect the judiciary. According to some newspapers, the protests would span 20 provinces and would lead to clashes with police. Responding to the instability, the idea was that the conditions would be rife for the military to step in so as to end the civil strife. However, it is doubtful that the TSK was part of any such plan. First, the series of events in the operation plan make little success in terms of practical logistics, and second, the military is set to consider promotions in August, including the election of a new Chief of the Armed Services. If Ergenekon was acting in cahoots with the TSK, it is highly doubtful that the military would pick this month as a good time to plan any such coup. The planned assassinations have been said to include that of Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya.

The truth is that the incredibly biased nature of news related to Ergenekon and the stories use of unnamed sources make any such conspiracies incredibly difficult to assess. This was the case with last June’s story in Taraf about plans for a coup that was to take place last year (see June 21 post). Most disconcerting about the investigation is that small bits of information are being leaked by the AKP government to a few selected newspapers and that there is little transparent and beyond conjecture about what is actually being discovered as to how big a threat Ergenekon really posed and as to what exactly it was up to. (For criticism from Turkish press organizations, click here). There is little doubt that the Ergenekon network existed (exists?), that its plans were violent, and that it embraced a neo-nationalist platform it aimed to promote by destabilizing the country. However, how serious were the plans and how organized was the network? Today’s Zaman speculated yesterday that the investigation was in no way over and that the network necessarily includes numerous people in the police and security forces, including the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), who have not yet been detained. It also speculates that the investigation is likely to include a number of artists and intellectuals who were engaged in the plotting. According to the Zaman media group, which is controlled by Fethullah Gülen, Ergenekon might be thought of as an umbrella organization that creates numerous terrorist groups with the single aim of creating an environment of political instability conducive to a coup. Zaman has speculated that the Ergenekon network is organized around seven separate areas related to terrorism, economy, media, NGOs, armed groups, ethnic groups, and officials. To this extent, Today’s Zaman has reported that the group underwent restructuring in 1999, pointing to a document uncovered in Küçük’s house entitled “Ergenekon, Analysis, Restructuring, and Development.” However, all of these claims should be regarded as just that—claims. With little information about the investigation actually released by named, credible sources, media stories about the group’s activities can be given little weight until accompanied by further documentation.

Of those detained on July 1, only 10 have been formally arrested and the other 14 released. An indictment is expected to be released by the İstanbul Chief Prosecutor’s office some time in the coming days, but has continually been postponed. The indictment will not include those arrested on July 1, but is rumored to include 2500 pages of evidence outlining the nature of the Ergenekon investigation and spelling out its criminal activities. However, the indictment has continually been postponed due to reported problems entering text into the National Judiciary Network Project (UYAP). In the meantime, the prosecutor in charge of the Ergenekon investigation, Zekeriya Öz, continues to execute a very broad-based organization in a highly charged political climate. Öz is said to be facing numerous death threats and security for the prosecutor has been reported to be quite high. While Öz’s responsibility is no doubt massive, so is that of the government. Erdoğan increasingly sounds like a prosecutor in his sounding off against those who have criticized the investigation as political (click here for his response to equally idiotic comments coming from CHP leader Baykal). Others who have been critical of the investigation and AKP’s practice of leaking information to the media using unnamed sources have been labeled as aiding the terrorists. As of late, this includes much-respected Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, President of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB). Such critics have been charged with showing their true face. This “us” versus “them” mentality is likely to only heighten political tensions in Turkey and further polarize an already dangerously divided political society. It also stinks of McCarthyism and undermines the investigation and the legitimacy of AKP as a responsible political party intent to follow the rule of law and the provisions of due process. By leaking information to the press, AKP has done little but send the message to many in Turkey and the international community that it is nothing but yet another political party intent to compete for power by scoring political points by whatever means necessary. By not taking criticism of the investigation seriously and pointing fingers, AKP is strengthening arguments that it is out for little but political power.

Beyond this leaking of sources, the dramatic early morning hours chosen to pursue the arrests seem particularly excessive and unnecessary, and most importantly, so does the day Öz decided to execute the detentions. Occurring only a few hours before the first hearing of the closure case, the Ergenekon investigation lit up papers, allowing them to juxtapose the closure case against the shadowy, imposing plans of "deep state" figures determined to undermine Turkish democracy. This narrative is a nice fit within the larger AKP-orchestrated narrative, and while AKP's closure is no doubt a blow to democracy, so is the party's jeopardization of the legitimacy of a very important investigation. While it will probably never be proven that the party had a role in ordering the arrests in the hours before the closure, the appearance of such impropriety is reason enough for criticism. When combined with the source leaking, it becomes all the more valid. The move was also particularly unwise as it came in the twilight hours of a day in which Turkish markets were already especially vulnerable. If the conflict inherent in politics is to be properly institutionalized in Turkey, there is indeed much work to be done. If democracy is to ultimately prevail, the Ergenekon investigation must amount to much more than leaks and the scoring of political points, thereby eschewing what has long made politics little more than a spectators' game for far too many Turks. Many Turks are left wondering when democracy will ever come ("Ne zaman demokrasi gelecek?"). It seems an appropriate partial answer to this question lies in yet another: When will they (the elite—new or old) ever learn?

Attack on U.S. Consulate

This news reached me about 11am this morning, but there is not much known at this time. News on NTV is repeating the same thing over and over again. There were rumors that Syrian passports were found on the shooters, but this has been proven as false. From the New York Times:

Gunmen opened fire on Turkish security guards outside the United States Consulate in Istanbul on Wednesday, the Turkish authorities said, and at least three police officers and three assailants were killed in a brief gun battle. Officials said that a fourth assailant escaped.

The attack was the first on a diplomatic mission in the city since 2003, when 62 people were killed in assaults on the British Consulate, a bank and two synagogues. While the motives behind this attack were not immediately clear, Turkish and American officials said they considered it to be an act of terrorism.

“Turkey struggles and will struggle against the mentalities that organize and stand behind these attacks until the very end,” President Abdullah Gul said in a statement. “Everyone, after all, has seen that nothing can be achieved through terror.”

Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said Wednesday in a briefing, “The United States condemns the terrorist attack that took place on our consulate general in Istanbul earlier today.”

In a televised news conference, Istanbul’s governor, Muammer Guler, said one of the police officers died at the scene and two others died of bullet wounds in a hospital. One of the officers was part of the consulate security detail, while the other two were traffic police officers. Another police officer and a tow-truck driver were also wounded.

“Three policemen were martyred and three attackers were killed,” Mr. Guler said. He added later that, while the authorities were waiting for final confirmation of the identity of the assailants, all three were believed to be Turkish citizens. Ross Wilson, the United States ambassador in Turkey, said that none of the dead or wounded were Americans.

Later, the Turkish interior minister, Besir Atalay, said that two of the slain attackers had been identified by their fingerprints. Speaking to the Anatolian News Agency, he identified them as Erkan Kargin, 26, from the eastern town of Bitlis, and Cinar Bulent. Both, he said, had records of petty crime.

The NTV television channel identified a third assailant as Raif Topcil.

Turkish officials said they had the license plate number of the gunmen’s car and were tracing the car’s ownership. Security in the city was tight after the attack.

The consulate is a heavily fortified building with heavy security measures. Witnesses and news reports said that about 15 minutes before the attack, the three gunmen were seen sitting in a gray car with another man — apparently the driver — that was parked at a car wash near the consulate.

About 10:30 a.m., the three, who looked to be 25 to 30 years old, hopped out of the vehicle, walked up to a police post at the main entrance of the consulate and opened fire, taking the officers by surprise, witnesses said.

“One of them approached a policeman while hiding his gun and shot him in the head,” a witness, Yazuz Erket Yuksel, said in remarks reported by Reuters.

In the ensuing clash, two of the officers fired back, hitting all three of the attackers, who the authorities said were armed with handguns and a shotgun. One witness told Reuters that one of the men, after being wounded, shot and killed himself. The others apparently were killed by the policemen.

Istanbul’s chief prosecutor, Aykut Cengiz Engin, told reporters at a televised news conference that “a fourth person coming to the attack site has escaped in the car.”

Huseyin Tuzemen, another witness, was across the street from the consulate when the gunfire erupted.

“I was sitting at the cafe and there were suddenly some gunshots,” he said. “I lay on the ground. I didn’t see where the shots came from. I found myself in the fridge” of the cafe, terrified.

After the attack, crowds of onlookers and police officers milled around the 15-foot-high walls sheltering the American compound, and officers cordoned off the area. A helicopter was seen hovering above. Televised reports showed one body lying on the ground.

From the police post, visitors to the consulate usually walk up steps to the hilltop building, which some people say resembles a fortress.

The consulate was for many years located in the center of the city near Taksim Square. But after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, it was relocated five years ago to the Istinye area near the Bosporus Straits to better protect it from terrorist attacks.

Several consular officers were absent from the building at the time of the attack, attending a meeting run by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, which took place on a quiet side street lined with apartment houses.

According to news reports in Istanbul, the authorities said they had found potential links to an organization but would not provide further details. NTV said the authorities were looking at Al Qaeda as a possibility, but there was no confirmation of these reports. Mr. McCormack, when asked about the possibility of Qaeda involvement, said he had no information indicating that Al Qaeda had played a role but nothing to refute the idea, either.

Justice for Hrant?

The sixth hearing of those accused of assassinating Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink took place in İstanbul yesterday. The investigation into Dink's murder and the trial of the arrested suspects has put on display systemic problems in Turkey's judiciary. As I posted in January, the investigation has been long criticized as weak-willed and has hit a number of brick walls, including the destruction of evidence (see Jan. 24 post). The trial has been little better.

Acting as the trigger-man in what is likely a very wide-reaching conspiracy, Ogün Samast gunned down Dink outside of his office in January 2007. Samast was accompanied in the assassination by Yasin Hayal, a 26-year-old ultra-nationalist with links to shady paramilitary groups (possibly Ergenekon) and the youth branch of the ultra-nationalist Grand Unity Party (BBP), the Alperens. At the beginning of his testimony, Hayal declared: "Dear Muslims and dear Alperens [BBP ultranationalist youth organization], be relaxed. We will have this situation continue until the BBP comes to power." Apart from Hayal and Samast, six others continue to be detained. Most significant of these is Erhan Tuncel, who is suspected to have played a key role in the premeditated conspiracy. A total of nineteen people are being tried in Dink's murder, but only Hayal and Tuncel are facing life sentences.

Yesterday's hearing was the first open to the press since the assassin has been under the age of 18 at each of the previous hearings and it proved a circus. Reports of past closed hearings characterized the proceedings as chaotic, confusing, and even light-hearted. Some of the defendants have grinned at each other and testimony has bordered on the ridiculous. Public observation of the sixth hearing indicates that these reports have been true and highlights a serious problem in terms of the state's ability to carry out highly complex and politically sensitive trials. Among such criticisms is the fact that trials concerning the same case have not been combined and that a great deal of finger-pointing and bizarre evidence has been enabled and has served only to further obfuscate what actually happened. Further, several of those involved have been handled with impunity. The feebleness reflected in the Dink trial evidences how hard it will be to carry out the trial of the Ergenekon suspects.

The most troubling note to come out of today's testimony is that members of the gendarmerie, a branch of the Turkish Armed Forces, were informed about the plans to kill Dink and did nothing. Testimony from the assassin's uncle, Coşkun Iğcı, revealed that gendarmerie forces in Trabzon were repeatedly warned of the conspiracy. It has been suggested that the plot was also known by members of the İstanbul police. Sadly, the truth may never be known. However, in a positive development, the court did decide to broaden the investigation into Hayal and is seeking critical records that might reveal important information about Hayal's connections, a move that deepens the investigation.

In his column in Today's Zaman, Yavuz Baydar discusses the growing despair surrounding the case.

Başbuğ to Prove a More Apt Political Player

General İlker Başbuğ is by all intents and purposes set to replace current head of the Turkish General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt when the Supreme Military Council(YAS) meets in August to consider promotions and transfers. Although Erdoğan and Gül must approve his appointment, their objection would be quite unorthodox, and therefore, unexpected. Embroiled in the recent Ergenekon mess and the chaotic, sloppy media uproar surrounding the politicized investigation, Başbuğ has found himself in quite a difficult position. However, his cool handling of the situation suggests that he will be a much more apt political player than his hot-headed predecessor.

From Gareth Jenkins:

On July 2 General Ilker Basbug, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, issued a public statement calling for calm in the wake of the unprecedented wave of detentions of hard-line secularists on July 1, in which a number of high-ranking retired military personnel were taken into custody (see EDM, July 1).

“Turkey is going through difficult days,” Basbug told reporters. “We must all show common sense, remain calm and behave coolly and responsibly” (Milliyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Yeni Safak, July 3).

Basbug bluntly refuted media speculation that in a meeting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had warned him in advance that the police were planning to detain high-ranking military personnel, such as former gendarmerie commander General Sener Eruygur and former First Army commander General Hursit Tolon. “I want to be very clear about this. The issue was not raised in any form at the meeting,” said Basbug (Milliyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Yeni Safak, July 3).

. . . .

Basbug is widely regarded within the military as one of the most able officers of his generation. After graduating from infantry school in 1963, he served in variety of positions both in Turkey and abroad, including two postings to NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. A fluent English speaker, he is renowned within the military for his calculated calmness even under intense pressure; unlike the more volatile Buyukanit, who during his two year command sometimes appears to have allowed his heart to rule his head and has issued emotional, poorly prepared public statements condemning the AKP. Like most senior members of the TGS, Basbug shares Buyukanit’s hard-line interpretation of secularism and has frequently expressed concern that the AKP is committed to its eventual erosion.

The detentions of July 1 have thus left Basbug in a dilemma. The vast majority of the members of the Turkish officer corps will have interpreted the detentions, and particularly the manner in which they were conducted, as a direct assault by the AKP-controlled Interior Ministry on the military as an institution. There was already a degree of restlessness among some hard-liners in the military at Buyukanit’s failure to combat the AKP, particularly after the failure of his attempt in 2007 to prevent AKP foreign minister from being appointed President of Turkey. Consequently, Basbug would have been expected to issue a public statement condemning the July 1 detentions, but if the statement were too harsh, he could have presented the AKP with an excuse to veto his appointment as chief of the TGS in August.

Even before the July 1 detentions, AKP supporters had already launched a defamation campaign against Basbug (see EDM, June 18); as they also did in 2006 to try to prevent Buyukanit from being appointed chief of staff. It is an alarming indication of the continuing depth of anti-Semitism in Turkey that in each case the most damning calumny they could level at the generals was to imply that they were Jewish. Neither is.

Basbug’s statement of July 2 was a typically measured response at a time when emotions would have been running extremely high in the TGS: he combined a call for calm with a concise rebuttal of rumors being spread by the Islamist media, while avoiding saying anything inflammatory that could give the AKP grounds to veto his appointment. The statement was also a further indication that if he is formally appointed in August, Basbug will prove, from the perspective of the AKP, a considerably more formidable opponent than his predecessor.

Just When Will Closure Come?

From BIA-Net:

Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek and Deputy Chairperson of AKP’s Parliamentary Group Bekir Bozdağ presented to the members of the Constitutional Court the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) oral defense for the closure case.

The procedure started yesterday morning (July 3) and lasted until 18.00 with a lunch break in between. Commenting about the presentation at the end, Çiçek said, “We explained why this case should have not been filed at the first place through arguments based on the Constitution, the Turkish legal system and the international conventions.”

Çiçek declined to give information about the content of the defense, adding that they would wait for court’s decision.

Oral defense

Based on the newspaper reports, Çiçek stressed the following arguments in the oral defense: “There were confuted disclaimed news reports in the indictment”, “the indictment had false information” and “the indictment included baseless allegations.”

AKP’s defense made use of the Constitutional Court’s latest verdict in the closure case of the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR). The defense also stated that the Chief Prosecutor wanted a type of deputy who is completely subservient to everything.

The oral defense also gave a detailed account AKP’s accomplishments in its six year long rule in various areas from health to women’s rights. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is on trial for being the center of the activities against secularism.

Now the Constitutional Court rapporteur Osman Can will collect all the information and the documents about the case and write his report about the substance of the case. While these procedures are taking place, both the Chief Prosecutor and the AKP will be able to present additional evidence or written additional defense.

The report will be presented to the eleven members of the Constitutional Court, President of the Court Haşim Kılıç will determine a meeting day, on which the members will start discussing the matter of substance of the case.

The eleven member court will make the final decision. In case one of the members is missing or retired, the most senior of the four alternate members will replace the missing member.

According to the Constitution a qualified majority is needed to close a political party. Therefore 7 out of 11 members of the Constitutional Court must approve the closure. According to article 69 of the Constitution, the court may decide to cut the treasury aid to the AKP either partially or completely rather than closing the party permanently. (EÜ/NZ/TB)

Very few observers still think it is possible that the Court will dismiss the closure case or merely cut treasury aid. After Can's report is issued, a decision will be expected soon after and all of this could happen as early as August. As before said, the real question is not so much of AKP's closure, but how the court will treat the 71 politicians who are faced with political bans (see June 17 post).

Ties Deepen Between Turkey and Iran

From John C.K. Daly at the Eurasia Daily Monitor:

The United States has maintained various sanctions against Iran since 1979, implemented in aftermath of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. As relations worsen between the U.S. and Iran, Washington is seeking to have the United Nations Security Council impose additional sanctions on Iran for its nuclear enrichment activities, which Tehran insists are legal, entirely peaceful, and intended for generating electricity.

Among the sanctions that most concern foreign energy companies and nations is the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), renewed in 2001, which provides for punitive measures against entities that invest more than $20 million annually in the Iranian oil and gas sectors.

Many countries are deeply ambivalent toward the U.S. policy, none more so than Turkey, which imports 90 percent of its energy needs. Now Ankara is pushing the limits by increasing its natural gas purchases from Iran and considering possible involvement in developing the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. On July 29 Iranian Petroleum Minister Qolam Hosein Nozari said in Tehran that Turkey and Iran were negotiating over Turkey being a transit corridor for Iranian natural gas exports to Europe and that Iran would provide increased amounts of natural gas to Turkey during the winter (Anadolu Ajansi, June 30). According to Nozari, the pipeline, which would run from Iran’s South Pars natural gas and oil fields to the border province of Bazargan, was discussed during the OPEC summit held on June 22 in Jeddah (Tehran Times, June 29). Even worse for administration officials seeking to sustain and intensify the U.S. sanctions regime, Nozari said, “We have also spoken about the participation of Turkey in the development of phases 14 and 23 of the South Pars field” (Hurriyet, June 30).

Baydemir Acquitted in Brochure Trial

A victory for common sense . . .

From BIA-Net:

The 2nd Court of First Instance of Diyarbakır acquitted Osman Baydemir, Diyarbakır mayor, and Yurdusev Özsökmenler, Bağlar mayor, who were on trial for printing a brochure both in Kurdish and Zaza languages. The prosecutor was asking for up to two years in prison.

The court did not construe as criminal the brochures that were printed in Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza languages to inform the citizens about the cleaning campaigns of June 2007.

The brochure that said “leave your garbage by the door in the evening” was put on trial
Following the investigation permission by Abdülkadir Aksu, the Minister of Interior, the State Council had started the trial process in spite of the objections by the two mayors.

Baydemir, Özsökmenler and four more municipality workers were taken to the court for the crimes of being in opposition to the Law on the Acceptance and Application of Turkish Letters and the misconduct in office. The trial resulted in acquittal on June 27.

Muharrem Erbey, Baydemir’s lawyer, reminded that the brochure simply told those who did not know Turkish to how to prepare their garbage for the municipality workers. Reaching the decisions that there was nothing criminal in the brochures, the court acquitted the accusers.

For more on the state's treatment of the Kurdish language, see Feb. 18 post and March 10 post.

The Letter "W"

Bad news on the Kurdish front . . .

Also, from BIA-Net (article by Erhan Üstündağ):

A German citizen child whose father is a political refugee was not allowed to enter Turkey because of the W letter in his name and sent back to Germany.

Submitting a motion of question, on June 15, the Democratic Society Party deputy Akın Birdal asked the authorities to explain the reason behind this action.

Although the seven year old Welat was sent back to Germany by plane, his mother Yadigar D. and her two other kids were allowed to enter the country.

There is no “forbidden name”

According to the Turkish Census Law that was in effect until 2006, the newborn could not be given names that were “not appropriate to our national culture, our code of ethics and our traditions or injures the public opinion.”

At that period, the Turkish Language Society (TDK) had prepared a “list of forbidden names”. There were 23 names on the list. Demonstrations were organized to protest this arrangement which was essentially targeted the Kurdish names.

In 2003, a new regulation, which was set up for the adaptation to the European Union, restricted the name banning only to those cases that offended the public morality, but added to this a requirement of “suitability to the Turkish alphabet.” Thus, the letters Q,W, X were banned and names that included these letters.

There is no restriction regarding the names in the Census Law and the related regulation that went into effect in 2006.

On the other hand, the Chief of Staff asked its institutions not to use the letters Q, W and X.

The Implementation is against the Convention on the Rights of the Child
The 8th article of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (ÇHS) states the following:

“1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.

2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.”

The 30th article of the Convention about which Turkey expressed a reservation is:

“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.”

One of the changes made during the reform revolution that followed Helsinki was law that allowed for the right of parents to give their children Kurdish names. The EU was key to the implementation of this law and Ankara had to be firm in ensuring that local authorities followed the new law. However, as the BIA-Net article notes, the law was not so comprehensive as to assure the right to use names with "Q," "W," and "X."

Sex, the State, and Discrimination Against Women and Children

The sentencing of a 16-year old girl for the rape of a 13-year old boy after the two children engaged in a sexual relationship that resulted in the girl's pregnancy raises important questions about children's rights in Turkey and discrimination against women and children. Despite significant revisions to the Penal Code in 2004, sexual relations between children aged 15 to 18 years is still a crime and children can be treated as adults in judicial proceedings. This is a violation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, to which Turkey is a state-party. Under the convention, all children under 18 should be considered as such under Turkish law. In addition to the judicial proceedings against the 16-year old child, criticism also includes coverage of the case by the Turkish media. From BIA-Net:

Acting irresponsibly, the media turns a sexual relation between two children into a rape by a woman of a boy.

Radikal: Prison sentence for the woman who raped a man.

Star: A woman was sentenced for raping a man

Akşam: First time in Turkey, a woman is sentenced for raping.

The media reality: What do you understand from these headlines? The newspapers attached importance to the fact that a woman was sentenced for the crime of rape. They sound like they are happy about this “first”. The judiciary must have made an important decision.

The reality: Two kids of ages 13 and 16 had a sexual relationship. The girl got pregnant. When the parents of the boy, who is younger than the girl, made a complaint, the Court of Boyabat sentenced the girl for the crime for the sexual exploitation of children. The case is appealed.

The news of the reality: The judiciary violated the children rights. Those for defending rights had objected in 2005 to the age discriminations in the new penal code and said that this would cause problems. According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, everyone under eighteen is a child. The experts had emphasized that even the games that help form the sexual identities of the children were considered as crime in the new penal code.

Most recently, the topic was brought to the attention of the public when a German boy was arrested in Antalya for sexually harassing an English girl was taken to the court. Seda Akça, a lawyer and a defender of rights, had stated that sexual relations between hildren should not have included in the penal code. These children need to be taken out of the penal system, to be supported and protected.

The justice system discriminate. The court stated in the justification of its decision that hiding the pregnancy was indicative of guilty psychology. In other words, she had to be guilty since she hid her pregnancy.

The news of the media reality: The media is a rights violator. Even though the names of the children were not printed, the name of the school they went was published and therefore their identities were revealed. This is against the media law. This news was aired by Ankara News Agency.

The media is male-dominated and ignorant of the children rights. According to them, children become man and woman when they are in a sexual relation. The “rapist” girl was made a woman and the boy a “raped boy”. In fact, in some newspapers, it was a woman who raped a boy.

Conclusion: It is the responsibility of the journalists and the judiciary personnel to learn about the children rights, to be able to approach these issues from the perspective of the children and to implement these principles.

What Happened at Dağlıca?

On June 20 and 25, Taraf published news that the General Staff had information about the attacks that took place on Turkish troops near Dağlıca in October. The attacks left 13 dead and eight captured following a PKK attack. The Dağlıca affair has been quite controversial as the eight captures involved in the incident were put on trial last December following their negotiated release. For background, see Feb. 5 post.

From BIA-Net:

The Turkish General Staff made an announcement on its internet site regarding the articles “Action Plan” and “Dağlıca ambush was reported nine days before it took place”, both of which were published in the newspaper Taraf on June 20 and June 25, respectively.

In Dağlıca ambush thirteen soldiers were killed and eight were captured by PKK.

The complete text of General Staff’s announcement is as follows:

1. The attrition campaign against the Turkish Armed Forces by certain circles for some time has increased its intensity recently with attacks through the media institutions, including the internet. It is realized that these multidimensional and systematic activities against the Turkish Armed Forces will continue and therefore they are watched closely.

2. In this respect, a daily newspaper published a news article on June 20, 2008, about a document claimed to be an Information Support Plan prepared by the General Staff.

3. Although the said news article was denied by the General Staff with a press release on the same day, it was interesting that some media institutions interpreted the expression that “There is no such an official document or plan that was approved by the command structure in the records” as there was such a plan outside the command structure. Such an interpretation shows that the Turkish Armed Forces is not known at all. The methods and the manner the plans are prepared in Turkish Armed Forces with long-established tradition of discipline and headquarter work culture is very clear.

4. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO SUCH A PLAN IN TURKISH ARMED FORCES. It shows clearly how ethic, democratic and legal the mentality that produced this plan and laid the responsibility of it on the General Staff or accept every document that reach them as accurate is.

5. On the other hand, the question by another newspaper on June 25, 2008, that “Then, is this plan prepared by the Army, without the knowledge of the General Staff?” is a clear example of an irresponsible behavior and a baseless attack on its commanders. We leave the determination of how appropriate it is from the perspective of media ethic to publish such an article before the subject is clarified as far as its supporting arguments are concerned to the public.

6. The newspaper which brought up the alleged Information Support Plan also published on June 25, 2008, a “SECRET” message by a command post about the activities of a PKK-KONGRA-GEL terror organization and claimed that although it was warned in this document that an attack on Dağlıca was planned, no measures were taken.

The published message was a real document, whose function was to warn all the units that were under the said threat. Evaluating the received information, turning it into an intelligence report and publishing it as a warning is a standard procedure within the Turkish Armed Forces. In fact, with this warning, the security measures within the units in this area were increased. These units in Dağlıca area showed the necessary reaction and prevented the treacherous attack from reaching its real target. It is a matter of great concern that such provoking perspectives are expressed while the judiciary process is continuing.

Leaking out a “SECRET” military document and publishing it is an illegal act and the matter is transferred to the courts. An institutional investigation was conducted and those responsible for leaking out this document were determined and the legal procedure against them began.

7. The Turkish Armed Forces realizes that it is facing an organized wretched attack by certain circles. The Turkish Armed Forces is taking the necessary measures against these attacks that are bound to be unsuccessful. The legal organs and the infallible justice of the Turkish people are the biggest assurances of the Turkish Armed Forces against such attacks. As always, our biggest support is the endless love and trust our beloved nation has for the Turkish Armed Forces.

Respectfully presented to the public.

To see coverage from the Turkish Daily News, click here. For the story in Today's Zaman, click here.