Progress on the Domestic Violence Front

Turkey has signed a new Council of Europe convention to prevent and combat violence against women. As documented by a report released by Human Rights Watch earlier this month, Turkey has been plagued by domestic violence over the years thanks in part to problems implementing existing law. Turkey pushed very hard for the Convention to be opened for signatures at the Council's recent ministerial meeting. From Hurriyet Daily News:

Reaching a consensus proved difficult as many countries expressed resistance to the far-reaching provisions of the convention, but Turkey adopted a negotiation position based on international standards, Acar told the Hürriyet Daily News in an interview.

“We did not hide behind any cultural, economic or political pretexts and we resisted those who wanted to water down the stipulations,” she added.

The convention is revolutionary in the sense that it accepts violence against women as a human-rights violation, according to Acar. “This is very important, because violence against women will no longer be seen as a social problem. This will strengthen women’s demands for access to judicial recourse as well as protection,” she said.

Also important is the fact that the convention has endorsed a wide-ranging definition of “violence,” Acar added.

“Violence is not only physical. It can be economic or psychological; stalking is, for instance, a type of violence,” she said. The convention also includes violence against immigrant women, a measure that was resisted by some countries.

The convention covers what are called “the 4 Ps”: prevention, protection, prosecution and policy.

“The fourth P is especially important for Turkey, since we lack an integrated policy on gender equality. This convention will be known as the Istanbul convention and that way Turkey will be known as a country championing the cause of combating violence against women,” Acar told the Daily News.

“Just as we endorsed a zero-tolerance policy on preventing torture, we need to endorse zero tolerance on violence against women. In this sense, this convention will be a new driving force for Turkish domestic efforts,” she said. “Because we really need a mentality change, especially as far as implementation is concerned. All the judges, prosecutors, police and health officials will have to be trained. And for that Turkey needs to ratify the convention as soon as possible to set a good example as well.”

And more from Bianet:

Some 20 to 25 percent of women across the European region suffer physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives, according to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Convention.

The convention is the first legally binding instrument in the region that creates a comprehensive legal framework to combat violence against women through prevention, protection, prosecution, and victim support. It defines and criminalizes multiple forms of violence against women: physical, sexual and psychological violence, as well as forced marriage and female genital mutilation. The treaty also establishes an international group of independent experts to monitor its implementation at the national level.

The Convention addresses gaps in domestic violence legislation and implementation, such as weak laws, bad implementation of protection laws, lack of coordination, lack of access to justice, low funding for domestic violence responses, lack of shelters, and lack of prevention measures.

To implement the convention, countries will establish hotlines, shelters, medical and forensic services, counseling, as well as legal aid.

Progress at the top to be sure, but real change, of course, will be shown from below and Turkey's willingness and effectiveness to ensure that police officers and other state agents responsible for protecting women follow legal guidelines.

Erdogan Defensive on Threshold Issue

The question of Turkey's high 10% electoral threshold came up again on Wednesday when Prime Minister Erdogan spoke at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). The Council of Europe recommended in January 2010 that Council members adopt a 3-5% threshold. When a PACE parliamentarian asked the prime minister why Turkey had such a high percentage, Erdogan became pointedly defensive. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The question brought a stinging response from the Turkish leader, who said the 10 percent election threshold was determined by the Turkish people’s will, rather than the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP.

“The 10 percent threshold is not determined by my party, we also came [to power] with this threshold. We established our party and managed to come to power 16 months later,” he said, impyling that the threshold was no barrier to becoming elected.

Lowering the 10 percent threshold is not a matter of democracy, according to Erdoğan.

“We will lower the threshold when the time comes, but we will do this by asking our people, not you,” Erdoğan said.

Russia, at 7 percent, is the only other European country approaching Turkey’s 10 percent threshold.

Germany and Belgium have thresholds of 5 percent each; Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia all have thresholds of 4 percent; Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden have 3 percent; Spain, Greece, Romania and Ukraine have 2 percent; Denmark has 0.67 percent, while the Netherlands merely requires parties to win 1/150 of the votes cast to enter parliament.

Although the practices varied widely, the report said the general application was around 4 to 5 percent.

Studying Turkey, the report analyzed 2002 general election data and noted that only two political parties succeeded in passing the 10 percent threshold. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, gained 66.9 percent of the seats even though it won only 34.2 percent of the votes, while the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, gained 33.1 percent of the seats with 19.5 percent of the votes.

As such, 46.3 of the votes were not represented in Parliament in the wake of the 2002 elections, the report said.

“More than half the electorate was deprived of representation and those parties that were elected had a percentage of seats twice that of their percentage of votes, [meaning] that a proportional system became a majority one,” the report said.

For the Council's full report and recommendations, click here. While the CHP and BDP have supported lifting the threshold, the AKP has resisted. Whether to raise or lift the threshold is, of course, a matter of politics. Lifting the threshold would cost the AKP the super-majority it hopes to land in the parliament in June elections while the BDP and AKP would stand to benefit from the AKP's loss. One would expect the MHP to also get on board the threshold issue given that it stands to lose the most should it not reach the the threshold in June. The BDP subverts the threshold by running independent candidates, and then forming a parliamentary group after their election.


UPDATE I (4/18) -- State Minister and EU Chief Negotiator Egeman Bagis defended the threshold yesterday using Israel as a counter-example while speaking on a TV program. “In Israel, they have a foreign minister who flushes the toilet as he speaks on radio . . . . The guy in his youth was a nightclub bodyguard in Moldova. He still thinks of himself as one and cannot pass on to being a statesman. Israel’s foreign policy has been entrusted to this man because they don’t have an election threshold.”

Lausanne and Beyond: The Council of Europe and Greeks in Turkey

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Earlier this month, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc met with religious leaders, including Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew, Chief Rabbi of Turkey Ishak Haleva, Armenian Archbishop Aram Ateşyan, Syrian Orthodox Archbishop Yusuf Çetin and Simon Zazadze, who represented the Catholic Georgian Church. At a press conference following the meeting, Arinc averred that the government will move to amend Turkey's laws to allow the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary at Heybeli Island to be re-opened. The seminary was opened in 1844, but closed in 1971. The Greek Orthodoz Patriarchate has long argued that its re-opening is essential to the preservation of the church (see Jan. 10 post), and this was not the first time that government officials have made promises to re-open the seminary (see June 30 post). However, Arinc's statement might be more than a bit premature. Soon after Arinc's remarks, Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesperson Cemil Cicek said, "The Turkish constitution and related regulations do not make the opening of private religious schools possible. If you are going to introduce new rules regarding human rights and freedoms, you need to do it for all groups equally."

In addition to opening up Halki, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate seeks recognition of its ecumenical status, which Turkey has long denied. For Turkey, the Patriarchate represents Turkey's now tiny Greek minority (estimated at between 2,000-4,000 people). The Constitutional Court has blocked past efforts to recognize the Patriarchate as the ecumenical representative of the entire Greek Orthodox Church, and a local court has recently held the same finding in a decision that the Venice Commission declared this month to be inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights, namely Article 9 pertaining to freedom of religion. The issue of Halki and recongizing the Patriarchate as ecumenical all comes down to the Lausanne Treaty, which set up relations between Turkey, Greece, and their minorities at Turkey's founding in 1923.

At the heart of any reform is Lausanne's status in both Turkish and Greek law. In a bold and diplomatic resolution passed this January, the Parliamentary Committee of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on both Greece and Turkey to eschew Lausanne and recognize the supremacy of the European Convention of Human Rights as the appropriate framework in which to make policies related to minorities and minority rights. Arguing Lausanne to be outdated, the resolution calls on Turkey and Greece to deal with minorities as citizens of equal status and to drop the constant rhetoric of reciprocity (in line with Lausanne) inherent in both countries' discourses. Minorities in both Turkey and Greece have long fallen victim to the 1923 treaty, legal arguments both states have make about reciprocity going something like this: Greece treats their Turkish minority in Thrace badly, and so Turkey must as well, and vice-versa.

Bianet does an excellent job of laying out Turkey's homework on minority rights as given to it by the PACE. Importantly, the inclusion of criticism of Greece strengthened the reception of PACE's report, making it both palpatable and welcome to some Turkish politicians, policymakers, and opinion leaders. (In contrast, see the European Parliament's one-way criticism of Turkey in regard to Cyprus, which Hurriyet Daily News reported side-by-side with the PACE resolution. See also Feb. 17 post.)

Also passed by the PACE in January was the report, “Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for Mon-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace [Eastern Greece]," of French parliamentarian Michel Hunault. The report follows a tour of Turkey some visitors of PACE made in June of last year. Soon after the report was released, Turkey's Ambassador to the European Union Volkan Bozkir headed a 12-member delegation comprised of members from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and local officials that met with Greek community leaders. Because of the continued importance of Lausanne, issues involving Turkey's Greek minority are handled by the Foreign Ministry, one of many recommendations the Venice Commission has said needs to be changed.

The most recent Council of Europe action -- the opinion by the Venice Commission -- follows January's PACE resolution and Hunault's report. Significantly, the report analyzes the legal dimensions of the Treaty of Lausanne and, though stating its subordinance to the European Convention on Human Rights, finds no legal basis in Lausanne by which Turkey can justify its refusal to recognize the Patriarchate as ecumenical. Whether the Commission's decision will help the government change current law and navigate around exisiting Turkish case law on the subject remains to be seen, but its unequivocal statement that Lausanne does not limit the Turkish government from recognizing Bartholomew's title will not ring weakly in the ears of those who are listening, however limited their number. From the Commission's opinion as relayed by Today's Zaman:

“The argument appears to be that the Patriarchate was only allowed to remain in Istanbul on the condition that it would shed its ecumenical status. This argument cannot be supported for several reasons,” it said, listing those reasons: “First, even assuming that there was a conflict between the ECHR and the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty the latter does not prevail over the first … Second, there is nothing on the ‘ecumenical’ nature of the Patriarchate in the provisions of the treaty itself, which do not mention the Patriarchate at all … Third, recourse to the preparatory work of the Lausanne Treaty or the circumstances of its conclusion as supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) do not lead to a different conclusion.” The commission concluded, “The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne therefore in no way limits the right of the Patriarchate to use the title ‘ecumenical’.”

The Venice Commission's "Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to use the Adjective 'Ecumenical,'" is not limited to the Patriarch, but the Greek minority in Turkey as a whole, and came at the behest of the PACE following the visit by the PACE delegation last June. For the full opinion, click here.

CORRECTION (3/22) -- Halki was shut down in 1971 following a Constitutional Court decision that annulled sections of the law governing private universites. All private universities were faced with either nationalization or closure . The Patriarchate chose not to nationalize and the seminary closed.


UPDATE I (3/25) -- Deputy Prime Minister Huseyin Celik discusses the persecution of Greeks and the status of the Patriarchate in an interview with Today's Zaman. He also questions the Greek Turks status as a minority under Lausanne.

Serious injustices were done to all these groups during the single-party era in Turkey; however, the injustices done to the non-Muslims were more severe. The wealth tax was a disgrace. The closure of the Greek seminary was a great shame. The Sept. 6-7 incidents were an inhumane conspiracy that humiliated Turkey in the eyes of the world. The alienated villagers were unable to enter Ankara’s city center until 1946. The violation of the rights of the humiliated Alevis, Kurds and the pious have continued until today.

. . . .

We have been having ‘ecumenical’ debates for a long time. Is Bartholomew ecumenical or not? It’s none of our business. Why do Muslims debate the world leader of the Orthodox community, why do they want to be decision-makers regarding this issue? Let the Orthodox community decide on this. If they see İstanbul Fener Patriarch Bartholomew as ecumenical, do we have any right to debate this as nnon-Orthodox people? Let the Orthodox people decide of their own free will.

. . . .

In my view, none of our 72 million citizens should be treated as a minority,” Çelik said. Indicating that believers of the three monotheistic religions along with many other religious communities lived in peace during the Ottoman Empire, Çelik said the state approached all religions and beliefs with tolerance back then. “The slogan that reflected this in the Ottoman Empire was ‘Diversity in unity,’ a slogan which is now promoted by the Council of Europe. The two cultures met at the same point centuries later.

I wonder if this interview would have run in Zaman (the Turkish edition) . . .

Council of Europe Enables Homophobia

Demonstrators outside of Galatasaray Lisesi mark their concern for the safety of members of the LGBT community following the deaths of five people in the last two months. PHOTO from KaosGL

Though the AKP government has won the support of many Turkish liberals (though this support has diminished in recent years), on LGBT rights the AKP government lags far behind European standards. This is not news. However, what is news is what many liberals perceive as the Council of Europe's kow-tailing to Turkish conservatives. The Hurriyet Daily News' Kristen Stevens has an op/ed in English:

To suit the Turkish government’s intolerance for gay people, the Council of Europe has changed its declaration of children’s rights to allow state discrimination that puts lives at risk. The threats the council was trying to eliminate just grew bigger.

The text in question from the Council of Europe’s declaration of children’s rights said: “Currently, the family [is a concept] composed of different lifestyles, and children in Europe grow up in family forms that can change during the life of children.”

No, no, Turkey says, not gays; if you’re saying that gays are part of families with children, we have to ask you to change Europe’s version of children’s rights… Alas, that’s what happened this week.

The declaration now includes the phrase: “These family forms change from one country to another.” Do they? The whole point of the declaration was to support kids whose parents might be shunned by certain countries and societies.

. . . .

This unnecessary protest is not only discriminatory but also exacerbates a current climate of violence against people with sexual orientations outside the mainstream. Homophobia has led to murder in a number of cases in Turkey. Last Tuesday in Istanbul someone broke into a transgender woman’s apartment, killing her by slitting her throat and stabbing her 17 times. At least eight transgender people have been killed in Istanbul and Ankara since November 2008.

Covering the Gay Pride Parade for the Associated Press in Jerusalem a few years ago, I watched an Ultra-Orthodox Jewish man stab a father and a young woman. The Ultra-Orthodox mayor had spoken against the “immorality” of the parade, no doubt galvanizing this man and others to attack marchers throughout the day.

Turkey issued a statement this week, saying: “We do not accept gay marriages and we also do not accept the institution of homosexual family parenting.” Selma Aliye Kavaf, the minister responsible for families and women, said she informed the Council of Europe about Turkey’s “sensitivity on the different forms of families” and that they made the “necessary changes.” Was there anything necessary about this?

Shame on the council. Kids can’t reject or exchange gay parents for straight ones; they only suffer when separated from them. Children in Turkey without parents can only hope that they will be taken in by loving parents, gay or straight. By law, the state can remove them from the parents or deny them inheritance.

The Turkish Council of State has ruled that homosexuals should not have custody of children, but it is not a must under the law. It is precisely children in this gray area that the Council of Europe aimed to protect. Instead they have failed them.

Furthermore, at Turkey’s urging, the Council of Europe has undermined its very existence by adding: “The relevant articles will be evaluated under the framework of national regulations.”

For a press statement from Lambdaistanbul (in Turkish), click here. See also Lambaistanbul's Ecem Dalga and Bora Bengisu's interview on the recent murders in Milliyet (in Turkish). See also this story from the Hurriyet Daily News on the challenges faced by LGBT women, including another interview (this one in English) with Dalga.

Squaring Off on Constitutional Amendments, Part II

In a luncheon meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan on Wednesday, Hurriyet Daily News' Fulya Ozerkan reported that EU ambassadors were planning to make it clear to the leader of Turkey's parliament that a new constitution is needed in order for Turkey to accede. The AKP is currently considering amending 22 articles of the existing military constitution, which was largely forced on the Turkish public in the violent years following the September 12, 1980 coup.

An anonymous diplomat told Hurriyet, "Even if Turkey solves all its problems, it still needs a new constitution. Turkey cannot become an EU member with its current Constitution." While overhauling the constitution is no easy task, the AKP seems to be taking a more piecemeal approach. However, while it is still unclear what the 22 amendments the AKP will propose, some have suggested the AKP is planning a larger overhaul. In either case, the AKP has introduced legisltion that would reduce the waiting time needed to hold a referendum on constitutional amendments from 120 days to 45 days, which is necessary since any amendment to the constitution is likely to be challenged at the Constitutional Court. If the amendment is approved in a popular referendum before the Constitutional Court has the chance to reject it as violating the first four articles of the Constitution, it will be much more difficult for the Court to act.

A Little Background

The AKP has two options for making amendments: to pass legislation with the 2/3 vote of the parliament, which means getting 367 deputies when the AKP has only 338 seats; or, to go to referendum, which requires 330 votes and a simple majority of Turkish voters. The Kurdish-oriented Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has 20 seats and is likely to support amendments, as well as some members of the Democratic Left Party (DSP). However, even with these parties' support, the AKP will need to seek votes in the MHP or, an even greater ong shot, the CHP, to pass anything. Given the recalcitrance of the MHP and the CHP, a referendum seems the only shot. And, so here is the question: can opposition parties challenge the constitutional amendments by filing to have them annulled at the Constitutional Court should they be approved in referendum? Legal scholars disagree, and should opposition parties get the 110 MPs needed to petition the Constitutional Court to annul the amendment, there will be a legal showdown of epic proportions.

Since CHP has proved completely recalcitrant to any amendment of the constitution whatsoever, such a showdown seems likely unless the AKP passes a constitutional package that is able to win the support of the MHP, allowing it to take the first option and eschew a referendum altogether. However, plenty of reformers and long-time advocates for a new constitution think the AKP should adopt an "all-or-nothing" approach, and the EU seems to agree. The AKP has twice now made plans for a re-write of the constitution, and twice now has not followed through. President Gul has voiced his opinion that the government missed a historic chance in 2007 and early 2008, and those who have just the slightest bit of optimism left in tact hope that Turkey will again put a new constitution and see it through.

To this end, SETA-DC recently organized an event in which constitutional expert Saadet Yuksel, Istanbul University, discussed the design, adoption, and successful implementation of a new constitution. Yuksel argues that past attempts have been flawed, failing to get much input from civil society groups or seek consensus in Turkish society at large. Her entire speech can be accessed through the link above.

Echoing frustration from Europe, Gianni Buquicchio, the new president of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, gave an interview with Today's Zaman consistent with the views of the European Union ambassadors who met Erdogan this week. Buquicchio expressed his dismay that Turkey had not moved forward with a new constitution, and urged Turkish leaders to apply to the advisory institution for advice on what a new constitution may look like. Additionally, the Turkish president-elect of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has also called for a new constitution. Of course, Turkey seeking out a cooperative relationship on constitution making would lend power to nationalists bent on maintaining the status quo, but when these parties are opposed to even the smallest of progressive changes, why not seek out expert advice, design a solid document, seek broad input and consensus throughout Turkish society, and finally bring a new legal basis to the security of Turkish democracy to facilitate its consolidation? It is no easy process, but whoever said democracy is easy.


UPDATE I (2/15) -- In regard to the Venice Commission, I thought it approproate post the Commission's 2009 opinion on the Political Parties Law, which it found to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Şener Trial Raises More Questions About Press Freedom

Nedim Şener, a columnist for Milliyet, faces a 28 year sentence for publishing a book documenting negligence of municipal police, the gendarmerie, and the Turkish secret service prior to the murder of rant Dink in January 2007. Şener's book, The Dink Murder and Intelligence Lies, was published in January, after which a police officer working in in the intelligence unit in Trabzon filed a complaint against Şener alleging the journalist had violated Turkish law by "targeting personnel in service of fighting terrorism, obtaining secret documents, disclosing secret documents, violating the secrecy of communication and attempting to influence fair trial." From Hürriyet:

After the investigation’s end, Prosecutor Selim Berna Altay charged Şener with "making targets of the personnel in service of fighting terrorism, and obtaining and declaring secret information that is forbidden to be declared," asking for a prison term of 20 years. Since they do not fall under his authority, Altay sent the dossier on "violation of the secrecy of communication" and "attempting to influence fair trial" to the Istanbul Second Court. In the meantime, it was also claimed the book contained the offense of "insulting governmental institutions," and that too was added to the second investigation. Prosecutor İsmail Onaran handled this investigation and filed a second case against Şener asking for his imprisonment for three to eight years.

Ogün Samast, the man charged with pulling the trigger in the Dink murder, faces a 20 year sentence by comparison. Some of the intelligence officers who have been made plaintiffs in the case against Şener are facing charges in relation to their negligence in the Dink murder in Trabzon.

The Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has condemned the trial as a violation of press freedom guaranteed in OSCE countries. In a letter to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Miklos Haraszti, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, asked Turkish authorities to drop the charges.

Şener is prosecuted in defiance of freedoms that both OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards grant to critical publications . . . . What he did was critically assess the events leading up to Hrant Dink's murder, and the deficiencies afterwards in the handling of the case and in the prosecution of the perpetrators.

Şener faces charges of violating state secrecy laws -- which he denies, claiming information he attained can be accessed via the Internet -- and for attempting to influence the judiciary, a charge under the Turkish Penal Code that has been levelled against numerous dissidents of state action. Milliyet editor Sedat Ergin has stood solidly beside Şener throughout the proceedings.

Yigal Schleifer writes

Although Şener may not be convicted, the fact that a prosecutor decided to press ahead with the case is very troubling, the message of the prosecution appearing to be that even publishing the truth can be a punishable offense. The case also serves as another indication that, despite training programs for prosecutors and judges and efforts at reform, Turkey's judiciary main concern remains protecting the state and its institutions, rather than safeguarding the rights of individuals.

Turkey and the ICC

The Parliamentary Council of Europe (PACE) issued a resolution yesterday calling on Turkey to sign and ratify the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Turkey is among eight of 48 Council of Europe countries -- including the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Monaco -- not to have ratified the Rome Statute. The resolution also urges all Council of Europe countries to fully cooperate with the ICC, addressing specific obligations States Parties have in so doing.

German MP Dr. Herta Daubler-Gmelin, chair of the Legal and Human Rights Committee of PACE, spearheaded the resolution alongside a report documenting the progress the ICC dossier has made in a number of Council of Europe countries, especially Turkey and the Czech Republic. MPs from Turkey endorsed the resolution, which also called on the United States, as an observer in the Council, and Israel, as an observer in PACE, to sign and ratify the Rome Statute.

Although ratification of the Rome Statute is not included in the Copenhagen Criteria, the ICC is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Turkish ratification of the Rome Statute would go a long way in proving that Turkey is intent to act in accordance with the foreign policy principles adopted by EU member states, and further bolster support for its accession inside Europe. And, the issue of European accession aside, it would also go along way in garnering support for Turkey in its campaign against the PKK, allaying concerns of human rights activists that Turkey continues to subordinate human rights in its struggle against the terrorist organization -- and, in doing, often violates the rights of Kurdish citizens.

In 2004, Turkey amended Article 38 of the Constitution to allow for the extradition of Turkish citizens to the ICC. At the time, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that Turkey would be ratifying the Rome Stature in the near future. However, in January 2008, Erdogan reversed this position, citing concerns that Turkish assent might compromise its ability to deal effectively with the PKK. To add insult to injury, this past summer Turkey hosted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is currently facing prosecution by the Court for war crimes committed in the Sudanese genocide.

In yet another turn, AKP included ratification of the Rome Statute in its third harmonization package. CHP and MHP are opposed to ratification on the same grounds Erdogan presented last January, citing concern that the Rome Statute does not include terrorism within its jurisdiction. For a statement from the UN as to why this is so, click here.

As it has in the United States, the ratification to the ICC becomes fodder for nationalists, many of who launch misinformation campaigns about the Court. As evidenced by earlier resistance from Ali Sahin and the Justice Ministry, it is also important to impact that support for the Rome Statute is not universal among AKP politicians. This row within AKP and Erdogan's folding in January 2008 evinces deeper divisions within the party between hardcore nationalists and liberal reformers.

The Rome Statute enjoys enormous support within DTP and the Kurdish southeast. It also enjoys widespread support among Turkish civil society. According to TDZ, "As part of a campaign initiated by Amnesty International Turkey in 1997, a national coalition of NGOs, including the TİHV, the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples (MAZLUM-DER), the Human Rights Agenda Association, the Human Rights Association (İHD) and the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, are also lobbying for the ratification of the ICC treaty."


UPDATE 1/31 -- Click here for a recently issued press release from the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) on the PACE resolution.

UPDATE 2/4 -- The Coalition for the International Criminal Court has selected Turkey as this month's target in its universal ratification campaign (URC). To encourage Turkey's government to sign onto the Rome Statute, click here.