French Senate Blocks Referendum Amendment

Good news for a change: The French Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee decided to block the amendment passed by the National Assembly that would oblige France to hold a referendum before the French government could assent to the EU accession of any country whose population exceeds five percent of the EU population (see June 1 post). Although the proposal might still be discussed in plenary session, the move makes it unlikely that the proposed amendment will become law.

Desperation Is Not A Good Thing

In recent days, two rather extraordinary proposals have been made by AK party officials, the most notable being Speaker Köksal Toptan's idea a senate be created so as to take on some of the responsibilities of the Constitutional Court and provide a further check on judicial power. A few days later, AKP deputy Ahmet İyimaya suggested that AKP draft a proposal that would allow the parliament to suspend verdicts issued by the Court. Both attempts are widely viewed as designed only as means by which AKP might save itself, and opposition parties have squarely rejected them while the party's top brass has been wise to keep its distance. These proposals will require that the parliament amend the constitution, a move that is unlikely now as it was before the court decided the türban case. Significant is that these very reactionary measures will likely weaken support for AKP by reinforcing the image that the party is only out to save itself. The idea that AKP is selfishly trying to save itself is similar to the idea of a significant number of former AKP party supporters who have come to view the party as only concerned with securing the rights of Sunni Muslims. The party should take heed of recent polls that reflect a growing disillusionment with AKP. Gareth Jenkins' analysis of a recent poll conducted by A & G research company and that ran in Milliyet this week echoes this cause for concern:

Worryingly for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the A & G survey reinforced the findings of other opinion polls, which had suggested that the government’s heavy-handed attempts to abolish the headscarf ban in Turkish universities (see EDM, February 11) and the subsequent case filed for the party’s closure (see EDM, April 1) have undermined its popular support. When asked how they would vote if a general election were to be held immediately, only 31.4 percent said that they would support the AKP, down from 46.6 percent in the last general election in July 2007. However, recent events appear to have shaken voters’ confidence in the AKP rather than persuaded them to switch their allegiance to another party. Of those questioned 24.7 percent either failed to reply or said that they were undecided.

. . . .

Although they have improved in recent years, opinion polls in Turkey have often proved unreliable. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the results of the A & G survey would appear to suggest that the AKP has been damaged by its attempts to lift the headscarf ban and the subsequent court case for its closure. Privately, some AKP officials have advocated bolstering its defense in the closure case by calling an early election, in the expectation that the party would be returned to power with an increased majority. However, although few doubt that the AKP would win any early election, the results of the latest A & G survey suggest that it could turn into a Pyrrhic victory and leave the party with a considerably reduced parliamentary majority (Milliyet, May 9-10, Vatan, May 11, A & G website, www.agarastirma.com.tr).

In terms of practical politics, it is wise for Erdoğan to reject these proposals and do a better job of keeping similar proposals out of public view. It also would seem necessary that the party reaffirm its commitment to work on behalf of securing greater rights and freedoms for all citizens instead of continuing to react to resistance againt the türban. The best way to protect the rights of Sunni Muslim women is to focus on bolstering the party's mandate so that it might have the political clout necessary to ecure passage of the constitution it was planning to introduce prior to the closure case.

Further, AKP should do a better job of listening to its detractors. The A & G poll suggests that there are numerous voters who have become disillusioned with AKP, but who are also not content with CHP or MHP and probably also uncomfortable with the judiciary's heavy hand. Not all AKP detractors are CHP-style staunch secularists out to deny Sunni Muslims' basic rights, but are deeply concerned with AKP political decision making and increasingly uneasy about the party's sincerity in expanding rights and freedoms to all citizens. They are skeptical that AKP sacrificed and continues to sacrifice so much political capital for the türban reform and I conjecture are made further uncomfortable with the party's seeming narrow focus on the issue and its desperate attempts to save itself from closure. Further, on a normative level, these concerns are not unjustified. Toptan' senate proposal and İyimaya's suspension idea rightfully draw criticism of AKP insomuch as constitutional reforms should be designed for the Turkish political systems' long-term benefit and not a response to a specific political exigency.

I Am Not in the CIA

Asked about my recent trip to Diyarbakır and armed with the knowledge that I met two other Americans, a professor from my university and a friend who is a graduate student at Koç, I was recently asked by a group of six people if I worked with the CIA. At first, I thought this was a joke. It is common enough to joke with Americans about CIA involvement, etc., but I soon figured out that the questions were actually quite serious. The group was certainly not determined I worked for the CIA, but were quite curious about the "professor."

The questioning started after I alluded to Turgut Özal while retelling a bit about my trip and made reference to the fact that the former prime minister and president haled from Malatya. Apparently it was difficult to conceive that an American could be in possession of such knowledge without being involved with American intelligence services, and this in spite of the marvel of Wikipedia. While I do not think that the suspicions of the vast majority of Turks are so easily aroused, I was struck by their obvious mistrust of my answers and the genuine surprise that a foreigner could be armed with such very basic knowledge. Resentful of what is perceived as American-CIA assistance of the PKK—I was told this was an undeniable "fact"—and most skeptical about the United States' larger "imperial" intentions, a growing number of Turks have become distrustful of Americans in recent years (see March 16 post). It is not at all uncommon to hear that the 9/11 attacks were an insider job designed to offer justification for the invasion of Iraq and even less uncommon to hear about vast U.S. conspiracies designed to create an independent Kurdistan so that Americans can obtain oil at a cheaper price. Ömer Taşpınar explores such suspicions and charges in his recent column in Today's Zaman. His analysis concludes in a call on Turks to disband the idea that America is omnipotent and all-controlling. From Taşpınar:

Turkey is a proud country that strongly values its national sovereignty. Yet paradoxically, most Turks seem to lack self-esteem when it comes to Washington's power over Turkish domestic politics. Almost all Turks, from sophisticated political analysts to average citizens, believe Washington controls Turkey's domestic political dynamics. There seems to be an American plot behind everything. This creates a political environment where even the wildest conspiracy theories go unquestioned. For instance, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins the general elections, the opposition blames America's plan to promote "moderate Islam" in Turkey. When the Kurds want to speak their own language, officials in Ankara blame Washington for promoting Kurdish nationalism. When there is a risk of a military or judicial coup, plotters are believed to have received a "green light" from Washington. You get the picture: Washington is behind everything.

In this conspiracy-prone political environment, any American commentary on Turkey naturally becomes the center of Turkish attention, as if the fate of the country depended on it. Washington's shallow debate on Turkey -- where only a few people pay attention to Turkey and even fewer understand Turkish politics -- turns into an existential matter. Since Turkish pundits irrationally exaggerate the importance of a few American pundits, whatever appears in the American press gains tremendous importance in the eyes of the Turkish public. All it takes is someone in Washington to say something about Turkey for conspiracy theories to start flying around in Ankara.

Turkey, of course, is not alone in that department. The Middle East and the larger Islamic world are notorious for conspiracy theories. A Pakistani friend once told me that the fate of his country is always determined by three big A's: America, the Army and Allah, in that exact order. I told him that the same could be argued about my country. Similarly, in the Arab world, the CIA or MOSSAD are supposedly behind everything. American, European or Israeli analysts often make fun of these "Oriental" fantasies in their own "Orientalist" way. Very few of them wonder why people in the Middle East believe in such conspiracies. Instead, they engage in cultural determinism and blame the "Arab political culture" or the Muslim "mindset" as if there was something in the Muslim DNA that made these people genetically predisposed to become conspiracy theorist.

In fact, there are some legitimate historical reasons as to why people in the Middle East feel disempowered. History has not been kind to the Middle East. Take Iran, for example. Try to convince Iranians that what happened to their nationalist leader Mossadegh in 1953 is not conducive to conspiracy theories. The whole world knows that Iran's democratically elected leader, who wanted to nationalize the oil industry, was ousted by a CIA coup. The pro-Western shah was restored to power simply because London and Washington did not want to give up their economic and political interests in Iran. Such events left deep scars in the Iranian psyche. They will not be erased from the collective memory of the region in just one generation. People in the Middle East never forget.

Yet it is equally true that blaming the West for everything develops an addiction to conspiracy theories. In time, this blame game turns into a convenient excuse for escaping national responsibility. Moreover, a country like Turkey, which was never colonized by the West, has no legitimate excuse to develop an addiction to conspiracy theories. Turkish analysts should therefore stop over-analyzing Washington and pay more attention to their own domestic dynamics. Washington may have had some influence over Turkey during the Cold War. But today's Turkey is a much more complex place than in the 1970s. It is almost impossible to single-handedly manipulate Turkish politics, military, media, markets and society. This why Turkey needs to grow out of this idea that Washington can call the shots in Ankara. America's leverage over Turkey is marginal. And most importantly, the Bush administration cannot even decide how to react to what is going on in Ankara. It is divided between those who want to unequivocally support the democratic process and others who believe that secularism is at stake. There is a dysfunctional, lame duck administration in Washington, and Turks should not read too much into the language of US officials when they talk about the domestic situation in Turkey. At the end of the day, it will be Turkish political dynamics -- not Washington -- that will determine Turkey's fate.

A quick note: Kurds are also suspicious of U.S. designs on Kurdistan. Some of the Kurds with whom I spoke expressed similar ideas and—hopefully to the relief of many Turks—were equally disturbed. No Kurd with whom I spoke wanted to see war break out in the southeast, and those that thought the United States to be up to no good expressed worry that U.S. actions might lead to violence and a civil war with the Iraqi north. And, an amusing story to show some peoples' lack of knowledge about the United States: in a conversation with a very old Syriac priest, who funnily enough had been to the United States, we were repeatedly told that the price of gas in America was under two dollars per gallon. Skyrocketing gas prices certainly tell a different story, and it took a while to convince our gracious host that, yes, soaring gas prices had affected the United States, too. No one is immune from the power of oil companies and speculators out to make a quick buck on the "free market."

Şemdinli Case Postponed

From Gareth Jenkins:

On June 6 the military court in the southeastern city of Van once again postponed a scheduled hearing in a case brought against three members of the security forces who are accused of carrying out an extra-judicial execution in the Kurdish town of Semdinli in November 2005. The trial is widely regarded as a test case for Turkey’s willingness to hold members of its security forces accountable for human rights abuses in its 24-year-old war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Two gendarmerie intelligence officers, Ali Kaya and Ozcan Ildeniz, and a former PKK member turned informer called Veysel Ates are accused of killing one man, Zahir Korkmaz, and injuring two others in a bomb explosion at the Umit Bookshop in Semdinli shortly after noon on November 9, 2005. The device is alleged to have been planted by Ates, who was apprehended by an angry mob of local people immediately after the explosion as he attempted to get into a waiting car occupied by Kaya and Ildeniz. The mob ransacked the car. Local TV showed them the brandishing weapons and documents they had found in the trunk of the car. These included identity cards indicating that Kaya and Ildeniz were gendarmerie intelligence officers, an apparent death list of alleged PKK sympathizers and diagrams of the home and workplace of the bookshop’s owner, whose name was also on the death list.

The Turkish authorities have traditionally either ignored allegations of extrajudicial killings by the security forces in southeast Turkey or attempted to attribute them to internal feuding in the PKK. But this time the evidence was overwhelming. The three men were tried and found guilty. On June 19, 2006, they were sentenced to 39 years in jail. However, on May 16, 2007, the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the convictions on the grounds that, as the accused were military personnel, the case should have been heard by a military court. The three were released pending their retrial. None of them was present in court on June 6, when the panel of judges postponed hearing the case until September 19, on the grounds that they needed to conduct an onsite investigation at the scene of the crime. It was the third time the court had postponed the hearing.

The Politics of Underwear

PHOTO from Milliyet: These İstanbul beachgoers are protesting new laws aimed to crack down on the bathing habits of poorer İstanbulular. Holding signs declaring that not all are able to afford nice swimsuits, they argue İstanbul's poor should not be discriminated against. After all, we all just want to swim, right?


I had not heard of this debate until today, but apparently there was much ado in the summer of 2005 concerning the swimming habits of the poorer sectors of İstanbul's population. Appalled by men swimming in their underwear and women wearing full chadors on the beach, the city's elite soon organized enough pressure to pass a municipal reform making it illegal to swim in one's underwear and requiring that women not cover their legs while taking a dip. Another matter of sartorial politics, the underwear controversy is an interesting illustration of the class conflicts between "white Turks" and "black Turks." So, despite the fact that this happened in 2005, it is an interesting complement to the recent news on the türban.

The so-called "white Turks" represent the established, most often secular elite of Turkey's old guard and have proudly adopted a cosmopolitan, European-type lifestyle. As Karl Vick's reportage in the Washington Post includes, they eat fish, not the traditional kebap. (Although, I am sure they eat plenty of kebap.) The opening pages of Orhan Pamuk's İstanbul give a wonderful description of what it means to be a "white Turk." Pamuk writes of his childhood contemplation of the sitting rooms devoted to Western culture in which he used to play as a child—their museum-like qualities and the pianos that went unplayed.

In contrast, the "black Turks" represent the rural poor who began to move into the cities as early as the 1950s and whose presence began to be viewed as a serious threat to the European-type Turkish identity as their immigration accelerated in the 1980s. They are seen as less refined by their "white Turk" counterparts and still hold tightly to the customs of the countryside they brought with them. From the article:

The flap appeared to begin with a screed that a columnist unleashed in the July 27 issue of the newspaper Radikal. Mine G. Kirikkanat, a very white Turk, began by writing about how proud she was of Istanbul's shiny international airport, which "lights up Turkey's 'non-Arab' face."

But the drive into the city, she wrote, was something else. In the parks along the shore road toward town, "men in their underwear rest ruminating, women wearing black chadors or headscarves all are fanning the barbecue. ... This view is repeated every 10 meters square, our dark people cooking meat by the sea that they turn their [behinds] toward."

"Carnivore Islamistan," the columnist dubbed the scene, capturing in a brutal phrase the major fault line of class and politics in modern Turkey.

If the kebab is the staple food of Anatolia, the white Turks native to Istanbul prefer sea bass, bluefish and other delicate catches of the two seas that bracket the city and the Bosporus Strait in between. And this, too, has caused consternation.

But while the men were branded as offensive for being undressed, their wives were deemed unsuitable for wearing the long cloaks favored by religious Muslim women. Modern Turkey, though 99 percent Muslim, was founded in 1923 as a secular republic, and was led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the dashing military hero who conceived the nation-state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk embraced the French definition of secularism — not so much neutral toward all faiths as antagonistic toward public expressions of the dominant religion.

In Turkey, female government employees are forbidden to wear the head scarves that, despite the official line, a majority of Turkish women wear, some out of tradition, others for religious reasons. Ataturk favored tuxedos, cigarettes and pinups of models in bikinis.

"We are Ataturk's women!" shouted Mine Okcugil, 38, clasping the hand of the woman in the chaise lounge next to her at Caddebostan. Her own bikini was in danger of falling off her front. She works at the Agriculture Ministry.

"We are all modern women of the republic," said Semra Aydemir, 52, a retired teacher, also in a tiny two-piece. "We are against terrorism. We are against violence. We are against ugliness."

So it is that men and women roaming the beach in T-shirts reading "Security" keep an eye peeled not only for men wearing too little but for women wearing too much. Female beach-goers no longer are allowed to wade with their legs covered by flowing fabric.

The immigrant population represented by the "black Turks" is still struggling in its coming to terms with urban life and integration of the two groups has been quite difficult, thus giving birth to the bizarre (and racist) terminology. The difficulty is owed to poverty (European tastes are expensive), a lack of social mobility, and a resentment on the part of the "white Turks" that stifles opportunities for the kinds of social interactions between classes that would facilitate integration. This resentment is quite well-portrayed in the article and is also seen in the türban debate (see Feb. 19 post). Some of this lack of integration is also no doubt owed to the fact that these "black Turks" do not necessarily want to adopt the lifestyle of their "white Turk" counterparts.

However, this division is very much a simplification, and as is often the case in Turkish politics, it is the complication of simplifications in which meaning can be found. Take the case of Abdullah Gül who in many ways is more cultured and sophisticated than the "white Turks" who oppose him. Gül is a pious Muslim who devoutly observes Ramazan and namaz, gives money to Islamic schools and charities, and has a spouse who opts to wear the türban (although his detractors say Ms. Gül has been coerced). At the same time, he was educated in Europe, wears sharp suits, and is well-known for his business knack. Like many AKP politicians and their supporters, he represents what has been called the new Islamic middle class. This new class represents a fissue in the social order as it does not easily fit within the "white"/"black" divide. Insomuch as this fissue threatens the social order, it disturbs the "white Turks." The fissure has also generated a politics of fear that pervades Turkish politics, most significantly in regard to secularism.

Whether it is swimming in underwear or donning a türban at university, the "white Turks'" fear of losing control of the social realities with which they are accustomed and comfortable is very much the driving factor behind these odd restricitions. Already uncomfortable with difference, the "white Turks" are being pressed to find new approaches to settling the fact that not all sectors of Turkish society can or do share their tastes, values, and customs. As evidenced by the recent türban decision, the approach so far has largely been the old, reliable authoritarian one: refusal to acknowledge and/or negotiate difference. The sniveling is only likely to increase.

And, just as an aside, I have been to European beaches. . . and, yes, along with others, swam in my underwear. No one seemed to care. Why is it an issue in Turkey?

Baykal Declares Pride In Diverse Ethnic Identities

Deniz Baykal in Diyarbakır on Wednesday: "Everybody should be proud of their ethnic identity. Our state embraces various ethnic identities. It is a good example of solidarity and unity. We have people of all ethnic origins and races. We have our Arabs, Kurds, Georgians and Circassians. They make up our diversity"

Did Hell freeze over, or is Baykal's declaration merely a tactic to win a few seats in the southeast come next elections? From Today's Zaman:

“I don’t believe Baykal’s remarks in the Southeast hinted that the CHP will change its intra-party policy. I am afraid he uttered these remarks simply because he felt himself obliged to do so. Several political parties, including the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), have attempted to win back the hearts of our people in the eastern and southeastern regions. I believe the CHP is engaged in a similar attempt to avoid falling behind these parties,” said Ferhat Kentel, a famous sociologist from Bilgi University, in a phone interview with Sunday’s Zaman.

. . . .

Ümit Fırat, pointed out that Baykal’s remarks on different ethnic identities do not make sense for Turkish people. “People are proud of their ethnic identities. They don’t have the chance to choose their ethnic identities. Turkey has a Kurdish problem. It doesn’t really matter for people whether the state is proud of different ethnic identities in society. They have never been ashamed of themselves. The CHP reduces the troubles faced in the eastern and southeastern regions to a problem of terrorism. But Ankara should start pondering ways to improve the Kurds’ situation without losing any more time,” Fırat said.

Sezgin Tanrıkulu, head of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, however, argued that what is important is not whether Baykal was persuasive in his remarks but the content of his speeches.

“It is a significant development that Baykal has finally said something different from the CHP’s intra-party policy. We will see in the months ahead what Baykal’s statements will bring to Turkey. I believe that he will contribute a great deal to the solution of Turkey’s problems if he stands by what he said. The CHP is a political party that has considerable influence on state institutions. It should be consistent in its statements and acts. This will help us solve our problems,” he added.

U.S. Shifts Line . . . Slightly

Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has spent the week meeting with various U.S. officials over a whole host of issues ranging from cooperation with the United States to develop nuclear power to Turkey's role in ongoing peace talks between Syria and Israel. Most important to my interests, however, is an apparent decision on Rice's part to declare the United States' support of AKP. Speaking at a joint press conference following here meeting with Babacan, Rice responded to a question about the closure case:

"Our view is that Turkey will, of course, resolve its issues through its democratic processes. But we are going to continue to work with this government with which we have found an excellent working relationship, with which we share common values and which increasingly, over the last year or so, we find ourselves working more cooperatively, more in unison to solve really hard problems than I think has been experienced in US-Turkish relations for some time."

Although her positive words do not constitute condemnation of the closure case, they do at least bolster support for AKP and send a clear message that the United States is in no way a proponent of AKP's closure nor will it "authorize" military involvement, as was the case when Refah was pushed out of power as a result of intense military pressure on the governing coalition at the time. I still contend that it is important for the United States to join the European Union in condemning the closure case, but the Bush Administration is obviously not willing to do so (see April 18 post).

In other news, the United States has appointed career foreign service officer James Jeffrey as its new ambassador to Turkey.

Military Intervenes in Headscarf Issue

So much for the military not intervening in politics . . .

From Gareth Jenkins:

Interestingly, the court’s decision coincided with the adoption of a more assertive public stance by the other bastion of the country’s secular establishment, the Turkish General Staff (TGS). In what was probably an accident of timing, the Constitutional Court’s ruling was announced late in the afternoon of the same day on which the TGS was hosting an international conference in Istanbul on the problems facing the Middle East. Since the AKP’s victory in the July 2007 elections, Chief of Staff General Mehmet Yasar Buyukanit, chastened by the Turkish electorate’s refusal to heed his warnings about the threat posed by the party to secularism, had adopted a relatively low public profile. But, in his opening address to the June 5 conference in Istanbul, which was carried live on Turkish national television, Buyukanit delivered a blunt warning both to those inside who sought to erode secularism and to foreigners who described it as a “moderate Islamic” country.

“The Turkish Republic is the only country in the Islamic world with a secular structure,” declared Buyukanit. “There are those who want to destroy Turkey’s secular structure or attach epithets to the country’s name. The judicial bodies will never allow this to happen. There is no power strong enough to overthrow the republic and its fundamental principles” (NTV, cnnturk, haberturk, June 5).

After the Constitutional Court had announced its decision annulling the constitutional amendments, a battery of high-ranking military officials lined up to endorse the ruling.

“We must all respect the decisions of the judiciary,” said Buyukanit. “Turkey is a secular, democratic, social state ruled by law. It is impossible to change these characteristics. This is not a comment; it is a statement of the obvious” (Radikal, Milliyet, NTV, Hurriyet, Vatan, Zaman, June 6).

“The Constitutional Court has made its decision and I respect it,” declared General Ilker Basbug, the current commander of the Turkish Land Forces, who is expected to take over as chief of the TGS when Buyukanit retires at the end of August this year (Vatan, Zaman, Radikal, Milliyet, Hurriyet, NTV, June 6).

Büyükanıt is a largely discredited figure, but comments reaffirm the TSK's hardline against AKP and portentously reassert its role as a key political player. The real question is in regard to Basbug, who is ot discredited and well-known as a Kemalist hardliner, but a much smarter politician.

Constitutional Showdown

PHOTO FROM Der Spiegel

The Constitutional Court ruled 9-3 yesterday to annul amendments passed in February to lift a ban on the türban at universities. The appeal to annul these amendments was brought by CHP and DSP and is at the center of the current showdown between AKP and the Constitutional Court. Following a 6-hour emergency meeting, AKP declared that the ruling was in violation of the Constitution and some sympathetic legal experts have declared that the legislature can regard the ruling as non-existent and keep the amendments in place (see Mustafa Şentop's comments in Today's Zaman).

The ruling argued that the amendments violated the principles of secularism laid out in Article 2 of the constitution and found a basis to rule on the substance of the amendment in Article 4 of the constitution that assert the unalterability of the state's core values. The ruling is in contradiction with the non-binding recommendation's of the court's rapporteur, Osman Can (see May 18 post). In a report released prior to the court's verdict, Can argued that the court could only rule on the amendments as to their form, but not their substance. However, the court arrived at a different interpretation of Article 148's application to the appeal.

The court's annulment of the amendments on substantive grounds is a particularly bold statement in light of the fact that the court could have rejected the case without comment by asserting that it could not rule on the amendment's substance, but uphold the türban ban based on its obligation to adhere to prior rulings. The court rejected a similar attempt to lift the türban in universities in 1989, but the legislation was by statute and not amendment to the Constitution (see Jan. 20 post). In rejecting the amendments, the court went further than it did in 1989.

Protests occurred throughout the country today as many citizens declared that the Court had usurped the role of Parliament. The court's sweeping decision also has implications for the closure case pending against AKP in that the 9-3 ruling reveals strong secular sentiment felt by the court's judges. Eight of the twelve judges were appointed by President Sezer, a staunch secularist.

Joost Lagendijk, co-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, and the European Parliament's Turkey rapporteur, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, used the opportunity to push AKP to introduce the new constitution. The EU has long argued that Turkey's political problems are systemic and that a constitutional overhaul is in serious need.

It seemed until of late that AKP took these recommendations very seriously, but at the moment they seem to be falling on deaf ears. Although last April AKP found itself considering calling early elections and attempting to push through amendments that might save itself from closure, the party has since taken another route and is preparing itself for closure. This strategy is in many ways more cautious than the former, but opens the party up to criticism that it cares only about its own self-preservation. Since today's bold decision reveals a willingness to take strong action against the AKP and its alleged Islamization of politics, it is ever more likely that the party will face closure and most have already begun to accept this fate as a foregone conclusion.

An article in today's Der Spiegel suggests that despite calls for peace and calm in the face of a shutdown, come the Court's decision there will likely be large-scale protests throughout the country. I am not so sure of this, especially as AKP has avoided such confrontational means before and insofar as Erdoğan, by every indication, likes to keep politics at the elite level. AKP has also repeatedly told its constituents to remain calm in the face of closure and has publicly sworn not to provocate mass demonstrations that might further destablize the country. Mass demonstrations risk intervention by the military and basically provide the TSK with a justification to enact a full-scale coup. Past reports of a previous coup attempt planned by some forces within the TSK suggest there is at least some support within the General Staff for strong action. AKP will thus likely play it safe, pray that it will not be closed, and in the likely event that the party is forced to re-group, do so as best it can with as little damage as possible done to the larger moderate Islamist forces long-term political existence. Perhaps most troubling to AKP is that yesterday's strong ruling indicates that the court is prepared to enact bold sentences on the list of 71 politicians the Chief Prosecutor has asked be banned from politics.

Click here for an English translation of Turkey's 1982 constitution.

USCIRF Reports on Religious Freedom

Turkey appears in the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom's 2008 annual report on the status of religious freedom in 22 different countries. Founded in 1998 to monitor religious freedom in conjunction with the State Department, USCIRF considers Turkey a country under review rather than a country of of particular concern or in which religious freedom violations warrant being put on its watch list. Nonetheless, USCIRF observes the country's struggle with its laicist understanding of religion and the state, as well as state discrimination against Muslim minorities, e.g. the requirement that Alevi children be subject to Sunni religious education. The report also includes a description of discrimination against Turkey's non-Muslim minorities, e.g. the lack of legal recognition afforded to the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates. The report also alludes to the anti-Semitism still encountered in the Turkish media and other sectors of civil society.

USCIRF joins other groups in criticism of the recently passed Foundations Law. Although the Foundations Law is a positive step in the right direction of returning property of religious minorities seized by the state, it makes no provision for the re-appropriation of property sold by the state to third parties. Admirably, the bill does allow non-Turkish citizens to open up foundations and reduces legal barriers to gaining foundation status for Turkish citizens as well.

ECHR Enters Fore Before Court Decides Türban Case

With the Constitutional Court set to decide the constitutionality of the türban amendments either today or tomorrow, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) affirmed past ECHR case law that state bans on the türban do not violate the European Convention on Human Rights, namely Article 9's guarantees freedom of thought, conscious, and religion. The ECHR ruled that the Turkish Education Ministry was within its right to fire Fatma Karaduman and Sevil Tandoğan, two teachers at a religious high school who refused to remove their headscarves.

Like in an earlier decided case in 2005, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, the ECHR ruled that the state had a legitimate interest in regulating the türban in universities. In Şahin, the ECHR opinion read that ". . . the regulations concerned have to be viewed in that context and constitute a measure intended to achieve the legitimate aims referred to above and thereby to preserve pluralism in the university."

France has a similar law banning students from wearing religious clothing or symbols that manifest an overt religious affiliation in public education institutions. French courts have affirmed the constitutionality of the law based on the ECHR's decision in Şahin. Although its timing was a complete coincidence, the ECHR's ruling, just as with Şahin, should do little to bolster EU support among conservative Sunni Muslims at a time when many are focused on what will happen at the Constitutional Court in the next two days.

The Coup That Did Not Happen

PHOTO FROM Today's Zaman
Alper Görmüş, former editor of Nokta, speaks at a press conference last year following a raid on the paper's office.

From Gareth Jenkins:

Public Prosecutor Suleyman Aydin has called for an investigation into allegations of a 2004 plot to topple Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), according to a report in the Islamist daily Zaman (June 4).

In March 2007 the weekly news magazine Nokta published what it claimed were extracts from a diary by Admiral Ozden Ornek, the commander of the Turkish navy from 2003 to 2005. The diary appeared to detail the unsuccessful attempts by Ornek in 2004 to persuade other members of the Turkish high command to stage a coup, codenamed “Blonde Girl,” against the AKP, which had first come to power in the November 2002 general election. The writer of the diary clearly regarded the AKP as having a long-term radical Islamist agenda and severely criticized General Hilmi Ozkok, who served as chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) from 2002 to 2006, for not countering the perceived threat posed by the government to the principle of secularism enshrined in the Turkish constitution. The diaries also alleged that after the writer’s failure to secure enough support for “Blonde Girl,” the then Gendarmerie Commander Sener Eruygur came up with a coup plan of his own, codenamed “Moonlight” (Nokta, March 29-April 4, 2007).

The allegations were vigorously refuted by Ornek, who not only denied that he was the author of the diary published in Nokta but sued the magazine’s editor, Alper Gormus, for “insult and defamation.”

On April 5, 2007, as Turkey was swept by a series of mass public protests against the AKP’s plans to appoint one of its leading members to the presidency, Nokta published an article implying that the demonstrations were being coordinated by the TGS. The military prosecutor responded by issuing a search warrant for the Nokta offices in Istanbul. Over a period of three days, from April 13 to 15, 2007, all of the magazine’s archives and computer disks were examined and copied. On April 21, 2007, Gormus announced that Ayhan Durgun, the owner of Nokta, had decided to stop publishing the magazine. It has remained closed ever since.

On April 11 Gormus was acquitted by an Istanbul court of insulting and defaming Ornek, but the judge refused to allow the defense to present a report that they claimed had been prepared by the police. They claimed that this report would prove that the documents on which they had based the diary extracts published in March 2007 had been written on Ornek’s computer. The judge also dismissed as irrelevant an application to order a judicial investigation into whether members of the Turkish high command had been planning to stage a coup in 2004. “Attempting to stage a coup is a crime,” protested Gormus. “I want the right to prove my claim” (NTV, Radikal, April 12). But he now appears skeptical about whether Aydin will succeed in taking the case to the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals (Today’s Zaman, June 5).

The allegations have been a major embarrassment to the TGS and a gift to its Islamist opponents, who have used the diary extracts to support their contention that the military as an institution is inherently anti-democratic and perpetually plotting to undermine the civilian administration and seize power

Click here for the story in Today's Zaman.

Limits to Liberalism: Gay Rights Go Unprotected

An İstanbul court ruled on Tuesday to close the gay rights organization, LAMBDA İstanbul. The organization promotes the rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people and is being closed on the grounds that it violates law and morality. According to Human Rights Watch,

"The judgment referred to article 17 of the Law on Associations and article 60/2 of the Civil Code, which taken together provide for closure of associations if they do not “remedy errors and deficiencies” in their statutes. But the court’s judgment did not specify these “deficiencies.” The proceedings made no reference to these articles before this last hearing on May 29. Neither the Governor’s Office nor the judge or prosecutor raised any such deficiencies in the statutes during previous hearings."

The case resulted from a complaint filed by the İstanbul governor's office in January 2007. The mayor's office had asked prosecutors to open a case against LAMBDA, but the request was denied in July. Apparently determined to close LAMBDA, the governors's office brought the case to trial on its own. LAMBDA was further harrassed in April when police raided its facilities on the grounds that the organization was involved with prostitution.

See the full report from Human Rights Watch. According to HRW, LAMBDA is not the only gay rights organization to be harassed by Turkish authorities as there have been similar cases of harrassment in Ankara.

LAMDA plans to appeal the court's decision to the Court of Cassastion (High Court of Criminal Appeals) and, if necessary, the European Court of Human Rights. Of the ruling, LAMBA member İzlem Aybastı said, "We were not an association for several years. If this decision is approved by the Supreme Court and Lambda Istanbul is closed down we will continue to work. However, this will threaten the existence of other gay rights associations in Turkey.” LAMBDA is a recognized association in Turkey and has been governed by the state's Law on Associations.

See also HRW's May report, "'We Need a Law for Liberation': Gender, Sexual Equality, and Human Rights in a Changing Turkey."

Significant to this affair is that the İstanbul governor, Muammer Güler, was appointed by AKP in 2001 and is subject to the influence of AKP top party officials. AKP repeatedly claims that they are in support of civil liberties and possess a libertarian view that all lifestyles should be protected from government intrusion, but this incident clearly shows that there are bounds. If AKP is as committed as it says it is to protecting everyone's rights and not just those of devout Sunni Muslims, it should denounce the repression of LAMBDA and reign in Güler. By not doing so, it tacitly consents to Güler's actions and the authority of the judiciary under which the governor is currently hiding.

Of note, I searched Today's Zaman for news of this story that might have appeared while I was in Diyarbakır and found nothing—more evidence to suggest that the liberal proclamations of religious conservatives have limits. This also reinforces my earlier argument that it is incumbent on AKP and other religiously conservative public actors to define boundaries as to what spheres of life the government should be able to intervene (see May 14 post). The expansion of rights simply does not seem to extend to members of LAMBDA.

Hope on the Western Front (In Light of the Recent Disquiet)

Sarkozy's attempts to block Turkish membership aside, there is really much reason to hope that the EU will look upon Turkish accession with favor once it is ready for membership. Many EU bureaucrats at the helm of the European Commission and a significant number of EMPs are in strong support of Turkish membership, including Joost Lagendijk who CHP decided to target last month.

As to the European population at-large, despite that only 28 percent of EU citizens polled last fall supported Turkish entry, several EU citizens are not firmly opposed and are certainly able to be persuaded. If Turkey overcomes significant human rights barriers (85 percent of Europeans expressed serious concern in this regard), continues its project of democratization while avoiding pitfalls like the closure case, and continues to improve its economy (the political pitfalls being a serious threat), European opinion will naturally change as EU politicians move to laud reform and voices like Sarkozy's are crowded out. Thus, in many ways, Turkey is in control of its own destiny and it is still far too early in the reform process to be discouraged.

Perhaps most encouraging is that 34 percent of Europeans responded that Turkish membership would benefit the EU more than it benefits Turkey. There is ample reason for this. From the Economist:

Will Turkey ever join the union? There is no shortage of strategic arguments in favour of its accession. It is a large, secular Muslim democracy. It controls the Bosporus, as well as gas or oil pipeline routes that would allow Europe to become less dependent on Russia for its energy supplies. Such arguments mark Turkey out as important. But many Europeans clearly feel that is not the same thing as saying it should join the EU. Any enlargement of the club must be agreed on by all existing members. The most recent Eurobarometer poll on enlargement found that 69% of Germans, 54% of French and a striking 81% of Austrians were opposed to Turkish entry.

Olli Rehn, the EU’s current enlargement chief, likens the EU accession process to a journey that matters as much as the destination. Europe wants Turkey to become more modern, democratic and stable because Turkey has strategic importance as "an anchor of stability and a benchmark of democracy for the wider Muslim world", he says. The best way of achieving those changes is the process of becoming an EU member. So to him, "importance and membership are inseparable."

If membership is ruled out as a destination, the journey cannot continue. But a clause in the French constitution (a sop for the anti-Turkey camp from the previous president, Jacques Chirac) obliges France to hold referendums before approving new accessions after Croatia’s. Given French voters’ views, the clause makes Turkish entry talks pretty pointless. Back in April Mr Sarkozy was arguing for the clause to be scrapped. After a parliamentary outcry he is now wavering.

Turkey itself, meanwhile, seems rather disillusioned. When Eurobarometer pollsters asked Turks whether membership was mainly in their interest, the EU’s interest or in the mutual interest of both, the largest block of respondents (34%) thought the main beneficiary would be the EU. Perhaps surprisingly, some senior EU figures agree. "We need Turkey more than Turkey needs us," says Mr Verheugen.

Such statements may shock Europeans, but they need to hear them. They are too used to seeing enlargement as a charitable gift from a rich West to its poorer neighbours. It is hard work for both sides. But it is also an almost magical tool for stabilising a whole continent, creating new markets and letting free trade and free movement build ties of interdependence.

For these reasons and more, Europe’s most recent expansion was not just a good idea. In retrospect, it will be seen as one of the EU’s most significant achievements. It reunited a continent divided by Soviet oppression and brought into the European fold nations that had previously hovered on the edges of the West. If it were tried now, it would be far harder to pull off. Europeans everywhere should be glad it happened just in time.

Turkey has a lot to offer Europe and vice versa, and like previous expansions, Turkish accession can be mutually beneficial for both parties.

In the meantime, it is necessary that Turkish politicians, including Babacan, not to make too much of EU opposition. From talking to people on the street, the hope of EU membership is fading and, consequently, so is a major impetus for reform. Every time a raucous is made in the Turkish media about EU opposition, the result is a disenchantment that does not seem to ever be balanced with the great lot of support Turkey has in the EU. Hence, usually criticism plays right into the hands of the Euro-skeptics. Let the Turko-philes in Europe deal with the issue and if Turkish input is needed, it can happen behind closed doors. In the meantime, there is much to be done in Turkey and Turkish politics won't win any favor with the European Commission if they continue to stall to finish the ample amount of work that still needs to be done. When Babacan took a hostile position at the Association Council last week, he was duly greeted with a calm reminder from Rehn that the government needs to stop worrying so much about rhetoric and focus on action. (AKP has still not appointed a chief negotiator to better distribute the huge workload that EU negotiations entail.) When AKP was successful before the 2005 slow down, this was its method of operation. At the beginning of the reform process, Erdoğan said famously , "The alternative to Europe is ourselves." Unfortunately, if AKP does not pick up the pace, this might prove the case.

The full results of the fall 2007 EuroBarometer poll are worth a careful look.

More Public Opinion Polling

To complement the previous post, this analysis is from EuroActiv.com:

Turks losing trust in EU

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan came into office in 2002 having pledged to Turkish citizens that he would eventually lead his country into the EU.

In fact, since negotiations on Turkish admission to the EU were officially launched in October 2005 and celebrated with much fanfare, the momentum of government reforms has slowed dramatically, which appears to be at least partly due to the constant drop in public support for EU accession.

The autumn 2007 Eurobarometer survey conducted by TNS Opinion revealed that only 49% of the Turks still consider EU membership a "good thing". But respondents were still twice as likely to consider it a good rather than a bad thing (25%). To put this into context, the proportion of Turkish respondents in favour of membership is much higher than in Croatia (35% support) but far lower than in Macedonia (76%).

Many Turks were asking why they should adopt the difficult reforms required by the EU before accession if Europeans do not want Turkey inside the Union anyway. Indeed, last year only 26% of the Turks still believed that their country will actually join the EU (compared to 56% of Europeans), according to a German Marshall Fund survey.

EU image suffers setback

Asked in June 2007 to name the country which they would most associate with 'warm feelings', more Turks cited arch enemy Iran as their answer than the EU, according to a Transatlantic Trend survey carried out in 11 selected EU member states. On a scale from 0 to 100 degrees, the EU only reached 22 degrees - a 20-degree drop compared to 2006.

Moreover, the majority of Turks considered EU global leadership 'undesirable' (54%).

Nevertheless, in the August 2007 elections Turkish citizens provided the two main pro-EU parties, the AKP and the CHP, with a remarkable two-thirds majority in Parliament. Erdogan's AKP gained 47% of the vote – up from 34% in 2002 - indicating that the Turks have not completely given up on Europe yet.

Respect for human rights: A shared value

The lack of respect for human rights is a central argument being brought up against a Turkish accession.

85% of Europeans insist that Turkey cannot join if it does not 'systematically respect human rights', according to the latest TNS Eurobarometer from autumn 2007.

Between October 2006 and October 2007, the European Court of Human Rights delivered 330 judgements finding that Turkey had violated at least one article of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In this context, it is worth noting that when asked to choose the three most important societal values from a given list, the responses of Turks and EU citizens are not so different. Turkish citizens generally share an appreciation of many of the values which constitute the heart of the EU's legal system, such as the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights.

France and Germany see EU as 'Christian club'

The main dividing line appears to be religion. Cultural and religious differences are perhaps the most sensitive of all the arguments raised against Turkish accession to the bloc, with several conservative European leaders, most notably France's President Nicolas Sarkozy and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, making the case for the EU as a 'Christian club'.

Both leaders can rely on large support from citizens of their own countries as well as others. The populations of France and Germany along with those of Austria, Cyprus, and Greece have been most critical of the prospect of allowing Turkey to join the Union, with proportions against membership as high as 80 percent, according to a Eurobarometer survey from 2005.

In this context, it will be interesting to see how the Union's talks with Turkey progress when France takes over the EU Presidency in the second half of 2008. Sarkozy has previously pledged to hold a referendum on Turkey's accession and during his election campaign even called for the suspension of EU talks with Turkey in favour of a 'privileged partnership', strongly supported by Merkel and her Christian Democratic Party (CDU).

The story was largely taken up by the Turkish media, fuelling anti-French sentiment among the population.

However, Sarkozy recently reassured the Turkish government that the talks will continue under the French Presidency, although likely to take place at a more moderate pace, and also Merkel made clear she would stick to the commitment negotiated by the predecessor government.

Scholars often refer to France's failure to integrate its five million-strong Muslim immigrant community when looking for reasons to explain its staunch anti-Turkey stance.

Although only 400,000 of France's Muslims are Turks, people do not distinguish between nationalities, French commentator Dominique Moisi says. "For the average Frenchman, a Turk is an Arab," while every new riot in the suburbs involving Arabs nurtures the 'no' camp, Moisi argues.

The Pew Center's 2005 and 2006 Global Attitude Polls support this argument, suggesting that citizens in EU countries with high percentages of Muslim immigrants adopt negative attitudes towards people practising Islam. Figures are remarkably high in Spain (62%) and Germany (54%) and still significant in France (35%) and the UK (20%).

French not alone in their anti-Turkey stance

The UK is often mentioned as an alternative example, where the 1.5 million Muslims are more or less well integrated into society.

However, this has not been enough to prevent a drop in popular support for Turkish membership in the UK, with the percentage of citizens in favour suffering a dramatic 15% decrease within two years (from 38% in 2005 to 23% in 2007).

In Germany – home to the largest Turkish community outside home soil - riots like those in France are rather the exception, but the reputation of the Turkish population is nevertheless relatively low.

This is largely due to the fact that while much of Turkey is becoming more open, modern and diverse, many Turkish immigrants remain traditionalist, as Katinka Barysch from the Centre for European Reform (CER) writes. The 45 honour killings committed by Turks on German soil since 1996 are a proof of this, the author argues.
In Austria, the EU's most Turkey-sceptic member, the impression that the alpine country's 200,000 Turkish immigrants have not integrated well appears to have strengthened concerns about Turkey's accession to the EU, writes Barysch. Public opposition in Austria is being further fed by the strict anti-Turkey stance of Austria's two biggest political parties and much of the media, allowing the – admittedly small – 'pro' camp little public space to communicate its arguments.

Like France, Austria's government has promised to hold a referendum on Turkish membership once the accession treaty has been signed. "In this context, it seems possible that in the long-term, accession referenda [as proposed by Austria and France] will fail, blocking Turkey's bid to join the EU even if it fulfils all other necessary conditions," argues Antonia Ruiz Jimenez from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Europeans fear mass Turkish immigration

Jimenez argues that Europeans' perception of "cultural differences" appears to be rooted in their fear of Muslim – not necessarily Turkish – immigration to their countries. In fact, 85% of the Europeans who believe that the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are "too significant" also fear that Turkey's accession will bring more Muslim immigrants, according to a Eurobarometer from 2005.

Does Turkey belong to Europe?

The perception of cultural distance appears clear, despite the fact that Turkey is often geographically seen as 'European'. In the same Eurobarometer, 56% agreed that "Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography," yet 66% also decided that "the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow for this accession".

This perception was particularly high in countries where popular support for Turkey's accession is lowest, such as Greece, Germany and Austria.

Old vs. New Europe

European opposition to Turkish EU membership has risen constantly over the last decade and exceeded 50% for the first time in 2005. In 1996, opponents of Turkey's accession outnumbered supporters by just eight percent, while in 2006 the difference had grown to 35%, according to Eurobarometer.

This development runs contrary to the general trend of more favourable attitudes to further enlargement recently, as the TNS Eurobarometer from spring 2007 revealed. 49% spoke in favour of further accession rounds (+3%), while 39% were opposed.

As a general rule, newer member states tend to be far more enthusiastic about future enlargement, the Eurobarometer reveals. While support for more enlargement in the new member states averaged 68%, in 'Old Europe' (the EU 15) only 43% shared this view.

Poland holds the title of the most pro-enlargement country (76% in favour), while in Luxembourg only 25% of citizens support further accessions to the bloc. In this context, it does not come as a surprise that the countries most inclined towards further enlargement are also the ones which are most supportive of Turkish accession.

'Pro' camp in the minority

According to a 2006 Eurobarometer, the supporters' camp consists of Poland, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia. All of these are among the strongest proponents of further enlargement.

Citizens in Hungary, Malta, the UK and Portugal are undecided, while the vast majority of countries – 19, including heavyweights Germany and France - are clearly opposed to Turkish accession.

According to this poll, only 22% see Turkish membership as a good thing, while 42% do not have a clear opinion on this issue. The overall picture remained more or less the same even when participants were asked if Turkey should be admitted when it has implemented the required reforms. 64% of the French, 54% of the Italians and 49% of the Germans would still reject Turkey's accession in this case. Only in Spain did supporters of Turkish admission achieve parity with their opponents given further Turkish reforms (36% both for and against).

Turkey's accession: An external or domestic question?

Some scholars argue that the country's attitude "depends critically on whether it sees Turkish accession as a question of foreign policy (such as in Spain or the UK) or primarily a matter of internal EU or even national politics (such as in France or Germany).

They also consider opposition to Turkish membership to be linked to a country's wider view of the future of the Union.

"Many people in Belgium, France, Germany and Italy fear that including Turkey would spell the end of the federalists' dream of a political union. In the UK, the Nordics and other countries that are less keen on political integration, further enlargement is viewed more positively," says Nathalie Tocci of the Instituto Affari Internazionali.

Turkey would upset the EU's internal balance of power

Among French people, and politicians in particular, there is a wide belief that their country's role in Europe has already been weakened by previous enlargements and Turkey's accession would only further dilute its influence.

"For them, Turkey is a step too far," says Nicolas Veron of the Brussels-based Bruegel think tank, who argues that by the time Turkey is ready for EU membership it could even surpass Germany as the Union's biggest country in Europe, with 80-90 million people.

This would have wide-ranging implications on the power structure within the European institutions, with Turkey sending the largest number of MEPs into the European Parliament and gaining the most dominant position in the Council.

Citizens turn blind eye to benefits of Turkish accession

All these findings indicate that EU citizens are largely immune to the elites' debates about the strategic and economic benefits of Turkish accession, which are "plain to see", argues Barysch from the CER. They range from the economic boost that would come from adding the fast-growing and youthful Turkey to the soft power that the Union would gain from including a well-functioning Muslim democracy, she says.

In fact, Turkey's economic performance since the 2000/2001 crisis has been impressive, with growth averaging eight percent during 2002-2004 and since then settling down between 5-6%, according to World Bank figures.

Despite these facts, the Turkish economy is not a factor in the European public debate on the country's accession. Only 36% of EU citizens consider it a strong argument in favour of Turkey's accession that a strong Turkish economy may boost to the EU economies, the 2007 Transatlantic Trends survey showed. In comparison, 74% of the Turks said they considered it a good argument.

On the European side, the only aspect that features high in the public debate is the security issue. 52% of Europeans support the theory that Turkish membership could help promote peace in the Middle East (and even 67% of the Turks think the same way).

This does not come as a surprise as the security aspect is also the one most often referred to by EU leaders. Apart from that, EU citizens instead tend to emphasise the negative aspects of allowing Turkey to join the EU.

Improving Turkey's image

Turkey's general problem is the country's less than positive image. According to the Anholt nation brand index 2007, Turkey came 34th out of 40 countries ranked for their appeal to citizens, behind Russia, Mexico and Egypt.

Candidate country Croatia on the other hand is seen fairly positively by EU citizens and its membership bid encounters little opposition.

"In many ways, Turkey's brand image today in the West is in the same shape as if Atatürk had never lived," says the independent government advisor Simon Anholt.

Turkey would need a "comprehensive and consistent strategy for gradually improving its international image," allowing Europeans to glimpse 'the real Turkey' in its modern manifestation, Anholt suggests.

Thus far, positive aspects such as its good reputation as a tourist destination are being foiled by negative events, such as court orders against journalists or the debate on the head scarf, which have tended to confirm people's prejudices.

Debate lacks European dimension

Scholars acknowledge that it is "difficult to reach a European consensus on Turkey's accession" given the lack of an EU-wide dimension to the debate. Indeed, although debate has picked up it remains limited to the national level.

Public opinion scholars Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose I. Torreblanca from the European Policy Institutes Network rule out the idea that the argument over Turkey's future EU membership can be won simply with cost-benefit arguments.

"The key to Turkish EU membership may well lie in the way accession is argued and justified, and not wholly in the way it is negotiated," the authors conclude