Honing in on CHP

At Turkey's founding as an independent state, Atatürk embraced the European ideals of the age in a way that no Ottoman sultan had ever imagined and at his death in 1938, Anatolia looked and felt drastically different than it had at Turkey's founding in 1923. Indeed, Atatürk not only embraced European values, but emulated them. Modelling the new Turkic republic on the European states of the day, the "Immortal Leader" adopted European legal codes and replaced Ottoman institutions to resemble those of Europe. Central to this nation-building project was Atatürk's wholesale adoption of the same European-style nationalisms that were reshaping Europe. As David Fromkin sadly narrates in A Peace to End All Peace, Turkey was not alone in this endeavor, but was undoubtedly the most successful. Unlike other nation-states carved out of the former Ottoman Empire, the Turkish nation-state was not designed by Europeans, but by Atatürk. Building atop the nationalist ideology of the Young Turks who preceded him, Atatürk carved Turkey out along the same nationalist lines that had come to shape those communities in the Americas and Europe to which Benedict Anderson has referred as "imagined." As one of the first nationalist movements organized against imperialist power, Atatürk brought together the peoples of Anatolia as Turks, romanized the Turkish language, worked to establish nationalist narratives of a shared tribal past, and sought diligently to "Turkify" the Ottoman institutions that had previously governed the Anatolian heartland. An ardent admirer of the French Revolution, Atatürk assembled Turkish nationalism along French lines, an educated, noble project built in the name of modernity, progress, and Enlightenment rationalism. Indeed, many of Turkey's liberals have come to denigrate the Turkish nationalist project as "Jacobin," inferring that just as French revolutionists reached particularly troubling and misguided excesses, so do some similarly self-avowed Turkish nationalists.

The nation-state pervaded what was both a project for state and society and came to define Kemalism, a loose-based ideology prescribing the political order that is still very much descriptive of contemporary relations between the Turkish state and society. Kemalism was defined in 1931 by CHP, the country's only political party in operation at the time. If one was (is?) a Kemalist, one swore adherence to what CHP considered to be the six principles of the state's existence: secularism (bearing close resemblance to French laicism), nationalism (very much influenced by European conceptions of flag and country), republicanism (in the sense that the Jacobins rejected French monarchy only to install institutions that would hardly be considered democratic by contemporary definitions), populism (very much resonant in European discourse following the First World War as it placed the interests of the nation over those of class politics, feared in Europe as Bolshevik), revolutionism (Orwellian insomuch as this meant specific support of the Kemalist status quo), and statism (recognizing the dominance of the state in the economic realm along similar lines and thought of in relation to European étatisme). The endurance of Kemalism is evidenced by CHP's continued symbolic use of the six arrows (alti ok)in its party emblem. These principles were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937 and continue to be the foundation of Turkish governance. (Previously posted on Sept. 16.)

Although CHP ventured leftward during the 1960s and 1970s, placing a great amount of its emphasis on social and economic issues in opposition to the center-right, the party remained for the most part true to its laicist approach to Islam, its statist reproach for federalism, and its nationality-based understanding of Turkish citizenship. While its commitment to laicism prevented it from making inroads with religious Turks, its statism/nationalism compromised the party's ability to deal effectively with ethnic minorities. Here, I think it is useful to note that the CHP, especially during the 1970s, was championed by the country's Alevi religious minority, whose support for secularism and democratic socialism fit well with the CHP agenda. Revealing here is that Alevi identity is largely religious, and not ethnically based, and that Alevis saw their rights against a Sunni religious majority as guaranteed by CHP's commitment to secularism. (I have written some about this right-left conflict in my historical tracing of MHP and the extreme Turkish "right.") Whereas nationalist groups on the right have traditionally been both ethnically and religiously chauvinist, CHP's nationalism is more narrowly tailored, keeping religion well removed from state affairs while protecting what many in the party see as the integrity of the Turkish nation. After the 1980 coup, and largely as a function of leftist politics being marginalized in the public sphere, CHP focused less on social democracy, and more on issues pertaining to secularism, state security, and Turkish nationality. Even as Turkey opened up in the 1990s, this remained a large part of the party's focus, and in recent years, under the leadership of Deniz Baykal, so much so and to the exclusion of any legitimate leftist agenda that the party was threatened with expulsion from the Socialist International. Turkish citizens have also decried the party's abandonment of any meaningfully leftist politics -- for example, see Genç Siviller. (I have explored these issues before in previous posts, see especially my Feb. 12 post of last year.)

CHP leader Deniz Baykal places a CHP pin on a woman's chador this past November. Baykal proclaimed that no Turkish citizen should be discriminated against based on their attire, a reversal of his party's staunch political and legal opposition to constitutional amendments made just last January to allow covered women to enter university under certain conditions.

Although CHP affirmed these dogmas in its party convention this past April and amidst the AKP closure case, it seems the party has turned an about face ahead of upcoming local elections. For example, in a most controversial and stunningly surprising move, the party has endorsed opening CHP membership to female candidates and party members who wear chadors. In Baykal's words: "It is not right to discriminate against people because of what they wear. It is not right to make deductions about them based on their attire." The move is particularly bizarre given that the chador is in many ways more controversial than the headscarf, although the debate about Islamic garb and politics is quite complicated. (See Mustafa Şentop's discussion of the chador initiative.) However, polls revealed the political acumen behind such a move, which is surely designed to capture religious conservatives and perhaps even some liberals who have long been disenchanted with Baykal's CHP. Some liberals praised the move as progressive, and the opening was hailed by Joost Lagendijk, co-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, as a welcome step forward.

Perhaps most surprising is that CHP's turnabout also includes criticism of the early republican period, previous criticism of which has landed journalists, politicians, and intellectuals like Atilla Yayla in jail. On December 3, Baykal declared, "“People with traditional clothes were not allowed to enter Atatürk Avenue [in Ankara] then. They were ordered to change their clothes and wear modern ones to be able to enter the avenue. We are a political party. Will we classify people in accordance with their attire? Is this possible? This is Turkey. People may wear whatever they want and go wherever they want.” Such comments were spiritedly reported in the liberal press:

"Little time left before second republicanism," the Taraf daily announced on its front page yesterday, implying that the secularist politician may set Kemalism aside and turn to a new understanding of republicanism.

Star's [Mehmet] Altan shared the same belief, saying that Baykal's new move stands as a litmus test for his commitment to becoming a new type of republican or, in other words, a next-generation liberal.

"When the CHP received a harsh defeat at the hands of the AK Party in the July 22, 2007 elections, party officials pointed to Baykal as the reason for the failure and accused him of turning his back on second republicanism. Second republicanism means to make the republic more democratic and save it from Kemalism. The CHP leader is going through self-criticism and heading toward second republicanism," he noted.

However, there are also many skeptics, such as TDZ columnist Fatma Disli and Marmara University Professor Levent Köker. Just what CHP tends to do in terms of securing actual policy in line with its newly expressed sentiments is unclear, but it is unlikely that Baykal will be able to counter much of this skepticism given CHP's past history without taking serious steps to renounce the party's past policy decisions, including its vehement opposition to the headscarf amendments last spring. As Saban Kardas at EDM reports, the move has also caused fighting within CHP: [

T]he “chador initiative” has provoked enmity within the CHP. Baykal’s call for a critical reflection on the party’s past angered more radical voices. Necla Arat, a parliamentary deputy from Istanbul and one of the fervent advocates of the headscarf ban, disparaged Baykal. She said that “criticizing practices during the era of Ataturk and Ismet Inonu [the second president of Turkey] because of ‘one-party-rule’ is unfortunate. My friends and I have started wondering whether the party is betraying its heritage [reddi miras].” Scores of other CHP deputies reportedly share Arat’s opinion (Hurriyet, December 4).

A rather surprising attack on Baykal came from the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Devlet Bahceli, who said that this issue was, in fact, a non-issue and did not correspond to the real problems of the people. He said, “As part of the Greater Middle East Project, there is an attempt to shape Turkish politics through moderate Islam… The Right pillar of moderate Islam is the AKP…Is there an attempt to erect a Left pillar of moderate Islam through this opening?” (Anadolu Ajansi, December 9).

Baykal issued a written response to Bahceli, in which he drew a distinction between a legitimate right to certain religious freedoms and moderate Islam as a political project. Baykal attacked Bahceli by saying, “only those who either abuse religion or come from a tradition of setting political traps [referring to the MHP’s controversial role in urging the AKP to pass the constitutional amendments on headscarves] will dislike this [the CHP’s defense of religious freedom]” (ANKA, December 10).

Baykal indeed took a bold step by opening one-party rule to debate and indicating that the CHP would defend religious freedom, but there are grounds for being skeptical about the prospects of the “chador initiative.” As political scientist Bekir Berat Ozipek says, having ruled the country single-handedly during the one-party-era (1923-1950), the CHP has not been able to adapt itself to competitive electoral politics since Turkey moved to multi-party rule in the 1950s (Today’s Zaman, December 8). Indeed, the CHP’s critical distance from the masses and their lifestyles and its modernization project of transforming Turkish society have shaped the identity of the party’s core grassroots. Therefore, even if Baykal’s intentions were sincere, many analysts like Ozipek are skeptical about the CHP’s ability to transform itself from a statist party to a liberal party embracing human rights and religious freedom.

Whether sincere or not, if Baykal's recent gamble fails in March elections, it will certainly damage his leadership of the party, leaving him vulnerable to be challenged by Haluk Koç. Key races to watch out for are the Ankara and Kocaeli mayoral races, in which CHP has nominated candidates Murat Karayalçın and Sefa Sirmen.

In other news with CHP, the party's continued vow to oppose any attempt by AKP to renew efforts to overhaul Turkey's military constitution has met with opposition from DSP (the Democratic Left Party). While DSP has not allowed women wearing the chador to enter their party, it has announced that it will not support CHP's opposition to constitutional reform, which might well allow for the substantive policy changes to which both DSP and CHP have before been opposed. It was only with the votes of DSP that CHP was allowed to challenge the headscarf amendments at the Constitutional Court. Although DSP's party has been significantly weakened over the years, the party to which Bülent Ecevit jumped has publicly declared its contention with CHP.

In relation to the Kurdish question, CHP has also revamped its policy. According to TDZ,

The Diyarbakır branch of the CHP submitted a report to the CHP headquarters and is supported by all of the 21 provincial party branches from predominantly Kurdish areas. In the report, the Diyarbakır branch suggested that the party's program first name the question the "Kurdish question" and not hesitate to use the term "Kurd." The report's other suggestions include: "The Kurdish identity should be recognized. Instead of being Turkish, being a citizen of the Turkish Republic should be emphasized. Kurdish language courses should be elective courses in primary and secondary education. Universities should open Kurdish language and literature departments. Formulas should be developed for the integration of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK] members."

. . . .

The CHP in its report on the Kurdish question in 1989 suggested cultural rights -- including education in one's mother tongue -- but was unable to implement its own recommendations.

The recent report issued by the Diyarbakır branch of the CHP also refers to the 1989 report and underlines that this report should be revised.

Kurdish citizens have a tendency to perceive the CHP as a "Turkish nationalist" party. The CHP's votes since the mid 1990s started to decline in Kurdish-populated areas. In the 2002 general elections, they were next to nothing. Baykal, during his visit to Diyarbakır this summer, faced protesters.

Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the former chairman of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, said the CHP's new initiative concerning the Kurdish question is not the talk of the town at all. He noted that the CHP has long had no influence in the region and has therefore not been able to revise its own 1989 report.

"The CHP does not represent anything in the region. This report or any initiative can only be meaningful if the party is able to establish a relationship with Kurds based on trust. For now, the CHP says one thing in Diyarbakır and the exact opposite elsewhere," Tanrıkulu underlined.

As with the chador initiative, it is completely unclear as to exactly what CHP is up to, and for good reason. Reconsidering notions of "Turkishness" seems laughable given CHP's opposition to Article 301, and its obdurate defenses of laws restricting freedom of expression. However, as I mentioned on Wednesday, it is of note that CHP is even campaigning for votes in the southeast given the unlikelihood of the party acheiving even the smallest modicum of success.

Bizarrely, Baykal recently predicted the AKP to receive over 50 percent of the vote. However, a recent MetroPoll has AKP behind, and the election seems all the more unpredictable because parties are reaching out beyond their traditional bases of support. In the end, will CHP be successful in its effort to expand its reach? If it should fail, will it again reverse itself and become even more nationalist? What will become of Baykal, whose authoritarian leadership over the party has long been questioned? If the party were to make inroads, could it sustain itself, or would its lack of a clear agenda result in fragmentation? What would any of these results mean for the future of Turkey's center-left?

KADER Wins Victory in Freedom of Expression Case

From Hürriyet:

KADER President Hülya Gülbahar and association lawyers argue in court that their campaign was covered by the freedom of expression. They cite a case that in the past went to the European Court of Human Rights and a French court’s decision to aid their defense

A women’s organization’s campaign poster featuring a collage of three party leaders arm-in-arm does not violate any law, a court in Ankara decided Friday.

A photo showing Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan linking arms with opposition leaders, Deniz Baykal from the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, and Devlet Bahçeli from the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, were adorned on 1,376 billboards as part of a campaign launched by the Association for the Education and Support of Female Candidates, or KADER.

The move was made to support further female representation in the upcoming local elections in March.

Under the photo, a banner read: "All three of us have the same view: our target is to have women make up 50 percent of candidates for local administrations."

The collage, however, was a fictional one prepared for a billboard campaign to criticize the 1 percent presence of women in local administrations and the political parties’ lack of commitment to boosting female representation in politics.

Soon after the poster appeared on billboards, the MHP leader filed a complaint against KADER for not asking for permission to use his photo.

KADER President Hülya Gülbahar and association lawyers argued in court that their campaign was covered by the freedom of expression. They cited a case that went to the European Court of Human Rights and a French court’s decision in their defense.

For further background, see TDZ, Dec. 25.

Toward Multiculturalism? : Circassians Make Demands for Broadcast Time, Language Departments

From TDZ:

Last year Parliament passed a bill that allowed television broadcasting in languages other than Turkish -- specifically aimed at introducing Kurdish, Arabic and Farsi programming -- and this month TRT 6 began Kurdish programming to appeal to the nation’s 20 million Kurdish citizens. Work is also under way to create Kurdish literature and language departments in Turkish universities. Circassian Turks, who account for an estimated 6 million, are now asking for similar steps to be taken to recognize their culture.

On Monday, President Abdullah Gül received the heads of the Caucasian Associations Federation (an umbrella organization for 56 Circassian groups) at the Çankaya presidential palace. The representatives, Turkish citizens of Abkhazian background, told the president that Turkey had implemented a de facto embargo on Abkhazia and that they had started a signature campaign to reverse it.

The group presented a file to the president containing their requests, and Gül said he would look into and consider their requests. Caucasian Associations Federation Secretary-General Cumhur Bal told Today’s Zaman that the meeting had “passed positively,” adding: “The esteemed president has been informed on the topics. We didn’t see any hint of a negative reaction.”

According to Bal, Gül had responded positively in particular to their requests for Circassian language and literature departments in Ýstanbul and Ankara universities and broadcasts on TRT, saying, “Why not?” In his interview with Today’s Zaman, Bal said the TRT’s current once-a-week, half-hour broadcast in Circassian languages on Thursdays was insufficient. “The programs broadcast soccer match results from a week ago. We know Turkish, we already know about this. Our request is for programming containing news,” Bal explained.

Recalling that the newly started TRT 6 channel was to broadcast in many languages, Bal was quick to point out that his federation was not trying to constitute competition for Kurdish in TV broadcasting. “We see the start of Kurdish broadcasting positively. Broadcasting in Circassian can be on TRT 6 or on other channels. It’s not competition [with Kurdish broadcasting] -- it’s something that we also deserve,” he said, adding that broadcasting in native languages was a way to perpetuate culture and tradition.

For full article, click here.

Circassians comprise approximately 6 million of Turkey's estimated 72 million people. Hürriyet quotes MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, " "Everybody can speak in their mother tongue in their private lives. There is nobody preventing this, we respect this." The issue of using languages other than Turkish in the public sphere is widely opposed by those concerned that it will lead to the deterioration of Turkish nationality, which for many people underpins the basis of Turkish citizenship. Demands for cultural recognition from Circassians and other ethnic groups in addition to the country's Kurdish minority, which constitues 20 percent of its population, will prompt Turkey to give more thought to its accomodation of minorities.

Gaza Imbroglio Places Turkey in Unique Role

Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the UN Security Council meeting on Tuesday. PHOTO from Today's Zaman

While Turkey presses on in its efforts to secure a cease fire in Gaza, using its newly acquired position at the UN Security Council to call for an end to Israeli military operations, Ankara is positioning itself to play a major diplomatic role. President Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, and chief foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu are all engaged in serious shuttle diplomacy, all hoping to prove Turkey has the diplomatic clout necessary to reach a satisfactory resolution of the conflict. At stake is Turkey's historic relationship with Israel (and the United States), its potential to prove itself a worthy foreign policy ally in Europe, and probably most in the minds of the Turkish government, its ambitions to become a major regional player, the latter of which also rests squarely on its perception in the Arab world.

Turkey's recent diplomacy might well have bolstered its foreign policy credentials with the EU. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, praised Turkey's efforts to mediate with Hamas as constructive. And, encouraging words from the Guardian's Simon Tisdall:

Turkey, on the other hand, has played an important role as an intermediary. This should not come as a big surprise. Why the Germans and others (including Sarkozy) cannot accept what a great addition to the EU Ankara's membership would be is hard to understand.

If the proposed cease fire brokered by France and Egypt is actually accomplished, Turkey might well play a pivotal role in future peacekeeping. However, Ankara's foreign policy is very much a balancing act, and there exist plenty of opportunities for it to go awry. Criticizing Erdoğan and the government's dealing with Hamas, Hürriyet issued an editorial arguing that the government should take care in its relations with Hamas, questioning the government's consideration of Hamas as a "responsible actor," and urging the 300+ parliamentarians who are members of the Turkish-Israeli Interparliamentary Friendship Group to play a greater diplomatic role. However, the government's position is unlikely to change. Ha'aretz is reporting that Ankara rejected a proposed visit by Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni following Prime Minister Erdoğan's remarks earlier this week. The explanation reportedly given by Turkish diplomats is that there is no reason for Livni to come unless she is prepared to discuss a cease fire. Turkish diplomats have neither confirmed nor denied the report. Although the recent imbroglio in Gaza is unlikely to change the fundamentals of the Turkey-Israel relationship (see Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu, Dec. 31), it has caused numerous Turkish commentators to be more confident in asserting that ultimately Israel needs Turkey more than the other way around -- for example, see Bülent Kenes in the Guardian.

In other news, Jordan's Queen Rania, Syria's Asma Assad, Qatar's Sheikha Mozah and Lebanon's Wafaa Sleiman joined the Turkish prime minister's wife Emine Erdoğanin İstanbul to call for an end to hostilities between Israel and Hamas. And, in continued solidarity with the people of Gaza, donations continue to flow into local mosques for distribution in Gaza while street protests show no signs of disappearing. In evidence of just how high feelings run, Turkish basketball fans halted a game between a Turkish and Israeli team on Tuesday.

And, not to be lost in the ether, news of anti-Semitism from Bianet:

Criticizing anti-semite comments and reactions in protests against Israel's offensive in Gaza, former head of the conservative rights organization MAZLUMDER Ayhan Bilgen and rights activist –and a Turkish Jew- Avi Haligua underlined the error of identifying a state's policies with its people.

. . . .

"It's a grose error to bill the faults of the Israeli state to Jews living in other parts of the world" said Bilgen. "We must clearly distinguish between demands of peace in the Middle East and demands that would instigate further ethnic and religious fights. One should not forget that the most powerful reaction to Israel's policies comes from within the country, from Israeli peace activists"

Noting he had covered most of the demonstrations in Istanbul, "I'm not comfortable faced with demands to account for Israel's actions" said Haligua.

While this is the case, he also reacts to PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan saying "we've welcomed Jews as our guest here 600 years ago".

"I'm not a Israeli citizen says Haligua. "Utilization of the notion of 'guest' after 600 years shows how deep anti-semitism goes. AKP exploits the situation for the upcoming elections just as the Israeli government does."

He notes that the media lays ground to racist comments through sentimental approaches. "We should demand peace instead of revenge."

Wise words indeed, and on that message, I recommend American progressive Bill Moyers' recent commentary on Gaza and the struggle for peace in the region.

Gas Crisis to Boost Turkey's Hand with Europe

Europe's recent gas crisis lends additional support to the argument that the EU needs a strong relationship with Turkey in order to shore up its energy security. Turkey should not only strengthen its hands going into negotiations with Europe over the Nabucco pipeline, which is set to supply Europe with gas from Central Asia via pipelines laid over Turkey. For more an Nabucco, see this article from the Guardian on Wednesday.

All incoming gas from Russia into Turkey (almost 65& of its total supply) has been cut as a result of Gazprom's dispute with the Ukraine, although the Turkish government has retained the position that there will be enough gas to meet demand. There has been discussion that Turkey might broker a deal with Iran to increase the amount of gas currently being supplied by the Iranians, but the government is reluctant to consider this option.

For analysis by Saban Kardas at EDM, click here. For an excellent synopsis of Turkey's energy policy, focused primarily on its dealings with Europe in energy security matters, see Katinka Barysch's "Turkey's Role in European Energy Security," published in December 2007 by the Center for European Reform.

In related news, Turkey denied Greece's request to be supplied additional gas.

More Ergenekon Arrests

Detentions of 10 military officers in conjunction with the Ergenekon investigation resulted in Gen. İlker Başbuğ, Chief of Turkey's General Staff, calling a meeting Wednesday that included the heads of each branch of Turkey's armed services. After the meeting, Başbuğ met with Prime Minister Erdoğan. The officers were arrested with 20 other individuals amidst doubt that the investigation into "deep state" forces -- long hidden away from public scrutiny -- would go much further. From Emrullah Uslu at EDM:

It appears that the TSK was expecting the operation. The Ankara Central Command reportedly told the security units of the military compounds where active and retired generals live not to allow police and prosecutors to enter the compounds, even with a search warrant, without the command's permission (Taraf, January 9).

As usual, the Ergenekon investigation has once again divided Turkish intellectuals into two camps. On the one hand, Kemalists and neo-nationalist intellectuals argue that it is politically motivated. They maintain that it is no coincidence that the government opposition is the target of the investigation. Some of the pro-Ergenekon intellectuals went so far as to call the arrests of such well-known people “state terror” (Hurriyet, January 8). Chairman of the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) Deniz Baykal harshly criticized the investigation, claiming that it was an attempt to change the Turkish state regime. Baykal even saw parallels to the developments during the preparatory stages of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Aksam, January 8).

On the other hand, some intellectuals say that the Ergenekon investigation is a well-organized investigation and a golden opportunity to punish those who plot against the civilian government (Sabah, Yeni Safak, January 9).

The police reportedly have video tapes of meetings where military plots against the AKP government were discussed (Taraf, December 19). Although these reports need confirmation; it is no secret that Tuncer Kilinc was the first person to advocate that Turkey leave the U.S. and EU camp and form a new pact with Russia and Iran (see EDM, December 2). The Ergenekon network believes that a military coup is the only way to control the government (Sabah January 9).

The recent arrests took place at a time when people had started asking whether the prosecutors could really go any deeper. The recent wave of arrests has shown just how serious the prosecutors are about investigating the Ergenekon network. The wave of arrests has triggered deep concern within the TSK leadership. After the long meeting with other commanders, it appears that Basbug wants to intervene in the due process of the Ergenekon investigation and trial. It will not be the first time that he has actively taken the side of Ergenekon suspects. The day of his appointment as Chief of the General Staff he sent a general to visit retired Generals Hursit Tolon and Sener Eruygur at the prison where they were being held awaiting trial.

The investigation known into Ergenekon is impenetrable for even the most expert in Turkish politics, and media coverage and information released by the government and police is heavily influenced by partisan politics. Both the New York Times and the Financial Times ran brief stories on the recent arrests. For a feel as to just how entangled the politics of Ergenekon are in terms of the government's relationship with the military, read this analysis by Bill Clark, a professor at King's College. The controversies surrounding Dağlica and Aktütün are both documented in this blog, as is the evolving relationship between AKP and the General Staff since the closure case.

Also, perhaps useful, though of course not free from bias, is a recent account by TDZ documenting the investigation from its beginnings last January.



UPDATE 1/10 -- A weapons cache was found in the home of İbrahim Şahin, a former head of the National Police Department’s Special Operations Unit and one of the total of 36 arrested on Wednesday. From TDZ:

The operation started when Şahin, whose phone conversations had been tapped by police for at least two months, recently gave the order to finalize plans to assassinate Armenian community members in the city of Sivas. Twelve others were detained in Sivas during Wednesday’s operation. Police also found evidence that the group was plotting to kill prominent figures including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Former Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt, Police Department Intelligence Unit Chief Ramazan Akyürek, journalist Fehmi Koru, author Orhan Pamuk and some politicians, including members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP).

The fields brought to mind a large number of depots of NATO arms found buried during an investigation launched by Italian prosecutor Felice Casson, who discovered the existence of Operation Gladio, a NATO stay-behind paramilitary force left over from the Cold War. In a panel discussion he participated in in İstanbul last April, Casson said these weapons were found buried in cemeteries, under churches and even in caves. Ergenekon is also thought to be a remnant from the original Turkish Gladio, which was founded against a possible Soviet invasion during the Cold War, but later turned into an organization trying to cut off Turkey's ties with the West. The retired generals arrested in the Ergenekon investigation seem to have an anti-European Union and anti-NATO stance favoring a closer relationship between Turkey and Russia and Eurasian nations.

The article further speculates that the uncovered cache might be linked to violence in the Gölbaşı district of Ankara following the infamous Susurluk incident, the most significant happening since the 1980 coup to raise serious question about the existence of Turkey's deep state.

Also, see Gareth Jenkins' quote in the Guardian yesterday:

Gareth Jenkins, an Istanbul-based expert on Turkish security affairs, said: "The army will have issued a stern warning to the government to back off and that this has to be the last of such arrests. Most of those arrested on Wednesday were not involved in the Ergenekon plot.

"It was just a political move, and has destroyed any hope that the probe will find the real culprits. The question is what happens next. What we are going to see is a power struggle between two fundamentally undemocratic forces using their influence in the judicial system."

Beyond Bananas: Hopes for the Kurdish Minority in 2009

PHOTO from the New York Times

President Gül received praise from those serious about resolving the Kurdish problem when he invited Hakarri DTP deputy Hamit Geylati to Çankaya Palace this November. With Geylati, Gül discussed the status of the Kurdish minority with the president, including cultural and political rights. What made the meeting so remarkable was its contrast to the politics of Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose staunchly nationalist remarks in Hakarri in late October helped ignite protests against the prime minister throughout the region. Sparked by reports from imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's attorney that the exiled head of the infamous separatist group is being mistreated, thousands of Kurds rallied against the prime minister's appearance, prompting stores to be shut down in protest and demonstrators to clash with police. The Prime Minister's failure to fully recognize and promote the cultural and political rights of Turkey's Kurdish minority has been a sore spot for Kurds for some time, and was quite palpable when I visited Diyarbakır last May.

The political differences between Gül and Erdoğan evince the incoherency of the government's policy toward the Kurds, especially at a time of considerable rapprochement, even cooperation, between AKP and the Turkish Armed Services. Like other contrasts between the policy positions the president and prime minister have taken, Gül is more willing to make fundamental reforms, escape from the vicious cycles of past politics, and move Turkey forward. Erdoğan, on the other hand, is playing a role more molded to the traditional statist/nationalist politician. Intellectuals like Mehmet Altan, Ece Temelkuran, Altan Tan, and Hasan Cemal, among scores of others, have expressed scorn at AKP policy as of late (see TDZ, Dec. 2; Yavuz Baydar, Dec. 1). Cemal, who writes for Milliyet, went so far as to compare Erdoğan's increasingly cozy relationship with the Turkish Armed Services (TSK) to Tansu Çiller, who served as prime minister as the state's war against the Kurds escalated in the early 1990s. Indeed, the prime minister's Kurdish policy is so bemoaned by Turkish liberals as to catch the attention of the not-so-long-ago enamored international press: both the New York Times and the Spiegel recently ran stories on the prime minister's disconcertingly nationalist proclivities.

AKP won re-election in 2007 with high hopes that the party would transform politics in the Kurdish southeast, thereby easing tensions between the Turkish state and the PKK terrorist group. The PKK assumed a dominant position in the 1980s following the reactionary-led military coup of 1980 that devastated its politics. Throughout the 1980s and the bitter war the organization fought with the Turkish state in the early 1990s, the PKK declared a right to self-determination for all Kurdish people to be secured by its winning full territorial and political independence from Turkey and forming its own state. Since then, the "Organization," as it is referred to by many Kurds, has expressed its willingness to negotiate a settlement with Turkey that provides the country's Kurdish minority with cultural and political rights to self-determination within the confines of the Turkish state. Since Öcalan's capture in 1999, the PKK is far from monolithic in its structure, ideology, and practical politics, and neither is the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi), often recognized as its political wing. One might think of the DTP's relation to the PKK as similar to that between the IRA and Sinn Feín in Northern Ireland or ETA and Harri Batasuna in the Basque country, although its association is probably even more obfuscate and control weaker. The PKK is largely a destructive force in Kurdish politics, preventing more moderate, compromising voices from rising to power, and conflict between hardliners in the Turkish state and those in the Kurdish minority has the effect of further empowering the hardliners while undermining compromise. This is true in terms of military relations between the PKK and the Turkish military just as it is between nationalist politicians in Ankara and the more radical politicians in the DTP. (For further discussion of this dynamic, see my post on the DTP party conference from last August, as well as my assessment of Kurdish politicians' reactions to the Ergenekon investigation.)

In Hakarri, Erdoğan declared that those who question the idea of "one nation, one flag, one state" should leave Turkey. This is exactly the kind of thinking that will empower hardliners in both the PKK and the DTP, and in an environment in which over 90 percent of Turks would rather live in Turkey than an independent Kurdistan, is likely to disenchant a significant number of Kurds before hopeful that their cultural and social rights might be accommodated within the Turkish state structure. Politicians as far back as the 1960s have recognized that the Kurdish problem affects all of Turkey, and that the only peaceful and just solution is an arrangement in which the Kurdish minority is assured cultural and political rights, and perhaps even given some measure of limited autonomy from Ankara. Just as there are similarities between Turkish and Kurdish citizens, there are also differences, and there is certainly room to negotiate smart, lasting solutions premised on multiple sites of sovereignty, identity, and participation, all secured by rights. Indeed, it is the denial of even the most basic political rights that pits Kurds against Turks (for example, see Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu on freedom of expression and the Kurdish issue), not to mention invasive practices of torture and police abuse that inflict severe psychological damage and ill will. And, while there are plenty of reformers -- Turks and Kurds alike -- who are determined to change the status quo, rhetoric like that from the prime minister in Hakarri is sure effrontery to the spirit of progress first engendered by the more conciliatory politics of AKP, especially when Gül exerted a leadership role within the party.

Disillusionment with AKP's commitment to cultural and political rights for Kurds was already greatly waning at this time last year following the PKK's renewed attacks in fall 2007. My description of the situation I wrote about last February for the most part holds true. Kurds continue to be prosecuted under restrictive speech codes as torture and detention of suspected PKK-members is on the increase. Further, AKP is less likely to offer its support to local efforts that promote Kurdish culture or education. Although the EU still has a very important role to play in implementing law that legalizes rights for Kurds to hold cultural gatherings and conduct Kurdish language education, AKP support for such undertakings remains half-hearted. Further, even though Turkey's recent efforts to make way for a 24-hour Kurdish broadcast channel are hugely laudable, 2008 brought with it more problems as well, including the recent conviction of Leyla Zana, an increase in "open air" torture and detention, and the continued prosecution of Kurds under draconian restrictions of freedom of expression. For the most recent examples, see the cases against journalist Veysi Sarısözen, who is alleged to have praised the PKK in his writings, and Kurdish politician Mahmut Alınak, who was recently sentenced to four months and five days in prison for organizing people to take part in civil disobedience. Harrassment of Kurdish politics is evidenced by the cases brought against Diyarbakir mayor Osman Baydemir and the city's DTP leader, Nejdet Atalay, for referring to members of the PKK as "guerillas" versus "terrorists." Violent protests during Newroz celebrations this March in Van and Hakarri further belie any claim that much progress has been made to stem state repression of Kurdish dissent and open the southeast up politically.

Instead of talking about political and cultural rights, Prime Minister Erdoğan is more keen to talk about economics. Turkish intellectual Ece Temelkuran has compared AKP policy in the southeast to giving out Islamist bananas, an attempt to perhaps bridge the development gap, but an approach that ultimately fails to address the demands of Kurds for the state to recognize their unique identity and standing in Turkish society. (For a similar argument, see Kerem Oktem, who assesses these Islamist bananas as tantamount to co-optation.) While some Turks far too often decry such a demand as separatism, other Turks and most Kurds see recognition as the foundation of basic human rights -- the right to address each other in their own language without state interference, to educate their children in the language of their grandmothers, to celebrate their culture in free assembly, and to enter politics as individuals with identities that might be both Kurdish and Turkish, and therefore, more difficult to negotiate than that of the average Turk. However, what Temelkuran identifies as "Islamist banana politics" and the politics that analyzes in his consideration of AKP policy, fall far short of meeting this demand. Nonetheless, AKP holds economic development and the creation of a state television channel as sufficient compromises, a secret battle plan to combat a war on terrorism that fails to extirpate the root of the problem. While AKP's realization of the need to develop the southeast is light years ahead of the thought asserted by other political parties, it still simply not enough, and as a result, likely to fail. Nonetheless, even when AKP's economic policies for the Kurdish southeast are highly dubious, they have often tacitly endorsed by some in the Western media (see the New York Times' treatment of GAP this March).



Kurdish Turks/Turkish Kurds?? protest in Ankara. PHOTO FROM REUTERS

Islamist banana politics gained further legitimacy this fall when the government and military began working more closely together. As indicated by the recent resignations of former AKP deputy chair Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat, an ethnic Kurd, banana politics are likely to become even more entrenched as the government further eschews cultural and political rights . As Lale Sarııbrahımoğlu elucidates, his replacement, Abdulkadir Aksu, also Kurdish, "has been widely viewed as a reflection of the AK Party's shift in policy from one that supports the greater engagement of Kurds in the political process to one that has further narrowed the room for maneuver for Kurds to express their political opinions." Further signalling this new era of cooperation and consensus on the Kurdish issue, the military top brass, typically quite reticent on political approaches to the Kurdish problem, has publicly agreed with the prime minister that the solution is economic. While this is undeniably in-part the case -- and, despite the TSK's discussion of non-military solutions being a positive step -- the danger is that too exclusive a focus on the economy is incapable of leading to a comprehensive political solution, thereby risking failed policy, and likely more violence as a function of resulting frustration. Not only are banana politics not fair to Kurds, but they are not pragmatic.

Insidious defenses of banana politics cite AKP's decisions as made in agreement with Kurdish public opinion (though the polls are dubitable, and show only the slightest of majorities placing economic over cultural/political concerns), in addition to an exaggerated disconnect between Kurdish intellectuals/political leaders and the overwhelming majority of Kurds, who are overwhelmingly very poor people. The myopia of the banana defenders is on full display in arguing the last point since any amelioration of the living conditions of Kurds will likely raise consciousness of cultural repression, not diminish it. For examples of banana defenses, see Abdulhamit Bilici and Mümtaz'er Türköne. In one defense, Türköne argues,

"For [DTP], the victory of the AK Party, especially in Diyarbakır, will be a
nightmare. If the AK Party wins in southeastern Anatolia, the Kurdish question
will enter a new phase. The PKK and the DTP will not remain the sole powers
designing pro-Kurdish politics. Pro-Kurdish politics will be ‘pluralized.’"

Plural societies value multiculturalism, and rarely does one see pluralism used as a verb; what Türköne means is more closely approximated by the term assimilation, and prosperous, multi-ethnic societies are just as, if not more, likely to resist assimilation and make self-determination claims (see Quebec, the Basque Country and Cataluña, Northern Ireland, Belgium, etc.).

Further undermining its credentials in the southeast, AKP has failed to take a strong stand against DTP's potential closure, leaving many Kurds, even those not necessarily fond of DTP, feeling betrayed. DTP is in the process of preparing itself for potential closure, including forming a backup party, though it is possible that the Constitutional Court will not reach a decision until after March's local elections (see Bianet, Dec. 18).

In an interview this Novemeber in the Spiegel, DTP co-chair Ahmet Türk, a moderate within the party who has denounced PKK violence, characterized the Turkish state's treatment of the Kurdish minority as cultural and social genocide. Although such claims are difficult to adjudicate, they do reveal just how oppressed many Kurds feel by a state that has historically been reluctant to even recognize the fact of a distinct Kurdish identity. It is important to remember that Turkey has gone leaps and bounds from where it was in the 1980s in its treatment of the Kurds (and, this is not to discount the work of leftist before the coup), but it has further to go still. (See Nicole Pope's column from yesterday wherein she recounts remembering a time when "Kurd" was not kosher in policy discussions).

And, while Erdoğan's remarks in Hakarri give cause for concern, President Gül's actions give reason to be hopeful. There are indeed other reasons for hope. In the course of ongoing preparations for local elections, political parties are undertaking intense efforts to win Kurdish votes in the southeast. AKP's recent release of TRT-6 -- and Erdoğan's interview introducing the channel, in which he wishes for its success in Kurdish -- is just one example of the progressive reform that might come about if such competition for Kurdish votes continues. AKP and CHP both have welcomed the recent opening of departments of Kurdish literature at Dicle and İstanbul University, a bill introduced in November by DTP deputy Siirt Osman Özçelik. For its part, CHP has also attempted to court Kurdish voters, though the party, as AKP-leaning Today's Zaman concludes, is less likely to win large percentages. Even so, that the party is making a serious effort despite knowing it is unlikely to have much success is even more indicative of the importance of the Kurds' burgeoning vote in the country.

Also, as the Christian Science Monitor's Yigal Schleifer reports, worthy of note is that the competition for votes is also affecting DTP's politics. In the course of campaigning, DTP has boosted efforts to appeal to religious Kurds and shed its Marxist secular image. DTP's transformation is just as groundbreaking as that of CHP or AKP, if not more so, as a vote-savvy, politically conscious DTP courting religious Kurds is less likely to be beholden to the PKK, and from a stronger position of power, more capable of participating in a political solution to end PKK violence. As Schleifer notes, Kurds are among the most religious of Turkish citizens, and as DTP moves to win Kurdish AKP-voters, AKP will feel even more pressure to win religious Kurds who also demand cultural and political rights. According to Taraf, DTP deputy Hasip Kaplan has already proposed a law allowing that the Kurdish letters Q, W, and X in government correspondence, and attention is focused on the continued prohibition of the use of Kurdish by public officials, including parliamentarians.

Hikmet's Citizenship Restored

From the AP:

Turkey restored the citizenship of its most famous poet Monday in a symbolic step meant to show it was addressing criticism of its human rights record in hopes of joining the European Union.

Turkey stripped Nazim Hikmet of his nationality in 1951 at the height of the Cold War because of his communist views, branded him a traitor and imprisoned him for more than a decade. He died in exile in Moscow in 1963, but his work lived on — and the government's decision to restore his rights is meant to show Turkey is ready to embrace a limited amount of criticism.

"It is a step toward accepting differences in opinions, languages and ethnicity, which is necessary to become a member in the EU," said Dogu Ergil, a political analyst at Ankara University.

The BBC quotes Deputy PM Cemil Çiçek: "The crimes which forced the government to strip him of his citizenship at that time are no longer considered a crime." According to Bianet, in announcing the reinstitution of Hikmet's citizenship at a press conference yesterday, Çiçek declared, "We have annulled a 1951 decree to strip Nazim Hikmet of his Turkish citizenry. UNESCO had declared 2002 the 'Nazim Hikmet Year'. A most reputed name in the literary circles across the globe Nazim Hikmet deserves the annulment of this outdated and meaningless decree."

Hikmet is revered by many in the Turkish left. Outside my apartment in Kocaeli, there was a graffiti caricature of the poet, one of more than a few I saw etched on Turkish streets. Hikmet denounced imperialism, rallied to the causes of labor and worker's rights, and espoused that communism was his country's best hope for democracy and freedom. Useful to those unfamiliar with Hikmet, see a brief biography in today's Hürriyet.



And, to further ruminate on Hikmet, I feel compelled to post this YouTube video sent to me by a friend some time ago. The video is of a Turkish symphony commemorating Hikmet . . . if Copland interpreted Hikmet, I am assuming you would end up with something quite like this.

Turkey & Gaza

Protests have drawn thousands throughout Turkey
PHOTO from Getty Images

Prime Minister Erdoğan delivered his most scathing remarks against Israel yesterday in a move that is likely to compromise Turkey's ability to negotiate a peace agreement between Syria and Israel -- not to mention turn the heads of many Washington policymakers. Erdoğan told "Ehud Barak and (Tzipi) Livni to forget about the elections, because history will judge them for the black stain they are leaving on humanity." The remarks caught criticism in an editorial by the Jerusalem Post, in which the Israeli right paper accuses Turkey of choosing sides, finding no fault with Hamas, de-stablizing the region in its efforts to represent Hamas using its newly acquired seat at the Security Council, and lacking little moral authority on the issue given its treatment of the PKK and the Kurdish minority.

As Yigal Schleifer writes, Turkey would do well to re-assess the limits of its soft power in the region. Nonetheless, the AKP goverment seems to be doing precisely the opposite, suggesting that it is well-positioned to mediate between Hamas and Israel as the circumstances arise, filling Egypt's role now that Mubarak is thoroughly discredited with the Hamas leadership. At question is the future of Turkish diplomatic clout in the region, and the prime minister's actions as they have and will occur are vital to keeping Turkey's diplomatic ambitions alive. Will we see Turkey representing Hamas' concerns at the Security Council? Will Erdoğan, who is sure to be met with a firestorm of criticism in Israel and the United States, alter his comments? In what condition will the Gaza conflict leave Turkey's soft power to conduct peace negotiations between Syria and Israel? With massive protests occurring throughout Turkey, is it even domestically possible for Turkey to have anything to do with Israel?

More Musing About Illiberal Turkey & "Neighborhood Pressure"

Professor Binnaz Toprak of Boğaziçi University recently released the results of a survey of "neighborhood pressure" in Anatolian cities. The survey was conducted in conjunction with the Open Society Institute, and its subjects are self-identified secular university students who the research finds to experience social pressure when moving into conservative neighborhoods. The report is entitled "Being Different in Anatolia." BIA-Net quotes from Professor Toprak's conclusion of the survey's findings:

“Our finds show that overcoming the oppressive conservatism of the ruling power does not play a transforming role in making people more respectful to the rights and freedoms of the people who live in these places. On the contrary, when the process by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to put its own people in the bureaucratic positions combines with the religious-community structuring and the activities in the Anatolian cities, we think the environment that exists now causes more worries when looked from these perspectives.”

BIA-Net documents reaction to the research, which hardly eschews the political in its design, execution, or findings. "Neighborhood pressure" is a commonly cited concern of some secularists, many of whom cited the phenomenon last year as reason for their opposition to the AKP-MHP passed legislation enabling women to wear headscarves at university.

Criticism of Toprak's research includes claims that the research question is not new, and conceptually muddles "social pressure" and "intolerance" (see Emre Uslu and Önder Aytaç), forgoes meaningful explanation of the intolerance it identifies (see Şahin Alpay), and ignores intolerance, bigotry, and social pressure as dilemmas not only related to Islam, but also the values of fanatical secularism and hardcore nationalism (Alpay). The last of these criticisms are also present in this Hürriyet op/ed, which is authored by one of Toprak's former students. Appropriately, the op/ed concludes with qualified optimism:

Unfortunately, some conservative commentators, which have praised previous works by Professor Toprak, now criticize her severely and argue that the "neighborhood pressure" is imaginary. They should have done better. Because pressure is a very personal thing: only you decide whether you face it or not. By this dismissive attitude, those conservatives only mirror the lack of empathy that the secularists show when it comes to the official pressure on veiled women. That’s why we should take Dr. Toprak’s findings seriously. But we should also not exaggerate them. First of all, this is a targeted research, not a random survey. In other words, the interviewees went out to find out those specific groups that could be under neighborhood pressure. So, it does not give a full picture of the country.

In fact, there are many signs showing that Anatolia is actually less conservative today than it used to be. It is more business-oriented, its women are more integrated into society, and it is more open to the world. But perhaps it is this very dynamic which creates a tension. Maybe the clash between the secular establishment and the AKP boils down in society to the tension between the mosque community and beer hall crowd. Maybe, because of their political ascendancy, the conservatives are now more self-confident and triumphant. These are all speculations, since Dr. Toprak’s research does not tells us much about the conservative side of the picture. We would be misleading ourselves by ignoring the complexities there.

We would also be misleading ourselves by thinking that the conservatism in question comes all from religion. The survey tells us that among the "inappropriate" behaviors in Anatolia, there is not just consuming alcohol or "eating during Ramadan", but also speaking Kurdish. "Kurdish youth who are called on their cell phones in a bus by their relatives who don’t speak Turkish," the research says, "decide not to take the call". And allergy to Kurdish is not an Islamic reaction -- it is a nationalist one.The problem, then, is actually a lack of tolerance to anything that is different. And, alas, that is the problem of the whole of Turkey! Not just the religious conservatives but also the secularists are very, very, intolerant. That’s why neighborhood pressure exists everywhere, from conservative and parochial towns to secular and chic plazas. In the former, the headscarf is the demanded norm. In the latter, it is the expelled heresy.

So, you may ask, if it is such a nation of illiberals, is Turkey simply hopeless?

Not really. I think we are still making progress. In the past, one illiberal camp -- the secular Kemalists -- had dominated the whole society. Now we have two illiberal camps clashing with other. That is better, because it paves the road to pluralism. The optimistic scenario is that these two warring camps will wear themselves out, and, over time, come to a live-and-let-live consensus. And the pessimistic scenario? Well, it is that we will be trapped in this cultural civil war, for ever and ever.

The question as to whether the clash between two rather illiberal camps is capable of making Turkey a more pluralistic society is certainly one worth poring over, but politics and institutions have a long way to go until both Turkish state and society are comfortable with accommodating differences.

Kurdish Broadcasting and TRT-6: Time Will Tell

PHOTO BY Yigal Schleifer

From Yigal Schleifer at his blog, Istanbul Calling:

In what could be a very significant move, Turkey's state broadcaster (TRT) is set to launch a Kurdish-language channel in the beginning of 2009. Full details about the channel, called TRT 6, are still sketchy, but it promises to provide much more than the pitiful current level of public broadcasting in Kurdish, limited to a few hours a week and hardly watched.

Dedicating a channel to Kurdish programming is an important recognition of a language that's the mother tongue of millions of Turks. But TRT 6's real aim, it appears, is to undercut the appeal of Roj TV, a Kurdish satellite network broadcasting out of Europe, that is extremely popular among Turkey's Kurds. Ankara has accused Roj of being a mouthpiece for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and of spreading anti-Turkish propaganda. But the channel, which shows a mix of news, music videos and other programs, has been able to become as popular as it is because there has been no other alternative out there.

Taking on Roj might be a tough job, though. The network's appeal, besides that it broadcasts in Kurdish, is based on its independence and the fact that it shows things no Turkish channel would dare do, such as footage from the PKK's camps in Northern Iraq or performances by Kurdish musicians who are banned in Turkey because of their political views. The channel also acts as a kind of Kurdish grapevine. I was in the predominantly-Kurdish southeast of Turkey a few years ago working on a piece about Roj TV and met with a family whose son was a PKK guerilla who had recently been killed in a clash with Turkish forces. When I asked them how they found out about their son's death, both parents told me that it was through Roj. I heard similar stories from other people.

If TRT 6 puts on some innovative programming, or at least programs that aren't produced with a very heavy state hand, then it and Roj TV might be in for an interesting ratings battle. We'll be watching.

As expected, the response to TRT-6 is mixed among both Turkish and Kurdish officials. TDZ quotes former Diyarbakır Bar Association President Sezgin Tanrıkulu: "This is an important and serious step. This shows that the state has moved on from the stage of denying the existence of Kurds to acknowledging Kurds. We can discuss the content of the channel, but regardless of all of that, it is important that a public broadcaster is allocating one channel for this." Meanwhile, Kurdish hardliners like party co-chair Emine Ayna and prominent DTP deputy Selhattin Demirtaş dismiss the channel as mere AKP politicking. One common attitude is reflected by Batman mayor and DTP party member Nejdet Atalay: “For years, Kurdish was recorded in police records as an ‘unidentified language.’ They used to tell us that Kurds do not exist. Now they are going to tell us that there is no such thing as Kurds in Kurdish.” DTP rhetoric is driven in part by upcoming local elections for which AKP and DTP are vying for votes, but should not be dismissed as mere campaigning. A more cogent call for skepticism was made by former DTP deputy Mahmut Alınak. From Bianet:

Reminding that he was punished for playing Kurdish music during an election period by the Kars Criminal Court of First Instance with three more people, Alınak said, “The state made this move because it could no more go on with the century long ban. Since it could not silence technology the Kurdish TV channels that already exits, it will try to reduce their influence.“The state made this move because it could no more go on with the century long ban. Since it could not silence technology the Kurdish TV channels that already exits, it will try to reduce their influence."

In Ankara, political parties are similarly divided. Predictably, CHP leadership is discontented while AKP and government officials hail the channel as a major step forward in the state's relationship with its Kurdish minority -- roughly 20 percent of its population.

After the 1980 coup, Kurdish language was largely prohibited in public places. Although there still exist numerous restrictions on Kurdish cultural life, a 24-hour Kurdish broadcast channel is a welcome development, especially if the channel is well-implemented and proves itself more than an election ploy. However, the channel has no firm legal basis, and appears more than a bit of a contradiction when restrictions are still in place that prevent the use of Kurdish letters in public documents. Pressing the government for further reform, DTP deputy Hasip Kaplan has proposed a law to include letters x, w, q in the alphabet and the removal of all the obstacles before the Kurdish language. And, to remove any question about the legality of using Kurdish in public -- which, given TRT-6, is indeed bizarre -- Gültan Kışanak, DTP’s Diyarbakır deputy, prepared a bill that will enable the Kurdish language to be used in the public space (see Bianet, Jan. 2).

An optimistic outlook of TRT-6 is made in a TDZ op/ed by Mutlu Çiviroğlu:

TRT's Kurdish broadcasts actually started in 2004, after the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) approved legislative amendments that allowed TRT and private channels to broadcast in local languages and dialects. Following these amendments, on June 7, 2004, TRT 3 started broadcasting in both the Kurmanji and Zazaki Kurdish dialects, as well as in Arabic, Circassian and Bosnian, each for 30 minutes a day. Due to legal obligations, all broadcasts had to have Turkish subtitles and the content and timing of the programs did not attract many viewers.

However, with the recent initiative of the Kurdish TV station, TRT officials seem to have taken a different view. In an interview with the Zaman daily, TRT General Director İbrahim Şahin said they would primarily use Kurmanji, which is spoken by 90 percent of the people in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish regions, and that they would later include the Zazaki and Sorani dialects, as well. "Our intention is not to scare anybody. We sincerely want to meet the need for a TV channel for people who couldn't learn Turkish. This channel will be a family channel, like TRT 1, that will have series, entertainment programs and news programs. It will have everything that a family channel offers. As long as our national unity, integrity, anthem and flag are not disrespected, we will produce the same programs for the Kurdish channel that we do on other TRT channels. In the Constitution, Article 2954 clearly indicates our principles and mission and, on the condition of remaining within these boundaries, our colleagues will be able to freely say and produce whatever they want," Şahin explained.

In fact, Dec. 25, 2008, represented a remarkable day for the democratization of Turkey and the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks because the opening of the Kurdish TV station has a historical significance and meaning for Turkey. It's the common hope and desire of many people that this channel will be a democratic and objective project that will respect the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish people. It is also hoped that TRT 6 will act as a bridge for sharing the language, literature, culture and traditions of Kurds and strengthening mutual love and respect between Kurds and Turks. Instead of making premature judgments and labeling the channel as a mouthpiece of the government, perhaps it would be wiser to give it some time and contribute to it in different ways.

Just how those cultural and linguistic rights will be negotiated with Article 2954 and other Turkish law will, of course, be the real kicker. As Schleifer writes, we will be watching. For a great piece on Roj-TV, see Schleifer from 2006. For a coverage from the Economist, click here.

Female Circumcision in Iraqi Kurdistan

PHOTO from the Washington Post

From the Washington Post:

Kurdistan is the only known part of Iraq --and one of the few places in the world--where female circumcision is widespread. More than 60 percent of women in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq have been circumcised, according to a study conducted this year. In at least one Kurdish territory, 95 percent of women have undergone the practice, which human rights groups call female genital mutilation.

The practice, and the Kurdish parliament's refusal to outlaw it, highlight the plight of women in a region with a reputation for having a more progressive society than the rest of Iraq. Advocates for women point to the increasing frequency of honor killings against women and female self-immolations in Kurdistan this year as further evidence that women in the area still face significant obstacles, despite efforts to raise public awareness of circumcision and violence against women.

"When the Kurdish people were fighting for our independence, women participated as full members in the underground resistance," said Pakshan Zangana, who heads the women's committee in the Kurdish parliament. "But now that we have won our freedom, the position of women has been pushed backwards and crimes against us are minimized."

There is a photo gallery accompanying the story, and, yes, it is quite gruesome to get through.

Environment and Human Rights Concerns Defeat Ilısu Dam

PHOTO BY Carolyn Drake/The Walrus

From the Guardian:

Insurers delivered a victory for environmentalists and dealt a body blow to Turkey's economic regeneration plans yesterday by pulling the plug on a bitterly contested dam project that critics claimed would wreck habitats, displace people and drown ancient archaeological treasures.

A consortium of German, Austrian and Swiss insurance firms ordered a halt to the £1.1bn Ilisu dam in Turkey's impoverished south-east after concluding that it failed to meet standards set by their governments and the World Bank.

The decision means suppliers underwritten by the insurers will have to stop work on the dam, located by the banks of the Tigris near Turkey's borders with Iraq and Syria, for 180 days and casts doubts on its long-term viability.

Environmentalists, heritage organisations and human rights groups campaigned against the project claiming it would have meant the loss of around 80 towns, villages and hamlets and the destruction of large areas of farmland. They argued that the mainly Kurdish local population had not been properly consulted and that between 50,000 and 80,000 people would be forced from their homes without compensation.

Heritage campaigners also claimed that the project would flood ruins from ancient Mesopotamia in the town of Hasankeyf and other sites, which are believed to contain evidence of 100,000 years of human occupation.

For full article, click here. The proposed dam has long been controversial, and has had both human rights and environmental groups mobilized for some time. There were concerns earlier this year that the German government might block the dam's construction. Hasankeyf was featured in an issue of the Atlantic this past November. See also Yigal Schleifer's earlier reportage of Ilısu, and the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) of which it is part. The AKP had sold the project on the grounds that it was vital to the economic development of the Kurdish southeast, though it is likely a majority of Kurds opposed it.

Also happy will be Turkey's southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq, which had both expressed anger at Turkey's decision to dam the valuable water of the Tigris.

The Pleasures and Guilts of Wealth: New Money and What to Do With It

One of New York Times correspondent Sabrina Tavernise's recurring themes is that of Turkey's emerging religious middle classes, and her insight into this new elite is on full display in this article from today's NYT. From the article:

Money is at the heart of the changes that have transformed Turkey. In 1950, it was a largely agrarian society, with 80 percent of its population living in rural areas. Its economy was closed and foreign currency was illegal. But a forward-looking prime minister, Turgut Ozal, opened the economy. Now Turkey exports billions of dollars in goods to other European countries, and about 70 percent of its population lives in cities.

Religious Turks helped power that rise, yet for years they were shunned by elite society. That helps explain why many are engaged in such a frantic effort to prove themselves, said Safak Cak, a Turkish interior designer with many wealthy, religious clients. “It’s because of how we labeled them,” he said. “We looked at them as black people.”

Mr. Cak was referring to Turkey’s deep class divide. An urban upper class, often referred to as White Turks, wielded the political and economic power in the country for decades. They saw themselves as the transmitters of the secular ideals of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s founder. They have felt threatened by the rise of the rural, religious, merchant class, particularly of its political representative, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“The old class was not ready to share economic and political power,” said Can Paker, chairman of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, a liberal research organization in Istanbul. “The new class is sharing their habits, like driving Mercedes, but they are also wearing head scarves. The old class can’t bear this.”

“ ‘They were the peasants,’ ” the thinking goes, Mr. Paker said. “ ‘Why are they among us?’ ”

Ms. Aydin, 40, who wears a head scarf, encountered that attitude not long ago in one of Istanbul’s fanciest districts. A woman called her a “dirty fundamentalist” when Ms. Aydin tried to put trash the woman had thrown out her car window back inside.

“If you’re driving a good car, they stare at you and point,” Ms. Aydin said. “You want to say, ‘I graduated from French school just like you,’ but after a while, you don’t feel like proving yourself.”

She does not have to.

Her father started by selling curtains. Now he owns one of the largest home-appliance businesses in Europe. Ms. Aydin grew up wealthy, with tastes no different from those of the older class. She lives in a sleek, modern house with a pool in a gated community. Her son attends a prestigious private school. A business school graduate, she manages about 100 people at a private hospital founded by her father. Her head scarf bars her from employment in a state hospital.

Her husband, Yasar Aydin, shrugged. “Rich people everywhere dislike newcomers,” he said. In another decade, those prejudices will be gone, he said.

The businessmen describe themselves as Muslims with a Protestant work ethic, and say hard work deepens faith.

“We can’t lie down on our oil like Arab countries,” said Osman Kadiroglu, whose family owns a large candy company in Turkey, with factories in Azerbaijan and Algeria. “There’s no way out except producing.”

Tavernise also briefly touches on how this newly emergent middle class is dealing with their new money status, and religious dictates that one should not consume more than one needs. Tavernise observes many wealthy and religious Turks justify the purchasing of extravagances by complementing such acquisitions with generous donations to religious charities (like Deniz Feneri). For full article, click here.

In my mind is Dutch painter Pieter Aertsen's juxtaposition of sinful meats and mussels alongside less lavish foods of piety, like bread and fish. For more on Islamic Calvinism and Turkey's religious classes, see the European Stability Initiative's 2005 report on the subject. For more on class politics in Turkey, see my June analysis of a 2005 law prohibiting newly arrived "black Turks" -- by no means the Islamic Calvinists referred to by Tavernise as buying fancy sinks and curtains -- from swimming in their underwear.

The İstanbul Cobber and the Shoe Heard Round the World

From Yigal Schleifer at his blog, Istanbul Calling:

I just spent some time today in the factory of the Turkish shoemaker who claims that it was his company's shoe that was thrown at George W. Bush and that his sales are now booming. Hard to verify his claims: the offending shoes have apparantly been destroyed, although I did see a group of men in the company's workshop feverishly making pairs of the shoe -- now renamed the "Bye Bye Bush" model -- for delivery to Iraq.

There certainly is a precedent for this intersection of politics and fashion (if that's a word we can use in connection with a very chunky, though suprisingly light, pair of shoes). In late 2005, Istanbul suitmaker Recep Cesur made headlines and then reaped a harvest of increased sales after Saddam Hussein appeared in a Baghdad court wearing a pinstriped Cesur suit. Cesur's sales skyrocketed in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, his suits now carrying with them the scent of power while making the statement that "I'm sticking it to the Americans" (or, more likely, to George Bush). During a visit to Cesur's Istanbul showroom, I even met an Iranian wholesaler who was snapping up Cesurs. The Iranians, who suffered terribly during the long war with Iraq in the 1980's, are no fans of Saddam, he told me. But a Cesur suit now had cache, he said. "If Michael Jackson drinks Coke, people will go to the supermarket and ask for Coke, not something else," he said.

You can read the article about Cesur and his suits here.

Click here for the New York Times article featuring Ramazan Baydan, the Turkish shoemaker who claims to have made the famous shoes.