Democracy and Education (And An Evermore Divided Turkey)

PHOTO from Vatan

The parliament took up the proposed education law (see past post for background) yesterday just hours after 20,000 demonstrators gathered in Ankara's Tandogan Square to protest what opposition groups view as a unilateral attempt by the ruling AKP to overhaul the education system.

The law the AKP is trying to pass is publicly referred to as "4+4+4" because it seeks to make 12-year education mandatory for all children. Yet that is not the full story. Under the current system, public education is mandatory for the first eight years, after which students may opt to attend imam-hatip, or religious high schools that teach a mixture of standard education and theology, and which are subject to different standards -- and, naturally -- a different ideological/pedagogical atmosphere. The proposed law, which has been amended since my last post, also includes provisions that would pave the way for children to opt to attend imam-hatip  as early as 10 years of age, as well as enter special vocational schools. The original law had included a measure that would allow children to opt into "open education," or home schooling, as early as 10 years of age. That provision has since been amended under pressure from women's another groups that introducing open education at such an early age would lead to an increase in child labor and young girls being kept from school to work at home -- a problem in conservative communities that activist groups have long sought to remedy.

The proposed system seeks to effectively divide education into three tiers -- first, middle, and high school. The government also plans to introduce a year before primary education akin to what in the United States is known as "pre-school," and which AKP politicians have haled as a major selling point of the new law. Under the proposal, children would also be able to join private religious education courses, often held during the summer, after their fourth year in school.

For AKP policymakers, the new system is to be celebrated not only as a means to further the quality of public education but also "democracy" -- a word much heralded by AKP politicians, but which for all intents and purposes, seems simply to mean rule by the majority, and a majority as the ruling party interprets it (for more on this, see this past post he AKP's sparring with TUSIAD, the leading business association in Turkey which has puts itself squarely in opposition to the new arrangements).

Much at the heart of the AKP's framing the issue is the fact that the current system is largely the product of the 1997 "postmodern coup" that toppled the country's former Islamist-led coalition, in which the AKP has its roots. Under military tutelage in the years after the coup, the government sought to guard secularism against what the generals saw as the rising tide of political Islam and the current education system was a major concern, in particular the increasing popularity of imam-hatip. The system prior to the coup allowed parents to place their children in imam-hatip at the age of 10, a policy to which the AKP is returning. It also forbade children to take private religious courses (for example, during summer vacation) before completing five years in school.

Though the reform process at the time was far from democratic and involved a major abuse of power by the military, as well as persecution of numerous educators and students haling from conservative Muslim backgrounds, the new policy did yield some positive results, including an increase in the enrollment rate of girls in the first eight years of public education (from 34% to 65%). While the coup-driven education reform of the late 1990s should in no way be celebrated, the AKP should at the least explain how its new policy will not seek to imperil the success of the past decade in this regard. Yet rather than explaining how the new system (or devising one alternative to that proposed) might build on increased enrollment rates while adopting a more sensitive approach to religion, the party has instead simply decried opponents of the law to be against "democracy."

Polarization over the new law reached a new high two weeks ago when the parliamentary commission responsible for education policy ramrodded the proposal through the commission amidst fistfights between the ruling party and the opposition. Knowing that debate could delay the law's passage through the commission, the AKP blockaded opposition party members' attendance in attempt to forestall efforts to frustrate passage to the parliament's general assembly.

Soon after the brawl, the opposition CHP petitioned to annul the commission's vote, arguing that procedural rules had been violated. Yet parliament speaker Cemil Cicek seems to have no intention of returning the law to commission, and the party's plans at this point are to pass the law in the general assembly by the end of the week.

The protests yesterday reveal just how divided Turkey is becoming. Speaking at Tandogan, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu said the law is not "4+4+4," but "8/2." Kilicdaroglu was referring to the two different standards of education children would be receiving after the first eight years (and, in reality, after the age of 10 given the planned introduction of vocational schools and imam-hatip at so young an age). Yet there is another element to the leader's words worth exploring.

Though some of the AKP's policies have aimed to strip national education of some of the more distressing nationalist/ideological aspects of public education (for example, military-designed national security education courses and celebrations of national youth day, which liberals have long considered quasi-fascist), the fact that the government's most recent effort seems to setup a system parallel to that of national education (that is, imam-hatip and vocational education), there is real concern that the secular/conservative divide could grow deeper.Further, there is the very real possibility that a large number of Turks (future voting citizens) as early as age 10 could receive an education that is sub-par when compared to their counterparts that finish 12 years of public eduction. While these students might be more likely to constitute the "pious generation" Erdogan envisioned a few weeks before the education debate started in full, it is highly unlikely that they would demonstrate the same level of political efficacy and sophistication as their more educated counterparts.

Among the groups protesting the new legislation at Tandogan is Egitem-Sen, the left-leaning teachers' union, as well as the Rightful Women's Platform and the Federation of Turkish Women's Associations. The Confederation of Public Sector Workers (KESK), of which Egitem-Sen is a part, is also present. Egitem-Sen has called for two days of teachers' strikes to demonstrate against the proposed law, and is the chief organizer of the demonstrations alongside the CHP.

Ankara's governor, who is a member of the AKP, has questioned the legality of the assembly, and though he has yet to break up the gathering, he has threatened to do so. The municipality has removed banners and placards put up in the environs -- a move CHP parliamentarian and women's rights defender Binnaz Toprak described as a violation of freedom of expression. And so it seems there is potential for the fighting in parliament to soon bleed onto the streets -- a country divided indeed, and with neither liberal nor consensual democracy anywhere in sight at the moment. For more coverage in English of yesterday's protests, click here.

Religious Education and 4+4+4

PHOTO from Birgun

Fast approaching the anniversary of the Feb. 28 process, or the 1997 "postmodern coup" that brought about the fall of the Islamist Refah government and a slate of reforms to defend secularism against what was perceived by some as the encroaching threat posed by political Islam, the government has announced plans to restructure Turkish education.

Reforms include provisions that would allow school children to receive education at religious (imam-hatip) high schools after completing four years of primary education or pursue distance learning (essentially "home school") courses. At the moment, students are required to complete eight years of education before being allowed to complete the final four years at imam-hatip, which combine traditional and religious education. Under the new law, education would be structured into three four-year segments: four years primary (ilk), four years middle (orta), and four years high school (lise), and hence the 4+4+4. The government is arguing the new law is an improvement since all 12 years will be mandatory even if it is to be completed at home.

The problems with the law should be apparent, and late this week earned the denunciation of the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists' Association (TUSIAD) and prominent opinion leader and entrepreneur Guler Sabanci. In rural areas, particularly in the east and southeast where children, particularly girls, already do not go to school, the law would greatly diminish educational standards. Parents in these areas are often not well-educated themselves (this is an understatement), and would not be capable of providing a quality education. Further, child labor is a tremendous problem (see past post) and girls are frequently kept at home (for more on this, see past post; see also the above advertisement from a 2010 campaign launched by Milliyet urging fathers to send their daughters to school).

The proposed law also allows for provision that would reduce the age of apprenticeship to 11, though it is still unclear to me as to how an apprenticeship works. (Is it pursued concurrent with other curriculum? Does it allow one to withdraw from school entirely? Would this possibly trigger more child labor?) The apprenticeship is also chief among TUSIAD's concerns (for more, click here).

On Wednesday, the parliament sub-commission for education took up the bill after a debate by a wider debate by a larger commission. Though the AKP has been sensitive to criticisms coming from groups such as TUSIAD and has expressed some willingness to compromise, it is unclear just how many of the proposed provisions could be made law. The sub-commission is scheduled to take the draft up once more on Feb. 28 after some tweaking from party officials. For an account in English, click here.

Cumhuriyet columnist Utku Cakirozer frames the recent move within the context of the Feb. 28 process. Cakirozer refers to measures put into play soon after the coup that required all students to attend eight years of primary education (from five to eight) before dropping out or enrolling in imam-hatip. The generals also restricted Koran courses. Students were not allowed to enroll in Koran courses until after their fifth year of school, and courses were subject to inspection by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet. Penalties, including prison sentences for parents who did not send their children to schools or sent their children to Koran courses before they were old enough. In addition, operators of illegal Koran courses were also subject to penalties.

Gradually, the AKP government has whittled away at what some might read as particularly intrusive restrictions, particularly on religious education. In 2003, prison sentences were replaced with fines; in 2004, parliament reduced the sentence for running an illegal Koran course from three years to one and ended and authorities ceased closing down illegal courses; in 2005, the Diyanet ceased inspecting Koran courses; and after last June's elections, the minimum age for Koran courses was eliminated. According to Cakirozer, the goal is now to do away with the eight-year rule for uninterrupted education.


As it inevitably does, the headscarf also falls into the debate. As Cakirozer points out, young girls wearing the headscarf (as young as fifth grade) will now be allowed to do so at imam-hatip, effectively ending the ban. I care more about the fact that these children will simply not receive the same quality of education as I do about an effective end to the ban after that age (the ban was one of the reasons driving the government to do this to begin with), but it is important to note that is also important for many critics of the new law (for another example, see this coverage from Hurriyet).

Other columnists and opinion leaders see the law as a broad-based effort to increase the influence of Islamist education, particularly imam-hatip and Koran courses. For an example, see Egitim-Is head Veli Demir's comments in Melih Asik's column in Milliyet.


UPDATE I (2/27) -- Nicole Pope's column in Today's Zaman offers a solid English-language analysis summing up the threat the proposed law poses to Turkish education.

"Pious Generations"

PHOTO from Radikal

The prime minister made waves last Wednesday when criticizing CHP Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who had, as he routinely does, accused the prime minister of religious populism.

Erdogan, in response, said, "Do you expect the conservative democrat AK Party to raise atheist generations? This may be your business and objective but not ours. We will raise a generation that is conservative and democratic and embraces the values and historical principles of its nation?" The remarks have caused a firestorm of controversy, most of it re-active, as the Turkish public waits for Erdogan to clarify his remarks.

Though the AKP has always publicly affirmed its commitment to secularism, most notably of late in the prime minister's address in Cairo last September, doubts still linger as to whether the party is simply waiting to show its true face. Yet this does not really capture the picture. The issue now is not so much whether Turkey could give way to the religious fanaticism of Iran, which was always an overblown assessment, but whether religious minorities and nonbelievers can be secure in their rights as minorities amidst a largely Sunni, and fairly conservative, religious population. The tension between the two rises to the surface as much in private space as public, in particular when it comes to neighborhoods where the more and less religious are now residing next to each other and walking the same streets.

The real concern with Erdogan's remarks is to just what role he envisions the state to play in the religious arena. AKP officials are well-known for espousing their support for the American interpretation of secularism over the French, which is entirely different, but as I have written before (see past posts), these same officials often do not have a very good understanding of the American system nor is it free from excesses and more than the occasional encroachment of religion into public policy making whereby minorities -- religious, sexual, and otherwise -- routinely face discrimination thanks to legislation seeking to promote values.

Turkey, though not by any means more liberal than the United States, has to some degree been protected from such excesses thanks to the state's understanding of secularism, which, despite a horrible history of discrimination against what likely is a religious majority (for example, the headscarf ban), has explained why many of Turkey's minorities, in particular Alevis and Jews, are quite nervous about the state of secularism in Turkey (whether they would characterize it as "deterioration," "decline," or "renegotiation"). I know this last sentence has a lot of clauses, but is revealing of the degree of careful qualification and nuance the issue requires. What is disturbing about Erdogan's recent remarks is precisely their lack of nuance.

Even more disturbing is that after making the remarks, Erdogan did simply clarify his remarks and put the matter to bed. First, seemingly attempting to re-frame his remarks by stating that "people can be both pious and modern," and only after stating that criticism of his remarks was the product of an ill-intentioned defamation campaign, the prime minister posed this set of twin rhetorical questions: "Do you want our youth to become thinner addicts? Do you want a new generation that has no moral values and no purpose?" Thinner addiction has become a major problem among youth in many of Turkey's large cities, which have experienced massive amounts of migration and where many still live in poverty.


UPDATE I (2/15) -- The Young Academicians have initiated a campaign in response to the prime minister's remarks, which can be viewed here, along with a letter of concern (English version here) addressed to the prime minister. An excerpt:

We, as the youth and academics of this country, of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Alawite, Shafi'i, religious and nonreligious, atheist and agnostic backgrounds, all joined with a firm belief in secularism, find your recent remarks about raising a religious and conservative youth most alarming and dangerous.

. . . .

We further condemn your speech which served only to hurt and humiliate the children that live on the streets in Turkey (stigmatised with the media-catchphrase of ‘thinner-addicted children’), who already live under harsh conditions and who are subject to abuse. The plight of these children is not due to a lack of spirituality, as you have implied, but is caused by the deep-rooted social and economic problems of our country, to which you have served as Prime Minister for a decade.

Not Just a Thin Skin . . .

The Wall Street Journal's Marc Champion will no doubt soon be on the AKP's list of journalists being used by international gangs to undermine its government. In an article appearing yesterday, Champion reports on what observers of Turkish politics have long known: Prime Minister Erdogan is a very, very litigious man. For the story, click here.

According to Champion, Erdogan had filed 57 libel suits by 2005, just two years after taking office. He won 21 of the cases, netting a total 700,000 Turkish Lira, or about $440,000, in compensation. An excerpt:

Since then, the government has refused to answer further questions on the matter. It said that whomever Mr. Erdogan sues—under article 125 of the Turkish penal code—is a private affair. The law criminalizes insults against a person's honor, differentiating such barbs from other protected free speech. Guilty parties face a maximum penalty of two years in jail.

Mr. Erdogan's spokesman didn't respond to several phone and email requests for comment.

Fikret Ilkiz, a prominent Turkish press freedom lawyer, says the frequency with which the prime minister's lawyers launch insult suits on his behalf has increased since 2005. By now the tally is "in the hundreds," he estimates, and has triggered a boom in lawsuits launched by cabinet ministers and legislators. Mr. Ilkiz added that previous prime ministers rarely used article 125.

The article goes on to document a few recent libel suits the prime minister has filed, including the one against the Milliyet cartoonist who depicted him as a cat tied up in yarn, as well as another involving a theater troupe and the case against British citizen Michael Dickinson, who drew the prime minister's head on a dog's body.

While the prime minister seem to have problems dealing with criticism, however tasteless or disrespectful it might be, he has no problems dishing it out. Erdogan recently called Milliyet journalist Nuray Mert "despicable" for having written that new roads the government is building in the southeast will facilitate security operations and threatened another journalist, Abbas Guclu, for tying the prime minister to a scandal involving Turkey's university entrance exam. In regard to Guclu, Erdogan said the journalist would "pay the price" for his allegations. For a litany of such allegations, see Sedat Ergin's recent column (in Turkish) in Hurriyet.


UPDATE I (6/9) --  Another example (from Milliyet, in Turkish) of the prime minister's thin skin was displayed when Erdogan accused Taraf columnist Ahmet Altan of insulting him after the columnist said he would not be voting for the AKP on Sunday.

Why Turkey and Turkish Civil Society Matter

Far too many Western political leaders, thinkers, and donors, especially here in Washington, have come to think of Turkish democracy as a “mission accomplished,” or at least, a project "near complete.” The sad state of affairs is indeed the opposite, and mostly sadly, it is this premature attitude that could turn Turkey back toward its authoritarian past rather than build on the democratic successes it has achieved in the past 15 years.

As American think-tanks bandy about a “Turkish model” as some ideal path for the newly emerging Arab democracies to follow, the real state of Turkish political affairs remains a mystery to all too many. In fact, Turkey now has more journalists in prison than any other country in the world, including China. And, like China, a new Internet regulation that goes into effect Aug. 22 will set up an online filtering and surveillance system by which every Turkish citizen will be followed by the government using an online profile. These developments are all the more disturbing given the ongoing Ergenekon investigation, which while supposed to bring down the infamous Turkish “deep state,” instead has been used as a political tool to go after the ruling AKP government’s political enemies.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish conflict, which the government’s “Kurdish opening” was to finally bring to a close by granting Turkey’s Kurdish population of 15 million plus people cultural and minority rights, has ground to a halt. Prime Minister Erdogan just over a year ago recognized the “Kurdish problem” as a democracy problem, but has since denied its existence. Last summer saw the largest escalation of the conflict since the 1990s, and given the government’s recent nationalist posturing, it is highly unlikely that the problem will be resolved.

Most important of all is Turkey’s stalled European Union accession process, the primary fuel behind the rapid-pace reforms that constitute Turkey’s democratic successes at the turn of the millennium. However, more than four years have passed since Turkey began accession negotiations, wherein the country has made little progress in fully meeting the EU’s Copenhagen criteria for democracy and human rights. Indeed, as Dilek Kurban notes in yesterday’s post, progress has actually become regression. Turkey now has a repressive Anti-Terrorism Law in place that has landed thousands in prison without adequate legal redress and torture, illegal detention, and impunity remain problems just as daunting as they were before the AKP entered power in 2002.

The main problem, more than any other, is a ruling party that has distanced itself from the liberal democracy it once embraced to in its place champion a majoritarian conception of rule by the people where minorities, opposition figures, and political dissenters are becoming less secure in their rights by the day. Democracy, as the AKP understands it, is rule by the majority—it is electoral authoritarianism dressed up to look nice for Western audiences keen to fondly fixate on the notion of an Islamist party that has somehow come to champion a long oppressed majority while adopting liberal values. However, the AKP is not liberal. While there is plenty of truth that the majority of conservative Muslim Anatolia has been repressed throughout the history of the country’s history, now it is the majority who is comfortable to reign over the minority.

There is no resolving the Madisonian dilemma—the inherent conflict between majority rule and individual liberties—for the ruling AKP government. There is only a will to power—a will evinced by Prime Minister Erdogan’s designs to create a presidential system. As The Economist noted in its controversial editorial endorsing the CHP and which now has the prime minister fuming about Zionist-driven conspiracies, if the AKP is to unilaterally push through a new constitution, it could end up being worse than the greatly amended one currently in place.

Ironically, if the United States and Europe do not move fast to realize what is happening inside Turkey, the world will lose a country that really could serve as a democratic example to the Arab Middle East. The AKP government made tremendous progress when it first came to power in 2002, and it could be said that the party’s first years in office provided the best government in the history of the Turkish Republic. However, a lot has happened since and the model is at risk. If Turkey’s democratic progress is ultimately lost, then there will not only be the lack of a democratic success story in the region but a failure that could set back Islamist/conservative democrats in other Muslim countries who otherwise have good chances of making democracy work. And, as recent survey research attests, Arabs are paying attention. (66% of Arabs surveyed at the end of last summer said they viewed Turkey as a democratic model.)

What is to be done?

Now is the time for action. The EU accession engine that powered the AKP’s early reform efforts is imperiled by the Greek Cypriot presidency, which will commence in just a little more than a year from now.  This means the Turkish government, which will still be led by the AKP whether the party gains a super majority or not, must make serious progress toward accession. The country is in a race against time. And, no matter what happens in June elections, movement toward a new constitution, or at least major constitutional reform, will be on the plate.

In this context, Turkish civil society will prove key to saving Turkish democracy just as it did during the optimistic years after the EU accepted Turkey’s application for membership in 1999 and major reforms started coming down the pipe. The authoritarian tendencies of Turkish political parties, not exclusive to the current party in power, need to be countered by civil society.

When the AKP tried to make adultery illegal in 2004 and ignore legislative proposals that would reduce the sentences for honor killings and rape in certain instances, it was a highly mobilized network of women’s groups that pushed the party to do the right thing. Many of these groups had become empowered thanks to donor money and expertise, and they fought the good fight, and well, won.

Though Turkey is now confronting a different set of challenges, support for civil society is just as critical now as it was then to support these groups. And, what kind of support exactly? What is needed are not requests for proposals that nearly prompt groups to apply for money, but rather funds for genuine projects grown out of grassroots understandings of political expediency. Turkish civil society groups should be encouraged to do more to work together, as women’s groups did in 2004, and even more importantly, engage political parties, the government, and the state (listed here in an ascending order of difficulty).

Support for strengthening political parties and institution-building has been enormously successful in Turkey, and to some extent, has resulted in the recent democratic turn by CHP we have seen of late, but without funding civil society to keep political parties in check and goad them to respond to democratic demands, little will get done.

And, the impact?

The AKP has accomplished tremendous feats in its time in power, but the party has grown too strong while civil society has lagged behind. Now confident that it is the voice of the majority, without an active, challenging, forward-looking civil society to remind it of its earlier liberal promises, the party will be doomed to failure—and, with it, Turkish democracy. It is no coincidence that civil society and liberalism emerged together in the history of other countries’ political development, and the two go together in Turkey as well.

If Turkish civil society, adequately funded and attended to, can take the mass protest movements we have seen in response to the government’s plans to pass draconian restrictions on Internet usage and round-up journalists and actually organize this anomic political mobilization into smart, organic political engagement with politicians, the result would prove not only beneficial to the longevity of Turkish democracy but also serve as an example to the Arab world.

The Forbidden Zone

The Turkish government via the Prime Ministry's Information Technologies Board (BTK) recently introduced a system in which websites bearing domain names carrying certain words will be automatically banned. Yesterday the government, through the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB) sent the list to Internet service providers ordering that website carrying these domain names be banned. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The affect of the decision could see the closure of many website that feature the banned words. For example, the website “donanimalemi.com” (hardwareworld.com) because the domain name has “animal” in it, a banned word and likewise “sanaldestekunitesi.com,” (virtualsupportunit.com) would not be able to operate under its current name because it has “anal” in it; also among the 138 banned words. Websites cannot have the number 31 in their domain names either because it is slang for male masturbation.

Some more banned English words are: “beat,” “escort,” “homemade,” “hot,” “nubile,” “free” and “teen.” Some others in English have different meanings: “pic,” short for picture, is banned because it means “bastard” in Turkish. The past tense of the verb “get” is also banned because “got” means “butt” in Turkish. Haydar, a very common Alevi name for men, is also banned because it means penis in slang.

“Gay” and its Turkish pronunciation “gey,” “çıplak” (naked), “itiraf” (confession), “liseli” (high school student), “nefes” (breath) and “yasak” (forbidden) are some of the other banned words.

Obviously there are problems with the list, and I do not think I have to mention that a website does not contain pornography just because an Internet domain site includes the word "gay."According to Yaman Akdeniz, who is at the lead of the fight for Internet freedom in Turkey, the government is in violation of the law. As draconian as Turkey's 2006 Internet regulation might be, there indeed seems little legal basis for what the BTK is doing.

“Hosting companies are not responsible for monitoring for illegal activities; their liability arises only if they take no action after being notified by the TİB – or any other party – and are asked to remove certain illegal content,” Akdeniz said.

The TİB cited the Internet ban law number 5651 and related legislation as the legal ground for its request. The law, however, does not authorize firms to take action related to banning websites.

“The hosting company is not responsible for controlling the content of the websites it provides domains to or researching/exploring on whether there is any illegal activity or not. They are responsible for removing illegal content when they are informed and there is the technical possibility of doing so,” according to Article 5 of the law.

On Thursday, following the heated debate surround the “forbidden” list, the TİB said the list was sent to hosting firms for informatory purposes. But the statement further confused the situation, as the body threatened companies with punishment if they did not obey its directions regarding the list in the first letter sent to service providers.

So, not only is the government violating rights to freedom of expression on a large scale, it is not even acting according to the rule of law -- at least not yet. The ban on domain names occurs at the same time the government is moving to implement a new regulation that paves the way for such infringements in the future.

As far as I can tell, the BTK is not citing recent regulation as the legal basis for its authority to demand internet service providers block access to these domain names, instead basing its authority on the 2006 Internet Law (No. 5651), which I have written about extensively. This law is draconian, but what is coming seems even worse.

The new regulations gives the government the authority to block and filter websites according to its own designs (independent of any court order), and importantly, not make its blocking and filtering practices public. Though the old regulation does give the TIB the authority to block access to websites, the authority blocking the website, whether the TIB or a specific court, is public information and the person trying to access the website encounters a message that the website is blocked. The TIB also acts on a set of criteria determined by the 2006 Internet law. For more on the old law, click here. If anyone can give me more information on the legal scheme here, I would much appreciate it.

Though Turkey has made considerable democratic progress in the past 10-15 years and in many ways improved its human record, this backsliding on media freedom raises serious questions about its democratic trajectory. Increasingly, the government seems to take the position that they can do anything they want as long as they are elected by a majority. Liberal democracy this is not. Electoral authoritarianism? Maybe.


UPDATE I (5/5) --  Bianet, a new portal from which I post regularly, is challenging the new regulations at the Council of State. Other websites are also following suit, and it might not be too much longer before the European Court of Human Rights is inundated with another round of freedom of expression cases in Turkey. Here is hoping the government repeals this insanity now and begins to work with experts on Internet law to pass a new Internet law that does not violate rights to freedom of expression and access to information, at least not on such a massive scale. For a bit of legal analysis from experts quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, click here.

A Liberal Democracy?

Jenny White calls attention to a recent incident in Ankara wherein a group of people advocating for organ donation got in a confrontation with police. From Kamil Pasha:

The governor of Ankara province wanted the stands handing out brochures to be removed from Yüksel Boulevard, one of Ankara’s main thoroughfares. A mass of police in full riot gear arrived to carry out his order and got into a discussion with a young woman at a stand promoting organ donorship. Young people gathered and surrounded her protectively, chanting “No to Fascism.” Watch the film. In seconds the police had moved in violently, as they have done with other protests and public civic actions in recent years, often by students and other young people. You can see them dragging people off (the news account said some were dragged away by the hair), throwing them about like paper dolls, and in the film if you watch carefully, you will see a policeman punching one of the young women hard in the face twice.

What was it that Erdogan said about the praiseworthy youth in Egypt demonstrating for their rights, that Mubarak should heed his people’s wishes?

Over-the-top police violence against men and women has been the norm in Turkey since I first went there in the 1970s. The problem has been police immunity and a continuing culture of disrespect for youth, for women, and for civil rights; a widespread acceptance and even approval of violence as a sign of masculinity and love of nation; and a lack of understanding of the principles of liberal democracy — making a safe space for alternative views and lifestyles. Democracy too often means I got the most votes, so everyone else should fall in line with my ideas and my values. A 2006 survey by Çarkoğlu and Toprak shows that the majority of the population values democracy and civil liberties, but shows little sensitivity toward others’ rights. Democracy is understood as a system that represents the views of the majority, rather than protecting the rights of minorities.

Radikal has posted a video of the incident.

Respect for difference and moving toward a liberal versus majoritarian understanding of democracy is one of, if not the, primary deficits of Turkish politics and one I have written about extensively. Events like the attack on the art galleries in Tophane last September to the beating of an Alevi man who sold alcohol at his store to the 1993 burning of the Madimak Hotel in Sivas (which left 37 people dead, mainly Alevis), and countless, countless others all stem from this basic need to respect difference and the rights of others.

On the government level, such questions are raised by restrictions on alcohol, "immoral broadcasting," the harassment and closure of LGBT groups, etc. Most of these posts are marked with "creeping conservatism," but they might also be labeled as "concerns for liberal democracy." And, conversely, respect for those who choose to drink alcohol should also be met with respect for those who choose not to drink alcohol just as respect for those who wear the headscarf should be met with respect for those who do not wear it. Too often disrespect is the story . . . over and over and over (like a broken record).

For more on the police, who should be first in line to be inculcated to respect the rights of others, see this December 2008 report from Human Rights Watch. See also many of the entries marked "police."

Parliament Passes Broadcast Media Bill

Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc speaking after the law's passage. AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

The Turkish Parliament has passed a comprehensive law on broadcast media that gives the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) and the Turkish government broader authority to restrict media rights. Although there are positive measures in the law such as the allowance of broadcasts in languages other than Turkish (something already done in practice), the new law raises serious concerns about the government's ability to restrict programming with which it does not agree or finds morally objectionable. From Hurriyet Daily News:

The new measures also give the prime minister the authority to temporarily halt broadcasting. The law further restricts the sale of alcohol and tobacco by banning all marketing of tobacco and alcohol products.

The new regulation is also designed to protect children by banning advertisements for alcohol, tobacco products, drugs, gambling and “anything that encourages minors toward violence and abuse.”

Risqué images are banned on TV, along with content that is against the equality of sexes or objectifies women.

Movies or news bulletins that go over their allotted broadcast time will have the opportunity to cut to commercial once every 30 minutes. The broadcast of religious events, however, may never be cut for commercial.

The law also allows foreign companies to hold up to 50% of the shares in Turkish media firms, a move that has raised concerns with nationalists and those who fear the kind of large foreign investment that companies like Rupert Murdoch's New Corporation have made in past years.

RTUK, which is part of Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc's portfolio, has already been heavily criticized for restricting programming that government officials find morally and/or politically objectionable. For a litany of such cases, click here. For an earlier law the Parliament passed this year restricting the marketing and sale of alcohol, click here.

New Alcohol Laws and Turkey's 'Madisonian Dilemma'

The Turkish parliament has passed a new law increasing restrictions on alcohol sales and marketing. The new law restricts alcohol advertisements at sporting events and youth-centered events (e.g., some concerts), prohibits unauthorized caterers from serving alcohol at special events, imposes a ban on alcohol being used in promotional sales, and raises taxes on raki, an anise-flavored Turkish liquor.

The law heightens concerns that the ruling AKP is legislating its moral values. As Jenny White notes, restrictions on alcohol and high taxes are nothing new.

Legal restrictions on alcohol again raise the question of just how far the AKP is willing to regulate public morals, though AKP politicians routinely sound the note that regulations are concerned with public health and safety and are not an imposition of its own particular moral view. All the same, AKP politicians routinely make statements that emphasize their majority rather than liberal values. For more on AKP's majority politics, see my take on the party's need to resolve Turkey's 'Madisonian Dilemma' and assuage the fears who are now given evermore reason to think that the party is determined to legislate according to its own particular Islamic bent.

Art Gallery in Tophane Attacked

From Hurriyet Daily News:

A group numbering dozens attacked the opening of several art galleries on Tuesday night, putting at least five people in the hospital with injuries from pepper spray, broken bottles, batons and knives. The hospitalized included one Polish and one German citizen. The attack was first believed to have been in response to art pieces on exhibit because Galeri Non had an exhibition by the collective Ekstramücadele (Ekstrastruggle) that featured content on the taboos of Islam and Atatürk both. However, witnesses at the scene who spoke right after the incident and the following morning confirmed that the scuffle broke out due to alcohol consumption in the streets.

After the incident, neighborhood residents claimed gala visitors had been harassing and disturbing other people in the street. One person also said the gallery owners had been told previously that their guests were disturbing neighborhood residents. More comments from locals in the media on Wednesday focused on them being disturbed by not only the art galleries but also the apart hotels and alcohol-serving restaurants that have multiplied in the neighborhood in recent years. As well, locals said they were disturbed by people drinking in the streets due to the smoking ban. However, the restaurants and hotels are also perceived to have a negative effect on morals, according to various comments offered to the media or stated on the Internet.

The attack took place in Tophane, a gentrifying neighborhood in Beyoglu that is home to newly renovated art galleries and restaurants in addition to traditional (men-only) tea houses and residences of migrants who moved into neighborhood from more conservative Anatolia in the past 30 years. Tophane, like much of the rest of Beyoglu, is home to a hodgepodge of residents from diverse backgrounds who hold several different viewpoints. No one is sure how organized the attack was or what the motivation, but it has led many to claim the incident should be viewed in terms of the neighborhood's ongoing gentrification and the inevitable clashes of values and basic attitudes that have accompanied the neighborhood's transformation.

Though Tophane is viewed as a conservative neighborhood -- and after this attack, will likely be viewed as an even more conservative neighborhood (Islamic fundamentalist?) -- it is likely the the gentrification process will continue. The question is whether the neighborhoods residents can learn to live with each other in a spirit of tolerance and respect for difference. Sure, the art-going crowd should watch their volume and perhaps not go onto the streets with glasses of wine in mid-daylight if it is offensive to the neighbors, but surely violence is not a solution and might there not be some give and take on both sides? All of a sudden that does not seem a question for Tophane alone . . .

Democracy and difference is hard to be sure.

Protecting Turkey's Soy

PHOTO from Radikal

Prosecutors have filed a case against Turkish actress Sevda Demirel after she became pregnant upon using an American sperm donor.

On March 6, the Turkish Health Ministry effectively made it a criminal offense for women to use a foreign sperm or egg donor to conceive a child using artificial insemination (see March 21 post). The law is premised in protecting Turkey's soy, or patrilineal bloodline.

Demirel is not the first Turkish actress to use a foreign sperm donor and attract this kind of attention, but she is indeed the first to be prosecuted under the new law. To add to the controversy, Demirel used an African American sperm donor.

For my analysis on the law, click here. Also, see Jenny White's commentary at Kamil Pasha.

More Reason Why Neighborhood Pressure Matters

Bogazici University and the Open Society Institute have released a study assessing intolerant attitudes in Turkey toward ethnic and religious minorities and LGBT people. The survey, released in report form as "The Otherization and Discrimination in Turkey
(in Turkish)" ("'Biz'lik, 'Oteki'lik, ve Ayrimcilik: Kamuoyundaki Algilar ve Egilimler"), was conducted between Feb. 15 and April 25, in 18 provinces with the participation of 1,811 interviewees. Hurriyet Daily News summarizes the results:

The most striking result of the survey concerns the question on “who deserves a restriction on their rights?” The answers given by the respondents indicated that the discriminatory tendencies and the level of tolerance have changed little in the last five years.

An astonishing 53 percent of participants strongly believed that the right to freely express a different sexual orientation should be restricted. Similarly, 37 percent of the people sampled denounced the right of believing in no religion, with 59 percent standing against atheists flaunting their lack of religion. Moreover, 28 percent denounced the right of non-Muslims to be open about their religious identity.

The results showed that 72 percent of the sample supported the idea that “those who have a different sexual orientation, like homosexuality, should be open about their sexual identities.”

According to the 2005 results of the survey, 58 percent said non-heterosexuals should not be equally free. The percentage of those who say the rights of those who have a different native language other than Turkish should be restricted is 19 percent, the same figure as the 2005 survey.

Those who say that all ethnicities, religions and sects should be secured by the Constitution make up 74 percent.

Some 36 percent of the interviewees said their primary identity was “being a citizen of Turkey,” whereas a 29 percent thought “having a Turkish national identity” was most important.

Meanwhile, 66 percent said they have no other ethnic culture and they are rooted completely in Turkish culture, while 20 percent said their ethnic culture and language were secondary to Turkish language and culture. Some 8 percent said their language or culture came before Turkish culture while 2 percent said they had absolutely no connection to Turkish culture and language.

59% of respondents in the survey said they did not feel any sort of neighborhood pressure. And, the rest?

Such surveys should boost concern about the arguments of "strong democrats," those who continue to stress democracy with little reference to rights protections and difference. See my March 26 post on the need for Turkey, and the AKP as the government in power leading up constitutional efforts, to come to a sophisticated of rights-based democracy. Until the "democrats" start talking about protecting everyone's rights, promoting difference and diversity in Turkish society, and adopt an open, articulate discourse that encompasses all of Turkish society, many Turks are likely to fear rule by the majority -- and, if the respondents in this poll hasd their say, for good reason. Leadership requires taking risks and promoting new understandings, most especially in conservative societies where difference is seen as something Other. The AKP has taken some positive steps in this direction, but how genuine, far-reaching, and reflective of an overall attitude appreciative of diversity is still very much in doubt. When combined with a general societal ambivalence toward liberalism and a lack of tolerance, many Turks' fear of rule by majority should be taken seriusly. Turkey might not end up like Iran, but it could certainly end up a more closed, oppresive society should majoritarian democracy continue to take a stronger place without attention to rights. For more on neighborhood pressure, see also Feb. 10 post.

Turkey's Madisonian Dilemma: The Constitution and Why "Neighborhood Pressure" Matters

On Monday the AKP made public its proposed package of constitutional amendments over stark protestations from opposition parties and some figures in the judicary who have issued public statements against the package. There is dissent about both the content of the amendments, as well as allegations about the AKP's intentions and the means the party is employing to push the package into law.

For several in Turkey who view the AKP as a sinister force bent on consolidating its own power and, for some people, pushing through an "Islamist" agenda, the constitutional package is nothing more but an attempt to aggrandize executive powers, shifting the separation of powers in its favor by diminishing the role of the judiciary. Yet, for others, the package is the only hope for meaningful reform, especially in regard to the judiciary, which has consistently used its authority to annul legislation and threaten political parties with closure. A majority in Turkey, in some polls well upward of 60 percent, think a new constitution is necessary, but that support does not necessarily translate into support for the proposed constitutional package, which the AKP admits is less than perfect, but the only means to reform in a political climate where drafting a new constitution is but a pipe dream. Yet, in either scenario, there is little doubt that the current momentum behind the constitutional package and the AKP's firm commitment to seeing it passed is related to the current polarization between it and the judiciary, including the possibility of yet another closure case (see Feb. 20 post). Going the route of the constititutional package means that the AKP has put itself on the track of advancing incremental reforms versus seeking a complete overhaul, which it had promised to do in 2008 before being faced with the closure case it survived by the skin of its teeth. (For a bit of background, see Feb. 5 post and March 7 post.) The party presented the constitution to opposition parties on Tuesday and Wednesday.

What's in the Package?

The most significant areas of reform include new law on the closure of political parties and a re-design of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the latter of which the European Union has consistently stated is in sore need of reform in order to shore up the independence of the judiciary. The number of judges on the Constitutional Court would be increased from 11 to 19, each judge serving a 12-year term and being ineligible for re-election therafter. The vast majority of the judges, 16, would be appointed by the president, who thanks to a constititional amendment passed in 2007, is now popularly elected. Three judges would be appointed by parliament. Some AKP supporters have pointed to this as a significant area of compromise since it is common in many systems to have constitutional judges appointed by parliament to begin with.

The majority of HSYK members would be increased to 21 and its powers reduced, a move that has establishment figures in the judiciary in a fervor. The HSYK currently consists of seven members -- five from the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State, and two from the Justice Ministry (the Minister, who heads the Council, and the undersecretary). An additional 10 provisional members would be appointed. Of the 21, four would be chosen by the president, one by the Constitutional Court, three by the Supreme Court of Appeals, one by the State Council, seven by judges and prosecutors from among judges and prosecutors of the highest rank, and three by administrative judges and prosecutors of the highest rank. The re-structuring of appointments gives more power to the president and to lower ranks of the judiciary. Also importantly, decisions by the HSYK to remove a prosecutor (as happened in the case of Erzurum prosecutor Osman Sanal) would be subject to further appeal.

In terms of making it more difficult to close political parties, another move long recommended by the European Union and the Council of Europe, political party closures would require parliamentary approval. Instead of the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals preparing an indictment to be pursued at the Constitutional Court, the Chief Prosecutor would instead be required to petition a parliamentary commission setup for the express pruposes of dealing with potential closures. All parties with a parliamentary group would be equally represented in the commission, and a 2/3 secret vote would be required before a case could be launched at the Constitutional Court. Evidence used and rejected in past closure cases could not be used again. And, in terms of political bans on politicians pursued in line with closures cases, and which are more politically destructive than party closures, any imposed ban would be reduced from five to three years and banned parliamentarians would be able to retain their seats (and, presumably, their immunity) until the end of their term. One significant lacuna here is the lack of inclusion of the Venice Criteria, which define reasons why political parties can be closed. Officials from the Venice Commission have largely welcomed the package of amendments despite the exclusion of the criteria.

One other amendment would also make radical changes to the current order of things by allowing for the trial of military officers in civilian courts. As a result of new amendments, decisions by the High Military Council could be challenged in civilian courts and the body would be theoretically subject to standards of judicial independence. The Constitutional Court annulled a law passed last summer to try military officers in civilian courts.

Other items in the package would open up political parties finances to auditing by the Court of Accounts, limit the reasons for which a citizen could be banned from international travel, protect personal data, and remove provisional Article 15, which granted immunity to individuals involved in the 1980 coup of which Turkey's current constitution is a product. The last move is largely symbolic and has broad support across political parties, though some have argued for prosecutions of who are by this time some very old generals. Also of potential significance are laws pertaining to labor, women, and children, which many critics suggest were, along with amendment of Article 15, as "sweeteners." Civil servants would be given the right to collectively bargain, though not to strike. An arbitration commission would be established to settle disputes, the decisions of which would be final. This is unlikely to gain much support from Tekel workers and others who are staunchly opposed to the neoliberalism of the AKP. Also, disciplinary decisions reached by boards of public agencies would be subject to judicial review. As to women, measures assuring positive discrimination would be introduced, though some women's groups have demanded that the operative term here should be "actual equality."

Addressing the Madisonian Dilemma

The AKP's plans to push the package through by referendum should it not be approved by an unlilely 2/3 majority of parliament raises important questions about majoritarian democracy and those whoare very much afraid that their rights are threatened by the more devout Sunni Muslim majority the AKP is thought to represent. Though the AKP constantly claims that it represents all citizens of Turkey, passing constitutional reforms that enhance executive power and diminish the role of the judiciary, however much needed, is a sensitive issue and should not be dealt with lightly. American constitutional theorist Robert Bork refers to the need to resolve the tension between values associated with what he refers to as competing moral demands for civility and toleration. Canadian political theorist Colin Farrelly expounds:

Civic liberalism takes seriously what Robert Bork (1990) calls the ‘Madisonian Dilemma’. This is the dilemma between the moral demands of the virtues of toleration and civility. Respect for toleration leads us in the direction of limited government, government that does not unjustly interfere with individual liberty. This concern for individual rights provides the normative basis for constitutionalism. This can be contrasted with the moral demands of civility, demands which leads us to majority rule and the idea of self-government. If we take only the moral dimensions of these two virtues into account, it seems that we cannot resolve the Madisonian Dilemma. For we have two contradictory prescriptions- limited government and self-government. But civic liberalism inspires a public philosophy that gives due attention to both the moral and pragmatic dimensions of these virtues. It does not seek to give an absolute priority to any of the moral demands of toleration or civility. Rather, it seeks to reconcile the diverse demands of toleration, civility and fairness. As such, civic liberalism does not see the Madisonian Dilemma as paradoxical. This apparent dilemma reinforces the case for invoking a virtue-oriented approach rather than a principle-oriented approach to government. Civic liberalism defends a virtue-oriented conception of liberal democracy that takes both sides of the Madisionian Dilemma seriously. A public philosophy that takes the complexities of the Madisionian Dilemma seriously is one that will seek to steer a middle path between judicial and legislative supremacy.

Steering such a path in Turkey is no easy task, but it is a road about which the Turkish government, judiciary, and most importantly, Turkish citizens should think hard on and debate fervently. Much of the criticism of the AKP's constitutional package centers precisely on this lack of debate, which is only compounded by the self-interests of the AKP that would be advanced by the package (for example, see this piece from "The Bosporus Straight"). The AKP's previous attempt to draft a new civilian constitutional was also subject to such criticism, though the latter argument about the AKP's self-interests could not gain near as much traction since the draft came after the party's huge electoral victories in 2007. Yet, replete with the liabilities that come with a lack of public consultation and consensus-seeking, a lack of public discourse opens the package up to serious, and some case, warranted criticism, however difficult discourse and consultation-seeking is given the recalcitrance of opposition parties, the lack of coalition building and dialogue in Turkish civil society, and the authoritarian nature of political parties and the policymaking process. At an event last night, one woman broke into near tears as she conveyed her fears, however valid they may be, that the AKP was leading Turkey down a path contrary to its "republican" and "secular" heritage. Rather than dismissing such fears as paranoid or delusional, or placing this woman in the position of being the member of an "elite" who does not want to lose power in a system that has historically benefitted members adhering to her values and ideological orientations more than devout Sunni Muslims, the AKP should take steps to allay these fears by addressing them head-on, addressing the limitations of state power and majoritarian democracy when it comes to values and lifestyles shared by a minority. Here, "neighborhood pressure" again becomes part of the discourse, and rather than dismissing the term and the validity of the phenomenon, the AKP should do everything in its power to engage citizens who fear what is perceived by many as its creeping conservatism. From my Aug. 1, 2008 post following the Constitutional Court's narrow decision not to close the AKP:

For those skeptical to affirm AKP's center-right identity, the party must move away from the intra-party authoritarianism that characterizes all of Turkey's political parties, open its eyes and ears to the complaints of liberal reformers, and renew its commitment to constitutional reform—change that seeks to expand personal liberties and redefine Turkish citizenship along lines much more agreeable to contemporary understandings of democratic pluralism.

So far, the party has done very little in this regard. For those fearful of AKP's more Islamist tendencies, the judiciary and the military, and for that matter, the state's laicist understanding of secularism, exist to protect civil liberties and freedoms (including to do such things as drink alcohol, not wear the headscarf, watch Western films, etc.). Until conservative Turkish governments can assuage fears that liberties and freedoms are not at risk, measures that reduce the power of the military or the judiciary will continue to be strongly resisted and seen by many as part of a hidden, alternative agenda. However much the AKP compares itself to center-right parties in Europe, few in Germany think the Christian Democrats are out to turn Germany into a strictly-conceived "Christian state." While the validity of perceptions that the AKP is out to do so might be open to question, this does not negate the need of the government to address the, and in doing, pursue the deliberation and dialogue necessary to resolve the Madisonian dilemma in the context of Turkish constitutional democracy.


UPDATE I (3/26) -- The Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), the Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Unions (TİSK), the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş), the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-İş), the Turkish Tradesmen and Artisans’ Confederation (TESK), Turkish Public Workers’ Labor Union (Kamu-Sen) and the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers (TZOB) have released a joint statement in which the unions said they would lend conditional support to the constitutional package, through they stressed a need for a new constitution. TUSIAD also expressed its desire for a new constitution, which some EU officials have said will prove a prerequisite for Turkish accession. TUSIAD stressed the importance of lowring the 10 percent threshold political parties must meet in order to form a parliamentary group -- a measure left out of the reform package, and which some have used as evidence that the AKP is concerned only with strengthening its own position. The fragmentation of opposition parties, many of which have not and are unlikely not to reach this threshold, has benefitted the AKP, especially in the 2002 elections that saw the party into power. The package will be presented to the parliament on Monday.

Guarding Turkey's 'Soy'?

The Health Ministry has announced a regulation that would effectively make it a criminal offense to use a foreign sperm or egg donor to conceive a child using artificial insemination. From Hurriyet Daily News:

With domestic egg and sperm donations already banned, Turkish women seeking to become pregnant have now been prohibited from receiving similar fertility treatments abroad by a new regulation seeking to “protect the country’s ancestry.”

According to İrfan Şencan, the director of the Health Ministry’s Health Services Department, the recent amendment to the law was made to “protect the ancestry, to make the newborn’s father and mother known.”

. . . .

The new regulation says, “Spouses will only be able to receive cells belonging to each other. Using a donor in any [other] way is prohibited.” If a center in Turkey performs an operation using a sperm or egg donation taken from a member of an unmarried couple, or transplants an embryo, the facility will be closed indefinitely and all personnel working there will likewise be barred from working at similar centers.

Since sperm and egg donations and using a surrogate mother are both banned in the country, many Turkish people have been applying to centers abroad to have sperm or egg transplants performed, recent media reports have said. The new regulation bans this practice as well.

In addition, Turkish doctors and medical centers are also prohibited from leading or encouraging couples to have sperm or egg donations performed abroad, or even informing them about the possibility. Centers that recommend a foreign facility or mediate between Turkish couples and doctors abroad will be closed for three months for their first offense. Centers that continue to do so will be closed indefinitely by the governor’s office, according to the new regulation.

The amended law says that complaints about facilities that perform sperm or egg donations or send patients to either foreign or domestic centers for such procedures will be filed with the public prosecutor’s office, along with complaints against the woman and the donor.

A woman breaking the law faces a three year prison sentence. The new regulation did not go through parliament, but rather takes advantage of an existing law in Turkey's penal code (Article 231) that makes it a criminal offense to obfuscate a child's parentage. The BBC quotes women's rights activist Pinar Ilkkaracan:

This is completely against the philosophy of the reformed penal code.

We spent years fighting to improve the law so that it would properly protect women's autonomy over their bodies and sexuality.

This government has slipped this regulation in without any debate in parliament.

Motivation for the regulation is unclear, but there is plenty of speculation, that the law is partially inspired by a concern to protect Turkey's bloodline (soy). Following the Kocaeli earthquake in 1999, Turkey's health minister at the time banned foreign blood donations from Greece entering the country, citing concerns about protecting the integrity of Turkish blood. The decision was widely detested at the time, and still does not sit well with many Turks. Sencan rejects this as the reason, and in defense of the measure, cited similar regulations in "Christian countries." Perhaps religion is more behind the new law than race, though it is also likely both are at play here and the result is a further restriction on women's bodies. (From the reportage I've seen, it seems only women can be tried under the criminal provisions and not their husbands or partners who might have also been involved in the decision -- not that including husbands or male partners would make the law less of an exercise over a woman's body and reproductive decision making.)

Today's Zaman columnist Nicole Pope writes that the law will prohibit couples from conveiving children, and relaying the sotry of a friend who conceived using artificial insemination, discusses the concept of soy, patriarchal notions of family, and its impact on women.

In this traditional society, women are under great pressure to produce children. We all remember Prime Minister Erdoğan’s call for them to bear at least three offspring. For years, I witnessed the trials and tribulations of a friend who was unable to conceive. She had to contend with the jibes of in-laws who viewed her as imperfect because of her inability to bring the heir they expected. Relatives would even urge her husband to swap her for a more fertile “broodmare.” Thankfully he resisted, but one of his uncles discarded four “sterile” wives, causing them untold misery, without ever admitting that he could have been the source of the problem.

Eventually my friend and her husband managed to conceive through IVF, but they had to seek medical help in secret because they feared relatives would disapprove or even reject their offspring.

At the heart of the matter lies a patriarchal definition of the family, linked by blood ties that need to be protected and kept pure no matter what. Taken to its extreme, this approach is responsible for most of the violent attacks reported against women in this country, whether it is a young girl killed for refusing to marry the partner chosen by her parents or a wife punished by a violent husband when she seeks to leave an abusive relationship.

The focus on reproduction and traditional views of the family might also help explain Minister for Women and Family Selma Aliye Kavaf's recent comments on homosexuality being a "disease" in need of treatment. See also Jenny White's blog post on this subject, including comments, for more discussion of the new regulation.

Kavaf and Homophobia

Minister of Women and family Selma Aliye Kavaf
PHOTO from Hurriyet

Minister of Family and Women Selma Aliye Kavaf's recent interview with Hurriyet (in Turkish) will do little to counter homophonia in Turkey. In the intervew, Kavfaf said she believes "homosexuality is a biological disorder, an illness. For me, it is something to be cured/treated. Therefore, I do not have a positive stand for the same-sex relationships." In recent months, members of the LBGT community have fallen victim to an increasing number of hate crimes.




UPDATE I (3/17) -- LGBT organization Lambaistanbul has filed a criminal complaint against Kavaf accusing the minister "of insult, incitement to crime and incitement to enmity and hate — crimes that are punishable by up to two, five and three years in jail respectively." Another LGBT organization in Ankara, Pink Life, has also filed a complaint on similar grounds. Kavaf has yet to apologize or offer clarification of her statements.

Food for thought: Self-identified Islamic liberal and Hurriyet Daily News columnist Mustafa Akyol defends the right to criticize homosexual lifestyles in his column last week, though he asserts that Kavaf's position as a minister should have placed her above making such statements. However, in a climate where the number of hate crimes against LGBT people is on the rise, how should such speech -- from a minister or ordinary citizen -- be treated?

UPDATE II (3/19) -- Lambdaistanbul staged a large protest in Taksim yesterday that drew over 100 demonstrators critical of Kavaf. The organization plans to present Kavaf with its "Hormone Tomatoes Homophobia Award," and threw genetically-modified tomatoes at an effigy of the minister. According to Lambdaistanbul, if Kavaf does not apologize for her remarks, it will present her with the award in parliament.

Wrestling for Co-Patriarch

The wrestling in the Armenian Patriarchate continues as its Spiritual Board moves to appoint a co-patriarch to serve alongside the disabled Patriarch Mesrob Mutfayan. Mutfayan is suffering from dementia, and though unable to perform his duties as leader of the Armenian Church in Turkey, is likely to continue to serve in the position until the end of his life as dictated by Church law. In the meantime, Archbishop Aram Ateshyan, who is head of the Spiritual Board, is vying for the position and has received criticism within the Armenian community (for example, in the Turkish Armenian newspaper Agos) for using his position to maneuver so as to ensure the invevitability of his own candidacy against other candidates who are abroad at the moment. At the beginning of the ordeal, Ateshyan opposed an election at all, his critics surmising that without an election of a co-patriarch he was able to control the church through his role as head of the Spiritual Board. In an unprecedented move, Armenian community members organized to form an Election Initiative Committee, which has petitioned the Turkish government to elect a new patriarch while ignoring the disabled status of Mutfayan. It is still unclear what move the government will take, if any, and some observers (for example, this American Armenian weekly) have speculated it is in the Turkish government's interests to keep the community divided by taking no action. Ateshyan's competitors live in Armenia and Germany, where both are primates, and have both made recent visits to Turkey. They are eligible because they were born in Turkey, a requirement of the Turkish government and a rule that has been criticized among some members of the Armenian community as hindering the selection of a competent patriarch.

RTUK, Minister of Family and Women's Affairs Lashes Out at Television Show

A popular Turkish television show featuring an adulterous relationship and sexual situations caught the ire of Family and Women's Affairs Minister Selma Aliye Kavaf, who linked the television show to a WHO study on juvenile sexual activity in Turkey. The show, “Aşk-ı Memnu” (Forbidden Love), has been fined twice now by the the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK). Hurriyet quotes Kavaf: “When you consider someone below the age 18 as a child, and you accept 13 as the age for sexuality, this is child pornography.” For more details on the show, see Fatma Disli Zibak's reportage in Today's Zaman.

Turkish Playwright, Vakit, and AKP Mayor Get Press in Middle America

PHOTO from The Plain Dealer

Controversal Turkish playwright Ozen Yula is the subject of an article this week in The Cleveland Plain Dealer by Tony Brown, which documents harsh criticism Yula and his colleagues received from the Islamic conservative newspaper Vakit. Yula is the writer of "Yala Ama Yutma" ("Lick, But Don't Swallow"), a play that has dawn scorn from some conservatives alleging it to be pornographic.

Criticisms from the Islamist newspaper Vakit have proved the most worrisome for Yula, which according to The Plain Dealer, accused the play of "smearing dirt on human angels." I cannot find the article on Vakit's website, and so am assuming the article in question was removed from the site as a result of the kinds of violent responses it elicited. Radikal features a few of the violent comments (in Turkish), including open-ended questions as to what kind of punishment should be wielded, where it should take place, and who should be assigned to do it. Additionally, the AKP mayor of Beyoglu, Ahmet Misbah Demircan, shut down the play, though the mayor's office has since allowed to open the production; however, as a result of the Vakit criticism, the play has been postponed, perhaps indefinitely. Demircan cited safety concerns, including the theatre's did not have a fire escape. As The Plain Dealer points out, this might well have been a reference to the Madimak Hotel in Sivas, where reactionaries burned alive 37 people, mostly Alevis. From The Plain Dealer:

Ozen Yula, a leading Turkish playwright who is spending most of 2010 working and teaching in Cleveland, got an unwelcome invitation earlier this month.

It was an invitation to join a list of people who wound up dead, hunted or silenced after being condemned in Vakit, Istanbul's most widely followed Islamic-fundamentalist newspaper.

Yula earned that distinction as the author of a comedy that was scheduled to open Monday at the Kumbaraci50 theater in the Beyoglu district of Istanbul, one of the world's largest cities.

In the play, an angel gets sent back to Earth to do good works in the body of a pornographic movie actress.

Or maybe the play is about a porn star who dreams she's an angel. Like many serious comedies, it's ambiguous.

But ambiguity is not something Islamic fundamentalists tend to appreciate. Which makes life in Turkey -- already complicated -- even more so. Founded in 1923, Turkey is struggling to find its identity as a secular, Western-style democracy with a centuries-long history as part of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

On Feb. 2, Vakit (Turkish for "Time") condemned Yula and his play -- provocatively titled "Lick but Don't Swallow" -- for "smearing human dirt on angels," according to one translation of the newspaper's online Turkish text.

That kind of accusation of blasphemy can get a person killed, or at least hunted, as a similar condemnation did in 1989 for Indian novelist Salman Rushdie.

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, issued a "fatwa" -- or Islamic ruling -- calling for Rushdie's death after the publication of "The Satanic Verses," in which a film star becomes the archangel Gabriel, who then describes Islam's founder Muhammad as balding, bespectacled and suffering from dandruff.

After years of running and hiding, Rushdie still receives what he has been quoted as calling a "sort of Valentine's card" from Iran each year on Feb. 14 to remind him his life is still in danger, though Rushdie now dismisses the threat.

Dutch movie director Theodoor van Gogh was not so lucky; he was assassinated by a fundamentalist for his portrayal of the treatment of women in Islam in the film "Submission."

Likewise, the attack on Yula's play is being seen by secularists as a deliberate attempt to whip up militant furor over the play and anybody connected with it. That includes actress Ayca Damgaci, famous for writing and performing in the autobiographical film "My Marlon and Brando," about her dangerous romance with a Kurd, a member of a minority ethnic group in eastern Turkey.

Deliberate or not, the Vakit story has touched off a sensation.

The mayor of Beyoglu, a member of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party -- which favors restoring some Islamic practices but claims not to be fundamentalist -- shut down the venue where the play was supposed to premiere Monday.

The mayor, Ahmet Misbah Demircan, has allowed the theater to reopen, but a threat of violence lingers, and members of the creative team are so rattled that the play is not likely to be seen in Istanbul until March, if at all.

Surely this is not the kind of comparison that the government of Turkey is keen to see printed in a newspaper from Middle America, and it certainly goes against the grain of the carefully crafted image of "moderate Islam" the AKP has promoted in the West. The paper goes onto question Prime Minister Erdogan's contention that the AKP is "is not a political party with a religious axis." Here, it is important to note that the AKP and Vakit are two very different forces in Turkish society, and that the latter is much harder-edged and associated with Islamist movements and parties far to the right o the AKP. Yet, Demircan's decision and reference to Madimak brings the AKP into The Plain Dealer's story. Ozen is living in Cleveland for the year.

On Neighborhood Pressure

Professor Binnaz Toprak, Bahcesehir Universitesi PHOTO from The Balkans Project


In 2008, the Open Society Institute, in cooperation with Bogazici University, published "Being Different in Turkey: Alienation on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism." Professor Binnaz Toprak led the polemical study, which instantly garnered criticism throughout the conservative press. Conducting research in 12 Anatolian towns, Professor Toprak and her colleagues documented concrete incidents of "neighborhood pressure," a concept first discussed by Serif Mardin who coined the term to describe the pressure some people in Anatolia experience because they are different. They might be different because they are Alevi or some other religious minority, speak Kurdish, or because they drink alcohol and/or wear an earring and have long hair. The reaction to the report's arguments no doubt stems from their similarity to the argument some secularists/Kemalists make to justify the headscarf ban in universities -- that is, if women are allowed to wear the headscarf in universities, other women will feel pressure to do the same lest they be judged as less moral, religious, etc. However, despite the similarity, the report delved deeper, examining the toleration of difference in the 12 Anatolian towns it explores.

I allude to the study now because the debate has once again appeared -- this time on a new blog, Changing Turkey in a Changing World -- and because the exchange is just as relevant now as it was in December 2008. Professor Ahmet Kuru, who is currently at Columbia University's School of International Public Affairs (SIPA), posted a criticism of the report, to which Toprak responds by reiterating many of the arguments she made defending it when it was published a little over one year ago. Also worth reading is a recent interview Toprak conducted with John Feffer of Washington's Institute for Policy Studies' (IPS) Balkans Project. In the interview, Toprak discusses growing conservative attitudes and the headscarf issue.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- Efes Managing Director Tugrul Agribas complains of "neighborhood pressure." From Hurriyet:

Speaking to reporters in Şanlıurfa on Wednesday, Ağırbaş said the company aims to expand the beer market in Turkey, but the number of sales points has diminished to around 83,000 from nearly 100,000 four years ago.

“The per capita beer consumption in Turkey is around 12 to 13 liters,” he said. “The European average is 100 liters. What spurs consumption is restaurants, cafes and pubs. But in Turkey, each consumer pays a special consumption tax that is nine times more than the tax paid in Germany, for example.”

Beer sales points have problems in getting licenses or renewing them, Ağırbaş said. “Beer is a key source of revenue for corner stores and kiosks. Rakı, beer and cigarettes together constitute 70 percent of a grocer’s revenue. When you take out rakı and beer, the grocer starts having a hard time,” he said. “Those who wish to open sales points cannot find places to rent. Others face neighborhood pressure. Meanwhile, chain stores are destroying corner stores.”