Literature or Pornography?

Literature and works of art are exempt from articles criminalizing obsencity in the Turkish Penal Code, but what is deemed "literature" is subject to debate. In a recent case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Court ruled that Turkey infringed on the freedom of expression when it convicted Hades Publishing House owner Rahmi Akdas for publishing the controversial, highly erotic novel of French author Guillaume Appolinaire. From Bianet:

The decision was announced by the ECHR on Tuesday (16 February). The court declared that there nothing to say against the protection of moral values. Nevertheless, "Acknowledgment of the cultural, historical and religious particularities of the Council of Europe's member States could not go so far as to prevent public access in a particular language, in this instance Turkish, to a work belonging to the European literary heritage".

The ECHR pointed out that the requirements of morals depended on time and place and therefore national authorities were more competent to perceive whether restrictions were necessary. However, in this case it should not be ignored that the work had been initially published more than a century ago.

The court board, including Turkish judge Işıl Karakaş, unanimously decreed for a violation of article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights on freedom of expression. Since Akdaş had not requested compensation, the court refrained from sentencing Turkey to a compensation fine.

Publisher Akdaş, who lives in the city of Bandırma south of the Sea of Marmara, was sentenced to a monetary fine of 684 Turkish Lira (TL) on the grounds of "obscenity" and "harming inner feelings of the people" by publishing the work which contains graphic descriptions of scenes of sexual intercourse, even though it is a fictional work.

On 11 March 2004, the Court of Appeals approved the decision and decreed for the seizure and destruction of all copies of the book. Akdaş was forced to pay his fine in November 2004.

Sel Publishing official İrfan Sancı is being prosecuted on the grounds of Guillaume Apollinaire's book entitled "The Exploits of a Young Don Juan". Additionally, Metin Üstündağ stood accused of "obscene contents" regarding the caricature album entitled "Sunday Lovers", he was released. Enis Batur was tried under the same allegations for his novel "Apple".

According to the Guardian, Akdas had argued the "the humorous and exaggerated nature of the text was more likely to extinguish sexual desire."

The Sanci case drew the attention of the European officials this week when European Parliament MP Philip Claeys submitted an inquiry to the European Commission. Commisioner Olli Rehn responded that the Commission is monitoring the case, and will inform Turkey of its concern. Apparently, in some review process of which I am not aware (required for prosecutors to bring charges?) "experts" at Istanbul Commerce University ruled that three works Sanci published through Sel had no literary value, "paving the way for them to be accused of being obscene."

Ergenekon Showdown in the Judiciary

The Ergenekon investigation reached a new level of polarization in the past two days following the arrest of the Chief Prosecutor in Erzincan. From Hürriyet:

Tension mounted in Turkey’s judiciary Wednesday with the formal arrest of Erzincan’s chief prosecutor, setting off a struggle over authority after he was initially detained Tuesday by his counterpart in the neighboring province of Erzurum.

Controversy flared late in the day after İlhan Cihaner was formally arrested on charges of links to an alleged anti-government gang and when the special investigation authority of the Erzurum prosecutor was revoked. As questions flew in the prosecutor-vs.-prosecutor case, the authority of Erzurum prosecutor Osman Şanal was revoked, but apparently not soon enough to set Cihaner free.

As speculation grew in Ankara that pro- and anti-government factions in the judiciary had reached a new level of polarization, Cihaner stood accused of membership in the alleged “Ergenekon gang,” a group suspected of plotting to overthrow the government in an ongoing case that has seen scores arrested in the past 18 months.

Cihaner is seen as squarely in the “secularist camp” in Turkey’s political polarity, having launched an investigation into the Ismailağa religious sect in Erzincan in 2007.

However, Erzurum prosecutor Osman Şanal, who is – or was – specially authorized to handle counter terrorism and Ergenekon-related cases, took over the case. Şanal justified his claim with an anonymous letter that said Ismailağa was an armed organization and replaced Cihaner who was discharged from the investigation.

In 2009, Cihaner similarly attempted to launch an investigation into Fethullah Gülen, leader of the religious Gülen movement, but Şanal demanded the files, claiming that the probe fell under his own authority.

Then in June, because of his probe into the İsmailağa sect, Cihaner was accused of implementing an alleged anti-government plan drafted by Col. Dursun Çiçek, himself an Ergenekon suspect, to finish off the Gülen movement and the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, in Erzincan.

He also faced trial on charges of “falsifying documents,” “failing to inform the ministry of the Ismailağa religious sect probe,” and “causing environmental pollution by constructing a pergola in the garden of his official house allocated for judicial members.” The Justice Ministry launched the probe against Cihaner in line with Şanal’s indictment and at the end of June the investigation against Cihaner was merged with the Ergenekon case.

The first reaction came from Turkey's Judges and Prosecutors Association, or YARSAV, on Tuesday after Cihaner was detained, describing the move as a "serious violation of the law."

"This is a violation of the law caused by unauthorized people regarding a public prosecutor who should be tried by the Supreme Court of Appeals," said YARSAV Chairman Emine Ülker Tarhan said in a press conference late Tuesday.

The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, or HSYK, meanwhile, called an urgent meeting to discuss the developments, and after a four-hour meeting, the HSYK announced the investigation authority of the four specially authorized prosecutors, including Şanal, was revoked. The four prosecutors who were involved in the search process will not be able to take part in the Ergenekon investigation being carried out in Erzurum, according to the decision of the seven-member HSYK.

The decision was made by the five judicial members from the Supreme Court of Appeals and Council of State. HSYK’s other member, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, didn’t attend the meeting, while his undersecretary, who is also a HSYK member, left the meeting early.

Afterward, 30 members of the Supreme Court of Appeals on Tuesday called on the chairmanship to gather for a special agenda. Supreme Court of Appeals President Hasan Gerçeker on Wednesday said they found the HSYK’s decision in line with the law and that the decision should be implemented.

Hurriyet also reports that Cihaner was removed of his duties in the Ismailaga investigation after charges from his office that the group was armed and dangerous proved to be false. The investigation was apparently then turned over to Sanal. Cihaner's phone had also been wiretapped.

Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc and Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin denounced the HSYK decision as illegitimate, accusing the Board of ovestepping its bounds and obstructing the investigation. The Supreme Court of Appeals announced it will start its own investigation into what took place between the two prosecutors.

Railway Connects Mosul to Istanbul

MAP from the BBC

A railway connecting Mosul to Gaziantep facilitated the first train journey between the two cities since the 1980s. From Gaziantep, the train connects to Istanbul and onward to Berlin; from Mosul, the train connects to Baghdad. The train route was first thought up as a project between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Are railways on the Foreign Ministry's agenda? Yigal Schleifer links the train to Turkey's recent "zero problems" foreign policy, which has included building closer relationships with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq and Syria. Though portrayals of Turkish foreign policy as "neo-Ottoman" are a bit played up in the Western media sometimes, there could hardly be a more symbolic government-led venture. From the BBC:

[ ] the revived rail link symbolises the increasingly close ties between the three countries.

Having overcome its fear of Kurdish nationalism, Turkey now does about $10bn of trade with Iraq's Kurdish regional government every year - about 80% of goods sold there are Turkish.

Relations between Iraq and Syria are more fragile - in the past Syria has been accused of backing the insurgents behind several big bomb attacks in Iraq.

But trade between them - and between Syria and Turkey - is growing rapidly.

Turkey is gradually upgrading its railway network with high-speed routes and Iraq also plans big investments in its railways.

The Turkish government is now talking of a fast rail link running all the way to Pakistan.

According to Schelifer, "Along with the Mosul line, Turkey is building a fast train link between Gaziantep and Aleppo in Syria and is part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project, which conceivably could end up being linked up to a rail network that stretches all the way to China."

The EU Parliament: "Missing the Confederate Cyprus Train"

The Turkish government responded strongly last Wednesday to the European Parliament (EP)'s resolution on the European Commission's 2009 Progress Report, namely its call for Turkey to ratify the Addition Protocol of its association agreement with the European Union, remove its troops from Northern Cyprus, and return a section of Maras (Varosha) in the Cypriot town of Famagusta, which is currenty sealed off and occupied by the Turkish military. The resolution states that the EP

Deplores the fact that, for the fourth consecutive year, the Additional Protocol to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement has not been implemented by Turkey; calls on the Turkish Government to implement it fully without delay, in a non-discriminatory way, and recalls that failure to do so may further seriously affect the negotiating process;

36. Reiterates Turkey's unequivocal obligation to maintain good-neighbourly relations as provided for by the negotiating framework; underlines its undertaking together with all other parties to support the efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and to resolve any outstanding border disputes with neighbouring countries in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter;

37. Calls on the Turkish Government and all parties concerned actively to support the ongoing negotiations, and to contribute in concrete terms to the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation, in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the principles on which the EU is founded; calls on Turkey to facilitate a suitable climate for negotiations by immediately starting to withdraw its forces from Cyprus, by addressing the issue of the settlement of Turkish citizens on the island and also by enabling the return of the sealed-off section of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants in compliance with Resolution 550(1984) of the United Nations Security Council; . . .

Dutch MP Ria Oomen-Ruijten prepared the report, which was adopted by the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee by a vote of 65 for and 4 against, with 1 absention (EP press release). The resolution also called on Turkey to adopt numerous other measures also called for in the Progress Report, including a new constitution and political parties law, more rights for Kurds and religious minorities, and more work on the freedom of expression front, which the EP recognized as not being in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Yet, the real sticking point for the Turkish government is its strong words on Cyprus, which Ankara does not recognize to be rightfully part of the negotiation process.

Ankara's reaction was as could be expected. Prime Minister Erdogan denounced the report as biased, while Chief EU Negotiator Egeman Bagis said the report must not be taken seriously.

To some extent, the Cyprus dispute is linked to two competing narratives of what happened when the European Council agreed to start negotiations with Turkey at the European Council Summit in December 2004. Turkey claims it agreed to open its ports to Cyprus on the condition that the isolation of northern Cyprus be brought to an end. However, according to the EU, Turkey agreed to recognize all EU member states, including Cyprus, by signing the Additional Protocol to its EU Association Agreement. Turkey did sign the Association Agreement in 2005, but attached an explicit reservation to its signature asserting that its signature did not de facto mean it recognized Cyprus. The Additional Protocol has never been brought to parliament for ratification. Turkey's current position on Cyprus is that all embargoes be lifted simultaneously. Furthermore, Ankara asserts that since Greek Cypriot membership was not conditional on resolution of the Cyprus conflict, nor should the conflict be a factor in Turkey's accession process (see Bagis' interview with EurActiv.)

The Cyprus-Turkey-EU dilemma began in 1995 when Greece allowed Turkey to enter the Customs Union in exchange for Cyprus' EU candidature. In 1997, the EU and Cyprus concluded an association agreement that led to Cyprus' EU membership in 2004, though Cyprus had just rejected the UN-sponsored Annan Plan. In a referendum, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the UN-proposed solution. However, 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. The Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan did not hinder their entry into the EU despite a promise made in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit that Greek Cypriots would not stand in the way of a solution; instead, the Greek Cypriots entered the EU as representatives of the whole of Cyprus.

There is plenty of reason for Turkey to be frustrated with the EU's handling of the Cyprus conflict. With accession only a month away, Greek Cypriots had little reason to endorse the Annan Plan. Some European politicians did cry fowl, notably EU Enlargement Commissioner at the time Maxime Verheugen and External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten. Cyprus has since made the EU's relationship with Turkey difficult, as well as efforts to resolve its conflict with Turkish Cypriots in the north. Though the EU might well have made promises to end the north's isolation, Cyprus has blocked efforts to do so. Turkish Cypriots remain unable to directly trade with the EU and financial assistance has been hampered by Greek Cypriot intransigence. Additionally, despite ongoing negotiations, Cyprus continues to explore for oil in contested waters off its coast, which resulted in some serious naval showdowns with the Turkish Navy in November 2008. Since Cyprus has become a member, and having given up much of its leverage, the EU has done little to involve itself in reconciliation efforts. Instead, EU politicians opposed to Turkish membership have come to use Cyprus as an excuse to encumber the accession process while exerting little pressure on Cyprus now that it has full membership status. The Turks are, understandably, frustrated, and with now upwards of 23 chapters of the EU acquis blocked due to the Cyprus issue, Turkish accession is in jeopardy, as is the reform and external/internal security it helped bring about. The good news is that the European Summit in December took no action against Turkey on Cyprus, though it continues to be an albatross around the neck of the accession process, providing ample political fodder for EU opposition to Turkish membership and vice-versa. Additionally, as the International Crisis Group's Hugh Pope points out, as long as the question of Greek propeties in northern Cyprus remains unresolved, Turkey will continue to face costly verdicts at the European Court of Human Rights that not only imperil its future in the European Union, but also in the Council of Europe.

If Europe is serious about Turkish membership and a united Cyprus, lecturing Turkey without acknowledging past mistakes or the history of the conflict is not helpful. Pro-EU/reform columnist Mehmet Ali Birand on just why the current policy is unlikely to yield results:

The EU misses the confederate Cyprus train. The link has reversed. The EU does not notice but a new world is being established and Turkey is taking its place.

There is one other fact of which Europe is not aware. And that is that old balances no longer exist. Old connections, old accounts no longer exist in the heads of those who lead Turkey.

What I'm trying to say is very simple. Until now Western capitals and media established a connection between a solution in Cyprus and Turkey's membership of the EU. For years there was an equation established stating, 'Do this and that so we will give you what you want in the EU'.

In 1995 it was agreed with Greek Cypriots to start full membership negotiations in exchange for accepting Turkey into the customs union. And in 2004 in exchange for the acceptance of the Annan Plan, Turkey obtained candidacy status and negotiations started.

Do you know when this connection failed? It was when Turkey broke a huge taboo by accepting the Annan Plan whereas the Greek Cypriots denied and still received full membership. The Greek Cypriots were given the key to the door that leads to Turkey's full membership.

Europe played its cards boorishly. Thus the EU-Cyprus connection broke. The EU's former evasiveness no longer exists. In the Economist magazine dated 12 December, there was still a broad analysis trying to get a message across that implies, 'Turkey gets stuck in respect of the EU. In order to get out it needs to take steps toward a solution. Ankara needs to take action.'

How delusive an attitude. The magazine is probably not aware of the fact that the balance and certain things in Turkey have changed.

If European capital cities too think that way, I must say they are making a big mistake. The EU is no longer a matter that causes Turkey to make important sacrifices.

Turkey quickly changes. Europe is probably not aware that it is not only losing Turkey but also the possibility of creating a united Cyprus. The European Union for Turkey is no longer a piece of carrot worth catching.

I'd like to draw attention to the fact that this connection has been reversed. If Europe still targets or dreams about a united Cyprus and wants to prevent a split never to unite again, then it needs to change its attitude toward Turkey.

In order not to lose a united Cyprus, Europe needs to work up an appetite and prepare carrots to spurn the excitement for Turkey. Now the world is changing and Turkey will find its place in this newly established world."

While Bagis' statements that Turkey should ignore what the EU says are also not necesarily helpful to the accession process other than helping to keep Turkish hopes up, neither are ignoring where they are coming from -- and, yes, they too should be taken seriously. For Turkey's part, it should focus on the work ahead, taking positive steps to enact reforms requisite to accession while keeping the EU parliament resolution in perspective. Cyprus is indubitably a large impediment to the accession process, but a final decision on Turkey -- and in Turkey, on Europe -- is still a long ways ahead.

For more on the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus ahead of April elections, see analysis from Didem Aykel with the International Crisis Group. See also EurActiv's timeline and summary of Cyprus-EU-Turkey affairs.


UPDATE I (2/25) -- Today's Zaman reports that the EU Parliament's Turkey Rapporetuer Ria Oomen-Ruitjen said the resolution on Turkey was stronger this year due to changes in the European Parliament's composition after elections this summer.

Commenting on notes concerning Cyprus included in the EP's latest report on Turkey, Oomen-Ruijten said the parliament had similar demands from Turkey before.

Due to the "new balances formed in the European Parliament after the last elections," no amendments could have been made to the Cyprus paragraph of the report as Turkey expected, Oomen-Ruijten stated.

On Feb. 10, European lawmakers endorsed a resolution that called on Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, to resolve the issue of Turkish citizens settled on the island and to allow Greek Cypriot access to the Maraş region.

With a motion adopted in the general assembly afterwards, this call on Turkey to seek its active support for comprehensive peace talks on the island was expanded to include all relevant parties.

Negotiations between Talat and Demetrios re-commenced yesterday.

Squaring Off on Constitutional Amendments, Part II

In a luncheon meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan on Wednesday, Hurriyet Daily News' Fulya Ozerkan reported that EU ambassadors were planning to make it clear to the leader of Turkey's parliament that a new constitution is needed in order for Turkey to accede. The AKP is currently considering amending 22 articles of the existing military constitution, which was largely forced on the Turkish public in the violent years following the September 12, 1980 coup.

An anonymous diplomat told Hurriyet, "Even if Turkey solves all its problems, it still needs a new constitution. Turkey cannot become an EU member with its current Constitution." While overhauling the constitution is no easy task, the AKP seems to be taking a more piecemeal approach. However, while it is still unclear what the 22 amendments the AKP will propose, some have suggested the AKP is planning a larger overhaul. In either case, the AKP has introduced legisltion that would reduce the waiting time needed to hold a referendum on constitutional amendments from 120 days to 45 days, which is necessary since any amendment to the constitution is likely to be challenged at the Constitutional Court. If the amendment is approved in a popular referendum before the Constitutional Court has the chance to reject it as violating the first four articles of the Constitution, it will be much more difficult for the Court to act.

A Little Background

The AKP has two options for making amendments: to pass legislation with the 2/3 vote of the parliament, which means getting 367 deputies when the AKP has only 338 seats; or, to go to referendum, which requires 330 votes and a simple majority of Turkish voters. The Kurdish-oriented Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has 20 seats and is likely to support amendments, as well as some members of the Democratic Left Party (DSP). However, even with these parties' support, the AKP will need to seek votes in the MHP or, an even greater ong shot, the CHP, to pass anything. Given the recalcitrance of the MHP and the CHP, a referendum seems the only shot. And, so here is the question: can opposition parties challenge the constitutional amendments by filing to have them annulled at the Constitutional Court should they be approved in referendum? Legal scholars disagree, and should opposition parties get the 110 MPs needed to petition the Constitutional Court to annul the amendment, there will be a legal showdown of epic proportions.

Since CHP has proved completely recalcitrant to any amendment of the constitution whatsoever, such a showdown seems likely unless the AKP passes a constitutional package that is able to win the support of the MHP, allowing it to take the first option and eschew a referendum altogether. However, plenty of reformers and long-time advocates for a new constitution think the AKP should adopt an "all-or-nothing" approach, and the EU seems to agree. The AKP has twice now made plans for a re-write of the constitution, and twice now has not followed through. President Gul has voiced his opinion that the government missed a historic chance in 2007 and early 2008, and those who have just the slightest bit of optimism left in tact hope that Turkey will again put a new constitution and see it through.

To this end, SETA-DC recently organized an event in which constitutional expert Saadet Yuksel, Istanbul University, discussed the design, adoption, and successful implementation of a new constitution. Yuksel argues that past attempts have been flawed, failing to get much input from civil society groups or seek consensus in Turkish society at large. Her entire speech can be accessed through the link above.

Echoing frustration from Europe, Gianni Buquicchio, the new president of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, gave an interview with Today's Zaman consistent with the views of the European Union ambassadors who met Erdogan this week. Buquicchio expressed his dismay that Turkey had not moved forward with a new constitution, and urged Turkish leaders to apply to the advisory institution for advice on what a new constitution may look like. Additionally, the Turkish president-elect of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has also called for a new constitution. Of course, Turkey seeking out a cooperative relationship on constitution making would lend power to nationalists bent on maintaining the status quo, but when these parties are opposed to even the smallest of progressive changes, why not seek out expert advice, design a solid document, seek broad input and consensus throughout Turkish society, and finally bring a new legal basis to the security of Turkish democracy to facilitate its consolidation? It is no easy process, but whoever said democracy is easy.


UPDATE I (2/15) -- In regard to the Venice Commission, I thought it approproate post the Commission's 2009 opinion on the Political Parties Law, which it found to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Into the Bunkers?

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

The Turkish Armed Forces and Interior Ministry's recent annulment of the secret Police-Security Cooperation Protocol (EMASYA) on February 4 has re-focused Turkish political observers on the transformative state of civil-military relations here. EMASYA allowed the military to intervene in domestic affairs without seeking approval from civilian authorities, though its exact contents remain unknown to the public. According to TESEV's 2006-2008 Security Almanac, the Protocol laid out the command structure that would follow suit during the course of such an intervention. Bianet translates the EMASYA section of TESEV's report (in Turkish, save for a short summary):

The EMASYA protocol is one of the most typical examples for perceiving the protocol and its legislations superior to the law, for applications contrary to the law and for one of the privileged devices of the military tutelage system.

The interior security doctrine restructured after 28 February was build upon the EMASYA Protocol. The Protocol consists of 27 articles regarding the Provincial Administration Law (no. 5332) article 11/D and was worked out by the General Staff Presidency and the Ministry of the Interior on 7 July 1997. In cases deemed necessary, the protocol directs the intervention of military forces in situations of incidents regarding internal public order and security.

In accordance with the EMASYA Protocol, internal security operations and regional police task forces, village guards, gendarmerie internal security units and gendarmerie units conjoin with the highest ranking Land Forces Command (KKK) unit in the region upon the consent and approval of the governor. Police special operation task forces are subordinate to EMASYA Region and Subsector Commands; provisional village guards report to the regional Gendarmerie Command which again is subordinate to the EMASYA Command. Therefore, in terms of territorial issues the gendarmerie is not connected to the Ministry of the Interior but to the military authorities in such situations.

The "Public Order and Security Centres" established in each province garrison are made dependent on the military in terms of organizing the provincial police and civil chiefs of intelligence, assessment and planning. Due to this structure, the entire information gathered by civilian units and the intelligence can be obtained by the military. Again, the military can intervene in civilian incidents without permission of the civilian superior in situations deemed necessary. Thus, interior security is in fact provided by the military since provincial civilian structures are outranked by the armed forces.

According to the Protocol, internal security operations and the regional operation command are subordinate to the highest ranking military unit of the region. This unit is connected to the KKK in a large part of the country. In the south-eastern provinces of the country the operational status is not temporary but permanent, which means that public order is under control of the military in wide parts of the country.

One of the means to expand the Gendarmerie's jurisdiction is to deprive the governors of their duty in individual incidents or issues pending for more than one year which would normally be covered by the police forces. The previously mentioned article 10(c) of the Law on Gendarmerie Operation, Duties and Authority has been issued according to article 11/D of the Provincial Administration Law which is shaped by the EMASYA Protocol. At the same time, joint operations by the gendarmerie and police forces upon the permission of the civil superior and the directive of the prosecutor become increasingly common. This situation is highly compatible with the internal security doctrine of the military authorities and is indirectly relevant to the EMASYA Protocol.

Though Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug has said that EMASYA is not necessary because much of it is stipulated in existing law, namely Article 11 of Law No. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration Code, its repeal does mean that such an intervention will not be allowed to take place unless a provincial governor asks the military to intervene. From Hürriyet:

“As you know, EMASYA originated from public order, civilian and military cooperation. As a matter of fact, article 11 of law no. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration clarifies the issue. Actually, if it was consummately read, that much discussion would not take place,” Başbuğ said.

“Yet, what is important here to us is the rule of law. It is out of the question even for the EMASYA protocol to go over the law, and it should not be inconsistent with the law, as well. Law no. 5442 is very clear: “The governor is superior to all general and local law enforcement officers.” This is irrevocable under any circumstances. Everything is under the command of the governor,” he said.

. . . .

Asked if the protocol could be annulled, Başbuğ said: “It may be annulled, this protocol is not needed, the capacity already is in the law. All in all, the law is the basis for us about EMASYA. It is impossible for the EMASYA protocol to pass over other laws. This protocol has been given excessive importance and has been misunderstood. And its confidentiality has created more trouble in the process.”

Basbug also commented on Article 9 of EMASYA, which gave the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) permission to intervene in "social incidents." According to Basbug, this is not the TSK's job, stating that a strong distinction be made between terrorism and the former, the meaning of which is still unclear, but from Basbug's words, seem to pertain to mass meetings, such as protests and marches.

Prime Minister Erdogan was the first to announce plans for the annulment of EMASYA, and President Gul followed up soon after with a statement urging the government and military to repeal the controversial protocol, which the European Commission has long listed as an impediment to Turkey's accession to the European Union (see the latest progress report). The EMASYA annulment follows revelations about the alleged Balyoz coup plans, which the TSK maintains were merely war games scenarios.

The Red Book

With EMASYA gone, questions have arisen as to whether the National Security Document (MGSB) may face similar annulment or overhaul. The MSGB is also known as the "Red Book," and critics have long characterized it as a kind of secret constitution, another secret document facilitating government intervention in internal security matters. The Human Rights Association (IHD) and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) are challenging the MSGB; their lawyer, Ozturk Turkdogan, is currently arguing the case before the Council of State. However, so far the government has refused to respond to questions from the Council of State about the contents of the MSGB, responding that the document is a "state secret." Turkdogan claims the MSGB is unconstitutional since the document was never submitted to parliament, to which the constitution stipulates the cabinet answer in regard to national security matters.

In addition to the government drafted MSGB, there are also significant concerns about the broad powers the current constitution enumerates to the Armed Forces. Though reforms in 2004 reduced the powers of the National Security Council to advisory and increased the number of civilians who sit on the Council, reformers claim the constitution still leaves broad room for the military to maneuver. The Feb. 28 process is still fresh in the minds of many of these reformers, and further reform of the constitution in this area is also critical to the accession process.

The State of Civil-Military Relations

While public support or the TSK is still high (estimated at above 80 percent), support seems to be dropping, leading some military refor advocates like Ibrahim Kalin, a policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, to argue that the military is conscious of the public demand for it to "stay in the bunkers" and taking steps to make that happen. While some Kemalist/secularist Turks see the repeal of EMASYA and the military stepping back from civilian affairs as dangerous, painting the military retreat as further empowering political parties and groups they perceive as anti-secular, chief among them the AKP, many reformers, AKP supporters and not, have long called for the military to step away from poltics, a necessary condition they see for the consolidation of Turkish democracy. The Economist ran a decent summary this week of the state of civil-military relations in Turkey, including analysis of the TSK's "blighted image" and loss of public support in the wake of the Ergenekon investigation and the Daglica affair. However, the article also notes that "for millions of secular Turks the army remains the sole guarantor of their freewheeling lifestyle." The article quotes Eric Edelman, a formers ambassador from the United States to Turkey: "One might feel better about the military’s loss of power if Turkey had a balanced political system with the possibility of alternance of government.”

At the heart of the civil-military relationship is Basbug, who is in the increasingly diffcult position of negotiating between hardliners in the TSK and demands for the military to keep out of politics. While several press organizations ocntinue to rail against Basbug, especially for his "talkative" relationship with the pro-secularist/Kemalist press, Basbug also consented to the EMASYA reform and recently expressed regret to Hürriyet that Prime Minister Erdogan's wife could not enter a military facility while wearing a headscarf. Yet, after making this statement of regret, unthinkable by a head of the TSK just a few years ago, Basbug gave a 5-hour interview with Haberturk (for a two-part series that ran this week) in which he criticized press he routinely characterizes as out to get the TSK and fomented disbelief at recent coup accusations within the Naval Forces Command. Saying the TSK's patience is limited, both with the press and those seemingly inside the military who are leaking information, he said the TSK had a slieu of secret documents he could release, intimating that the TSK taking such an action would smear its opponents. There has been plenty of speculation in the Turkish press about just what these documents might contain and who they might damage. Ihsan Dagi comments on Basbug's troubled position:

He told Hürriyet that he wished the GATA incident had not happened. Could his harsh remarks to Habertürk have come because of his ‘wish’? He may have delivered those harsh remarks to calm ‘covert groups’ within the military and avoid their criticism [?] . . . .

To me, Gen. Başbuğ can’t wait for August to remove the ‘ordeal’ of his uniform. Just like [former chiefs of general staff] generals Hilmi Özkök and Yaşar Büyükanıt did.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- The Natioanl Security Council (MGK) met on Friday, Feb. 20, and are assumed to have discussed amending the National Secuirty Document (MGSB). Some observers think the MGK might remove contests pertaining to Islamist threats. The other two main threats the MGSB identifies are extreme leftism and ethnic separatism.

Loss of Public Space in Besiktas

PHOTO from Hurriyet Daily News

Municipal authorities have plans to take away more public space along Besiktas' public shore. Citing security concerns, plans for a major hotel are underway. The Hurriyet Daily News has the story in English, which raises important questions about public space, privatization, and cultural preservation, all issues Istanbulu have had to deal with for some time now. One of the things I noticed in Turkey, and even in Istanbul, is the seeming lack of public space found in many other European cities I have visited. It seems the deficit might only increase, and much to Istanbul's loss.

Turkish Playwright, Vakit, and AKP Mayor Get Press in Middle America

PHOTO from The Plain Dealer

Controversal Turkish playwright Ozen Yula is the subject of an article this week in The Cleveland Plain Dealer by Tony Brown, which documents harsh criticism Yula and his colleagues received from the Islamic conservative newspaper Vakit. Yula is the writer of "Yala Ama Yutma" ("Lick, But Don't Swallow"), a play that has dawn scorn from some conservatives alleging it to be pornographic.

Criticisms from the Islamist newspaper Vakit have proved the most worrisome for Yula, which according to The Plain Dealer, accused the play of "smearing dirt on human angels." I cannot find the article on Vakit's website, and so am assuming the article in question was removed from the site as a result of the kinds of violent responses it elicited. Radikal features a few of the violent comments (in Turkish), including open-ended questions as to what kind of punishment should be wielded, where it should take place, and who should be assigned to do it. Additionally, the AKP mayor of Beyoglu, Ahmet Misbah Demircan, shut down the play, though the mayor's office has since allowed to open the production; however, as a result of the Vakit criticism, the play has been postponed, perhaps indefinitely. Demircan cited safety concerns, including the theatre's did not have a fire escape. As The Plain Dealer points out, this might well have been a reference to the Madimak Hotel in Sivas, where reactionaries burned alive 37 people, mostly Alevis. From The Plain Dealer:

Ozen Yula, a leading Turkish playwright who is spending most of 2010 working and teaching in Cleveland, got an unwelcome invitation earlier this month.

It was an invitation to join a list of people who wound up dead, hunted or silenced after being condemned in Vakit, Istanbul's most widely followed Islamic-fundamentalist newspaper.

Yula earned that distinction as the author of a comedy that was scheduled to open Monday at the Kumbaraci50 theater in the Beyoglu district of Istanbul, one of the world's largest cities.

In the play, an angel gets sent back to Earth to do good works in the body of a pornographic movie actress.

Or maybe the play is about a porn star who dreams she's an angel. Like many serious comedies, it's ambiguous.

But ambiguity is not something Islamic fundamentalists tend to appreciate. Which makes life in Turkey -- already complicated -- even more so. Founded in 1923, Turkey is struggling to find its identity as a secular, Western-style democracy with a centuries-long history as part of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

On Feb. 2, Vakit (Turkish for "Time") condemned Yula and his play -- provocatively titled "Lick but Don't Swallow" -- for "smearing human dirt on angels," according to one translation of the newspaper's online Turkish text.

That kind of accusation of blasphemy can get a person killed, or at least hunted, as a similar condemnation did in 1989 for Indian novelist Salman Rushdie.

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, issued a "fatwa" -- or Islamic ruling -- calling for Rushdie's death after the publication of "The Satanic Verses," in which a film star becomes the archangel Gabriel, who then describes Islam's founder Muhammad as balding, bespectacled and suffering from dandruff.

After years of running and hiding, Rushdie still receives what he has been quoted as calling a "sort of Valentine's card" from Iran each year on Feb. 14 to remind him his life is still in danger, though Rushdie now dismisses the threat.

Dutch movie director Theodoor van Gogh was not so lucky; he was assassinated by a fundamentalist for his portrayal of the treatment of women in Islam in the film "Submission."

Likewise, the attack on Yula's play is being seen by secularists as a deliberate attempt to whip up militant furor over the play and anybody connected with it. That includes actress Ayca Damgaci, famous for writing and performing in the autobiographical film "My Marlon and Brando," about her dangerous romance with a Kurd, a member of a minority ethnic group in eastern Turkey.

Deliberate or not, the Vakit story has touched off a sensation.

The mayor of Beyoglu, a member of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party -- which favors restoring some Islamic practices but claims not to be fundamentalist -- shut down the venue where the play was supposed to premiere Monday.

The mayor, Ahmet Misbah Demircan, has allowed the theater to reopen, but a threat of violence lingers, and members of the creative team are so rattled that the play is not likely to be seen in Istanbul until March, if at all.

Surely this is not the kind of comparison that the government of Turkey is keen to see printed in a newspaper from Middle America, and it certainly goes against the grain of the carefully crafted image of "moderate Islam" the AKP has promoted in the West. The paper goes onto question Prime Minister Erdogan's contention that the AKP is "is not a political party with a religious axis." Here, it is important to note that the AKP and Vakit are two very different forces in Turkish society, and that the latter is much harder-edged and associated with Islamist movements and parties far to the right o the AKP. Yet, Demircan's decision and reference to Madimak brings the AKP into The Plain Dealer's story. Ozen is living in Cleveland for the year.

Armenia (Continued . . .)

The spat about the Armenian Constitutional Court ruling on the ratification of the Protocols hoped to be signed between Turkey and Armenia continues with no end in sight. Since the court decision, Turkey has seemed to focus its argumentative energy on the historical commision the Protocols would establish. While it was unclear from the beginning just what such a commission would look like, the Turkish government claims that the Armenian Constitutional Court's reference to a specific article of the Armenian Declaration of Independence hinders the implications of the Protocols. The article in question reads that Armenia will not retreat from its position that the massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 constituted a genocide.

However, long before the Armenian Constitutional Court decision, Turkey had tried to link the Protocols to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Prime Minister Erdogan explicitly linking the two matters when he met with President Obama in Washington in December. While some analysts maintain that Turkey is merely looking for a way to get out of the Protocols, especially following the angry response from Azerbaijan, Turkish diplomats continue to reiterate their support for the process and have asked Swiss mediators, as well as the United States, to provide written assurance that the Armenian Constitutional Court's decision will not place impediments on the proposed historical commission to discuss what happened in 1915. So far, Switzerland and the United States have said they have no intention to do so, and that the Armenian court decision in no way impedes implementation of the Protocols. The United States, in particular, has lauded the Armenian Constitutional Court decision for moving the process forward, characterizing Turkey's responses as "exaggerated." Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has been trying to persuade Washington otherwise, so far holding talks with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Seteinberg, National Security Advisor James Jones, and Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Turkish government has expressed that it feels pressured by the United States, and these accusations of undue meddling only increased with news that the House Foreign Affairs Committee is set to take up consideration of yet another resolution calling for President Obama to recognize 1915 as a genocide. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman said the committee will consider the resolution in early March, in time for it to moved to the House floor for a vote before April 15, the day on which the start of the massacres is memorialized and on which Obama will or will not name the event a "genocide."

Armenian President Serge Sarkisian called on Turkey last week to expedite the ratification process, asking President Gul to help overcome the opposition and clear the way for a vote by the Turkish Parliament. Prime Minister Erdogan, who commands a majority in Parliament, has not moved to put the issue forward; meanwhile, Armenia has threatened to annul the process should Turkey not move forward. Pressure from the Armenian opposition will only increase as April 24 approaches, and though Sarkisian has a solid majority in the Armenian parliament, he is in a much less tenable political position than Erdogan. Armenian opposition figures are insisting that the Protocols are merely an excuse for President Obama to yet again refrain from calling 1915 a "genocide," and that the Protocols are a diplomatic convenience for the United States president to eschew the genocide issue. The Armenian parliament is also preparing legislation to allow the president to remove his signature from international treaties.

There is also plenty of pressuring from Azerbaijan. Azeri Ilham President Aliyev has expressed his confidence that Turkey would not ratify the treaty without the Nagorno-Karabakh link. Aliyev has repeated old threats that he could direct gas away from Turkey and toward Russia, which has promised to buy as much gas from Azerbaijan as it can supply. Meanwhile, Armenia played up its ties with Iran this week, concluding deals to build a transnational railway and energy facilities with the Iranians, a move speculated to strengthen Armenia's hand and pressure the United States not to call on Armenia to make additional concessions.

Far From Safe: Yet Another LGBT Group Targeted

PHOTO from Hürriyet Daily News

The Izmir Governor's office is seeking closure of LGBT group SiyahPembe Ucgen (BlackPink Triangle) for threatening "Turkish moral values and family structure." From Hürriyet:

The case against the Black Pink Triangle Association is not the first case opened against an LGBT organization in Turkey in recent years. The Interior Ministry has repeatedly attempted the closure of such organizations on similar claims. In 2005, KAOS-GL and in 2006, Pembe Hayat (Pink Life) faced closure cases. In 2009, Lambda Istanbul won its closure case after a lengthy legal battle.

. . . .

Black Pink Triangle is the first İzmir-based LGBT organization and was established in February 2009. Following the founding of the organization, the governor’s office complained that one of the articles in the Black Pink Triangle’s constitution was violating the Turkish civil code, in particular, paragraphs protecting Turkish moral values and family structure. The office also demanded the organization amend the questioned article and submit full documentation of the change within 30 days. Black Pink Triangle claims it met the deadline, however, did not alter the constitution, regarding such demand to be a violation of the members’ freedom of association. Following that incident, the İzmir Governor’s Office brought the complaint to the prosecutor’s office in May.

The Istanbul LGBT organization Lambda faced a similar complaint from the Istanbul governor's office, winning their case at the Supreme Court of Appeals a little over a year ago following a long legal process. However, Lambdaistanbul is continuing their legal fight, claiming the reasoning of the decision still facilitates the closure of LGBT groups for "moral" reasons. From Amnesty International following the Supreme Court of Appeals' decision:

However, as we take a closer look on the fifth page of the reasoning, it is noted that the court of appeal indeed agrees to a great extend with the court of first instance with regards to its persuasions on "general morals". Without a doubt, the following sentence on the fifth page is an open threat to all LGBTT organizations in Turkey:

"Certainly, the execution of the above mentioned articles 30 and 31 and the dissolution of the defendant association could still be demanded, if it would act counter to its constitution, in the ways of encouraging or provoking gay, lesbian, bisexual, transsexual and transvestite behavior or acting with the aim of spreading such sexual orientations."

Sexual orientation or sexual identity cannot be changed through imposition. It is the fact both for LGBTT and for heterosexual people, admittedly the majority of the population.

For the last 20 years, it is not the number of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transsexuals and transvestites increasing, rather it is their individual and organized visibility that has been pressured and silenced until today. It is thus, unfortunate, that the court of appeal considers the organized visibility and rights struggle of the ignored LGBTT's, who are subjected to pressure and othering because of their sexual identity and sexual orientation, as a risk to society.

And, here is a press release SiyahPembe Ucgen issued in January about their own case:

The closure case that has been taken against SiyahPembe Üçgen (BlackPink Triangle) Izmir begins with the first session on the 9th February...

The first trial of the closure case that has been taken to the 6th civil court of general jurisdiction of Izmir by chief public prosecutor's office after the recourse of Izmir's governorship with the claim that the 2nd article of its charter's being "against the general morality and the protection of family" is on 9 February, 2010.

The closure case against SiyahPembe Üçgen Association is an attempt to block LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual) individuals' right of association, whereas, it, for the communities that faces discrimination, is an absolute must. The only possible way to resist to isolation and exclusion for lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals that are under pressure of the social structures because of their sexual orientations and identities is unity and solidarity. There is no other discovered way to struggle against hate crimes, homophobic and transphobic discourses and discriminatory practises in publicity. In a world where heterosexism is rammed down people's throat as a divine reality, closing down the LGBT associations who are the only ones that can criticise all is the sign of an authoritarian mindset.

How possibly should an association that was founded on the purpose of securing LGBT individuals' vital rights and while they try to exist economically, socially and culturally, preventing them being exposed to discrimination be closed?
The black pink badge that LGBTs were forced to wear in Nazi Genocide Camps shall no more be the symbol of destruction and discrimination but a fight for a life that is based on living together with all our differences.

As well as for heterosexuals, the constitutional rights and freedoms go for lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals!

Against all kinds of discrimination and inequality, we call for all right defenders who shout for equality and freedom to be with us and act with solidarity as long as this case continues...

SiyahPembe Üçgen cannot be closed down, must not be closed down!

As Jenny White writes, " as in Article 301 court cases accusing people of “insulting Turkishness,” the aim is often judicial harrassment, months of court appearances, legal costs, disruption of lives, and often threats in the street. You don’t need a conviction to do damage."

Iranian Refugees Face Problems in Turkey

Accusations have arisen in recent months that Iranian refugees seeking asylum in Turkey have been threatened by Iranian security agents, and that these security agents have in some cases worked with local Turkish police in a campaign of intimidation. Turkey is a popular destination for refugees thanks to its long border with Iran and its lax visa laws, though under Turkish law only Europeans can claim asylum status. It is the responsibility of the UN Refugee Agency(UNHCR), whose Turkey office is in Ankara, to re-locate asylum seekers. From the Guardian's Robert Tait, who is based in Istanbul:

The intimidation campaign comes after a senior revolutionary guard commander, Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, told the hardline Keyhan newspaper that foreign-based supporters of the opposition green movement would be targeted as "extensions of a soft coup".

"So far, a large number of the infantry of the enemy has been identified," he said. "The Islamic Republic will not allow the extensions of a soft coup to act on further sedition and if necessary, the government will make them face serious challenges."

Iranians do not need visa requirement to enter Turkey, meaning it would be easy in theory for Iran's state agents to operate clandestinely within Turkey's borders. Western diplomats have privately voiced concerns about the security of Iranian refugees from the election upheaval.

However, Metin Corabatir, external affairs officer with the UN's high commission for refugees, insisted they were safe in Turkey. "The Iranians are under the protection of the Turkish state and Turkey is a secure country," he said. "If there are some high profile people, extra measures are taken to ensure they are protected. But we know of no incident and there is no threat to these people."

Yet, Tait has interviewed numerous refugees whose stories belie Corabitir's assurances. In one case, two men beat a refugee on the streets of Kayseri and stole her mobile phone. Maryam Sabri, the victim, claims she was raped by Iranian authorities and fears the attack was carried out by Iranian authorities keen to prevent her from telling her story. In Sabri's case, the UNHCR in Turkey took the word of the police, who have concluded the attack to be a simple street crime. Though a local NGO, the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (Asam), has agreed with the police, United States authorities are reported to have sped up Sabri's application. Tait documents other cases of rape victims who have been intimidated, as well as reported that some victims have alleged Turkish police have asked them to keep quiet about the rape and torture from which they purport to be escaping, in some cases even threatening to hand refugees over to the Iranian authorities. The UNHCR continues to maintain that the victims are safe in Turkey.

And, another aspect of discrimination against Iranian refugees that has come to my attention involves gay Iranian asylum seekers who the Turkish government has re-located in the conservative central Anatolian town of Kayseri, no doubt a bizarre choice. According to Hossein Alizadeh,

While in Turkey, the authorities insist that refugees can only stay in one of 30 designated small cities. These locations are assigned based on the asylum seeker’s nationality, gender, age, and reason for seeking asylum.

. . . .

In a society where job opportunities are rare and financial resources are limited, refugees usually encounter public hostility. But for LGBT refugees, the picture is particularly frightening. Gay people, especially in more conservative areas, are perceived to be moral degenerates who will destroy social cohesion and promote prostitution. In this context, many view gay refugees as the “bottom of the barrel”—the public (and unfortunately sometimes the authorities) see them as parasites who not only suck blood from their host’s body, but who will fatally damage this body if left unchecked. For this reason, some “concerned citizens,” and occasionally local law enforcement agents, take it upon themselves to continuously intimidate gay refugees to make their lives as unpleasant as possible.

For LGBT refugees in Turkey, this is the daily struggle they must contend with: away from family and friends, with painful memories of persecution and harassment in their native country, they are now unwelcome strangers, living in extreme poverty, isolation and hopelessness, waiting for what feels like an eternity to find out if any country on the planet will give them a chance to live like human beings.

Alizadeh also documents difficulties all refugees in Turkey face, and gives their total number at 18,000 (as of June 2009), and I assume this number includes only those who have filed applications with the UNHCR. I have no idea how many are Iranians, and the number has no doubt increased following this summer's unrest. See also Alizadeh's June 11, 2009 post and this story from Voice of America.

"For Hrant, For Justice"

Özgür Mumcu (L), the son of slain journalist Uğur Mumcu; Rakel Dink (2nd from L), the widow of journalist Hrant Dink; Sezen Öz (2nd from R), the widow of prosecutor Doğan Öz; and Nukhet İpekçi (R), the daughter of the late journalist Abdi İpekçi, attended the 12th hearing of the Dink trial on Monday. PHOTO from Today's Zaman

The twelfth hearing of the Hrant Dink murder case is taking place in Istanbul this week, and the concealing of evidence continues. At the hearing, joint attorneys of the Dink family repeated requests that the security institutions indicated to have played a role in the murder be investigated. These include the National Intelligence Organization, the Istanbul Police Directorate, the Trabzon Police Directorate, the Trabzon Gendarmerie Command and the Intelligence Office Branch of the Police General Directorate. Past government investigations made at the behest of the family have cleared security services of any such role, but evidence that might indicate otherwise remains unavailable to prosecutors, classified as "state secrets" critical to national security. The court rejected requests that statements be taken from Head of Intelligence Department Ramazan Akyurek and Muhettin Zenit.

The Dink lawyers also requested that invetigations be made of persons who had concealed evidence, including just how footage from the AK Bank security camera documenting activity on the street where Dink was shot came to be deleted. Also requested was an investigation into a group that legally targeted Dink and might well have incited his murder. Members of this group have tried to disrupt past hearings, as well as harassed Dink's attorneys. Also significant were requests that the Dink investigation be looked into as possibly part of the Cage Plan (part of the Ergenekon investigation), which was allegedly devised by the Naval Forces Command and laid out plans to create disorder by assassinating members of Turkish minority groups.

This hearing had many of the same problems as previous hearings, including trouble attaining testimony from a secret witness to the murder. "Secret Witness #1" watched two men shoot Dink, one from in front (Ogun Samast) and one from behind (Yasin Hayal). The same witness saw Yasin's brother, Osman Hayal, at the murder scene. Osman is among twenty defendants, but is not being detained.

Rakel Dink, Hrant's widow, was joined by relatives of other political murder victims whose cases remain unsolved. Filiz Ali, daughter of prominent author Sabahattin Ali, who was assassinated in 1948, read out a joint press statement. It has been translated by Bianet. (I am not sure if the translation is of the entire statement, or simply contains excerpts. I suspect it is the latter, and so have used ellipses between what Bianet quotes.)

Most of our cases have already been closed since they reached the statute of limitation. As far as the Dink case is concerned, it is still in the process of being concealed. The crimes have not yet fallen under their statute of limitation.

. . . .

The state has still got the possibility to dissociate itself from the infiltrated and destructive focus in order to reveal the truth. Even with a murder as well concealed as this one, we still have the opportunity not to hand down this contempt of the state to the generations coming behind us, these affiliated crimes constituted after the murder.

. . . .

We are not here based on feelings of hatred, anger and revenge. We are here because of our responsibilities as citizens and because of our never-ending demand for justice. We are part of an ever growing family living in a country where people are getting killed constantly. We do not want the number of our family to increase any further. We hold all state institutions responsible for revealing the organizations behind the murders of our relatives. They will all remain guilty in our eyes until the truth will have been revealed. And they will convey the thought that they can easily commit this kind of crime any time.

. . . .

We came here to make our voices heard to the ones carrying the official capacity, addressing the ones in responsible positions. We are not addressing the people in despair who are sensitive about this issue. We came here to be together with Rakel Dink and our friends Arat, Delal and Sera. We are interveners in this trial as well and today we will follow up that the list of demands submitted by the lawyers will be taken into account by the court.

. . . .

We did not come here to have the pain and sorrow of our families depicted in the press but to pass on our demand for justice.

The next hearing is set for May 10.


UPDATE I (2/12) -- 19 representatives of the "Deep Families" are meeting with members of parliament to discuss a petition to establish a parliamentary investigate commission to look into their relatives' unsolved murders. Also, a bit of disturbing news: the website of Agos newspaper, of which Dink was editor-in-chief from its found in 1996 to his murder in 2007, was hacked by someone who posted a picture of Samast in praise of Dink's assassination. The hacker also made threats against supporters of the paper. Agos has long been subject to intimidation and illegal harassment, which lawyer for the paper and the Dink family, Fethiye Cetin, claims have and are not receiving the attention by the judiciary and police they deserve.

UPDATE II (2/12) -- The Greater Istanbul Municipal Assembly has rejected a proposal to officially change "Ergenekon Street" in Sisli to "Hrant Dink Street." (For history, see Jan. 23 post). The proposal was submitted by Ozgen Nama from the CHP, and had the support of most other (if not all) CHP representatives. However, a majority of the seats in the assembly are controlled by the AKP, and these representatives voted down the proposal. The name of "Ergenekon Street" will stay as it is. Today's Zaman's Orhan Kemal Cengiz has a column condeming the AKP assembly members for their vote. Why did these AKP assembly members, most of whom are undoubtedly supportive of the Ergenekon investigation, vote against the CHP proposal?


UPDATE III (2/20) -- Vatan journalist Kemal Goktas is facing five eyars in prison following the publication of an investigative book about Dink's assassination, including allegtions against Akyurek, who initiated the criminal charges against Goktas. At a hearing on Tuesday, Goktas' lawyer,Filiz Aydin, argued the case was not filed properly, exceeding a statute limiting the time frame in which charges may be brought. Goktas will have another hearing on May 11, at which time judges should rule on the merits of Aydin's argument. Goktas is on trial for publishing a classified document revealing information about Hayal passed between the Trabzon Police Directorate and the Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate.

In another case, Milliyet journalist Nedim Sener is facing at least 20 years in prison for charges stemming from his own investigative book into the murder. Samast, a juvenile at the time he was involved in the Dink assassination, faces a sentence of 18-24 years, though there are indications it might be less. Samast was recently married to a young woman from Trabzon at the F-type prison in Kocaeli where he is awaiting trial. Last summer, Samast threatened members of the Dink family, telling them to "wait five years." See this statement from PEN in regard to Sener.

Power and Discipline?: Religion and Identity Cards

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled that religion cannot be listed as a field on Turkish national identification cards, which all Turkish citizens are required by law to carry. In 2006, Turkey began allowing people the right to leave the field blank or change their religious designation by application, though the ECHR ruled that the new regulation did not go far enough. The ECHR decision also said it was not the duty of the state to collect religious information about its citizens, which the Turkish Statistical Institute collects all the same regardless of whether religion is left blank or entered on the ID card.

The case that resulted in the ECHR decision came from an Alevi man who claimed state authorities would not allow him to change the religion on his identifiation card from "Islam" to "Alevi," and that this violated Article 9 ("freedom of thought, conscience, and religion") of the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as the Turkish constitutional prohibition against anyone being coerced to disclose religious beliefs (Article 24).

At the moment, the Turkish government has only a limited number of categories citizen may declare on their identification cards: Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Christian, Jew, Hindu, Zoroastrian, Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, Religionless, Other, or Unknown. As the U.S. Department of State's report on religious freedom in Turkey observes, some religions, such as the Baha'i, have complained about not having their religion included in the listing. As the report also documents, several non-Muslim minorities have complained of exposure to harassment and discrimination as a result of the inclusion of their religion on their identification cards, and as is the case with the Alevi petitioner, others have complained of harassment by local authorities when seeking to change their religious designation. Additionally, some groups, like Protestants and Syriac Christians, have faced particular difficulty opting out of otherwise compulsory religion classes if their identification cards did not include a religion other than "Islam." The courses teach world religions, but minorities, including Alevis, have long complained about a Hanafi Sunni Muslim slant.

There is also the question, of course, of the sheer construction of such categories by the state, in particular the consideration of "Alevi" as apart from "Muslim," the lack of specific categories for Syriac Christians (who are not Greek Orthodox or Rumeli), and as aforementioned, the fact that some religions in Turkey are simply not represented in the choices available.

Also of interest are demands from women and gender groups to remove marital status and gender from religious identification cards, as well as to change the current law governing women's surnames. Divorce can result in discrimination and other difficulties fror women that men simply do not experience, and LGBT and other gender-conscious groups have long decried the blue and pink color of the cards in terms of LGBT rights.


UPDATE I (2/11) -- Ayse Karabat of Today's Zaman has written more about the demands from women's groups. The article expounds on the Bianet article linked above, and gives some more specific examples of discrimination. In regard to surnames, several women's groups are also demanding amendment of Article 187 of the Civil Code, which restricts women's surnames. A local court has petitioned for the Constitutional Court to consider the matter, implying that the article might violate the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). According to the Turkish Constitution, and thanks to the EU-inspired reform process, treaty law supercedes the Civil Code.

On Neighborhood Pressure

Professor Binnaz Toprak, Bahcesehir Universitesi PHOTO from The Balkans Project


In 2008, the Open Society Institute, in cooperation with Bogazici University, published "Being Different in Turkey: Alienation on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism." Professor Binnaz Toprak led the polemical study, which instantly garnered criticism throughout the conservative press. Conducting research in 12 Anatolian towns, Professor Toprak and her colleagues documented concrete incidents of "neighborhood pressure," a concept first discussed by Serif Mardin who coined the term to describe the pressure some people in Anatolia experience because they are different. They might be different because they are Alevi or some other religious minority, speak Kurdish, or because they drink alcohol and/or wear an earring and have long hair. The reaction to the report's arguments no doubt stems from their similarity to the argument some secularists/Kemalists make to justify the headscarf ban in universities -- that is, if women are allowed to wear the headscarf in universities, other women will feel pressure to do the same lest they be judged as less moral, religious, etc. However, despite the similarity, the report delved deeper, examining the toleration of difference in the 12 Anatolian towns it explores.

I allude to the study now because the debate has once again appeared -- this time on a new blog, Changing Turkey in a Changing World -- and because the exchange is just as relevant now as it was in December 2008. Professor Ahmet Kuru, who is currently at Columbia University's School of International Public Affairs (SIPA), posted a criticism of the report, to which Toprak responds by reiterating many of the arguments she made defending it when it was published a little over one year ago. Also worth reading is a recent interview Toprak conducted with John Feffer of Washington's Institute for Policy Studies' (IPS) Balkans Project. In the interview, Toprak discusses growing conservative attitudes and the headscarf issue.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- Efes Managing Director Tugrul Agribas complains of "neighborhood pressure." From Hurriyet:

Speaking to reporters in Şanlıurfa on Wednesday, Ağırbaş said the company aims to expand the beer market in Turkey, but the number of sales points has diminished to around 83,000 from nearly 100,000 four years ago.

“The per capita beer consumption in Turkey is around 12 to 13 liters,” he said. “The European average is 100 liters. What spurs consumption is restaurants, cafes and pubs. But in Turkey, each consumer pays a special consumption tax that is nine times more than the tax paid in Germany, for example.”

Beer sales points have problems in getting licenses or renewing them, Ağırbaş said. “Beer is a key source of revenue for corner stores and kiosks. Rakı, beer and cigarettes together constitute 70 percent of a grocer’s revenue. When you take out rakı and beer, the grocer starts having a hard time,” he said. “Those who wish to open sales points cannot find places to rent. Others face neighborhood pressure. Meanwhile, chain stores are destroying corner stores.”

The Council of State and Coefficient Reform

The 8th Council Chamber of State has again ruled against reform that would make it easier for graduates from imam-hatip schools to enter universities. These schools are theological, but also have curriculum equivalent to that at Turkish public schools.

Following the infamous Feb. 28 process, which is considered by many Turkey's "postmodern coup," measures were put in place to curb the influence of imam-hatip, including the now contested the lower coefficient applied to the scores imam-hatip students receive on the Student Selection Examination (ÖSS). The lower coefficient places these students in the same field as those graduating from vocational schools, significantly reducing their chances of entering public universities.

In July, the Higher Education Council (YÖK) eliminated the lower co-efficients altogether. However, in December, the 8th Chamber of the Council of State reversed the YÖK policy change following an application from the Istanbul Bar Association. YÖK then moved to reduce the difference in the coefficients, the change again affecting both imam-hatip and vocational students. It is this most recent reform that the Council annulled.

Some Turks see the coefficient system as inherently unjust, discriminating against students who receive the same education yet are treated differents in the university admissions process (for example, see news coverage from Today's Zaman and this column from Fatma Sisli Zibak.) Yet, other Turks fear overhauling the coefficient system would result in a flood of religiously-oriented imam-hatip students entering university, and thus the state establishment.

For more on mam-hatip schools, see TESEV's 2004 report, "Imam Hatip Liseleri: Efsaneler ve Gercekler" (Imam Hatip Schools: Myths and Realities). Some of the report is in English, and gives a history of imam-hatip schools, as well as explains their popularity, explores attitudes of their students, and discusses their relationship with public universities.

UPDATE I (2/20) -- A student from Konya has applied to the European Court of Human Rights. The ECHR has affirmed Turkey's headscarf ban, though this is a different issue entirely. Not to politicize th ECHR, but a ruling in favor of the student and against the coefficient system here could help the image of the Court and Europeaniation in the eyes of religious Muslims who used to be more inclined to see Europeanization as a means to protect "their" rights against a "secular" state. As always, more details on the boy's human rights complaint and the legal grounds for bringing it here are appreciated.