Mustafa Sarigul: A Progressive for Turkey?

PHOTO from Hürriyet Daily News

Emphasizing the need for change with an enthusiasm for grassroots organizing and a new kind of politics akin to that of Barack Obama during the America presidential campaign, Mustafa Sarigul, the three-term mayor of Istanbul's Sisli district, is positioning himself to pose a serious challenge to both the AKP and the CHP in the November 2011 parliamentary elections. Sarigul resigned from the CHP last year following a dramatic fallout with the party resulting from his consistent challenging of CHP leader Deniz Baykal. TDH will become a formal political party once it clears formal legal hurdles, at which point the mayor says he will resign to focus on the 2011 elections.

At an event held for foreign press this afternoon, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States Faruk Logoglu, who has joined the TDH outlined the movement's plans and how its agenda differs from the political parties in power at present. Logoglu spoke alongside his youthful female colleague, 32-year-old Zeynep Dereli, who advises the TDH on foreign policy issues. Elaborating on TDH's plans to establish a broad-based social democratic party, Logoglu talked of the need for an alternative in Turkish politics at a time he said is defined by economic uncertainty and disenchantment with the government. Key to TDH's agenda is the European Union accession process, which Logoglu and Dereli characterized as stagnate under the AKP. Dereli went so far as to question the commitment of the AKP to join the EU, and both spoke of the need to re-focus Turkish foreign policy on transatlantic relations. Other big ticket items were the need to bridge the development gap in the southeast, as well as the wealth divide throughout the country; reform of the judiciary, including an overhaul of the High Council of Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK) and the need to expedite judicial proceedings; repeals of restrictions on freedom of expression facilitated by Article 301 and 318 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK); revision of the constitution and other laws in place that allow for military intervention in civilian affairs; and a rejuvenated initiative that would include engagement with Kurdish actors outside the state.

Logoglu said TDH polling has the party winning at least 13 percent of the vote, with more of its votes coming from the AKP's network of support than that of the CHP. Confident TDH would easily clear the 10 percent threshold needed by a political party to enter the Parliament, Logoglu confidently asserted the TDH's main advantages came in its early organizing efforts and ability to attract women and youth. These two groups are repeatedly emphasized as key demographic targets for the future party, which Logoglu claimed were also quite active in its leadership. The TDH has a gender quota of 30 percent in place at all electoral levels. According to the TDH, the movement has so far mobilized over 600,000 volunteers and established offices in 79 Turkish cities. Plans for offices in Brussels and Washington are in the works.

Also emphasized was the TDH's plans for a democratic inner-party structure, which the CHP has long lacked and to which Sarigul, among others, have fallen victim. CHP leader Deniz Baykal has held the CHP chairmanship for the vast majority of its post-coup history, and with an iron-clad grip that has long fueled charges of inner-party authoritarianism. Contrarily, the TDH said its new party chairmanship will be elected by a vote of all registered party members and will have a term limit of two years. Members of parliament will also be determined through a more democratic process rather than by headquarters, and the positions of party leader and prime minister will be held by two separate persons (like in Germany's SDP).

I have written frequently about the lack of a viable Turkish left in Turkey, especially during the past years when the CHP's increasingly nationalist stances have been so extreme as to place its membership in the Socialist International (SI) in serious jeopardy. For a comprehensive post on the CHP I posted before last year's municpal elections, see Jan. 11, 2009 post; for my first, and longest post on the demise of the Turkish left, see my Feb. 13, 2008 post.


TDH on the Issues

The Kurdish Conflict: Logoglu emphasized the need for Kurdish actors to be involved in the Kurdish process and expressed criticism of the state-centered conflict resolution efforts. Specifically, he highlighted the dearth of AKP consultation with civil society groups, as well as the delay to bring reform proposals to parliament and the domination of the Ministry of the Interior in terms of process. Twice Logoglu laid out alternative process by which the state would devise a plan, submit it summarily to parliament, seek civil society consultation, take it back to parliament, pass it, and then implement it. Logoglu did not address engaging combatants in any sort of negotiation effort, which, of course, would be the most difficult thing to sell in Turkey. According to Logoglu, the time it has taken for reforms in the AKP's Kurdish opening to go to parliament has solidified opposition and seriously imperiled current reform efforts, especially as the Kurdish DTP, which favors negotiations with the PKK, was largely shutout of the process.

The Transatlantic Relationship: Both Logoglu and Dereli emphasized that the EU accession process, in addition to Turkey's larger transatlantic position, was not merely a foreign policy choice, but a wider strategic objective with profound implications for Turkish domestic policy. Dereli sharply derided Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's foreign policy, saying the "zero problems with neighbors policy" was unoriginal in that this is, of course, what all countries want, while implying that Turkey must make strategic choices that do not jeopardize its transatlantic position or alienate its neighbors such as Israel or Azerbaijan. Specifically, she mentioned Iran, iterating her fears that Turkey would refrain from voting for sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council and thus further jeopardizing its standing with Europe and America. According to Dereli, Turkey should vote with its transatlantic partners. Logoglu also criticized Davutoglu, lauding some elements of the current Turkish foreign policy while pointing out that even in areas of great progress, such as Turkey's rapprochement with Syria, fundamental issues remain unsettled.

Cyprus: While wholeheartedly supportive of the EU accession process, Logoglu was candid about the problems with Cyprus and the necessity to pursue conflict resolution efforts. Dereli was optimistic despite acknowledging the unlikelihood of Talat winning in April elections, saying that perhaps the hardline Eroglu will be more able to negotiate a deal that is satisfactory to hardline parties in borth Northern Cyprus and Turkey. For his part, Eroglu acknowledged the inconsistensy in Turkish pledges to open up its ports to Cyprus, but was also sharply critical of the EU decision to admit Cyprus and not follow through on its old promise that Greece's 1981 admission would not adversely affect prospects for Turkish membership.

The Economy: Both Logoglu and Dereli pointed to the development gap between Turkey's West and East, declaring that the AKP has done little to address fundamental inequalities. Dereli evinced her argument by citing that a mere 10 percent of government subsidies for new investment were spent in the southeast while 35 percent were spent in the Marmara region. Logoglu declared the need for even greater foreign direct investment, which has been a tremendous accomplishment of the AKP, as well as the need to continue to develop a free market economy that is globally competitive.

Secularism: Logoglu spoke of a secularism that is "respectful" of all beliefs, and the need to find solutions (accomodations?) on deeply divisive issues like the headscarf.

UPDATE I (2/18) -- Sarigul is voicing his opposition to the Council of State's recent decision on reducing the difference in coefficients between students graduating from imam-hatip and vocational schools and those graduating from other high schools.

Medine Memi and the Duty to Protect

After burying alive 16-year-old Medine Memi, her father and grandfather face life in prison for "premeditated homicide with aggravating circumstances, perpetrated with cruelty." Memi had been missing for over forty days when her body was uncovered in a concrete-covered hole outside the family chicken coop. After complaing to police about severe beatings received at home, it is entirely possible that her father and grandfather killed her out of revenge. However, authorities and media jumped to call the crime an honor killing, claiming the motive for her family's savagery had to do with Memi spending time/having friendships with boys. In a very provocative post, Jenny White criticizes the media for having jumped to the conclusion that the crime was an honor killing, pointing out that Memi's father was most likely the source of this information.

Honor killings are a familiar story — but this might well be a case of outright murder for revenge and to hide family violence. That would demonstrate the low status of women outside of the “honor” paradigm (and the authorities’ disinclination to take their claims seriously). In the most recent Turkish article, the father and grandfather are reported as claiming that when Medine reported the beatings to the police, the father and grandfather told the police that she was beaten because she was “talking to boys”. The police now say they began a “procedure” (islem) at the time. Yet Medine disappeared for 40 days before anyone investigated.

Significantly, it will be interesting to see if any investigation is made of these local authorities who seemingly did little to prevent Memi's horrible death. Memi's case parallels that of Nahide Opuz, whose case was brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and resulted in a historic decision last summer in which the ECHR ruled that failure to protect women from domestic violence constitutes gender-based discrimination, in addition to violating an individual's right to life and be free from torture. According to the ECHR, the state has a responsibility to protect women from domestic violence. In the case of Medine Memi, local authorities seem clearly to have fallen short.

Tekel, Neoliberalism, and the AKP

AA Photo from Hurriyet Daily News

Pictures of class warfare continue to flash across Turkish television screens as workers for the formerly state-owned tobacco monopoly Tekel carry on their protest against the state's closure of 12 factories and plans for their re-assignment as temporary workers (4C employment status). Under the government's plans, laid off Tekel workers would be redeployed into lower-paying temporary personnel positions in other private firms for a period of ten months. Under the plans, Tekel workers would receive no severance and be faced with unemployment following the ten months. Further, they would lose their rights to strike and collectively bargain since they would no longer be working as public workers under the Labor Law.

Protests have been marked by violent street clashes with police, a seige of AKP party headquarters, and now, a hunger strike that has left at least nine protestors hospitalized. After AKP efforts to resolve the conflict by meeting with labor union representatives failed, the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Turk-Is), the main umbrella labor union here, executed a general strike in which thousands of workers across Turkey did not report to work in order to show solidarity for Tekel workers. The Labor Confederation (Hak-Is), the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DISK), the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (KESK), and the Turkish Public Workers’ Labor Union (Kamu-Sen) all participated in the strike. In a February 1 meeting with union leaders, the government had offered the workers an additional month of work, as well as severance pay and 22 days paid leave.

Turk-Is, along with the other five unions, are now calling for another meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan and Parliamnet Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin. The unions are planning to meet Friday to decide their next move.

While labor unions conflicts are not unusual in Turkey, the intensity of the Tekel workers determination have garnered the sympathies of some Turks at a time when the AKP is already facing pressure on its most recent Kurdish initiative. It is possible that the strikes could have a significant impact on drawing attention to and heightening dissent of the AKP's neoliberal economic policies. Left-leaning intellectuals have been particularly keen to highlight what they see as inconsistencies between AKP's reputed welfare orientation and its neoliberal tendencies. (For an example, see Milliyet columnist Riza Turmen's recent column.)

Turkey has historically had a very large state sector, of which Tekel is a legacy. The question of what to do with laid off workers cast out of their jobs after sometimes decades of employment is particularly difficult, and indubitably irksome to the AKP, which has shown itself eager to privatize public sector firms, boost foreign direct investment, and solidify Turkey's re-orientation as a liberal market economy based on free trade principles and a diminished public sector. While the AKP has promoted welfare policies, its emphasis has been on strengthening Turkey's largely traditional welfare regime, moving responsibilities for caring for the least vulnerable members of Turkish society out of the state's hands and into those of voluntary and philanthropic organizations, with which the Islamic-oriented party has plenty of connections.


UPDATE I (2/21) -- An estimated 20,000 people assembled in Ankara on Sat., Feb. 22, to march in support of Tekel workers. AFP reports that Prime Minister Erdogan has "given the workers until the end of the month to either accept the new status or face unemployment, threatening to send police to demolish their make-shift tent city in the heart of Ankara."

UPDATE II (2/24) -- Tekel workers are planning another demonstration for tomorrow and a sit-in for Saturday following resignation of their principal union leader following a meeting on Monday between Turk Is, DISK, KESK, and Kamu-Sen, folloing which the four unions said they would end resistance if Tekel workers decide to do so. The four unions are characterizing the demonstrations as successful, though they have said they will support Tekel workers in their final decision. This organizational rift occurs as the end-of-the-month deadline approaches.

"Fight!"

PHOTO from video footage shot by CNN Turk (More CNN Turk video of the confrontation can be accessed through the Hurriyet Daily News by clicking here)

In my absence from regular blogging last week as a result of dealing with a serious bout of food poisoning, I missed posting coverage of the fistfight that broke out in Parliament last week following the perceived insulting of Prime Minister Erdogan. The clash took place between AKP and MHP parliamentarians, and left one AKP MP hospitalized after he had a stroke. From Hürriyet:

MHP deputy Osman Durmuş sarcastically said, “How do you [the hospital] not let the wife of a prime minister who is regarded as prophet come into the hospital?”

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned in a televised interview Sunday that his wife had been denied entry to a military hospital, the Gülhane Military Medical Academy, or GATA, three years ago when she tried to visit actor Nejat Uygur while wearing a headscarf.

Erdoğan said his wife Emine Erdoğan wanted to visit Uygur in the hospital and that Uygur’s wife had said they would be honored by the visit. Uygur’s wife then informed hospital officials of the intended visit but the latter said GATA could not allow Erdoğan to enter because of her headscarf.

During the parliamentary session late Tuesday, MHP deputy Durmuş sarcastically said: “It is the [nasty] white collar doctors [who didn’t allow her to enter the hospital]. How do you not let the wife of a prime minister who is regarded as prophet come into the hospital?”

Durmuş’s words drew a fierce reaction from AKP deputies, including Erdoğan, leading to a fistfight between AKP and MHP deputies. Some deputies were slightly injured while one deputy was hospitalized.

Taking the floor for the second time, Durmuş recalled one of the AKP member’s earlier remarks describing Erdoğan as the second prophet.

On the floor, Erdoğan said: “First of all, our friends don’t know that the chain of prophecy ended with our last prophet [Mohammed]. And, you also lacked intelligence as to defend those who didn’t let her enter GATA. Nobody who attributes such an adjective to me can keep their place in our party. You cannot insult my wife. This is crude and immoral."

. . . .

Durmuş's comment referred to a remark made by Ismail Hakkı Eser in November 2008. In a speech, the AKP’s Aydın provincial council member said, “Erdoğan is like the second prophet for us.”

On Wednesday, Eser resigned from the party.

AKP Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc followed the series up with a visit to acting CHP parliamentary speaker Guldal Mumcu's room, criticizing Mumcu for not keeping better control of the session. Mumcu and the CHP then complained about executive meddling in parliamentary affairs. Erdogan followed the incident up with accusations that the MHP and the CHP are one in the same. The MHP worked with the AKP in February 2008 to pass a constitutional amendment paving the way for women to wear the headscarf in universities in a limited fashion. That amendment was later annulled by the Constitutional Court, but speaks to MHP's efforts to make inroads among the conservative voters that have been attracted to the AKP over the issue.

In another interesting development, the Turkish Armed Forces' Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug has said that he regrets Ms. Erdogan was denied entrance to the military hopsital, calling the incident "unfortunate." Today's Zaman columnist Fatma Disli Zibak considers whether Basbug has softened his position on the headscarf issue.

And, for another take, Nicole Pope wonders how children can be tried as adults for offenses she considers similar to those modelled by MPs.

While politicians behave like kindergartners in Parliament and get away with it, it is somewhat ironic -- and tragic -- that real children, the ones you would expect to get into scraps, are being tried as adults in courts around the country on terrorism charges for taking part in protests.

Stone throwers are not the only teenagers targeted by the judiciary. Three minors face jail sentences in Bursa after being charged with “insulting the prime minister” by referring to him as “lightbulb Erdoğan.” The court based its decision on a definition of the word “lightbulb” provided by Google, and deemed it insulting.

There is a link between the unedifying sight of grown-up men charging at each other, broadcast across the country, and the detention of young people. Such scenes carry consequences: they ratchet up the tension and increase polarization in society. Perhaps an R rating for bad language and the use of violence should apply to political discussions.

Is it surprising that teenagers, with the idealism and enthusiasm that characterizes the young, should express their views in ways that are sometimes extreme and misguided when confrontation is the norm in the political arena?

UPDATE I (2/9)-- The three students facing jail sentences for the "lightbulb" statements to which Pope alludes hale from Bursa, where another student sentenced last year for making the same remark. Citing Google, the Bursa court in that case ruled the student was not in his rights since the remarks constituted an insult and could not be considered legitimate political speech. Though not children, members of parliament have immunity from such charges, or from breaking into fistfights, which is not an altogether extraordinary event in Turkey's Grand National Assembly.

UPDATE II (2/11) -- Arinc has apologized for some of the comments he made to Mumcu after saying earlier he would apologize if she wanted him to, though he would stand by the correctness of his criticism. Also, President Gul, while on a state visit in India, urged the media not to cover controversies occuring between politicians so as to not increase the social tension they produce.

RAND Issues U.S.-Turkey Report

The RAND Corporation has released a new report, "Troubled Partnership U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change on the U.S.-Turkey Relationship," in which RAND analyst F. Stephen Larrabee lays out the basic framework of the two countries' bilateral relations. Among Larrabee's recommendations for United States' policies are:

- Increase political and intelligence support for Turkey's struggle against terrorism from the Kurdistan Workers Party. Many Turkish officials consider this as the litmus test of the value of the U.S.-Turkish security partnership.

- Put greater pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government to crack down on the Kurdistan Workers Party and end its logistical and political support of the group.

- Encourage Turkey to carry out social, economic and legal changes so Kurds in Turkey enjoy the same rights and benefits as ethnic Turks. The Kurdish terrorist threat will not be resolved by military means, but by a strong anti-terrorist program combined with social and economic reforms that address the root causes of Kurdish grievances.

- Express readiness to engage Iran and Syria in diplomatic efforts to help stabilize Iraq as U.S. forces are drawn down there. While such diplomacy would not improve U.S. relations with Iran and Syria overnight, it would more closely align U.S.-Turkish policy and reduce a past source of friction between the two nations.

- Encourage and support Turkey's recent efforts to promote an improvement in relations with Armenia, particularly the opening of the border between the two. The normalization of relations between these two countries would significantly contribute to enhancing peace and stability in the Caucasus. It would also enable Armenia to reduce its economic and political dependence on Russia and Iran.

- Intensify efforts to persuade Iran to abandon any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran will destabilize the entire Persian Gulf region and potentially spark a nuclear arms race in the Gulf and Middle East, directly threatening Turkey's security.

For RAND's release announcing the report, click here.

Bianet Releases Annual Media Freedom Report

Bianet has now released its full annual report of media freedom violations in 2009. From the release:

The process of the "Kurdish initiative" imposed a muzzle to freedom of expression. The 2009 Media Monitoring Report by the Independent Communication Network (BİA) Media Monitoring Desk revealed that 323 people, among them 123 journalists, were tried in the context of freedom of thought and freedom of expression.

Three years after the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, the state's indifference to violence against journalists lead to the death of Güney Marmara Yaşam newspaper editor-in-chief Cihan Hayırsevener. Hayırsevener was writing about organized crime and corruption in tenders.

The Anti-Terror Act (TMY), which was not accounted for as "in contrary to the Constitution" by the Constitutional Court, silenced nine newspapers and magazines: Günlük, Özgür Yorum, Politika, Ayrıntı, Azadiya Welat, Özgür Mezopotamya, Demokratik Açılım and Atılım newspapers and Aydınlık magazine. One-month publication bans were imposed once or in some cases more than once.

The report tackles the struggles and cases of 978 people. Violations of freedom of expression are divided into the following sections: Attacks and Threats, Detentions and Arrests, Cases on Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression, Corrections and Seeking Justice, European Court of Human Rights, Reactions to Censorship and Punishments by RTÜK.

47 people, 22 of them journalists, were prosecuted in 2009 under charges of "publishing pronouncements of terror organizations", "spreading propaganda for an illegal organization" or "revealing people struggling against terrorism as targets". 23 people were sentenced to 58 years imprisonment and monetary fines of 9,749 Turkish Lira (TL) (€ 4,640). However, this is a small number compared to 44 convicts and thus twice as many convictions under the TMY in 2008.

. . . .

34 journalists among 101 Turkish citizens were sentenced to 98 years and five days imprisonment and compensation claims summing up to TL 1,408,680 (€ 670,800) under charges of "attacks on personal rights". Local courts in 2009 decreed for a total of nine years, three months and 6 days imprisonment and monetary fines of TL 41,290 (€ 19,660). In the previous year, 74 people received prison sentences of 77 years and faced compensation claims of TL 1,885,500.

The report also documents relevant decisions made at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), as well as new applications the ECHR received last year.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) convicted Turkey to a total fine of TL 472,392 (€ 225,000) in compensation. In the previous year, this amount added up to TL 183,801 (€ 87,525). 11,100 complaint files concerned with Turkey are currently waiting to be dealt with at the ECHR.

26 employees of Ülkede Özgür Gündem, Gündem, Güncel ve Gerçek Demokrasi newspapers sought their rights at the ECHR together with Seyithan Demir, İsmail Kara, Ömer Bahçeci, Fikret Turan, Cihan Öztürk, Aziz Özer, İbrahim Güçlü, Sedat İmza, Ayhan Erdoğan, Mehmet Cevher İlhan, Rüya Kurtuluş, Erdinç Gök, Haşim Özgür Ersoy, İnci Açık, Serpil Ocak, Ayfer Çiçek, Nuri Günay and Murat Kaya.

The following new applications were made to the ECHR in 2009: the Hrant Dink murder, publication bans imposed to Özgür Mezopotamya, Özgür Görüş, Rojev, Siyasi Alternatif and Süreç newspapers, Internet Technology Association (INETD) in regard to the ban of youtube.com, Birecik'in Sesi newspaper official Şevket Demir, Siirt Mücadele newspaper owner Cumhur Kılıççıoğlu, Cumhuriyet newspaper journalist Alper Turgut, Cevat Düşün from Alternatif newspaper, Vakit newspaper writer Abdurrahman Dilipak and Taraf newspaper journalist Orhan Miroğlu.

Sigh.

I cannot find the full report, but when I get it, I will be sure to sidebar it under "Key Documents."

The Tax Discourse (Or, Lack Thereof)

I sometimes think of Turkey as the Texas of Europe, and Turkey's regressive tax policies give me all the more reason to draw the comparison. Liam Hardy at American Anatolian Viewpoint takes a look at Turkish tax structures, writing that taxes here are not as widely debated as in the United States. I wonder why this is so, particularly when Turkey's reliance on regressive taxation disadvantages workers. Is this one more result of the lack of a viable Turkish left? Are there studies providing more concrete information about how Turkey's tax system affects social inequalities? Who is empowered by Turkey's tax system, and who all is hurt?

According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the revenue Turkey collects from personal income taxes and profits stands at less than six percent of the total GDP, and has been declining steadily since 2000. (See "Public Finances" at the bottom of Turkey's OECD statistical profile.) This is the lowest among all OECD countries. As the Anatolia News Agency pointed out in its report Monday, a decline in personal income tax collections likely shifts the burden to workers and more vulnerable members of society. Though the Agency cites no sources, I would very much like to see more analysis of the problem.

Also worth taking note of are the remarkable revenues taken in on cigarette sales, which no doubt hit the families of smokers quite hard. (And, in Turkey, smoking is not only an "upper-class" addiction.)

According to the United Nation Development Program's Gini index calculations, Turkey stands between Peru and Ecuador in terms of economic inequality. All European Union member countries rank far ahead of Turkey according to Gini's equality measures, in addition to Croatia and Macedonia, the two other countries that have accession partnerships with the EU.

Postmodernity and the Arc of Turkish Identity

Ferhat Kentel, Professor at Istanbul Sehir University / PHOTO from the Balkans Project

The Balkans Project recently featured a fascinating interview with Ferhat Kentel, a sociologist at Istanbul Sehir University. Working on the construction of Turkish national identity, Kentel is examining one of the most controversial and heuristic themes in Turkish politics -- in many ways, a theme that defines, and most certainly pervades, every aspect of political discourse, be it Turkey's efforts to come to terms with its minorities (Muslim and non-Muslim), its attempts to reconcile Islam and the Turkish naton-state, its ongoing EU accession process, its confrontration with ultra-nationalist elements like Ergenekon, its international relations, etc. I have provided excerpts in this post, though I most definitely recommend reading though the whole interview.

This new situation is not just about the disappearance of the old Turkish national identity. Someone can feel that he or she is Kurdish, another Turkish, another Moslem, and these all together. All are negotiating identities. Turkishness is a negotiation as well. It becomes a crisis situation for the integration and unity of this society. I am working on this polarization between the early national construction and the new emerging complex identities and trying to find if there is a possibility of a new language, another way of speaking about this society.

I’m not just focusing on identity, but also people’s relationship with everyday life. Everyday life is the humus that lies beneath these identities. These different identities emerge from everyday life.

What does it mean to be a Turk today? The most prominent aspect of this established modern identity is a defensive one. When it emerged at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Turkishness was new. It was promoted in the name of a modernizing subject, in the name of enlightenment. It was connected to the creation of a new modern nation-state, to Ataturk, to Kemalism, to secularism, to the flag. To be Turkish was to be something modern. But today, it is more and more defensive. It refers to an older time. For that reason, it is more and more aggressive against the new voices.

Kentel goes onto discuss the origins of Turkish national identity, and the haven Muslims in the Balkans found here in the face of Christian racism and European nationalism following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As Kentel notes, these Turks are the most keen to identify themselves as Kemalists, and eager to embrace Turkey as a newfound home, largely left their old identities behind for something new and modern. In the epigram of his epilogue to Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt quotes Ernest Renan:

Forgetting, I would even go so far to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation; thus the progress of historical studies is often a danger for national identity . . . The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things.

Turks, like other European nations, have forgotten many things. At the same time, what awaited those immigrants was a refuge from the discrimination, suffering, and war they had known in the past; in Turkey, they found a new home. Kentel's analysis of ultranationalists is different: not having immigrated from the Balkans, they were often left outside of the Kemalist project. According to Kentel, ultranationalists generally look to the Caucasus and Asia for their roots, often pointing to Central Anatolia as the origin of Turkish identity. Yet, I have met plenty of people who share both perspectives, often the products of mixed marriages between Balkan and Anatolian Turks, merely all the more proving Kentel's argument of the negotiation, multiplicity, and inherent complexity underlying Turkish national identity.

Kentel also explores the lack of understanding between Turks and Turkish minority groups, who are all too routinely bifurcated from one another in the literature into the oversimplified categories of "majority" and "minority." One need only to look at Hrant Dink to see how reality is far more complicated. Dink, proud of his Armenian heritage, never rejected his "Turkishness," but rather understood it differenty; sadly, it was this "different" understanding that led to his murder by people who adopted a defensive understanding of what it meant to be Turkish, and in turn, conspired to kill Dink. Similar kinds of negotiation and multiplicity also hold true for Kurds, Alevis, Greeks, Circassians, Laz, Roma, all of these groups and the diverse individuals in them approaching what it means to be Turkish differently. Many of the identities overlap, and few break down into the nice, neat categories in which they are often placed. Yet, for those Turks who did leave so much of their history behind, the issue of settling these multiple identities and the insistence that they be recognized is difficult. Kentel explains:

These Balkan-origin Turks are also the most reticent on the Kurdish issue. It seems to be a psychological dimension: These Turks left behind their traditional sense of belonging, so they cannot accept another people claiming their original identity. “We gave up ours,” they say, “why can’t you give up yours?” I hear this even from the Uyghur-origin people who came to Turkey during the last decades. “We were oppressed by the Chinese state,” they say. “We came to Turkey and this state protected us. We cannot betray this state. How can you Kurds do what you are doing?” Of course, the Kurds were not migrants to this country. Nor were the Armenians. They are autochthonous peoples of the Anatolian territories.

Holding the traditional/pre-modern construction of Turkish national identity in opposition to the modern, Atatürkist understanding, Kentel highlights the conflicts and convergences between the two. Though Kentel does dwell too much on Ottomanism in his analysis, I think it too is probably worth examining in the mix, conflicting and converging with the other two in all sorts of ways relevant to political identity. And when religion is added into the mix, identity becomes all the more complicated, pushing and pulling with all of these other elements in what I have described elsewhere in this blog as a kaleidoscopic fashion, shifting and turning to suit the situation at hand or whatever the mood of the moment may be. Identity not being something intractable and constant, but rather adaptable and changing, Turks may well be all the richer for the multi-dimensional complexity of their specific identity(ies) despite the difficulties in its negotiation.

And, yet, though Turks have long negotiated these identities, and too often with a good bit of phobic defensiveness, the increased travel and business between countries (which Kentel assesses as weakening the defensive posture of Turkish nationalism -- see my post, "Article 301: An Imperialist Discourse," on the Sevres syndrome), the rise of political Islam, and European discourses about a postnational, multicultural Europe have all drastically pushed that negotiation into a new realm. I perhaps too optimistically evaluate the role of Europe, but the former two have certainly had a tremendous impact on just what observers of Turkish politics are seeing. Yet, as Kentel describes, this "opening" is not unqualified.

There are two contradictory tendencies, each one feeding and reinforcing the other. As we open up, the fear inside becomes more intense. Imagine all the people living under this ideology that says that we are alone, that we are superior, but that everyone fears us. What do you with the burden of this ideology? The opening of frontiers – in the world at large and in our minds – radicalizes the Turkish defensive identity. We are now living in the middle of this clash.

What I mean by a new Turkish identity is not just a global, liberal, or cosmopolitan identity. It is more complex. Part of this new identity is the overcoming of the ruptures of Kemalism. Kemalism required a rupture with the Ottoman era that defined it as an ancien regime. It involved a rupture around borders. It created a Turkishness on this territory with Arabs, Kurds, and others, but this required a rupture with the Arabs of Arabia, the Kurds of other countries and so on. Today it is not necessary for a nation-state to isolate itself this way. Our task is to reconstruct the bridges with all those populations and histories with which we have ruptured.

This new identity is looking for new words, new definitions.

As Barrington Moore described the transition to democracy as wrought with discord and violence, so perhaps is the journey to new, more open, more complex cultural identities. Much has been made of the rise of ultranatonalism in Turkey in recent years, the street protests and ethnic clashes that have erupted on the streets of Turkey's cities with an unwielding, defensive sort of hatred (see Ece Temelkuran n the Guardian, 2007); yet, is this perhaps a sign that things are getting better, that Turkey is moving forward in some sort of cultural transition of which we have yet to see the arc?

Provocatively, Kentel lays out a possible journey, eschewing cosmpolitianism, liberalism, and racist traditionalism for something far more intriguing -- and perhaps, liberating.

So we can make a three-fold distinction. The first is cosmopolitanism or the loss of specific Turkishness. The second is the concentration, redefinition, and reshaping of Turkishness in a more racist way. And the third is an open-ended alternative: we don’t know where we are going but there is another way. This third situation, the creation of new meanings, is the revolutionary tendency.

This new identity, if we summarize, is made also by linking to the past. It doesn’t involve returning to the past but, rather, struggling against the ruptures of history, against the categorizations of old/new, rational/irrational and so on, and against all the modernist constructions created by these categories.

Examining the construction of Turkish identity as affected by a series of historical ruptures, Kentel goes onto explore how Islam is bringing to light the ruptures of Kemalism.

Right now society is caught midway between Islam and modernity. Or, rather, there is no distinction between Islam and modernity as it was defined by modernist approaches. When you listen to some Islamic actors who focus on the authenticity of the Islamic message, they say that the majority of Muslims are lost now, that they have become almost like Protestants, that they only think about symbols of wealth, that they have lost the original message of the religion. But other, modernist voices inside the Islamic universe say that, no, the religion is not frozen in the 7th century, that Moslems as individuals must adapt to the new situation. This is a more liberal, maybe “Protestant” Islam, more individualized. They don’t forget that they are Moslem. They are still good believers. “I am essentially a businessman,” this kind of believer will say. “But five times a day I pray and then it is finished. My practice of Moslemhood doesn’t take more than one hour a day.” There is no difference with people who do gymnastics for one hour a day or do Indian meditation. This person’s identity is that of a businessman first.

So, they are not just Moslems, but they have a class position too. The Moslem businessmen’s union and the labor union of Moslem workers do not necessarily share the same communitarian Moslemhood. They are in conflict. The bourgeois Moslems say, “We are all Moslems, so accept your salary.” But the workers say, “No, we are not all Moslem brothers. You are rich and we are poor!”

There was a declaration recently launched by three Moslem women. “We are not free yet,” they said, referring to the liberalization of headscarves for a couple months before the constitutional court forbad them again. During this period, they said, “We will not be free until the Armenians, the Kurds, the Alevis are free too. We will not be free until the rights of shipyard workers are recognized.” They are very Moslem. They wear headscarves. They dream of living in an Islamic society in which Islam is recognized totally. But in their minds there are other possibilities for how to live with others. If someone doesn’t want to wear a headscarf, she is free to do so. This is something new. This is not the traditional Islam or the Islam of Kemalism. This third version has links with the new Turkish identity, which in turn has links to the past. They are important actors for this new Turkishness. Their Turkishness is not defensive. It is not racial. They are Turkish because they live in Turkey.

Turkey can be perceived as a model or a laboratory for the whole world.

Just what that model will be or laboratory yield remains to be seen, but it truly is incredible, not to mention intellectually humbling, to be the midst of it.

Squaring Off on Constitutional Amendments

The AKP is working on a new package of 22 constitutional amendments it might well put before Parliament in the next month. The package was drafted by the Parliamentary Constitutional Commission, headed by MP (AKP) Burhan Kuzu. The amendments have not been made public, and so it is unclear exactly what the AKP is planning on putting forward. On January 10, Kuzu had said that the AKP would not been seeking amendments to the constitution or to the election law, which stipulates that parties must receive at least ten percent of the total vote to enter parliament. I am not sure what changed, but so be it.

The last time Turkey's 1982 coup constitution was reformed was in 2004, when a number of amendments were passed in line with the Copenhagen political criteria for Turkey's accession into the European Union. Since the CHP and MHP have opposed the package, the AKP has threatened to send the amendments to referendum.

The CHP has promised to resist any attempt, vowing to apply to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of any amendment passed regardless of its content. The AKP has used the CHP's opposition as a reason not to bring new constitutional amendments forward.

Under Article 175 of the constitution, amendments can either be passed by a 2/3 majority of Parliament or by a popular referendum. In the second scenario, the amendments must pass the Parliament by a 3/5 majority and then be approved by a simple majority vote in the referendum. Additionally, it is possible that the amendment must be held by the Constitutional Court as not contravening the first four articles of the Turkish constitution, though there is significant legal debate on this point. The Court has a history of broadly interpreting these articles, which are in themselves vague and useful weapons for anti-reform forces.

In a new development, the MHP has expressed its willingness to work with the AKP on the amendments in order to prevent a referendum. This, in turn, is reported to have led the AKP to forestall introducing the amendment package to Parliament, instead sending it to the MHP for their input. The MHP is likely looking to avoid having the 2011 parliamentary election turn into a referendum on constitutional amendments, which would polarize the vote between the AKP and the CHP and leave little room for it to maneuver.

For a not very clear accounting of constitutional amendments passed in 2001 and 2004, see the EU Secretariat General for EU Affairs' summation of the reform process up to 2007. In August 2007, the AKP had promised to introduce a new constitution to replace the 1982 coup constitution. However, despite a committee being formed and a constitution drafted, it eventually fell victim to the turbulence that followed the headscarf reform and the AKP closure case.

Food for thought: during the closure case the European Stability Initiative called on the AKP to move forward with the new constitution by putting it to referendum. Of course, if the AKP did this, the Constitutional Court, as it is, would be dissolved. Additionally, Article 4, which forbids any amendment to the constitution that violates the first four articles, would go out the window. The result would be no less than a political revolution, and I am not really sure what would happen. The AKP has expressed no such plans, and though the idea of a new constitution lingers, it is nowhere close to being placed on the agenda.

Human Rights Watch Releases Turkey Report

Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently released its World Report, a country-by-country survey of the status of human rights across the world. While HRW praises the Turkish government's recent Kurdish initiative, it notes problems in Turkish courts' treating of PKK supporters the same as armed militants under Turkey's Anti-Terrorism Law. Specifically, the report mentions the number of children who have been tried under the Law. HRW also criticizes the ease of bringing charges against supporters of Kurdish rights by claiming they are members of the PKK.

Torture, detention, killings by security forces, and prison conditions remain par for the course, as does impunity (including Hrant Dink's assasination) and restrictions on the freedom of expression. Of particular concern for HRW is the Court of Cassation's unwillingness to apply the European Convention on Human Right and Fundamental Freedoms in its case law, which continues to result in Turkish citizens submitting more petitions to the Court than the citizens of any other state in the Council of Europe.

On Europe, HRW continues to see Turkey's bid for European membership as "the most important international actor with the potential to foster respect for human rights in Turkey."

The report does laud the military courts law the government passed in June, but which was just last week overturned by the Constitutional Court.

Israeli Intelligence Charges Erdogan with Anti-Semitism

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan /
PHOTO by Alessandra Benededeti/Corbis

An intellegence report authored by the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Center for Political Research levels accusations that Prime Minister Erdogan is an anti-Semite, has turned a blind eye to rising anti-Semitism in Turkey despite evidence of its rising fervor, and often uses anti-Semitic remarks in his populist politics. The report alleges that despite Erdogan's public condemnations of anti-Semitism, the prime minister "incites and encourages" anti-Semitism by making low-brow remarks designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator of Turkish political society. From Hürriyet:

A government official said Tuesday the seven-page report accuses Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of inflaming Turkish public opinion against Israel with his repeated allegations that Israel committed war crimes during its Gaza offensive last winter, according to a report by The Associated Press. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the report is confidential.

He said the report also acknowledged Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon seriously offended Turkey's ambassador when he summoned the diplomat to protest a Turkish TV show that portrayed Israeli intelligence agents as cruel. Still, it said that the incident made clear that Turkey "reached the outer limits of the Israeli government's patience."

The report came as Turkey stated Tuesday that it would pursue its determination against anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia and discrimination with its belief in mutual understanding, tolerance, freedom, security and democracy.

. . . .

In Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Ayalon, both of Yisrael Beiteinu, are the leaders of the government's aggressive anti-Turkey faction, while Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Industry Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, both of Labor, head the conciliatory, pro-Turkey faction.

The report was written by the Center for Political Research, which performs the ministry's in-house intelligence analysis, and has already been distributed to Israeli embassies and consulates abroad. It was submitted to the key seven cabinet ministers a few days ago, Israel’s Haaretz reported.

Regarding Ayalon's humiliation of Ambassador Oğuz Çelikkol, the report said that while this seriously offended the Turks for many years to come, “at the same time, the manner in which senior Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, ended the crisis may indicate that Turkey recognizes that it entered the red-line zone and [reached] the outer limits of the Israeli government's patience, and that this was liable to lead to it losing Israel, which would damage Turkey's international legitimacy."

But most of the report focuses on the Turkish prime minister, who it considers the main source of the current friction. “In our estimate, ever since his party took power, Erdoğan has conducted an ongoing process of ... fashioning a negative view of Israel in Turkish public opinion,” via endless talk of Palestinian suffering, repeatedly accusing Israel of war crimes and even “anti-Semitic expressions and incitement,” it said.

Though in international forums Erdoğan always stresses that anti-Semitism is “a crime against humanity," the report continued, in reality, he “indirectly incites and encourages” anti-Semitism in Turkey. "For Erdoğan and some of those around him," it explained, "there is no distinction between 'Israeli' and 'Jewish,' and therefore, [their] anti-Israel fervor and criticism became anti-Jewish."

One result, according to the report, is articles in the Turkish press questioning whether Turkish Jews are loyal to their country – something that could endanger Turkey's Jewish community.

In some cases, it added, Erdoğan simply does not understand the anti-Semitic nature of his remarks – such as "Jews are good with money," which "he sees as a compliment."

While charges of anti-Semitism levelled by Israeli leaders against those critical of Israel are quite common, some of those made by the report have also been echoed in the Turkish liberal press and among intellectuals. While accusing Erdogan of anti-Semitism is quite bold, it does seem that the prime minister has a bizarre understanding of Judaism and Israel. Yigal Schleifer gives one illuminating example from last January when Erdogan alluded to an obscure Jewish saxophonist and anti-Semite named Gilad Atzmon. For more on the AKP response to the wave of anti-Semitism that struck Turkey following Israeli war crimes in Gaza, see Emrullah Uslu's analysis from last January. Also see post-Gaza post from last February, in addition to my post on some Washington neoconservatives' targeting of Turkey and some of the pieces of the puzzle its exponents conveniently leave out.


CLARIFICATION (1/27) -- The analysis from Emrullah Uslu that I linked here contains a factual error. Uslu cites Article 312 as a speech law in Turkey's penal code that has traditionally been used to punish hate speech. While this was the case prior to April 2005, in September 2004 Turkey adopted a new penal code. This penal code basically replaced Article 312 (offense and incitement to religious or racial hatred) with Article 216 (inciting hatred or hostility). I had missed this, and thanks to Bulent for pointing it out.

Making Sense of Sledgehammer

Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug / PHOTO from AFP

On Wednesday, yet another alleged coup plot was revealed by Taraf, this one centering on alleged plans by some military officers to create a level of chaos in Turkey conducive to a military coup. Code-named "Operation Sledgehammer" (Balyoz, in Turkish), the 2003 plan centers on creating a level of national chaos conducive to facilitating a military takeover. From Hürriyet:

. . . measures included bombing two major mosques in Istanbul, an assault on a military museum by people disguised as fundamentalists and the raising of tension with Greece through the usual dogfights between the fighter planes of the two countries over the Aegean Sea. The allegations even include shooting down a Turkish plane and blaming it on Greece.

Newspapers and talk shows on TV gave almost blanket coverage to the Sledgehammer affair, with the reporting and views generally split along the familiar lines of the pro-government media and mainstream media. The former saw the latest revelations as proof of a nefarious military while mainstream news outlets focused on the General Staff’s explanation that the reports were constructed entirely on "scenario exercises." Many also questioned the timing of the revelations, which coincided with a Constitutional Court ruling on civil vs. military judicial jurisdiction.

Taraf wrote that they have over 5,000 pages of printed documents, CDs and voice recordings as proof. They delivered copies of the mentioned documents to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office after a criminal complaint was filed on the allegations by a group of intellectuals from the platform of “70 million steps against a coup,” a coalition of various political parties and nongovernmental organizations. Taraf yesterday made a call to the General Staff, which said records of such “scenarios” are destroyed after four years, and told the General Staff the paper can send the documents to them also if requested.

The Hürriyet story goes on to explain the Turkish press' reaction to the story, including its polarization as evinced by the differences between newspapers' editorial lines. Indeed, it seems everyone either believes in the coup story or thinks it total hogwash. Joost Lagendijk takes a different position, writing in a Hürriyet op/ed that what matters is not so much whether the story is true or not, but that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) did not carry it out. Assuming the story is true, Lagendijk points out the fact it went nowhere points to "a split in the TSK between, on the one hand, generals who still believe it is their task to kick out democratically elected politicians when they feel they have to do so and, on the other hand, generals who think those days are over." Lagendijk proceeds by asking,

If that is true, why do the anti-coup officers not speak out clearly in public against their plotting colleagues? Because they don’t want to harm the public perception of the military? I am convinced that, by not doing so, they harm that same image much, much more.
Peer group exposure should be one part of the new, post Sledgehammer scenario for a democratic Turkey.

While the Turkish media and politicians obsess about the validity of Sledgehammer, the real pressure should be on the military to stop playing defensive and move forward. By doing so, they have the opportunity to eschew the chaotic, often lunatic discourse, and actually move Turkey in the right direction.

Lagendijk, making another critical point in his second recommendation, suggests

a government initiative for a total overhaul of the present, totally outdated National Security Strategy, which still focuses on internal threats such as Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. The time has come for elected politicians, after having seriously considered the advice from the military, to spell out what according to them are the real dangers facing Turkey now and in the foreseeable future. That would include (possible) external threats such as al-Qaeda or a nuclear armed Iran, which should be dealt with by a modern, professional military.

If only these were the things Turkey was talking about. Sadly, they are not -- and, yes, for that, it seems the military plays a role by at least enabling the controversy over Sledgehammer to continue. If I am wrong, and the TSK is indeed still controlled by dark, sinister forces secretly plotting to blowup airliners, then Turkey is in seriously dire circumstances.

Sledgehammer comes on the heals of other alleged coup plots to be made public since the now defunct newspaper Nokta revealed Golden Maiden (Sarıkız, in Turkish) in 2007. In March 2009, the second indictment of the Ergenekon investigation revealed the details of three more coup plans in addition to the first (Moonlight, Ayışığı in Turkish; Sea Sparkle, Yakamoz in Turkish; and Glove, in Turkish Eldiven). In June 2009, Taraf reported on a plan to weaken Islamic reactionaries, allegedly drafted by Colonol Dursun Cicek in the Army's psychological warfare unit. The alleged plan targeted the AKP and the Gulen movement. This past November, Taraf reported on the Cage Operation Plan (Kafes, in Turkish), which the Naval Forces command allegedly designed to wreak havoc by targeting non-Muslim minorities.

For more on the Ergenekon investigation, which continues unabated, see this timeline from Liam Hardy at American Anatolian Viewpoint. For a critical, yet quite comprehesive view, see Gareth Jenkins' July 2009 report, "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation."


UPDATE I (1/25) -- The TSK's Chief of General Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug lambasted the accusations waved at it by Taraf, saying patience of the Armed Forces was limited. See also Today's Zaman's interview with Taraf's deputy editor-in-chief Yasemin Congar, in which she dismisses the military's claim that Sledgehammer was but a scenario taken out of context by Taraf.

UPDATE II (2/2) -- 27 of the 36 journalists laid out to be arrested in Balykoz have filed a criminal complaint.

Court Says No to Civilian Courts

The other big story in civil-military relations last week occurred Thursday when the Constitutional Court struck down an amendment to the Constitution allowing military officers to be tried in civilian courts for crimes involving threats to national security, constitutional violations, the organization of armed groups, and attempts to topple the government in peace time. The Court ruled the amendment to the Code on Criminal Procedure infringed on Article 145 of the Constitution. As Hürriyet reports, the law leaves cases involving military officers prosecuted in the Ergenekon investigation and various coup plans in legally murky waters. The AKP passed the reform in June, after which the CHP applied to the Court for its annulment.

As part of Turkey's accession process, the European Union has long reiterated Turkey try military officers in civilian courts for civilian crimes. The AKP is set to announce its plans to pass amendments to the constitution next month.

Things Fall Apart

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian and Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu in Zurich in October. PHOTO from Hürriyet

As the chances for ratification of two protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia crumble, the future of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia looks quite dim. The protocols were signed it Zurich in October, where both countries agreed to normalize diplomatic and bilateral relations, including opening the border and setting up numerous subcommissions, the most important of which would look at the "historical dimensions" betweent the two countries. However, Turkey has since made Turkish ratification contingent upon resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict despite making it clear in Zurich that ratification of the protocols would not be contingent on settling the rather intractable conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Erdogan has also stated that Armenia should remove its troops from the 13 percent of the territory it occupies inside Azerbaijan before borders are opened.

Nagorno-Karabakh

Turkey's position changed as its relations with Azerbaijan grew increasingly endangered after Zurich. Azerbaijan fears Turkey will sell it out on Nagorno-Karabakh, and opposes any Turkish rapprochement with Armenia before the conflict between it and Armenia is resolved. Armenians in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan revolted in 1993 with the assistance of Armenia, shortly after which Armenia essentially occupied. Following Armenia's invasion, Ankara broke off diplomatic relations with Yerevan and sealed the border. In addition to Armenia's campaign for genocide recognition, Nagorno-Karabakh has long been at the heart of tensions between it and Turkey.

Tensions with Azerbaijan had been high since the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement commenced in fall 2008, reaching a boiling point soon Zurich when President Gul appeared alongside Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan at a football game in Bursa. For public relations purposes, Turkish fans were prevented from entering the stadium with Azeri flags to protest the recent accords. Images of Turkish soldiers confiscating the flags in a none too delicate manner were aired on Azeri television, and a diplomatic splat soon blew up between Turkey and Azerbaijan, long considered "two states, but one nation." Soon after, Azerbaijan removad Turkish flags at a monument honoring Turkish soldiers who had died in Azerbaijan's 1918 independence war. In addition to fears surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan resents the price it receives for the natural gas sold to Turkey. The two countries remain in protracted negotiations over the issue.

The Turks are not without fears of their own. They fear increased ties between Russia and Azerbaijan, which include a recently signed major energy agreement providing or the sale of Azeri gas to Russia. Turkey needs Azeri gas in order to complete its plans for the Nabucco pipeline, and the more gas sold to Russia means the less gas for Turkey. Even worse would be a pipelines connecting Azeri gas to Russian supply routes, which Azerbaijan has used well to help terrify Turkey into submission. Russia has not proved instrumental to the peace process to the extent that it has done little to quell these fears, signing the energy accord in the heat of Turkey-Azerbaijan tensions.

All of this has led Turkey to look for the fastest exit route. Having introduced the Protcols to Parliament, Erdogan has declared his part done. Though Turkey stated at Zurich it could not guarantee ratification, the new conditions make it virtually impossible. Also important to note, Erdogan's ruling AKP controls a majority that could easily pave the way for ratification should the government be so

Fighting Over History

At the same time, Turkey and Armenia have very different visions of what a historical commission would look like: the Turks see it as an opportunity to open up discussion on the killing and insert more context into a debate of historical events that for many Armenians is shortly and simply understood as a state-planned campaign to exterminate them; meanwhile, the Armenians envision the commission as discussing relations post-1915. Concerns that discussion in such a commission would compromise the Armenian government's campaign for international recognition of the 1915 killings as genocide -- and, just as importantly, that of the Armenian diaspora -- have led to massive nationalist opposition in Armenia -- in which President Sargsyan's ruling party is less well-positioned than his Turkish counterpart. The nationalist opposition to the protocols has been tremendous, and drawn protests from the diaspora cross the world, most significantly in the United States.

Also disputed is the Turkish-Armenian border, premised on the 1921 Treaty of Kars. Armenian nationalists do not accept and bitterly resent the treaty, which was signed under pressure from the Russian government; the Armenian government, for its part, has never explicitly recognized the border.

Decision Time in Armenia

Turkey's exit strategy came on Jan. 13 when Armenia's Constitutional Court heard a challenge to the constitutionality of the protocols. While the Court affirmed them as legal, it seemed to place two important conditions on their implementation. The first of these involved the historical commission, which the Court ruled must not contradict Armenia's Declaration of Independence, which states that Armenia remain committed to its international genocide recognition campaign. The second involves a part of the Court's opinion that declares relations between the two countries must remain solely bilateral and not involve a third party. This would rule out Turkey's post-agreement demand that Nagorno-Karabakh be made part of the process.

Turkish nationalist opposition turned the court decision into political fodder. Soon after the Constitutional Court decision, the Turkish Ministry issued a statement declaring the conditions it establishes unacceptable. Perhaps more damaging is the Foreign Ministry's declaration of its sincerity as opposed to that of Armenia, Erdogan declaring that Turkey did not put the Protocols before its Constitutional Court. However, Erdogan clearly ignored that the Armenian government in power was not responsible for the constitutional challenge. Turkey, on the other hand, had said the protocols would not be conditional on Nagorno-Karabakh.

As of now, the future of the protocols appear dead in the water. Turkish experts have talked about trying to get Russia to pressure the Armenians, but as the International Crisis Group's Sabine Frazier lays out, the ball seems in Turkey's court. Should Armenia play its cards right, it could still pass the Protocols regardless of the conditions placed on them by its Constitutional Court. Since no specifics on the historical commission were ever determined and Nagorno-Karabakh intentionally not addressed, it will be hard for Turkey to cry foul, instead looking like the recalcitrant one at the end of the day. Such an appearance would make Turkey the diplomatic loser of a peace process some international observers could well say Turkish leaders were never serious about to begin with. Given that Turkey's problems with Azerbaijan are significant, and not unforeseeable, the real question seems to be why the Turkish government even initiated the process.

For a wonderful analysis of the issues at the heart of the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, including the benefits for both countries, see the Balkans Project's excellent October interview with Nigar Goksel. Goksel also had an excellent interview with the Armenian Reporter in June where she elucidates conflict resoluton efforts at the societal level. For a more comprehensive history of the conflcit as it stood before the August and October agreements, see also the International Crisis Group's April 2009 briefing of Turkey-Armenia relations. And, not to overwhelm with links, but for a commentary by a Turk who is supportive of the process, but critical of Erdogan's charges of Armenian insincerity, see Milliyet columnist Semih Idiz's recent column.


UPDATE I (1/27) -- Responding to the Armenian Constitutional Court's decision, U.S Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon averred that the Court's decision does not place conditions on the Protocols as asserted by Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In a clarification of Gordon's remarks, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley echoed Gordon's remarks, confirming they were on the record and that the United States views the Court's decision as an advancement of Armenia's ratification of the Protocols, which will now be submitted to the Armenian Parliament for a vote.

Facebook's Kurdish Opening

From Bianet:

The social networking site Facebook can now also be accessed by using the Kurdish language. After a campaign initiated by users of the website, the site administrators added Kurdish to list of available languages. Only a part of the application can be used in Kurdish as a start. The range of applications accessible by Kurdish can only be expanded if there is sufficient demand by the users.

An estimated 3,000,000 Kurdish people out of a total of 17,000,000 people in Turkey use Facebook on a daily basis. Under the section of "applications" on the main page of the site the user has the option to choose between 108 different languages including Kurdish.